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ABSTRACT

Remade in Hong Kong
How Hong Kong People Use Hong Kong Disneyland

by

CHOI Wing Yee Kimburley

Doctor of Philosophy

Recent studies of globalization provide contrasting views of the cultural and
sociopolitical effects of such major corporations as Disney as they invest
transnationally and circulate their offerings around the world. While some scholars
emphasize the ubiquity of Disney’s products and its promotion of consumerism on
a global scale, accompanied by cultural homogenization, faltering democracy, and
diminishing state sovereignty, others highlight signs of contestation and resistance,
questioning the various state-capitalist alliances presumed to hold in the encounter
between a global company, a local state, and the people.
The settlement process and the cultural import of Hong Kong Disneyland in Hong
Kong complicate these studies because of the evolving post-colonial situation that
Disney encounters in Hong Kong. While Disney specializes in “imagineering”
dreams, Hong Kong itself is messily imagining what “Hong Kong” is and should be,
and how it should deal with others, including transnational companies and
Mainlanders. In this thesis, I appropriate Doreen Massey’s ideas of space-time in
order to examine Hong Kong Disneyland not as a self-enclosed park but as itself a
multiplicity of spaces where dynamic social relations intersect in the wider context
of post-colonial Hong Kong. I illuminate the shifting relationship between Disney,
Mainlanders, and the locals as this relationship develops in its discursive,
institutional, and everyday-life aspects. Through interviews and ethnographic
research, I study how my respondents have established and interpreted the
meanings of Hong Kong Disneyland, and how they have made use of the park to
support their own constructions of place, of politics, and of identity.
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Chapter One
HKDL: A Construction Site for Place, Identity, and Politics

On 3 November 1999, many Hong Kong newspapers featured in their headlines the
success of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) government in
signing up contracts with the Walt Disney Company in the establishment of Hong
Kong Disneyland (HKDL).1 To celebrate the joint-venture, the popular press used
headlines like that of Apple Daily, which read “Millennium Dream Comes True!.”2
This millennium dream was not only about Hong Kong’s having one more theme
park, “Hong Kong Disneyland,” but also about Hong Kong’s following in the
footsteps of other global cities like Tokyo and Paris, which have imported the
mega-brand Disneyland from the United States. On 12 September 2005, Hong
Kong Disneyland officially opened on the reclaimed land of Penny’s Bay in Lantau,
an outlying island in Hong Kong. Unexpectedly, however, Hong Kong Disneyland
drew negative portrayals from local media through their circulation of the
uncomplimentary views of visitors and workers. By reporting the Chinese New
Year chaos3 that occurred on February 2006 and that resulted from HKDL’s
ticketing system, local media replaced the “millennium dream” with the “Hong
Kong shame”4 to describe HKDL. HKDL’s attendance rocketed shortly after the
park’s establishment, but its first year attendance figures fell short of its target of
5.6 million.5
What events and themes have contributed to the drastic changes of meaning
that have characterized “Disneyland” in Hong Kong? Are words like “millennium
dream” and “Hong Kong shame” adequate in describing Hong Kong people’s
views of HKDL? Who made the dream? Whom does the dream work for? What are
1

the sociopolitical effects of this particular dream? How should we reconsider this
particular local dream under the globalization process?
Recent globalization studies provide contrasting views of the cultural and
sociopolitical effects of global corporations such as Disney as they invest
transnationally and circulate their offerings around the world. In the case of Disney,
some scholars emphasize the ubiquity of Disney’s products and its promotion of
consumerism on a global scale, along with cultural homogenization,6 declining
citizenship rights and faltering democracy,7 and diminishing state sovereignty.8
However, other scholars highlight signs of contestation9 and resistance,10
questioning the absolute alliance that is presumed to hold between the state and
capitalists11 in the encounter between a global corporation, a local state, and the
people.
Because of different local sociopolitical and cultural situations, scholars
need to study how globalization processes manifest themselves in different local
contexts. The settlement of Disneyland in Hong Kong has become an important
source that scholars can use to examine globalization processes and cultural
transformation, with the focus on the interaction between, on the one hand, a USbased company with a global operating span and, on the other hand, local actors
including the government, media practitioners, and local people as workers or
consumers. In the case of HKDL, it was the HKSAR government that invited
Disney to build HKDL, and in 1999, the HKSAR government and the Walt Disney
Company forged an alliance that promotes a particular “world city” dream12 for
Hong Kong people to imagine. In the early period of the park’s operation, however,
the HKSAR government characterized certain requests made by the park as
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“unacceptable”13 and “requested” the park “to make improvements.”14 How should
we evaluate state sovereignty in this situation?
Before the transnational joint-venture was forged between the HKSAR
government and the Walt Disney Company in 1999, Hong Kong people recognized
Mickey Mouse, knew Disney as a famous entertainment brand with its international
presence, and consumed merchandise featuring Mickey Mouse and related movies.
How should we examine Hong Kong culture and identity in relation to Hong Kong
people’s consumption of Disney offerings? Have Hong Kong people changed their
consumption activities since the park arrived? Since September 2005, the
relationship between Disney and Hong Kong people has been more than a
relationship between an entertainment provider and consumers—it has centered on
a big business organization’s provision of job opportunities to Hong Kong workers.
With HKDL’s emphasis on professional service quality and standards,15 have local
workers at HKDL been transformed into apt Disney workers? Facing certain
Disney management practices, how do media practitioners react to the circulation
of the Disney image?
The study of Hong Kong Disneyland is particularly challenging because
other Disney studies generally emphasize the problem of conceptualizing localglobal relations, and the term “local” in these studies is usually construed as
synonymous in the first instance with the “national.” However, Hong Kong is not a
nation-state but a city, and Hong Kong’s city status was undergoing enormous
change during the very period of the establishment of HKDL: as HKDL took shape,
Hong Kong people themselves were experiencing—and continue to experience—
the transformation of their own civic status from that of being British colonial
subjects to one of becoming Chinese subjects. Having been a colonial city for more
3

than one hundred and fifty years, Hong Kong became China’s “Special
Administrative Region” starting on 1 July 1997. Scholars argue that, since the
1960s, rapid urbanization, industrialization, increased education opportunity, the
development of local popular culture, changing local immigration laws, and the
implementation of the Beijing government’s closed-door policy have helped
develop the local consciousness of the Heung Gong Yan (Hong Kong People)16.
And it is in this unstable context that HKDL has become a site expressing and
constituting not only the power dynamics of the local Disney project but also the
“Hong Kong people”-“Mainlanders” relationship. Although Hong Kong people
may see themselves as ethnic Chinese, many see themselves as different from or
even superior to mainland Chinese and see Hong Kong city as different from or,
again, superior to cities in China, culturally, economically, and politically. Gordon
Mathews terms such local consciousness as “Chineseness plus,”17 which
encompasses themes ranging from cultural taste, wealth, and rule of law to
democratization.
The Handover brought changes to Hong Kong society both internally and to
its relationship with China, and in this regard, Mathews’ “Chineseness plus” may
benefit from a reformulation. According to Alvin So, because of the Handover, the
Hong Kong colonial government started to launch limited democratization in the
1980s, but the emergence of the “strong Beijing-businesspeople-London alliance”18
in the late 1980s resulted in the endorsement of Basic Law in 1990 and hampered
Hong Kong’s democratization process. Despite political reforms undertaken by the
last governor, Chris Patten, who reinterpreted Basic Law in the 1990s after the
1989 Tiananmen Square incident, the pro-Beijing provisional Legislative Council
replaced the existing elected Legislative Council on 1 July 1997 and the HKSAR
4

Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa was indirectly elected by a 400-member Selection
Committee. Hong Kong, since the Handover, seems to be a dependent polity
controlled by Beijing authorities. Culturally and economically, the HKSAR
government has faced challenging tasks in re-imagining, reformulating, and reimaging Hong Kong as a city-state and a “special administrative region” of China.
On the one hand the HKSAR government acting as a dependent “special
administrative region” instead of an autonomous city-state government, knew well
that Hong Kong should experience decolonization and the re-nationalization
process after China’s resumption of Hong Kong sovereignty. On the other hand, the
strong local consciousness in Hong Kong suggests that any coercive attempt to
renationalize Hong Kong people would be undesirable, especially when the
HKSAR government would like to enhance its own political legitimacy and to
position Hong Kong as a city that has its own particularities notably different from
other Chinese cities; indeed, such a position might attract foreign investment, which
countries and cities throughout Asia sought after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997
and which was a possible remedy to local economic stagnation and to increasing
competition from other Chinese cities after the Handover. To differentiate Hong
Kong from other Chinese cities, the HKSAR government networked with Western
symbols, such as Disney, to demonstrate its “international” semblance without
endangering Beijing authorities’ endorsement of the model of “restricted
democracy,”19 which has characterized Hong Kong’s democratization since 1997.
The economic rise of Chinese cities and the potential tourist impact of
increasing numbers of affluent and worldly Mainlanders prompted the government
to lure Disneyland to HK. In this way, the HKSAR government hoped to confront
and to overcome competition from major Chinese cities such as Shanghai, and also
5

in this way, the government no doubted hoped to help legitimate its regime. As for
Hong Kong people, many were forming at this time (as my research in subsequent
chapters will show) a desire to become more “cosmopolitan” and, thereby, to retain
their self-perceived competitiveness. HKDL, therefore, is not only significant as an
economic revitalization project, or as an occasion to debate issues of cultural
Americanization, but rather requires us to ask how different Hong Kong people
have used HKDL to develop their personal sense of identity.
While Disney specializes in imagineering20 dreams, Hong Kong itself is
messily imagining what “Hong Kong” is and should be and how the Hong Kong
people should deal with others, including global companies and Mainlanders. The
HKDL project was announced in November 1999, around two years after Hong
Kong’s Handover in July 1997. The project has been one of the biggest investments
of the HKSAR government in the first post-Handover decade. As a small-sized and
self-enclosed park, HKDL creates many opportunities in which Hong Kong people
can experience intimate encounters with other Hong Kong people and with tourists
from other places around the world, including the Mainland. The park has become a
place for constituting multiple social relationships, and these encounters sometimes
reinforce beliefs and sometimes encourage Hong Kong people to reflect upon or
even to change their concepts of the self and of the other, including their concepts
of Mainlanders. As a site that links up the Disney Company with the city of Hong
Kong, HKDL brings up issues of city identity and of Hong Kong people’s cultural
identity in relation to those global companies whose presence is rendered so
desirable by the inter-urban competition driving the globalization processes. For
example (as I will show in a chapter Six and Seven), Disney’s corporate practice in
the local environment was perceived as “Americanism” by some Hong Kong media
6

figures, and the dynamic relationship between HKDL management and local media
encouraged Hong Kong people to rethink their relationship with the “Western”
corporate other as represented by the Disney Company.
Certainly, these identity questions are not merely cultural: they stem from
and can have sociopolitical effects on existing social structure and local governance.
Our perception of the self and of the other affects both how we treat people of
different cultures and what we want our city to become. How should the Hong
Kong people open themselves so that they embrace different cultures? Should the
Hong Kong people open themselves to all kinds of cultures, including corporate
global culture, which might diminish state sovereignty and citizenship, or should
they dare to say “no” to certain cultures? What kind of city do the Hong Kong
people want their city to become? Do Hong Kong people want Hong Kong to be a
city for affluent residents and tourists instead of for various populations if the city
continues to develop as a tourism-based one? What kind of city is the HKSAR
government promoting and constructing? Do Hong Kong people have enough
institutional access to monitor the government’s urban planning? If part of the
effect of globalization is to challenge citizenship, what particular kinds of
domestication should local actors (including the government, media practitioners,
and ordinary people) adopt to face global companies such as Disney?
The study of HKDL as a case provides me an opportunity to analyze Hong
Kong’s changing worldly situation after Handover. As a case study, my study is
specific to place (the intersecting Hong Kong-Mainland and local-global spatial
relationships) and time (the post-Handover Hong Kong facing globalization and
regional competition). Certainly, this case study is particular in the sense that I
studied particular individuals (HKDL workers, middle class parent consumers,
7

media practitioners) and groups (Disney Hunter and HKDL Cast Member Union);
these views are limited in the sense that the opinions and acts expressed by these
particular individuals cannot be generalized as a study of the whole population of
Hong Kong society. However, it does not mean that my HKDL study does not
involve some sense of generality. Unlike many cultural studies research whose
focus is on a particular group of marginal people or government policy making,
many of my respondents are common people. By forging links between Hong
Kong’s dreams and Hong Kong’s disappointment with HKDL, I argue that the
rigorous study of Hong Kong people’s views and uses of HKDL provides a
substantial ground for understanding the identity formation of Hong Kong as the
latter encounters the sociopolitical effects of a transnational private company-public
government joint-venture in the post-colonial context of Hong Kong. At the same
time, theoretically the study of HKDL as a global corporate import to the local soil
gives me chance to refine theories concerning cultural globalization: as we shall see,
there is no necessary correlation between globalization forces (such as Disney’s
global economic and cultural power) and homogenization of local culture, between
localization and political empowerment, and between cosmopolitanism and the
development of pluralistic culture.
To examine the same globalization story in three aspects (the discursive, the
institutional, and the everyday aspects), in the following section I appropriate
Doreen Massey’s concepts of space-time and of the connection (and the
disconnection) of social networks in the formation of city identity. Using these
concepts, I study how Hong Kong people use their connection with Disney, through
the HKDL joint-venture, to reconstitute Hong Kong’s city image, politics, and
cultural identities.
8

Space-time, place, identity, and HKDL
Doreen Massey’s distinctive concept of space-time introduces a cultural perspective
into the idea of space, which is traditionally seen as a passive and apolitical “setting
for objects and their interaction”21 in a timeless context. Rather than conceptualize
spatial relations as social relations taking a particular geographical form, Massey
conceptualizes space and social relations as mutually constructed. And if space and
the spatial configurations of social relations produce social effects, space and the
spatial are implicated in the production of history (p. 254); space, therefore, cannot
be seen as the realm of stasis. In Massey’s words, “Space is not static, nor time
spaceless…neither [spatiality or temporality] can be conceptualized as the absence
of the other” (p. 264). Because space is conceived in terms of social relations, and
because social relations are dynamic and multiple, and because individuals hold not
only different positions but consequently different experiences and interpretations
of spatial social relations, space does not imply fixity or stasis but “a simultaneous
multiplicity of spaces” in the “lived world” (p. 3). That is, space should be
conceived in relation to social relations, power, symbols, and representations.
Massey’s concept of space-time challenges the dualistic concept that frames
time as becoming and space as being. Massey’s concept challenges, as well, the
dualism that frames place as the local and “everywhere” as the global—a
distinction that pits the concrete against the abstract, the particular against the
universal. In “A Global Sense of Place,” she argues that the idea of place
problematizes the distinction between global and local because the specificity of a
place lies neither within the place’s identifiable borders nor within the place’s
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proper history. In truth, a place is a site where wider cultures meet, networks take
root, and social relationships evolve:

What gives a place its specificity is not some long internalized history but
the fact that it is constructed out of a particular constellation of social
relations, meeting and weaving together at a particular locus. If one moves
in from the satellite towards the globe, holding all those networks of social
relations and movements and communications in one’s head, then each
“place” can be seen as a particular, unique, point of their intersection. It is,
indeed, a meeting place. (p. 154)

If a place is not constructed by an internally produced and essential past, the place’s
identity is not singular, fixed, and unproblematic. If places are “open and porous
networks of social relations” (p. 121), places not only develop mixtures through
history but also bring differences together in space. It follows that places
constructed out of “juxtaposition, the intersection, the articulation, of multiple
social relations” are of course internally contradictory and contested, and that while
places are necessarily shared, there will simultaneously be clashes between various
and competing interests over what the area is, and what it ought to become (p. 137).
To extract advantages from a set of social relations, the particular claimant groups
lay claim to some particular position in time-space (whether through the
establishment of heritage centers and the promotion of nationalism), so that the
groups can establish an identity of a place, although “the past was not more static
than is the present” (p. 169):

When black-robed patriarchs organize ceremonies to celebrate a true
national identity they are laying claim to the freezing of that identity at a
particular moment and in a particular form—a moment and a form where
they had a power which they can thereby justify themselves in retaking. All
of which means, of course, that the identity of any place, including that
place called home, is in one sense for ever open to contestation. (p. 169)
10

Besides challenging the static identity of a place, Massey challenges the necessity
of an essentialist connection between place and cultural identities, and the idea that
place alone is the source of a stable and coherent identity. If a place does not
contain an “internally produced, essential past” (p. 170), the contested identity of
place cannot be the source of a single, stable, and coherent identity; the geography
of social relations enables individuals to recognize their interconnectedness and
contested personal and cultural identities. Situated in different locations in relation
to the overall complexity of social relations, various social groups read those
relations differently and these different social relations also make the personal and
cultural identity of these social groups distinct (p. 121). In other words, although
identities may be constructed out of place, class, gender, and race, identities cannot
be aligned with a place only (p. 137), because localities are about “the intersection
of social activities and social relations and, crucially, activities and relations which
are necessarily, by definition, dynamic, changing” (p. 136).
Massey’s concept of space-time, her concept of place as a meeting site for
wider cultures, her assertion that conflicts over what a place is and should be are
inevitable, and her argument that personal identity and cultural identity are multiple
and dynamic help me examine HKDL as not a self-enclosed park in Lantau but a
multiplicity of spaces with dynamic social relations in the wider context of postcolonial Hong Kong. To examine these complex social relations and multiple
spaces, I used interviews and ethnographic research. In this way, I studied, in
particular, how my respondents establish and interpret the meanings of Hong Kong
Disneyland and how they make use of the park to reconstitute their own
“constructions of place, of politics, and of identity”22 in Keith and Pile’s words.
These local views and constructions of both the city identity of Hong Kong and the
11

cultural identity of the Hong Kong people are neither stable nor unified but multiple
and contested. Individuals, whether they are media practitioners, HKDL workers, or
HKDL consumers, have different positions in their relationship with HKDL and use
their own positions diversely. Indeed, their views on the same project are internally
divergent. As we shall see, the connection between Disney culture and HKDL
networks has transformed social relations, cultural identities, and self-other
relations.
I examine the sometimes dominant, sometimes negotiated relationships
among Disney, “Mainlanders,” and the locals as these relationships develop in
discursive, institutional, and everyday life aspects. In the discursive aspect, Hong
Kong people were—long before the establishment of HKDL—well familiar with
the Mouse, the Disney brand, and its offerings. The success of the joint-venture
with public endorsement starts from the appealing representation of Disney. The
HKSAR government allied itself with Disney and has made use of Disney’s famous
brand name and huge symbolic value not only to revitalize Hong Kong’s economy
but also to sell the Hong Kong people the “world city” dream. The import of HKDL
also functions to extend Hong Kong’s existing symbolic connections to both “the
East” (so that Mainland Chinese can consume the spectacular Western Disney park)
and “the West” (so that business will increase its investment in Hong Kong). Some
Hong Kong people found the HKDL project attractive insofar as they could use
Disney as a cultural marker to distinguish Hong Kong from other Chinese cities or
to distinguish themselves from Mainlanders; some other Hong Kong people use
Disney as a way to achieve their cosmopolitan dream, to acquire cosmopolitan
sensitivity and cultural capital. However, these uses do not imply that Hong Kong
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people wholly embrace all Disney offerings, as I suggest when pointing out middle
class parents’ selective consumption of Disney merchandise.
In the institutional aspect, I discuss the problems and conflicts between the
HKSAR government and the Disney alliance. Although transnational companies
propagate their assertion that they glocalize their offerings for local uses, certain
major company management philosophies and practices seem difficult to either
glocalize or, for that matter, localize. These practices might also raise conflicts
between the state and the company and between the company and the local actors.
In the everyday life aspect, I examine how HKDL workers perform in
response to the Disney manual and to the HKDL work environment and how their
interaction with visitors, both locals and Mainlanders, affects their existing
conceptualization of the Hong Kong people and of Mainlanders. I also discuss
grass-roots populations’ organized resistance against both the Disney Company and
HKDL. In this regard, I further examine how local consumption has localized,
negotiated, and remade the meaning of the contextless Disney theme park, “the
happiest place in the world.”
Before delving into chapter details and research methodology, I would like
to mobilize Massey’s concepts of space-time, of place as a meeting site for
networks and wider cultures, and of dynamic identity to reread local studies on the
emergence, in the 1960s, of the ambiguous Hong Kong identity, Heung Gong Yan.
It is important that we first develop a rigorous understanding of the emergence of
local identities in the colonial period if we hope to understand, with similar rigor,
the cultural significance of HKDL inside Hong Kong society in the post-colonial
period, a topic that I discuss in later chapters.
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“Heung Gong Yan”: ambiguous local consciousness, changing space-time
Hong Kong is geographically and historically linked to Mainland China, but in the
1970s, Hong Kong’s colonial governance and modernization process, together with
China’s closed-door policy, fostered the emergence of a sense of a Hong Kong
identity. This identity, different from identities applicable to people in China, was
labeled Heung Gong Yan (Hong Kong People) and arose out of economic
development and colonial policy targeting housing, education, immigration, and
media. In considering Hong Kong’s cultural distinctiveness in relation to space, we
should not consider the identity difference to be a natural consequence of the
separation of Hong Kong from the Mainland. These have not been “‘naturally’
discontinuous spaces” in Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson’s words but rather result
from a “division of space” that stems from government’s efforts:

Representations of space in the social sciences are remarkably dependent on
images of break, rupture, and disjunction. The distinctiveness of societies,
nations, and cultures is predicated on a seemingly unproblematic division of
space, on the fact that they occupy “naturally” discontinuous spaces. The
premise of discontinuity forms the starting point from which to theorize
contact, conflict, and contradiction between cultures and societies…. Space
itself becomes a kind of neutral grid on which cultural difference, historical
memory, and societal organization is inscribed…. This assumed
isomorphism of space, place, and culture results in some significant
problems.23

Rather than treat cultural differences as a natural and unproblematic consequence of
geographically discontinuous space, Gupta and Ferguson argue that in the
production of imagined place-based communities, colonial states have significantly
affected the “division of space”: “Colonialism…represents the displacement of one
form of interconnection by another.”24 This point is accurate, but colonial
governance also actively represents the discontinuous space as a matter of “natural”
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cultural differences and emphasizes a naturalized link between place, people, and
culture.
We may partially apply Gupta and Ferguson’s argument on colonialgovernance displacement to the case of Hong Kong. Between 1843 and 1997, Hong
Kong was a British colony. It was not the colonial government’s initial idea to
disconnect Hong Kong from China spatially or culturally. Because the British used
Hong Kong as an entrêpot to open the China market and to extract economic
benefits therefrom, the colonial government ruled the people in Hong Kong on the
basis of Chinese law and Chinese customs.25 Between 1946 and 1949, however, the
Mainland experienced civil war between the Communist Party of China (CCP) and
the Kuomintang (KMT). To prevent Hong Kong’s devolution into another
battlefield that would harm British traders’ businesses,26 the colonial government
restricted human flows between Hong Kong and China. In 1949, the year in which
the CCP set up the People’s Republic of China, the colonial government issued
identity cards and set up population controls and, in response to these actions, the
Beijing government adopted its closed-door policy. After 1951, Chinese living in
Hong Kong and Macau had to apply for a “China Entry Permit”27 to enter the
Mainland, and their activities in the Mainland were under inspection. Zheng and
Wong28 argue that the Mainland’s entry system and inspections made it difficult for
Hong Kong people to conceive of China as a “homeland,” for they were treated as
“foreigners” there.
Meanwhile, Hong Kong’s restriction of human flows from the Mainland
was tightening through the years.29 In April 1974, Hong Kong’s immigration
control measures fell in line with the so-called “Reached Base Policy,”30 meaning
that only those Mainland people who had been received by Hong Kong relatives or
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friends at the China-Hong Kong border could stay in Hong Kong. Although the
Beijing government headed by Deng Xiaoping set up, in 1976, a China Re-entry
Visa system31 to loosen control over Hong Kong people’s return to the Mainland,
the colonial government implemented full immigration controls in October 1980.
People from the Mainland crossing the Hong Kong border became illegal
immigrants and faced immediate repatriation in the Mainland.
To disconnect Hong Kong’s cultural and political networks from China’s,
the colonial government set up new laws. In October 1948, the colonial government
set up a Public Ordinance to restrict activities that were associated with the spread
of communist ideas and of nationalism in Hong Kong. In the same year, the
government re-amended the “Education (Clause 2) Amendment Ordinance,”32
through which the Governor and the Executive Council could close a school or sack
a teacher in the public interest; in February 1949, one school supporting
Communism was closed.33 According to Wong Wang Chi, particular chapters in
Chinese history such as the Opium War of 1839-1842 and the Boxer Uprising
(1899-1901) were de-emphasized34 because the former highlighted the role of the
British in selling opium and the latter raised public’s nationalist sentiments.
In 1953, the “Report of the Chinese Studies Committee” issued by the
Education Department created the concept of “modern Chinese” for Hong Kong
people.35 As modern Chinese, Hong Kong students must know both Chinese and
Western thoughts and languages. Noticing that the successive governments of
China had been trying since 192736 to popularize Putonghua as Kuoyu, the
“national language,” the colonial government started its seven-year primary-school
expansion program in October 195437 and specified Cantonese38 as the medium of
instruction and English as a second language. As for secondary education, the
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Anglo-Chinese grammar schools used English as a medium of instruction and
Chinese was taught as a second language, while the instruction of Chinese middle
schools was in Chinese and English was taught as a second language. The medium
of educational instruction starting from the 1950s constructed the cultural
differences between people in Hong Kong and those in the Mainland, for the former
population’s cultural and language connection was with the “West.”39 The above
immigration and education policies can be seen as separatist in nature because they
limited human flows between the Mainland and Hong Kong and because they
developed Hong Kong people’s cultural identity as “modern” Chinese, in contrast
to “traditional” Chinese identity.
As shown in the education reforms, colonial governance also created the
Hong Kong identity in temporal terms. Because the Hong Kong population was
dominated by ethnic Chinese, the colonial government shaped the identity of the
Hong Kong people on the grounds of neither China-based cultural traditions nor an
extended historical lineage but a distinctive way of life in the present.40 Such a
perception of identity was developed through education media, collective
experiences on specific social crisis (in particular, the 1966-67 riots) and related
social issues,41 and the rise of an urbanized way of life.
The official station Radio Hong Kong,42 for example, produced popular TV
programs such as Family in Hong Kong and Below the Lion Rock43 from 1972
onwards to be aired on commercial TV stations; these programs portrayed Hong
Kong common people’s everyday life in concrete social situations. As the two titles
suggest, the two programs encouraged a largely immigrant audience to treat Hong
Kong as home. In the early 1970s, Below the Lion Rock was a series of five-minute
to fifteen-minute “slots” featuring a family’s everyday life practices through which
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the program commented on various social problems in housing, public transport,
education, and the like. From 1976, Lion Rock turned into a half-hour program
depicting life stories of different social strata.44 These programs played a role in the
popular politics of place making by inviting Hong Kong people to deal with
existing problems and not by promoting nostalgia over China’s past.
The concept of mor dun (modern) was grounded in present-day ways of life
and not in traditions and extended historical lineage. The colonial government
promoted mor dun through “school textbooks and trade promotions, public
information campaigns and tourist publicity.”45 It articulated mor dun on the basis
of contested local daily practices. On the whole, mor dun constituted the Hong
Kong people’s first distinctive sense of Hong Kong identity, and this process took
place in the late 1960s. The concept of “modern” can be interpreted in many
ways,46 two of which (in their Hong Kong usage) are particularly pertinent here.
First, “modern” stands for identity based on work, that industrialization and
economic hardship gave rise to “working daughters”47 who went out to work
diligently for family survival even though they had completed only their primary
school education. In this regard, to promote exports, the government agencies also
portrayed female secretaries as smart, diligent, and efficient, and this image became
working class women’s imaginary for social advancement.48
Second, the concept mor dun suggests styles that appealed to youths and
that were reflected in consumption and fashion patterns in the 1960s. For example,
working hard to earn money, working daughters became not only breadwinners of
the family but also consumers in the market. Evidence of this trend was observable
in the annual Chinese Manufacturers’ Exhibition of Hong Kong Products.49 One of
Hong Kong’s largest festivals, it was held for several weeks before Christmas
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during the 1960s. With songs and dance, fashion shows, opera, and beauty pageants,
the trade show promoted collective consumption as entertainment for the diligent
working populations. Young working populations, different from their seniors,
were concerned about fashion and mor dun and consumed these modern images
through movies, TV, stars’ appearances, government promotion, among other
media venues. Hong Kong youths have chased related images and identities since
the late 1960s.
However, the separatist and disconnected cultural and immigration policies
and the definition of cultural identity based on present-day and modern ways of life,
instead of on traditions, was in connection and contestation with human and
cultural flows from the Mainland to Hong Kong and with Hong Kong people’s
everyday practice of Chinese customs. In Massey’s words, the lived world of a
simultaneous multiplicity of spaces implies “cross-cutting, intersecting, aligning
with one another, or existing in relations of paradox or antagonism.”50 The
emergence of working daughters in the late 1960s and the 1970s, for example,
should not be seen as the mere product of industrialism; rather, it should be seen as
the articulation between the market regime of increasing demands of workers
during industrialization and the traditional Chinese family regime in neglecting
daughters’ wishes (to stay in school to study, in this case) and pressing them to
“sacrifice” for family.51 During the same period, a modern domestic ideal
developed in the West emphasizing nuclear patterns and suggesting home-based
careers (namely, homemaking) as the ideal female role, and this ideal also started to
emerge in Hong Kong, but the ideal of a full-time wife, as argued by Ng Chun
Hung,52 was unrealizable in the hostile economic climate of 1970s Hong Kong. As
Lui Tai Lok argues, although ambiguous local consciousness emerged in Hong
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Kong starting from the mid 1960s, it was not until the 1970s—with changing
family structure, the rise of living standards, the dominance of localized popular
culture, the intensification of urbanized consumption- and entertainment-based
ways of living, and changing government-public relations53—that a quasiautonomous local consciousness formed in Hong Kong.54 Underneath the concept
of Heung Gong Yan was an ostensible clash of contesting cultural elements from
contradictory daily lived experiences, and the resulting ambiguous local
consciousness marked the ostensible difference between the Hong Kong people and
Mainland Chinese.
The Hong Kong people’s inability to articulate a coherent identity for
themselves intensified from the mid-1980s onwards. Economically and politically,
Hong Kong people realized the impossibility of the existence of an autonomous
Hong Kong identity. With China’s economic reforms, with the increase of Hong
Kong-China trade, and with the British-Chinese 1984 decision55 to hand over Hong
Kong’s sovereignty to China in 1997,56 Hong Kong’s spatial connection with China
has seemed to intensify rather than diminish. It is not surprising then to see that,
from August 1997 onwards, successive university surveys on Hong Kong people’s
cultural identity identify four types of cultural identity in which Hong Kong people
describe their ambiguous cultural identity—the Hong Kong citizen, the Chinese
Hong Kong citizen, the Hong Kong Chinese citizen, and the Chinese citizen.57
These four types of identity illustrate the tensions that afflict Hong Kong identity,
which is the site of an often painful balancing act between ethnicity-based identity,
tradition-based identity, culture-based identity, and geography-based identity.

Post-colonial HK identity: re-nationalization and cultural distinctions
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Since the Handover, and as the implementation of the HKSAR government’s renationalization project has proceeded,58 more and more Hong Kong people have
ethnically or nationally identified themselves as Chinese. The 1997 survey
conducted by the University of Hong Kong indicates that almost 60% of
respondents considered themselves to be Heung Gong Yan in a broad sense59 and
that 38% considered themselves to be Chinese in a broad sense.60 Another survey
conducted by the same institution in 2004, however, showed a 10% decrease in the
number of Hong Kong people considering themselves to be Heung Gong Yan61 and
a 14% increase in the number considering themselves to be Chinese.62
The political Handover, the increase of Hong Kong-China networks, and the
implementation of the re-nationalization project have prompted more Hong Kong
people to identify themselves as Chinese instead of as Heung Gong Yan, but this
trend does not mean that Hong Kong people believe that they are the same
“Chinese” as the Mainland Chinese. The Hok Yau Club’s 2004 survey of 4,595
secondary school students’ cultural identity63 showed that although there was a
percentage increase in respondents who were identifying themselves as Chinese, the
respondents considered the characteristics of Hong Kong people to be more
positive than the characteristics of Mainland Chinese. Hong Kong people were
rated as open-minded, courteous, and knowledgeable64; Chinese were seen as
traditional and self-centered.65 In terms of politics, more than 90% of the
respondents stated that Hong Kong people were pursuing democracy, liberty,
equality, and a system of fairness; whereas less than half of the respondents stated
that the Chinese were pursuing these civic values.66 The appendix of the survey
divided respondents into two groups: students who were born in the Mainland and
students who were born in Hong Kong67: the former’s rating of the characteristics
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of Chinese was more positive than the latter’s rating of those characteristics. In
other words, positive ratings of the characteristics of Chinese are even lower if we
consider only the responses of Hong Kong-born students. In sum, although more
and more Hong Kong young people identify themselves as Chinese since the
Handover, these same young people believe that (1) the personalities of Hong Kong
people are better than the personalities of Mainlanders, (2) Hong Kong people are
more modern than (less traditional than) Mainlanders, (3) Hong Kong people are
more open-minded to foreign culture (and thus more knowledgeable) than
Mainlanders, (4) and Hong Kong people are more civilized in both a cultural sense
and a political sense than Mainlanders. Since the Handover, two frameworks have
pervaded the minds of Hong Kong’s youth: the colonial spatial definition of Hong
Kong identity, based on foreign—especially Western—cultural connections, and
the temporal definition of Heung Gong Yan, based on modernity and not on
tradition.
Gordon Mathews argues that “Chineseness plus”68 is the discourse that
many Hong Kong people deploy in recognizing sameness and difference in relation
to the Other, the Mainland Chinese. In general, Hong Kong people are affirmed as
representing “Chineseness plus internationalness” (p. 144) or “Chineseness plus
Westernness” (p. 144). In terms of politics, Hong Kong people are “Chineseness
plus freedom/democracy/human rights/the rule of law” (p. 150); in terms of culture,
Hong Kong people are “Chineseness plus aesthetic freedom/cosmopolitan
taste/manners/knowledge” (pp. 145-9); and in terms of economics, Hong Kong
people are “Chineseness plus wealth” (p. 159). These “plus” elements are largely
elements acquired from spatial and cultural connections with the capitalist Western
bloc.
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Certainly, “Chineseness plus” is only an aspect of Hong Kong local
consciousness. Although, in this thesis, I borrow from Mathews’ concept of
“Chineseness plus” in order to understand Hong Kong people’s cultural prejudice
against Mainlanders, I do not mean to claim that Hong Kong local consciousness
rests only on “Chineseness.” In my perspective, Hong Kong people’s local
consciousness derives chiefly from a sense of “Hong Kongism,” not from
“Chineseness.” As I have suggested, the spatial and temporal disconnection of
Hong Kong from China in colonial times helped Hong Kong people define Hong
Kong identity in their own terms (in particular through modernity and connection
with the West). In fact, Hong Kong people may exercise “Chineseness plus”
consciousness when they are actively considering themselves to be “Chinese,” but
they would also like to distinguish themselves from “Chineseness.” There are still
many Hong Kong people who think of themselves as Heung Gong Yan instead of as
Chinese. In the 2004 University of Hong Kong survey, 49% of respondents still
considered themselves to be Heung Gong Yan in a broad sense.69 When expressing
and legitimizing supremacist thoughts, Hong Kong people also interpret
“Chineseness” as Other to themselves. Politically, economically, and even
culturally, “Chineseness” is not the most prominent cultural bearing among Hong
Kong people: Hong Kong’s experience of almost thirty years of “prosperity and
stability” between 1967 and 1997 stands in stark contrast to the Mainland’s political
and social turbulence; Hong Kong’s self-proclaimed “non-interventionist” capitalist
economy is the opposite of the Beijing government’s interventionist socialist
economy; Hong Kong people may practice Chinese customs, but Hong Kong
people’s enjoyment of a relatively high degree of freedom of speech is hard to
attain on the Mainland.
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As Chan Koon Chung argues, Hong Kong people’s local consciousness is,
to a large extent, based on Hong Kong people’s experiences in Hong Kong,
particularly on Hong Kong’s rapid economic development after the late 1960s.
Because the Hong Kong government has had a relatively efficient system, rule by
law, and public housing, and because Hong Kong made an early entry into the
world economy by functioning as an entrepôt and as an exporter, the Hong Kong
economy developed rapidly, and Hong Kong people came to believe themselves to
be brilliant, flexible, efficient, and business savvy.70 I would prefer to call this
identity “Hong Kong supremacist,” one which proudly allows that these
characteristics surfaced under a colonial governance that turned Hong Kong from a
fishing port into an international financial center. “Chineseness plus” consciousness
can be seen as one type of “Hong Kong supremacist” consciousness, but Hong
Kong identity is not chiefly based on “Chineseness,” as Mathews’ concept of
“Chineseness plus” implies.
As Hong Kong fell back under Mainland China’s sovereignty in 1997, and
as Hong Kong people experienced economic doldrums between 1997 and 2003,
Hong Kong people started to question the superior aspect of “Hong Kong” identity.
Hong Kong people’s status as British colonial subjects disappeared forever with the
1997 Handover, which effectively ended the people’s “Chineseness plus.” In terms
of politics, Hong Kong as a quasi-city state has no say in defense or foreign affairs;
the Hong Kong people’s legal pursuit of democracy and universal suffrage must
receive Beijing authorities’ approval, and the Beijing authorities have sovereign
power over the common law courts of Hong Kong.71 In terms of economics, it is
true that Hong Kong’s economy has recovered, at least somewhat, from the Asian
financial crisis of 1997-1998, the dot-com collapse of 2000, the September 11
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attacks of 2001, and the spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) of
2003; nevertheless, the Mainland’s economy is the fastest growing region in Asia.72
Indeed, Hong Kong’s economic rebound, after all these traumatic events, received
most of its support from the Beijing government’s policies.73
There can be little doubt, then, that the development of Hong Kong’s
economic future depends significantly on the development of strong economic
relations between Hong Kong and Mainland China. And as I mention above, in
terms of culture, many Hong Kong young people characterize Hong Kong people
as open-minded, courteous, and knowledgeable and characterize Chinese people as
traditional and self-centered; however, we should bear in mind that Hong Kong
people who frequently work on the Mainland or who live in a Mainland cabin or
retreat during weekends may have a more complicated picture of Mainlanders.
Between 2001 and 2003, Eric Ma conducted an ethnographic study in Dongguan,
Shenzhen, and Guangzhou. Ma argues that, on the basis of their class, Mainlanders
differ among one another in their view of Hong Kong culture: working class
Mainlanders embrace the popular culture of Hong Kong and that of Taiwan,
whereas the Mainland’s cultural elites and the Mainland’s rising middle class take
great pride in traditional Chinese culture and have considerable disdain for Hong
Kong culture.74 Inside a private housing estate, it is always the Mainlanders who
occupy the most luxurious house at the center of the estate, and Hong Kong people
may know that they “may not be superior to these Mainland Chinese in fashion,
style of speech, and consumption acts.”75 The fragile and ambiguous differentiation
marker that Hong Kong people may still maintain rests perhaps on the Hong Kong
people’s hybrid culture, which derives from Hong Kong’s long-term connection
with Western culture. As James Watson argues:
25

Hong Kong in the late 1990s constitutes one of the world’s most
heterogeneous cultural environments. Younger people, in particular, are
fully conversant in transnational idioms, which include language, music,
sports, clothing, satellite television, cybercommunications, global travel,
and…cuisine. It is no longer possible to distinguish what is local from what
is not. In Hong Kong … the transnational is the local.76

Starting in the 1960s, Hong Kong people’s hybrid consumption activities
have influenced not only their cultural taste but also local production. Many of
Hong Kong’s productions of television programs, movies, and songs reflect not
merely local sources but also popular genres that prevail elsewhere and that the
Hong Kong people have appropriated. Stephen Teo argues, for example, that
“Contemporary Hong Kong cinema is a hybrid, a child of the two major streams,
the Mandarin and Cantonese cinemas of the 50s, as well as Western influences.”77
Hong Kong action movies in the 1960s were already a display of different martial
arts and opera traditions, and increasingly borrowed from Hollywood78; Jackie
Chan’s changing onscreen persona is often a play between Chinese nationalistic
culture that borrows heavily from martial arts traditions and a revisionist version of
kungfu comedies that draws on urban pragmatic and cynical values; as Steve Fore
argues, Jackie Chan’s early screen persona was “a balancing act between dual
manifestations of tradition and modernity in Hong Kong.”79 As for popular songs,
Cantonese songs are a hybrid of different elements.80 In Cantonese opera, for
example, both Chinese instruments and Western instruments accompany the
music,81 and the way of playing these Western instruments is “Cantonized.”82 In
terms of stylized manufactures, Hong Kong people obtain, re-make, and
merchandize the manufactures that originate from global consumer culture. These
remade products attract Mainland Chinese to Hong Kong for shopping excursions.
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In 2004, 12.24 million Mainland Chinese visited Hong Kong, where they spent
HK$23 million dollars on shopping, and this constituted 68% of their total
expenditure in Hong Kong.83 Mainlanders come to Hong Kong and buy Hong Kong
goods because of Hong Kong products’ hybrid nature, and Hong Kong’s hybrid
culture comes from adapting cultural goods not only from West but also from other
Asian cultures, particularly the Japanese.
Scholars find that Hong Kong youth identify especially with Japanese
popular culture. Watching television in the late 1960s and the 1970s was the most
popular entertainment activity for the Hong Kong public,84 and Japanese TV
programs such as Visour Sign (1970),85 Sugata Sanshiro (1970),86 G Men ’75
(1975),87 and Oretachi no Tabi (1976)88 were popular with Hong Kong viewers.89
Nowadays, Hong Kong people, especially youth, consume Japanese publications,
comics, movies, video games, fashion, cultural icons, models, popular music, online Japanese content, and non-cultural offerings such as electronic appliances, as
well as Japanese television programming. Wilkins90 conducted a content analysis of
the Cantonese spoken Jade channel of the Television Broadcasts Limited (TVB)
that airs in Hong Kong. Wilkins found that, in 1993, of all the programs the Jade
channel aired, 80% were its own production; 11% were imported from Japan; 5%
from Western sources; and 4% from other Asian sources. In 2001, Delwiche
conducted a qualitative study of twenty-four respondents who were between the
ages of sixteen and twenty-three, and Delwiche found that “nearly every respondent
expressed strong affection for some aspect of Japanese culture.”91 Delwiche argued
that owing to the similarities between Hong Kong people’s body types and
Japanese body types, between Hong Kong’s family structure and Japanese family
structure, and between Hong Kong’s academic system and Japan’s academic
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system, his respondents “were far more oriented toward the fashions and aspirations
of Japanese teens than toward the fashions and aspirations of young people
anywhere else in the world” (p. 88). Comparing Japanese teenagers with Hong
Kong youth Delwiche’s respondents suggested that “Hong Kong people [are]
always trailing one step behind” (p. 82). In research conducted by Jenifer Tam on
Hong Kong youth’s consumption of cuteness-themed Japanese products and
Japanese fashion magazines, she concludes that her respondents identified Japan
“as a world of consumerist pleasure, cuteness, and youthfulness.”92
Among various Japanese cultural offerings, the kawaii (cute) style is one
popular phenomenon in Hong Kong. The word kawaii stands for affectionate
feelings toward animals and children who are too weak to support themselves, and
as Sharon Kinsella argues, it turns out to be a style celebrating “sweet, adorable,
innocent, pure, simple, genuine, gentle, vulnerable, weak, and inexperienced social
behavior and physical appearances” and has dominated Japanese popular culture
since the 1980s.93 In relating Disney to kawaii, Shunya Yoshimi argues that
Japanese women remake the Disneyfied European folktale: While Disneyfication is
the transformation of a death-rebirth folktale into Disney’s Snow White and the
Seven Dwarfs, a fantasy about a young girl who, surrounded by cute pets, yearns
for a prince, Japanese women’s kawaii culture “produced a discourse to colonize
strangers” through cutification—to take in things kawaii and to deny things that are
not into their “imagined community of fantasy.”94
Based on Yoshimi’s argument, I would further argue that while Japanese
females use kawaii culture in order to place themselves in a warm atmosphere to
shut out everyday problems,95 and to resist adulthood and work,96 Hong Kong
youth use kawaii culture in order to link themselves to others, to maintain peer28

group ties, and to maintain close family ties. According to Jenifer Tam’s study97 of
nineteen Hong Kong youths’ consumption of Japanese cultural offerings, “More
than half of the informants agreed that they came into contact with either Japanese
cute products or fashion magazines from their family members, especially in the
case of cute products, as their parents or siblings bought them cute stuff when they
were little kids.”
Hong Kong people not only domesticate Japanese consumption patterns
relative to cute products but remake cute products, as well. Kinsella argues that the
early prototype of Japanese cute products derives from the cute style in Japanese
manga animation and from young people’s handwriting styles.98 This version of a
cute product “is small, pastel, round, soft, loveable…dreamy, frilly and fluffy.”99
Hong Kong people appropriate the Japanese cute style in remaking Disney
characters and appeal to both local and Mainland customers. This can be shown
through the increase of Hong Kong-designed Disney characters in contrast to the
decrease of Disney Stores in Hong Kong.
Although Disney characters were popular in Hong Kong, Mickey Mouse,
the major icon of “Disney,” is seen as outdated and boring in the eyes of many
Hong Kong children and, in 2003, was listed as the eighth most “not cool” cartoon
character100; even Disney animators agreed that Mickey’s characteristics were
indistinguishable from the characteristics of other cartoon characters.101 Hong
Kong’s first Disney Store opened in 1994, and the number of stores grew to nine in
the following years102 but only three were left by 2004; the only remaining
downtown store closed its doors on 4 September 2005, a week before the official
opening of HKDL. 103 The Hong Kong airport has two Disney stores, which target
tourists instead of locals.104 On the other hand, in 1997, Hong Kong celebrated the
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opening of Trendyland, a local retail shop designing and selling fancy gadgets
decorated with cartoon characters such as Mickey Mouse. By 2006, the number of
Trendyland stores in Hong Kong had grown to fourteen. Every year, Trendyland
designs more than three thousand products, including home appliances,
kitchenware, furniture, stationery, accessories, and plush dolls.105 Trendyland is
also one of the retail stores in Hong Kong designing and modifying Disney
characters’ appearances, which consequently acquire rounded faces, infantile body
shapes (big heads and small bodies), pastel colors, and soft textures. Because of the
popularity of Trendyland’s translated image, these designs influence the products
sold inside HKDL. Like Trendyland, HKDL sells Hong Kong’s cutified Mouse and
Duck. Trendyland thus exerts its influence on Disney in Hong Kong. This influence
extends, as well, to the Mainland. In 2006, Trendyland had eight stores in China in
total, with two stores in Shanghai, and one store apiece in Guangzhou, Chengdu,
Shaoxing, Beijing, Ningbo, and Hainan.

Fig. 1: Trendyland Character Design106

Fig. 2: HKDL Grand Opening Pins
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In that sense, Hong Kong’s cultural offerings are not only hybrids, but also
consumption goods that Hong Kong people remake from versions provided by
Disney and Japanese designers. In addition, these Hong Kong remade goods
exercise cultural influence on the Mainland, although Hong Kong has never
exercised political or military influence there.107 With the establishment of HKDL
under the post-colonial context, how should we understand Hong Kong-Disney and
Hong Kong-Chinese dynamics? How do Hong Kong people use and remake HKDL
for their own sake? What kinds of domestication consequently surface in HKDL?
Theoretically, how should we understand globalization and domestication in
relation to cultural citizenship and democracy? These are the issues to be explored
in the following chapters.

Chapter outline
As discussed in an earlier section of this chapter, I see the site of HKDL as “a
simultaneous multiplicity of spaces,”108 and, therefore, I attempt to illuminate the
HKDL globalization story in three of its different aspects: the discursive, the
institutional, and the everyday. To narrate the HKDL story in relation to globallocal dynamics, I examine in a bottom-up approach how Hong Kong people have
responded to and used the established meanings of Disney both before and after
HKDL settled in Hong Kong, and how Hong Kong people have used HKDL to
develop their own notions of place and identity.
Of course, Disney is a well-known global entertainment brand about which
many Hong Kong people have pre-conceived notions, but we should note that Hong
Kong people do not simply and passively receive these notions. Rather, Hong Kong
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people use and re-use the Disney symbol in their everyday situations. The meaning
of “use” in this thesis is threefold. First, based on the ideas of de Certeau, “use”
concerns consumption. We can use bread by eating it and use paper by writing on it.
The word “use” does not imply that “we have only a secondary relationship to
goods.”109 Rather, “use” implies that the act, itself, changes the state of the
consumed good. For example, when we use vegetables to make soup, we change
those vegetables. Furthermore, just as there are “procedures of ‘consumption’,” so
there are “ways of using.”110 It follows that, second, Hong Kong people both make
use of the existing established cultural meanings of Disney and reappropriate these
meanings in everyday practices to fulfill individuals’ particular goals. As we shall
see, some respondents in my study used Disney merchandise daily as baby-sitting
tools; some appropriated the international “aura” of Disney to achieve their own
aims of being cosmopolitan. Third, the act of making sense is itself a kind of use.
For example, the HKSAR government makes sense of the HKSAR-Disney jointventure as though it were proof of Hong Kong approaching “world city” status
simply by working with a world class entertainment company. As HKDL opened
its doors and presented itself to Hong Kong, the city’s residents may reconstruct
their own meanings of Disney on the basis of established codes and lived
experiences. While HKDL prompts Hong Kong people to complicate their
interpretations of Disney, the meanings of local identities may change, as well.
An important qualification is necessary here. Although I emphasize the
ways in which Hong Kong people “use” Disney and HKDL in the senses defined
above, and although I use a bottom-up approach to examine the globalization
process, I do not argue in this thesis that local actors have all kinds of powers to
tame and control a global corporation. Following de Certeau’s argument, I argue
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that Hong Kong people can pursue their own goals precisely by using the
established images and the established meanings of Disney, that Hong Kong people
can subconsciously or even consciously struggle against the assimilationist effects
of global corporations such as Disney, but that users maintain no specific base of
operations, as Disney does.111 That is, even though users have complicated and
changed the local meanings of Disney since HKDL’s opening, Hong Kong citizens
have had few ways to monitor or to control Disney actions owing chiefly to the
non-transparent contracts signed between the HKSAR government and Disney in
1999, and to Hong Kong’s current business law. With these premisses in mind, we
should examine users’ acts as somewhat “contingent or lateral” manifestations of
“power and resistance”112 in Paula Saukko’s words. In this way, we can promote
successful rigorous examinations of the specific effects of local-global negotiations
in culture.
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. In chapter Two, I will review the
extensive literature on Disney, focusing on those strands of argument which
emphasize, respectively, materialist, symbolic, and everyday-life approaches to the
subject. In particular, I will discuss the views of scholars who stress the social,
political, and cultural influence that Disney corporations have, and the landscape
changes that ensue; the utopian appeal that Disney gains in relation to its media
monopoly, its merchandising ubiquity, and its theme park design as an antidote to
urban problems; and the various meanings and uses that people invoked in relation
to the Disneyland park.
Chapters Three, Four, and Five focus on events that happened before the
opening of HKDL in 2005. As I stated earlier, I consider the HKDL project to be a
site where various social relations intersect. In this regard, I examine the various
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ways in which the HKSAR government and ordinary people used the established
cultural representations of Disney before the park’s opening. In chapter Three, I
argue that far from being a diminishing state under the global economy, the
HKSAR government allied with the Walt Disney Company and constructed a
“world city” dream for Hong Kong people to imagine. On a discursive level, the
“world city” dream not only promises Hong Kong people economic revitalization
and employment, but also functions as an identity marker distinguishing Hong
Kong from other Chinese cities. Certainly, the import of HKDL is for economic
revitalization, but we should not ignore HKDL’s political effects: some Hong Kong
people support the undemocratic and non-transparent HKDL project for a vague
cultural and economic dream.
In chapter Four, I shift my focus to how respondents’ views on the
established global Disney affect their various views and uses of the HKDL project.
Drawing on my arguments in chapter Three, I further challenge the assumption that
culture is economized under a neo-liberal economy. Many of my respondents
embrace the HKDL project but do not see it as an economic project. Rather, they
see Disney as a famous global brand that helps Hong Kong prove its cosmopolitan
city status and distinguishes Hong Kong from China. The cultural distinctions that
reflect “Chineseness plus” and “Hong Kong supremacy” that derive from the
colonial period are evident in the statements of some respondents. At the same time,
some other respondents, in particular the university graduates, voiced a bigger and
yet more individualized dream—the dream of becoming cosmopolitans. They used
Disney as a global corporation to achieve their own cosmopolitan dream. In some
cases, lived experiences of working in Orlando sometimes changed respondents’
established views on self and others.
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The dream of being cosmopolitan is characteristic of middle class parents,
as well as of university graduates. In chapter Five, I carefully study several parents’
selective uses of Disney offerings, the Disney English learning and other
educational kits, and argue against the alleged necessary connection between the
use of Disney merchandise and the acceptance of certain Disney values. These
parents appropriate Disney merchandise for their own uses: locally, parents attempt
to solidify their own children’s middle class status; seeing that Hong Kong workers
need to be highly competitive in the increasingly regionalized and even globalized
economy, parents train themselves and their children to be an apt international
workforce.
Chapters Six and Seven feature stories about respondents’ experiences of
both HKDL’s opening and HKDL’s post-opening operations. These two chapters
deal with multiple spaces of HKDL, namely the social relations (1) between Disney
management and the HKSAR government, (2) between Disney public relations
officers and local media practitioners, (3) between HKDL workers and HKDL
management, (4) between HKDL workers and visitors, and (5) among visitors.
These various social relations and competing social spaces construct and reshape
the local-global and Hong Kong-Mainland dynamics.
In chapter Six, I focus on the institutional and everyday aspect. I argue that
Hong Kong imports not only Disney’s theme park technology and service
philosophy but Disney’s management practices, as well. However, these
supposedly glocalized Disneyland management practices sometimes were in
conflict with local expectations. Conflicts then arose between Disney’s public
affairs officers and Hong Kong reporters and between Disney management and the
HKSAR government, in particular when HKDL securities, by maintaining Disney
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magic, challenged health inspectors to “dress down” to enter the park. Currently,
institutional constraints significantly limit legislators’ power to monitor the park,
although it receives significant investments from the HKSAR government.
Focusing on the institutional aspect themselves, media practitioners resignify the
meaning of ‘Disney’ as “Americanism” and circulate the new meaning through
media, thereby reshaping the global-local relationship.
In chapter Seven, I further examine how people’s everyday dialogue about
the park and how visitors and workers’ actual behavior inside the park have injected
local flavor into the established meaning of Disneyland. Disappointed with certain
Disney-management acts, workers “localized” their services rather than join labor
unions; and facing various critical comments circulated in the media, local
consumers disrupted Disneyland’s routine without boycotting the site. Furthermore,
Hong Kong visitors used HKDL as a stage on which they gave body to their
discriminatory attitudes toward Mainlanders; in contrast, some HKDL workers
changed their pre-conceived notions of “Hong Kong people” and of “Mainlanders”
after having everyday encounters with Mainlanders.
In short, the globalization story in the case of HKDL is not simply about
global homogenization of local culture or about diminishing state sovereignty or,
for that matter, about locals who wield and exercise all kinds of power to control a
global company. The globalization process is a long winding road, with unforeseen
local uptakes, appropriation, and resistance in relation to globalized corporate
offerings, and these local acts result in shifting local-global dynamics and
contestations in various spaces of social relations. In the concluding chapter, I
connect my empirical studies of usage with Hong Kong culture and identify the
important roles that local laws and citizenship rights play in local communities’
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efforts to deal with a transnational company’s management practices. Then, I raise
the issue of cultural citizenship to discuss Hong Kong culture’s effects on the
development of a democracy-based culture of openness and inclusiveness.

Research methodology
Following Massey’s idea that social groups’ locations in social relations differ from
one group to the next, and that social groups’ reading of these relations differ from
one group to the next, I argue that localities’ uses of HKDL in relation to Disney
differ from one locality to the next. To understand these various “spaces of
interactions,” as Massey puts it,113 I adopt a multi-sited research methodology to
study how respondents with different socio-cultural positions use the park and
construct their own notions of place, identity, and politics under post-colonial
governance, whether that governance derives from local administration or business
concerns. Except in chapter Three, where I undertake textual criticism of how the
HKSAR government has mobilized various discourses in promoting the HKDL
project, I use methods based on ethnographic research and attempt to tease out the
lived experiences and the complicated and sometimes changing meanings of Disney
among my study’s thirty-nine respondents.
Among them, there were ten HKDL workers (one of whom was a seasonal
part-timer); two Hong Kong-based Disney production workers; seventeen
consumers (three as individual consumers, eight as parents who consume Disney
offerings in a family setting, and six as children); four media practitioners (two
journalists, one daily-news program director, one music video producer); two
Disney merchandise licensees; one kindergarten principal; one labor union worker;
and two social-movement activists.114 In addition, I conducted two focus-group
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interviews with ten kindergarten students aged four to five. I engaged in numerous
casual talks with HKDL visitors, my neighbors, and students on the topic of Disney
and HKDL. Basically, I used semi-structured interviews115 to start my research with
my respondents and followed some interviews with field study and participant
observation (discussed below) recorded in the form of field notes. To protect
confidentiality, I use pseudonyms in the thesis. To study various Disneyland parks
in the world, I visited all Disney parks without financial support from the Walt
Disney Company.
As Paula Saukko argues, research is always political.116 It asks us, in
Haraway’s words, to be aware of “what kinds of realities and beings we are creating,
out of whom, and for whom.”117 To understand how individuals view and make use
of Disney merchandise and the HKDL project, chapters Four and Five focus on
individuals’ lived experiences, individuals’ behavior contributing to their lived
world, and individuals’ interpretation of their lived world. Following Saukko,118 I
connect these lived experiences to the larger social, economic, and political
environment not by first researching their lived worlds and by then contrasting
them with “real” structures or politics as envisioned by my own political agenda,
but by practicing “dialogic research strategies” to escape from ventriloquism.119
Believing that respondents are always aware, to different degrees, of the discourses
in which they are embedded, I questioned respondents in order to render explicit
their ideas and acts. Following Eric Arnould’s advice,120 I then practiced participant
observation to observe and to identify respondents’ behavior in resonance or in
conflict with their own ideas. Then I tracked the respondents by conducting followup interviews and fieldwork that took the form of casual encounters (such as
babysitting and casual talks through phone calls, e-mails, and home visits). I have
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tried not to interpret respondents’ thoughts without discussing my interpretations
with them. Shared interpretations turn into dialogues, during which complicated
and contradictory selves often reveal themselves. Through conversations, I
acknowledge people’s concrete concerns and experiences and also uncover my own
political agenda. That is, as a Hong Kong person, I am concerned about Hong
Kong’s democratization, including the development of accountable and transparent
governance, citizen-based participatory government, and a place-based culture that
both treasures its own values and ways of life and that develops openness toward
other cultures besides that of global consumerism. As a cultural studies student, I
use dialogic research method to put my belief in pluralistic culture and participatory
democracy into research practice. I attempt to do justice to the researched,
including their perspectives and their lived experiences, and I try not to homogenize
respondents’ views and acts but examine them from different angles. Hopefully, by
employing dialogic and self-reflexive ethnography, the people being studied, as
well as the readers, gain access to my motivations and concerns.
Dialogic research method requires that, between the researcher and the
researched, there exist long-time contact, strong trust, and openness. The goal,
therein, is to have the two parties recognize each other’s complicated and
contradictory thoughts. For example, when I practiced dialogic research in my
study of five middle class families (see chapter Five), I tried to study parents’
approaches to the process of parenting, particularly in relation to family
consumption of Disney products (including movies, merchandise, and theme parks).
Therefore, during 2002 and 2006, I conducted an ethnographic study on these five
families by undertaking at least three rounds of semi-structured interviews, home
visits, babysitting of their children, and casual talks through phone and e-mails. I
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knew three of the five families before I began this research. Because of this
knowledge and because of the long-term nature of the contact, I was able to find
that parents’ house-rules and parenting methods have significant effects over
children’s consumption behavior, and I also found that these middle class parents’
particular ways of using Disney offerings can be traced back to their childhood
memory of watching Disney movies and using Disney merchandise, their life
history of climbing up the social ladder through education, and their way of
associating career difficulties with a “lack” of world exposure.
With the Disney or HKDL staff respondents, I conducted semi-structured
interviews with two Disney production and ten HKDL employees, five of whom
had been cultural representatives of HKDL and had worked in Orlando Disney
parks for six months. Among the twelve Disney staff respondents, four of them
engaged in more than three individual interviews with me. Because I knew only one
HKDL staff respondent in 2004 (I became acquainted with all the others in 2006), I
conducted many of the interviews comparatively late in the research process. And
because Disney prohibits HKDL employees from talking about HKDL to
researchers and journalists, I found it quite difficult to develop trust between me
and the staff respondents. They worried that, by sharing information with me, they
would reveal their identities to their employers. To lessen their worry, I promised
them before the interviews that no local newspaper (whether in Chinese or in
English) would publish any interview information; to protect confidentiality, I not
only use pseudonyms in the thesis (as I mentioned earlier) but also blend different
voices into one story and break one voice into several stories.
I encountered other methodology problems. In the course of my research, I
found, for example, that my attempt to apply dialogic research method to my
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interactions with Disney-staff respondents was more difficult than my attempt to do
so with the parents. First, with two exceptions, I had no personal relationship with
my staff respondents prior to the start of the research project. I became acquainted
with the latter through friends or through other Disney staff respondents. To lessen
any tension during the interview process, I would sometimes invite my friends to
join the interview. Second, the duration of our relationships was rather short, a fact
that made it difficult to develop a solid and trusting relationship. Third, because I
did not know these respondents personally and invited them to be my interviewees
through their friends, some respondents accepted my invitation on the basis chiefly
of their friends’ request. Knowing that they should not disclose HKDL information
to outsiders, some of the respondents declined to be interviewed on more than one
occasion, and one respondent preferred to do the interview through phone. Without
a long-term relationship, dialogic research method becomes impossible to execute
insofar as the methods emphasize the importance of self-reflexive conversation.
The last type of difficulty that I encountered while conducting my
ethnographic study on HKDL employees concerned their high turnover rate.
Among the ten HKDL staff-respondents, four of them quit their HKDL job within
the first year, one with a permanent position was planning to quit the job, one
planned not to renew his contract, and one worked only as a seasonal part-time
worker. Only three had worked inside the company for more than a year. Both the
short duration of their HKDL work experiences and the short duration of our
contact have imposed difficulties on my efforts to tease out the workers’
complicated and maybe changing thoughts toward HKDL. As a result, although I
practiced dialogic research method toward my four Disney staff respondents, I
believe that one case partially failed. From this experience, I concluded that I
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should learn to execute dialogic research method in a more cautious way, and
therefore note some details here.
In 2004, I met my first HKDL staff respondent, Olivia, who signed a
contract to become an HKDL cultural representative in Orlando’s Walt Disney
World for six months and to return to HKDL to work for another six months. She
agreed to be one of my respondents and, through several interviews, to tell me
about her Disneyland work experiences. To help me understand her life in Orlando,
she gave me access to her blog,121 where she frequently wrote about her daily life
and feelings. When she was in Orlando, we communicated with each other by email. After her Orlando trip, we had two long face-to-face chats and many long
phone chats, all of which centered on her work experiences in Orlando and in Hong
Kong. I also phoned her several times to ask her some concrete questions such as
whether or not an ambulance could drive inside HKDL, and on all these occasions,
Olivia was helpful. Olivia had been a social worker, and given her past academic
training at a university and her two years of social-work experience, I thought that
by practicing dialogic ethnography, I could and I should reveal some of my antiDisney values (such as my opposition to Disney’s corporate practices) and discuss
with her how she viewed these anti-Disney values and practices. But I was wrong.
In our third and last interview, Olivia was in my home and I asked her to read a
newspaper article reporting accusations made by Disney Hunter, an anti-Disney
group to which I belonged. In fact, I had mentioned my affiliation herewith to
Olivia. She made no comments on the accusations, and I was unsure whether or not
her silence stemmed from her knowledge that I was a member of the group. I then
told her about scholars’ criticisms of Disney’s control over workers—the scripted
manners, the service with a smile, and other forms of emotional subjugation (indeed,
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she had once mentioned in her blog that her Disney job was not always suitable for
her because it required employees to smile and she sometimes just could not do it).
Immediately responding to my comments, she twice stated, “I think I am always a
good girl. I don’t find it problematic.” Her refusal to engage in discussion reflected
my insensitivity to her reluctance to exchange genuine but different views with me
on this particular topic. After our interview, I recalled that Olivia had once stated in
her blog that she would not say “in public” that Disney was bad in any sense
because to say so would constitute proof, in her mind, that her decision to be a
Disney employee amounted to a mistake. A couple of months later, I phoned her
several times but she did not return my calls. Because I wanted to send her a
Christmas present rather than conduct another interview with her, I asked one of
our common friends to help me send her the present. She then phoned me back, and
we made a date for dinner. On that day, she phoned me and said that, because of
some sudden change of plans, she was not free for dinner. She promised to phone
me back, but I received no reply from her. The present that I intend to send her is
still in my home. Her blog, after her return Hong Kong and after successive
negative entries on HKDL management, carried less and less information about her
work, and one day, she deleted all her past written entries (maybe she put these
written entries in a private section). I am not suggesting that my discussion with her
during our interview caused her to delete this information or to block her friends
from reading her online diary, but this experience has enabled me to sense the
dangers of practicing dialogic research method. Practice of these methods in some
circumstances can block, rather than foster, dialogue.
After this experience, I become more cautious in practicing dialogic
research. I intentionally and repeatedly told my respondents that I would like to
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have a balanced view of my Disney research and that, to this end, I would like to
hear about both their contentment and their discontent regarding HKDL. I did not
hide my own participation in some anti-Disney activities, but I did not tell
respondents about these activities right away. Critical dialogue works better with
some people than with others. Those respondents who were willing to disclose their
different attitudes toward Disney were able to engage me in conversations that
yielded many critical dialogues. Josephine, for example, was the most enthusiastic
HKDL staff member whom I met in the course of my research, and indeed, her
colleagues commented to me on her unusually pronounced enthusiasm for HKDL.
However, at our first meeting, she told me about both her enthusiasm for HKDL
and her disappointment with HKDL. Moreover, she said that she would like to
learn more different perspectives on Disney. We had two long talks in person and
many long phone conversations, during all of which we exchanged views on
various HKDL work and management practices. In our first meeting, Josephine
mentioned that she had bad feelings about the union. After several talks, I told her
over the phone that I had met the HKDL labor-union representative and that,
according to this source, the labor union’s activities went beyond the activities
reported in the news media. Then, rather than again voice her own distrust of the
union, she started to pepper me with questions about the union. Her way of
responding to my comments got me to thinking about the effects that activists’
characteristic mentalities may have on people’s involvement in social movements.
For example, activists often paint a picture of the opposition that is neither vague
nor ambiguous; in this way, the activists have a clear-cut object that they can resist.
This tendency to discount vagueness and ambiguity may hinder people’s
involvement in social movement, an issue that I will discuss in chapter Seven.
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Throughout the research process, I learned that one core difficulty in
practicing the dialogic research method actually follows from the way in which it
asks the researcher to encourage informants to express, using their own voice, their
own worldviews. In this way, the researcher should try to understand the informants
through their eyes. Yet on the other hand, the dialogic research method asks the
researcher to tease out multi-layered and sometimes contradictory meaning-making
processes that pertain to the researched, to talk to the respondents about the findings,
and to ask respondents to make their embedded discourse explicit. The method asks
not only that the researched genuinely express their views but also that both the
researched and the researcher have the courage to be self-reflexive. In short, only
through on-going dialogue, mutual trust, and openness to differences can we create
critical and self-reflexive ethnography.
Other respondents in my research are local media practitioners (including
journalists, a daily news producer, and a music-video producer), consumers
(including Disney fans, Disneyland fans, and a kindergarten principal) and Disney
merchandise licensees. I conducted semi-structured interviews with these
respondents by asking them about their HKDL experiences, their views on the park,
and their consumption practices inside the park. I also interviewed two members of
the anti-Disney group Disney Hunter to identify both the reasons for their decision
to join the group and their evaluations of the campaign. Because I am myself a
group member of Disney Hunter, I used participant observation to strengthen my
discussion about Disney Hunter’s influence on Hong Kong people’s views of
Disney. I used participant observation, as well, to study visitors’ consumption
practices inside HKDL.
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Although I attempt to identify many diverse meanings and many diverse
uses attributable to Disney in Hong Kong, my research findings are far from
exhaustive. In its treatment of HKDL as a workplace, my study fails to collect
information from high-ranking employees who would have a comprehensive
understanding of the HKDL management policy. In reviewing HKDL publicrelations policy and HKDL media-relations policy, the study lacks views and
responses from HKDL from high-ranking or policy-specific staff members, whose
insights would have made my study more pluralistic. I sent out a formal call-forinterviews letter to the media-relations department of HKDL but received no reply.
Two journalists helped me ask an HKDL public-relations officer in person to accept
my request for an interview, but she refused it. To counteract the unbalanced points
of views from reporters or freelance producers, I interviewed three HKDL
employees who were working in customer services and who were familiar with
certain HKDL practices touching on both public affairs and media relations. I hope
that these interviews remedied the aforementioned deficiency to a certain extent.
In this thesis, I emphasize multi-sited, polyvocal research because it can
help express the multifaceted realities of Disney. This emphasis can help
researchers, participants, and readers alike go beyond our common conception of
Disney as “just family entertainment” and situate Disney in a complicated
framework of local-global dynamics, local governance, landscape changes, cultural
identity and distinctions, and consumer politics. By interacting across these sociocultural and political themes, we can better recognize that a participatory civic
society is necessary condition for the development of participatory democracy. In
the following chapter, I will review literature on Disney in relation to these issues.
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Chapter Two
Disney Power, Cultural Globalization, and Local Contexts

In 1928, Disney began as a small frail animated-cartoon studio that distributed
Mickey Mouse shorts. In the eighty years since then, Disney has become one of the
most popular brands in the world.1 As a giant global company, the Walt Disney
Company divides itself into four major business segments: studio entertainment
(theatrical films, home video, television, theatrical productions), parks and resorts
(Disneyland parks, Disney Vacation Club resorts, Disney Cruise Line), media
networks (television channels including ABC television, Touchstone television,
cable television including ESPN and the Disney Channel), and consumer products
(children’s and teenagers’ fashion and apparel, toys, home décor, educational kits,
food and beverages, electronics, fine art and collectibles).2 With internet and direct
marketing, Disney’s net income soared (in US dollars) from 0.5 million dollars in
1952, to 3.4 million in 1959, 11 million in 1965, 26.7 million in 1971, 93.2 million
in 1983, 173.5 million in 1985, 703.3 million in 1987, 824 million in 1990,3 1,267
million in 2003, and 2,533 million in 2005.4
Well aware of Disney’s popularity and power, scholars of different
disciplines including architecture, art, anthropology, business, cultural studies,
political economy, and urban planning pay close attention to the Disney enterprise.5
Drawing on Disney animated cartoons, scholars from the academic left explicate
“Disney ideology,”6 analyses of which result in books entitled From Mouse to
Mermaid: The Politics of Film, Gender, and Culture, edited by Elizabeth Bell,
Lynda Haas, and Laura Sells, and The Mouse that Roared: Disney and the End of
Innocence by Henry Giroux.7 Starting in the 1990s, Disney expanded its market
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from a chiefly Anglo-American setup to a global one by representing cultural others
in Aladdin (1992), Pocahontas (1995), and Mulan (1998). In view of this shift,
while some scholars such as Lee Artz8 argue that Disney’s change demonstrates
only that Disney recognizes the enormous potential for profit in the multicultural
market, not that Disney has a multicultural agenda; other scholars such as Janet
Palmer9 argue that the changing Disney representations reflect pressures that
Disney has faced from social movements.
Disneyland, as is the case with Disney animation, cannot escape from
scholars’ scrutiny regarding Disney’s influences on global cultural landscapes.
Stacey Warren refers to Disneyland as “theoryland”10 because scholars always
study Disneyland in relation to their theoretical concerns: for example, Real’s use
of gratification theory to study respondents’ views of a Disney park in 1977,11
Eco’s semiotic study of Anaheim Disneyland in relation to social control in 1986,12
Baudrillard’s postmodernist study of Anaheim Disneyland and Los Angeles as
simulacra in 1988,13 Zukin’s cultural geographic analysis of the correlation between
Disney parks and landscapes of power in 1991,14 and Fjellman’s ethnographic and
contextual study of Orlando’s Walt Disney World in relation to contemporary
American society in 1992.15 Scholars argue that the attractiveness, the ugliness, or
simply the character of a specific Disney park that they study are themes that, if
properly understood, can help us understand a city such as Los Angeles or a
contemporary civilization like that of the United States.
Because of Disney’s long-developed global reach,16 scholars outside the
United States also examine cultural Americanization in relation to Disney offerings.
Within the context of an affirmative Third World, Ariel Dorfman and Armand
Mattelart published Para leer al Pato Donald in Chile in 1971.17 This was the first
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book critically examining Disney comics as American cultural products that,
transplanted to peripheral countries, disguise cultural power as entertainment to
promote American cultural imperialism. In 1975, the book appeared in the United
States as How to Read Donald Duck with a new subtitle, “Imperialist Ideology in
the Disney Comic.”
In 2000, twenty five years after the publication of How to Read Donald
Duck, scholars gathered at an international conference and discussed “how
extensively and intensively Disney products are marketed, and also how local
audiences interpret these products” in eighteen countries.18 In 2001, the book
Dazzled by Disney was published. Wasko and Meehan, in the concluding chapter of
the book, warn that consumers’ early contact with Disney offerings, and
consumers’ subsequent association of Disney with childhood innocence, nostalgia,
and family gatherings, make it difficult for audiences to question the assumptions
behind the consumers’ Disney-related cultural experiences. In terms of cultural
globalization, Wasko and Meehan also argue that children’s early contact with
Disney may lead to cultural hegemony instead of cultural hybridity19; “Disney’s
pervasiveness and symbolic ubiquity” result in the near impossibility that nations
can “maintain identities adjacent to the identities provided in global commercial
media.”20
Given Disney’s increasing influence and the increasing importance of
globalization studies in the 1990s, scholars vow to study Disney insofar as it is the
“greatest media empire” around the globe and an “entertainment empire”21 second
to none. Given its global ubiquity and the extension of company projects from
movies to theme parks to urban planning,22 scholars such as Richard Foglesong,23
Andrew Ross,24 Jane Kuenz,25 John van Maanen,26 Henry Giroux,27 and others28
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unveil Disney’s undemocratic and non-transparent private governance over public
domains, its application of controlling mechanisms to theme-park workers, and its
promotion of consumerism. These scholars also warn readers that Disney’s profitdriven, non-transparent corporate practices and largely conservative offerings
devour democracy, social justice, and civil society. Scholars such as Michael
Sorkin, Chris Rojek, Andrew Ross, Stacey Warren, and Alan Bryman have
presented different terms for these practices: “Disneyzone,”29 “Disneyfication,”30
and “Disneyization,”31 to point out Disney’s near-universality and its overwhelming
influence over cultural and social landscapes. These terms do not merely point to
Disney’s influence over its own projects but also suggest the devastating influence
that Disney’s principles have on urban planning. Indeed, to achieve business
success, other developers and companies emulate Disney-inspired business
strategies and practices. In other words, our lived but fantasy world is going to be
increasingly Disneyized and Disneyfied without Disney’s direct involvement.
To rethink the above problems raised by scholars in relation to Disney, I
must say that some speculative worries raised by scholars have already become
hard and fast reality. However, scholars disagree with one another as to the reasons
that underlie governments’ and the public’s support of a Disneyized landscape, and
scholars disagree with one another as to the conclusions that are to be drawn from
these findings: some scholars are chiefly pessimistic, seeing Disneyized landscapes
as an inevitable postmodern phenomenon, whereas other scholars emphasize the
negotiations and the resistance that greet Disneyized landscapes. I categorize these
different Disney literatures into three types: the materialist, the symbolic, and the
everyday. The materialist approach focuses on economic structuring and the
development of a consumerist landscape; the symbolic approach emphasizes
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Disney’s media-based and corporate-based cultural power to address and to shape
the public’s dreams; the everyday approach highlights various spaces where various
local actors—namely government officials, journalists, home-owners,
environmentalists, and consumers—differ from one another in their application of
local politics and local culture to remaking or to resisting a Disneyfied landscape.
Because of their different approaches, the three literatures identify different
implications and draw different conclusions regarding the relationships among
transnational capitalism, local governance, identity politics, democratization, and
civil-society development. One point to note is that although I discuss these three
approaches in the order of materialist, symbolic, and everyday, I do not mean that
these three approaches, in their manifest reality, surface one after the next; indeed,
the approaches are not entirely distinct from one another. For example, overlap has
occurred between the materialist approach and the symbolic approach insofar as
some materialist scholars (such as Hannigan) who address the effects of a
Disneyfied landscape do so on the basis of Sharon Zukin’s idea of “landscape of
power,” which I categorize as a symbolic approach. Readers of this study, therefore,
will note similarities between the materialist and the symbolic, especially in relation
to Disney effects.

The macro-materialist dimension: political economy and Disneyization
In identifying the relationship between large-scale social changes and postmodern
consumer society, scholars interested in political economy use a macro and
materialist approach to examine Disney’s effects on societies. According to these
scholars, contemporary urban redevelopment, because of government retrenchment
and deregulation, aims to re-energize a city center through public-private
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partnerships that draw the affluent middle class consumers back to the city center.
Urban renewal, then, is synonymous with the construction of not only office towers
but also convention centers, professional sports complexes, museums, and urban
theme parks—all to accommodate the post-industrial service economy. With the
great economic success of Disney theme parks, urban-development projects have
turned to Disney-inspired principles to redevelop space.
John Hannigan32 argues that this form of public-private partnership began to
emerge in the 1970s with the renovation of Faneuil Hall Marketplace in Boston: at
the partnership’s core was the premise that shopping and dining were the engines
driving the commercial regeneration of downtown areas. Famously able to attract
crowds to Disney parks by selling spectacular leisure experiences, the Walt Disney
Company set up the Disney Development Company in 1984 and began
incorporating theme-park experiences into urban entertainment centers. Major
multinational entertainment companies also followed Disney’s move and
established development teams to evaluate, plan, and initiate urban entertainment
destinations in joint business with public redevelopment agencies (pp. 125-6).33
Because many government officials and public agencies believe that entertainment
destinations have almost magical powers to create employment and to raise
government revenues, many municipalities provide entertainment companies with
infrastructure upgrades, tax benefits, and regulatory relief.
Hannigan argues that the shift from an industrial economy to a postindustrial economy led to the rise of public-private partnerships and to urban
entertainment districts. In making this argument, Hannigan shifts his own focus
from America to the Asia-Pacific region, stating that “the leading edge of the
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American themed commercial culture coming ashore in Asia” (p. 179) is due to the
region’s expanding economy and the rise of the region’s middle class:

To a considerable extent, the Asia-Pacific region in the 1990s can be
compared to that of the affluent years of America in the 1950s. In both
instances, you have an expanding economy, an increase in leisure time and a
ballooning middle class with rising discretionary income…. With rising
incomes, the new middle class is primed to spend…. Many of the
developing leisure products and services are foreign-supplied or inspired. (p.
177)

For Hannigan, the global development of urban entertainment districts has created
social harm instead of social good. To secure profits from these entertainment
destinations, planners incorporate theme-park experiences into renewed urban
spaces, such as shopertainment, eatertainment, and edutainment enclaves. These
fantasy cities sell themes and technology, branded merchandise and spectacles. This
development reinforces pre-existing consumer tastes and diminishes variety and
choice. Isolated from its neighboring surroundings, the Disney-inspired renewal of
urban space creates a space that is discriminatory for it ignores the reality of
homelessness, unemployment, social injustice, and crime; its high-rent lifestyle
discourages the mixing of different classes and races of people (p. 6).
Voicing similar worries to Hannigan, Alan Bryman coined the term
“Disneyization”34 to describe “the process by which the principles of the Disney
theme parks are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society as
well as the rest of the world” (p.1, author’s emphasis). Bryman declares that
Disneyization as a process is about “the spread of the principles that its theme parks
exemplify” (p. 11). These principles consist of theming (p. 15),35 hybrid
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consumption (p. 57),36 merchandising,37 and emotional labor.38 The goal of these
principles is to increase consumption:

Theming provides the consumer with a narrative that acts as a draw by
providing an experience that lessens the sense of an economic transaction
and increases the likelihood of purchasing merchandise. Hybrid
consumption is meant to give the consumer as many opportunities as
possible to make purchases and therefore to keep them as long as possible in
the theme park, mall, or whatever. Emotional labor is the oil of the whole
process in many ways: in differentiating otherwise identical goods and
services, as an enactment of theming, and as a means for increasing the
inclination to purchase merchandise. (p. 167)

The single aim of increasing consumption, however, leads to large-scale changes
throughout the landscape, the social structure, and the culture (particularly the
working culture and the consumption culture). The success of Disney theme parks
has prompted companies, architects, and governments to follow Disney’s principles
to transform streets, shopping arcades, restaurants, and airports into a vast
“entertainment-consumption” complex. The negative effects of this outcome
include distortion of history and place; destruction of natural habitats; emotional
and physical manipulation of children, consumers, and workers; and creation of
“limited citizens” in that the consumption levels of the poor fall far below the
consumption levels that consumer society deems appropriate and honorable.
Similar to Hannigan, Bryman urges us to treat Disneyization as chiefly a
global spread of a system and of principles, and to avoid prioritizing the worth of
particular commodities such as Disney films, merchandise, and theme parks. He
realizes that Disney theme parks around the globe have made many adaptations to
local contexts and sensibilities, but for Bryman, as a systemscape, Disneyized
“principles [that have] to do with the production and delivery of goods and
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services” still proliferate (p. 165). For example, theming as a principle can rather
easily be imported to local places and adapted to the places’ own local themes, but
theming as a principle remains non-negotiable. As a system, Disneyization
encourages variety and differentiation (p. 168), instead of standardization and
homogenization (p. 167).39
Bryman’s concept of Disneyization is significant because his emphasis on a
system and its four main principles clarifies how Disney practices become a model
that is supremely adaptable to various other parts of the world. However, his
emphasis on system and principles also assumes that these automatically spread
over the globe, that states just adapt the Disneyized system to their gentrification
and tourism projects such as Sydney’s The Rocks (p. 37) and Finland’s Lapland as
“Santa Claus Land” (p. 45), and that local cultures respond to Disneyization by
adapting to it. However, theming, for example, is not necessarily successful, as
Bryman notices in regard to the plight of themed restaurants (p. 53). Bryman states,
also, that “emotional labor has been a particularly prominent site for resistance” (p.
165). In fact, Bryman sees Disneyization as a process wherein “agents of
capitalism” (p. 160) promote consumption that exhibits a “growing interpenetration
of the economic and the cultural” (p. 173), but he provides no explanation as to
why or how these interpenetrations happen except to say that Disneyization has
“affinities” with “a post-Fordist world of variety and consumer choice” (p. 13).
Elsewhere, Bryman humbly admits that he uses Disneyization “to identify largescale changes that are discernible in economy and culture that can be found in, and
are symbolized by, the Disney parks”40; however, it is not correct to treat
Disneyization as a concept that, in and of itself, explains consumerist global
societies’ convergence with characteristics of Disney theme parks.
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Whereas Bryman assumes that Disneyization is a process spreading
throughout “a post-Fordist world” (p. 13, emphasis added), Hannigan assumes that
international capitalism’s free flow of capital accounts for transnational companies’
growing power and states’ diminishing sovereignty. Both analyses have determinist
economic assumptions wherein structural economic change shapes cultural change,
and transnational capitalism affects local governance. Besides, both Hannigan’s and
Bryman’s realist analyses ignore the fact that Disneyized landscapes are produced
by agencies, institutions, and actors that hold various views and interests in their
locales. Rather than focus on a model, a system, or a set of principles, Richard
Foglesong’s realist and political analyses of the Disney-Orlando government
relationship “emphasize the role of human beings rather than abstract forces in …
shaping events.”41 Of chief concern to him is the process that characterizes Disney
power in Orlando. His Married to the Mouse traces the spatial control inside the
Walt Disney World park and then proceeds to examine the long and rocky
relationship between the Walt Disney Company and the Orlando government.
In the early 1960s, because of its economic power, Disney bought 27,500
acres of land in Orange and Osceola counties in Orlando through private land
brokers and without public involvement. Having limited financial resources, the
Florida State Legislature designated Disney’s acres as the “Reedy Creek
Improvement District” in 1967, with Disney promising to fund its own roads,
sewage systems, and fire protection services, and what is most important, to build a
model city that would bring a potential economic boom to the Greater Orlando area.
The designation granted Disney every right to manage its land, including control
over zoning and building codes and power to tax and issue tax-free municipal
bonds, but Disney—unlike other developers—would bear no responsibility for
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addressing off-site impact fees. In other words, the designation made Disney into an
independent local-government unit that would serve its own private interests by
both asking for public funding as a local government would and resisting public
scrutiny as a private company would.42
Foglesong’s telling account of Walt Disney World’s history reveals the
untoward effects that privatization and deregulation can have on local governance.
Whereas Hannigan highlights intercity rivalry that has left little room in which local
political leaders can reject scarce private investment—investment that would create
wages, profits, jobs, and tax revenues—Foglesong argues (against an economicdeterminist model) that Orlando’s dependence on Disney is due more to political,
institutional, and cultural factors than to economic factors. In terms of institutions,
the designation of the Reedy Creek Improvement District led the Florida legislature,
in effect, to let Disney be its own private government, and as a government, Disney
needs to face only its own regulations: in terms of politics, Disney has built an
alliance with Orange County’s pro-growth and pro-business government officials,
and the long-established cooperation makes it difficult for policymakers to act
against Disney; in terms of culture, the popularity of Disney makes it difficult for
dissenters to badmouth Disney and to offer alternative paths for economic
development.
“To put the people back in the story” (p.xii), Foglesong shows how local
officials exercise definite power over the company. The designated Reedy Creek
Improvement District and the many legal exemptions that Disney enjoys are built
on a false premise: a city with citizens instead of a theme park with tourists. For
this reason, Disney made its first concessions in 1989 regarding fees for off-site
impact, concessions that came after three years of government-to-government
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negotiations. In return, Orange County agreed not to challenge the constitutionality
of the Reedy Creek charter for seven years. In early 1989, the Property Appraiser
Bob Day decided to deny Disney’s agricultural classification on their 11,000 vacant
acres in Osceola County. After negotiations, the county government successfully
taxed a certain amount of the land at the commercial rate, and Disney now needs to
release a certain amount of land from agricultural classification each year. As for
the Celebration project, Disney was subject to a development-of-regional-impact
review because the property had been de-annexed from Reedy Creek. These
developments show that local government does not always adhere to a global
company’s demands, even though Disney’s capital can be mobile. However,
although Foglesong stresses human agency instead of abstract economic forces in
his narrative of the Orlando-Disney relationship, “people” in his narrative are
limited to big men, political leaders, local officials, and financial investors: ordinary
people, Orlando citizens and consumers, are outside the circle of agency. “Local
officials,” not common people, “had the power to tarnish their [Disney’s] public
image” (p. 120). The “mundane” version of the Orlando-Disney story has not yet
been narrated in Foglesong’s “people” story.
If we examine inter-city rivalry, economic structuring, and thus the
development of public-private ventures and of Disneyized landscapes from another
perspective, we may find that the above-mentioned phenomenon are concrete
events happening in different parts of the world but scholars narrativize these
material facts in a cause-effect sequential order which interprets them in a reductive
way. Alexander Reichl’s examination of the success of Disney’s renewal of Times
Square differs from Hannigan’s and Bryman’s respective examinations insofar as
Reichl demonstrates that the Times Square renewal has been driven not by
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economic forces alone but also by a confluence of political arrangements, media
representations, and business interests.43 Reichl places great importance on urban
politics and popular discourse because decisions require support of the public, and
political and public discourse help shape redevelopment in the public debate,
political coalitions, and public support.
According to Reichl, in the 1920s, Times Square was at its peak regarding
its fame as a fashionable entertainment district. By the 1950s, Times Square was
reflecting national trends involving the migration of populations, of jobs, and of
investment dollars. And, in the 1960s, a loss of tax revenues compounded the
problems. In the late 1970s, the reduction of federal aid made it impossible for
many cities to address problems of poverty and unaffordable housing. The general
view was that crime- and drug-ridden areas whose populations consisted
increasingly of ethnic and racial minorities were driving the middle class
populations from the city centers. From the 1960s through the 1980s, Time Squares
epitomized this form of urban decline. Reichl argues that Mayor Ed Koch (p. 117)
and the respectable newspaper The New York Times (p. 44) popularized the above
discourse and that Disney’s renewal project for Times Square received popular
support because it addressed a collective dream (that Times Square would return to
its peak as in the 1920s through historic preservation packed with high culture) and
tapped into racial anxiety.
Reichl argues that under the name of historic preservation, the pro-growth
coalition centered on a trio of interests: the business community, public officials,
and urban arts and culture organizations and enterprises, with support from social
service organizations (for providing jobs) and religious leaders (for sanitizing the
area) (p. 119). The renewal project also received popular support. In 1984, the
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redevelopment project got unanimous approval from the Board of Estimates; in
1993, Disney’s presence on 42nd Street sanitized the district and worsened social
segregation. Reichl’s study of Times Square shows that we cannot treat
privatization, state deregulation, and the loss of public space as automatic
globalized trends affecting social and cultural landscapes around the globe. I would
further argue that scholars’ over-emphasis on economic changes leading to social
and cultural changes is rooted in Karl Marx’s analysis of mobile capital, that Marx
foresaw the rise of a world market and the fall of state regulations in Grundrisse:

The tendency to create the world market is directly given in the concept of
capital itself. Every limit appears as a barrier to be overcome.44

Under international capitalism’s free flow of capital, governments try to preserve
domestic business, attract foreign investment, and thereby secure revenue by
reducing regulatory intervention in markets, by providing tax incentives to business,
and by adjusting related policy. In this scheme, it is necessary to retrench the public
economy both to ease the tax burden and to strengthen the nation’s competitiveness
relative to international markets and to other governments’ economic policies. It
follows that national governments have no choice but to deregulate and to surrender
sovereignty to maintain economic performance, achieve high employment, income
growth, and thus political legitimacy. This is a common and compelling global
economic theory, but it also results in a “universal history” of humankind.45
The state may not be a neutral place for different parties with different
economic and social interests to fight over, but we cannot then assume that the state
must always immediately adhere to capitalists’ interests without considering other
factors and demands. Anthony Giddens argues that although capitalists have power
73

over the state because capitalists control “allocative resources,” capital and wagelabor are economically mutually dependent: neither one can survive without the
other. Workers’ organized and collective demands are an important drawing card
that enable workers to negotiate with capitalist interests and that functions as an
impetus for change and maintenance in state policies. Because “the ruling class
does not rule” but does business, a chasm opens up between state policies and the
interests of the capitalist class: the state may resist specific business interests. The
dialectic of control between capitalists and workers cannot guarantee the state’s
absolute approval of capitalists’ demands.46
Duane Swank’s econometric analysis of 1964-1993 data from sixteen
nations illuminates the above argument.47 Swank argues that the dramatic post1960s increases in international capital mobility have few direct effects on the size
of the public economy and that “configurations of democratic institutions
fundamentally shape the domestic policy impacts of capital mobility” (p. 133). He
divides the studied nations into three types: social corporatism (that possesses an
organized and centralized labor movement) defending welfare state policies
(Sweden and Norway); inclusive electoral institutions with broad-based forms of
representation through the electoral and party systems (Denmark and Finland); and
dispersion of policy-making authority with socially heterogeneous forces (Australia,
Canada, Switzerland, and the United States).48 He finds that the increases in
international capital mobility “vary systematically across national institutional
contexts” (p. 154). The states of social corporatism and of inclusive electoral
institutions can develop and defend large public economies directly or indirectly,
whereas the heterogeneous forces in dispersed authorities tend to distrust state-
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generated policy intervention, and national policies also enhance market flexibility
and low-wage production.

The symbolic dimension: Disney’s utopian appeal
A realist account of Disney power as the power of a global company may explain
why Disney and other global entertainment companies acquire more and more
power to shape contemporary social landscapes under international capitalism and
pro-growth politics; however, a realist account does not explain whether or not
Disney’s power is similar to the power exercised by other global companies. On
this subject, Reichl asks, “Is Disney’s power advantage atypical?”49 The second
group of analyses that I discuss concerns scholars’ understanding of atypical
Disney power around the globe. There are two groups of analyses, the first
concentrating on media analysis and the second on the utopian appeal of
Disneyland park. More specifically, the first group is concerned with Disney’s
media dominance and ubiquity in creating the “Disney universe” wherein audiences
in different parts of the world tend to agree with the core concepts promoted by the
company, while the second group focuses on how Disney, through its economic and
cultural power, addresses and molds contemporary urban problems and desires,
leading to the great success of its theme-park business and other urban projects.
Because of the incorporation of Disney’s offerings into cultural rituals50 and
because of the connection between Disney and childhood,51 Disney enjoys “relative
immunity … from criticism”52; and because Disney stories are always based on
widely accepted folk tales and cultural myths, Disney fantasies and narratives “are
shielded from external critiques.”53 Disneyland’s success in addressing, resonating
with, and shaping social desires enables Disney to win the public’s support easily in
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the theme-park business and in urban-planning projects. Scholars’ recognition of
Disney’s symbolic and cultural power as a kind of globalness plus happiness, plus
fantasy, plus innocence, and plus utopia helps wins Disney considerable public
support. Because the focus of my dissertation is on the establishment and the
operation of Hong Kong Disneyland, I will only briefly discuss scholars’ views on
Disney’s media imperialism and will concentrate primarily on the second group of
analyses.
As previously mentioned, in 2001, Janet Wasko, Mark Phillips, and Eileen
Meehan published the book Dazzled by Disney? The Global Disney Audiences
Project,54 which collects scholars’ research on how Disney offerings are marketed
and consumed in eighteen countries. The project was called “The Global Disney
Audience project.” According to the project’s findings, respondents underestimated
their contact with Disney because of a discrepancy between the number of products
they reported using in unprompted conditions (4.24 products per person) and the
corresponding number in prompted conditions (11.6 products per person).55
Respondents also tended to agree with the core concepts promoted by the company.
When asked to use one term to describe Disney, the most frequent mentioned word
was “fun,” followed in descending order by “happiness,” “fantasy,” “imagination,”
and “family” (p. 42). Respondents enjoyed Disney animation and termed it “cute,
cozy, warm, clean, safe, friendly, heart-warming, carefree, enchanting, wonderful,
perky, innocent, mystical, moral” (p. 49). They believed that Disney movies were
“harmless fun,” and they described Disney as a rite of passage because they
watched Disney movies when they were young. The reservations that respondents
expressed about Disney concerned its business side: “unending product promotions,
tie-ins, and advertising” (p. 49).
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Although respondents expressed different reasons for enjoying Disney56 and
although respondents expressed different degrees of attachment, including
ambivalent feelings, toward Disney,57 Wasko and Meehan argue that Disney’s
pervasiveness and symbolic ubiquity may none the less lead to a capitalist, global,
commodified culture. First, in terms of cultural industries, “Disney’s dominance of
children’s entertainment in many parts of the world has affected indigenous media
and cultural production by setting Disney products as the standard by which local
and regional productions are judged,” (p. 336) and Disney’s dominance also drains
local economies of resources. Second, Disney’s promotion of consumer culture
through its aggressive advertising and extensive merchandising inserts global
consumerism into local rituals and interpersonal practices. Third, Disney offerings
redefine local standards in media productions and contribute to cultural
standardization. In all, Wasko and Meehan argue: “If the future holds a global
system of distribution where production remains oligopolized and formulae remain
rooted in the model of US commercial culture, then one has to wonder if and how
localities, regions, and nations will maintain identities adjacent to the identities
provided in global commercial media” (p. 339).
Holding similar views about Disney’s dominant cultural power, Sharon
Zukin’s focus on “landscape”58 enables her to move between the materialist and the
symbolic approach to examine Disney’s power in shaping its own “landscape of
power.” Similar to the materialist approach (which has in fact been influenced by
her), Zukin suggests that capitalism has transformed the American landscape from a
production economy to a “symbolic economy” that emphasizes (visual)
consumption. Different from the purely materialist approach, Zukin argues that,
starting in the early twentieth century, Hollywood films and later broadcast
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television domesticated audiences’ fantasies, whose precise forms have derived
from a few media conglomerates including the Walt Disney Company. More
important, Walt Disney shapes people’s desires through not only television or
movies, but also a real fantasy land based on the real and collective desires of the
powerless:

While Walt Disney won fame as a founder of Hollywood’s animation
industry, his real genius was to transform an old form of collective
entertainment—the amusement park—into a landscape of power. All his life
Disney wanted to create his own amusement park. But to construct this
playground, he wanted no mere thrill rides or country fair: he wanted to
project the vernacular of the American small town as an image of social
harmony.59

To Zukin, Disney is atypical. Because of its media power, Disney can easily impose
its fantasy visions on audiences; and because Disneyland does not promote itself as
an explicitly educational medium, it can selectively use and reproduce the
American landscape and American history for entertainment and can project the
collective desires of the powerless: namely, the desires for safety, cleanliness,
mobility, and domesticity. Zukin’s warnings about the Disneyfied “landscape of
power” have been taken up by Hannigan, a topic that I discussed in an earlier
section; therefore, I will note only briefly here that Disney’s cultural vision-based
power resonates with social desires60 but promotes privatized and centralized urban
development, restructures landscapes around the globe, and undermines democracy.
Many scholars studying Disney’s power to address and to shape the public’s
utopian dream follow Zukin’s emphasis. Michael Sorkin argues that Disneyland
addresses modern urban problems such as the undisciplined complexities of the
city”61; Mark Gottdiener explains that Disneyland experiences are desirable because
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Disneyland “provides people with the illusion of escaping from the demands of
their own economy: the need to work, to budget, to save”62; emphasizing historical
specificity, John Findlay argues that Anaheim Disneyland in the 1950s “offered a
California-based critique” of the urban sense of unfriendliness, disorientation, and
confusion.63 Whereas both Sorkin and Gottdiener argue that theme parks’ spatial
control results in the commodification of public space and that Disneyland
exemplifies the development of “homogenized, underdimensioned citizenship,”64
Findlay emphasizes history and process in his study of Disneyland and its nearby
area. He argues that the success of the park turned the agricultural-oriented Orange
County into a tourism-based center that featured a stadium, a convention center,
and shopping malls; Disneyland also brought urban problems (such as traffic
congestion and an influx of prostitutes), from which Disneyland ironically offers
people escape. As a result, the outside world intruded into Disneyland while the
theme park Disneyized the outside world.
As we shall see, Zukin, Sorkin, Gottdiener, and Findlay all argue that
Disneyland experiences provide visitors a desirable or even a utopian substitute for
urban malaise. In contrast, Stephen Fjellman argues that Walt Disney World is “the
major middle-class pilgrimage center in the United States” because Disney World
uses various marketing strategies to symbolize the idealized essence of childhood
and because Disney World’s “utopian aspects appeal strongly to real peoples’ real
needs in late capitalist society.”65 That is, the rides inside Disney World are densely
packed with symbols that articulate wide-ranging ideological messages; the parks
sells fantasy, US history, science and technology, nature, and world travel, and the
park appeals to all the five senses as visitors play ride, eat, wait, and walk. Visitors
of different backgrounds and ages have different dreams, but the parks fulfill most
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of them because of the utopian experiences that Disney parks offer. Park visitors in
general turn out to be tourists experiencing the illusion of being somewhere else (p.
223): for example, they might engage in a ten-minute simulated safari trip “without
mosquitoes, monsoons or misadventures” (p. 226); child visitors can indulge in
some rides without either strife or adults (p. 276); parents (especially mothers) can
leave their children in day-care centers and pets in kennels; the disabled find
extensive provisions for them (p. 403). These utopian appeals are not limited to
urban conditions but extend to the specific needs that specific persons have in
relation to their specific location in social relations. Although Foglesong argues that
Disney theme parks fulfill various utopian visions that visitors have, he warns that
people can realize these visions only through consumption. To Fjellman, however,
this is the American culture of consumerism: “we must be taught that it is good,
reasonable, just, and natural that the means necessary for life are available only
through the market” (p. 402). Besides, the park’s world of commodities “leaves
minimal space in our lives for coherent critical thought about what we are doing” (p.
15). He draws a conclusion similar to that of Wasko and Meehan: Disney promotes
consumerism around the globe and manipulates consumers’ thinking.

Cultural domination, consumerism, and citizenship
Scholars’ worries about Disney’s consumerism-based standardization of tastes are
epitomized by Henry Giroux’s The Mouse that Roared.66 With the subtitle “Disney
and the End of Innocence,” the book rigorously alerts readers to Disney’s
universality and to its annihilation of public culture. Giroux argues that Disney is a
global company “spreading the conservative and commercial values that erode civil
society” (p. 91). According to Giroux, Disney’s media domination and involvement
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in public and private education control information and structure children’s
everyday life with its own ideologies. Disney movies are conservative in nature (p.
85) and promote consumerism as human choice and freedom. Disney’s economic
and institutional power in land use also diminishes the public sphere available for
participatory citizenship (pp. 87-9). In short, by forcefully presenting itself as
innocence and moral virtue (p. 86), by involving itself in entertainment and
education (p. 79), by regulating public land use, by blurring the line between public
and private, and by promoting values such as consumerism, the Disney Kingdom
diminishes civic society, participatory citizenship, and democratic culture:

As market culture permeates the social order, it threatens to cancel out the
tension between market values and those values representative of civil
society that cannot be measured in commercial terms but that are critical to
democracy, values such as justice, freedom, equality, health, respect, and
the rights of citizens as equal and free human beings. (p. 162)

Scholars such as Wasko, Meehan, Fjellman, and Giroux, consumerism is a
symptom of an apolitical age because consumerism does not strengthen people’s
political power and because consumerism provides people with a false alternative
between choice and freedom. In short, people are free to choose consumption goods,
and the desire that people invest in this freedom displaces their desire for political
participation. International capitalism commodifies the globe. Consequently, people
replace their citizenship rights with commodity desires. The above argument draws
upon the familiar series of oppositions between production and consumption,
capital and commodity, active and passive, use value and exchange value,
authenticity and homogenization, reality and ideology.67
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However, the very relationship between these “opposites” is not necessarily
oppositional but contingent. Anthony Giddens’ life-politics provides us with
another perspective on the role that politics plays in the context of “highmodernity.” For Giddens, although consumption and democracy are not equivalent
to each other, the relationship between the two may not be as polarized as critics
have imagined. From the modern era onwards, politics has been “emancipatory”—
its function has been “to release under-privileged groups from their unhappy
condition, or to eliminate the relative differences between them”68; once individuals
have achieved a certain level of autonomy of action in high modernity, life politics,
“a politics of lifestyle,”69 prevails. Others agree with Giddens that in the postmodern consumerist society, citizens do not struggle against the market by merely
challenging state policies; their political involvement manifests itself in the
consumption that citizens integrate into politics.70 Green politics and consumption
acts71 against sweatshops are two domains in which consumers connect their
consumption acts with citizenship rights, and these local everyday mundane
consumption acts produce globalizing effects. Consumer behavior need not stand in
contrast to active citizenship; rather, the former can be an extension of the latter.
The relationship between active altruistic citizenship and passive selfish
consumership need not be polarized.
Of course, consumer behavior does not always pair up with active
citizenship; life politics, as Giddens argues, is only for people with secure incomes.
In other parts of the world, people in developing countries also desire consumption
but their desires draw them to develop another kind of politics—that of the right to
consume. As Karl Marx wrote:
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The ultimate reason for all real crises always remains the poverty and
restricted consumption of the masses…72

Marx wrote the above comment during the mid-nineteenth century; similar urges
for the right to consume both public goods and private goods are common today in
Southeast Asian cities, but the effects vary from one context to the next. John
Clammer73 argues that there is no necessary link between demands for fair
allocation of public goods and democratization. In Bangkok and Jakarta, there are
large numbers of NGOs and citizens’ movements (p. 411); in Manila and other
large Philippine cities, however, members of the middle class who used to demand
political rights are now more likely to demand public goods (p. 411); and in
Singapore, there are no NGOs except those controlled by the state (p. 410).
Clammer’s study implies that the relationship between demands for the right
to consume and democratization vary across national institutional contexts.
Likewise, Bhaskar Mukhopadhyay’s ethnographic study of rural Bengal villagers in
India,74 by demonstrating a link between villagers’ desire for imported Chinese
bicycles and the villagers’ desire for democracy, argues that any rigorous
examination of the intricate relationship between consumption and democratization
must account for particular political and institutional contexts. The Bengal villagers
came from a remote village to Calcutta to buy Chinese bicycles, which were much
less expensive than the Indian ones and which the villagers referred to as gifts of
globalization. However, the villagers failed in their objective because the
government officials allowed the rich to purchase the bicycles before everyone else,
and these villagers left Calcutta feeling only bitterness (p. 42). Villagers then kept
on telling Mukhopadhyay about stories of corruption and about their dissatisfaction
with the communist ruling state that they had voted into power in the previous
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election. Mukhopadhyay discovered that, because the political left had transformed
the villagers into political subjects and because the villagers considered this new
political identity to be a gift from the communists, the villagers paid the left back
by voting for its candidates. However, the left conferred onto the villagers the
entitlements of citizenship, and the villagers subsequently denounced their ruling
government and its corrupt administration. Mukhopadhyay argues that the Chinese
bicycles should be seen as “a substitute-object for their [the villagers’] deep and
repeatedly frustrated desire to participate in the political process as dignified rightbearing citizens, as subjects of a welfare-state entitled to enjoy the benefits of statesubsidized goods as a matter of right, to participate in the global marketplace as
consumers free from the restrictions imposed by a paternalist state” (p. 52). More
important, Mukhopadhyay avoids a simple theory linking democratization with
people’s desire for commodities. He argues that villagers’ desire for democracy
resulted from both the leftist pedagogy concerning the rights and entitlements of
citizenship and villagers’ exposure to foreign goods including Chinese bicycles and
media-disseminated US and European lifestyles. Political and institutional
conditions, media flows, local culture, and everyday practices are all captured in
Mukhopadhyay’s analysis.

The everyday dimension: politics, culture, and everyday agency
In studying Disney power, scholars practicing the everyday approach emphasize
that, in addition to macro-economic trends, Disney’s media domination, and
cultural power, it is important to study how people view these specific situations,
appropriate or challenge them, and live through them. Rather than a narrow
examination of people’s everyday acts, the everyday approach accounts for how
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macro-economic trends, specific local political and institutional contexts, firms’
strong symbolic and cultural power, and locals’ everyday practices intersect each
other and produce various effects. Second, because the Disney landscape surfaces
in different places whose contexts are unique, Disney power is necessarily various
in relation to each unique context. Third, the everyday approach emphasizes the
multi-dimensional—as opposed to the uni-dimensional—relations that arise
between a single locality and Disney. I argue that the everyday approach can
function as a research methodology that underscores Massey’s idea of “a
simultaneous multiplicity of spaces” in reference to diverse local actors’ varying
views on Disneyfication, globalization, and the local world.
Stacey Warren75 examines various Disney-local power contestations at
various Disney sites. In her earlier article on popular resistance toward
Disneyfication in Seattle, Warren argues against the postmodern critique, which
posits that “not only are individual people powerless to transform the parameters of
their existence, but structural realities of the postmodern world ensure that true
participatory democracy shall never be achieved.”76 Rather, by “tracking the
activities of actual people in actual landscapes,” Warren sees Disney-Seattle power
relations as a kind of “hegemonic give and take” (p. 85) embodying both consent
and resistance in relation to people’s practices, understandings, and expectations;
resistance to powerful corporations such as Disney is possible.
The Seattle Center project was Disney’s first extensive urban planning
project on non-Disney property. In the early 1980s, City Hall and Seattle Center
management decided to ask Disney to be the urban planning consultant because
Disney was “probably the best in the world” (p. 99); Disney was ultimately
dismissed in 1989 after three years’ negotiation and friction. Soon after the
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Imagineers arrived in Seattle, Disney declared that it would not pursue the project if
the city insisted on an open bid; the Seattle government required that Disney solicit
input from a local watchdog advisory board, which subsequently reported that even
the arranging of meetings with Disney was difficult; at Disney’s public meetings,
Disney talked and the public listened. Seattle people then circulated petitions that
requested the dismissal of Disney, and City Hall received letters and complaints
calling for more public involvement. Disney’s three alternative blueprint plans,
entitled Plan A, Plan B, and Plan C, fueled a new dimension of criticism that
stemmed from the media, citizens’ groups, and council chambers: the general
criticism was that Disney’s designs “did little to evoke Seattle’s own culture or
history” (p. 102). Council members favored Plan B and insisted that Disney modify
the plan by integrating into it more local citizen input; Disney modified the plan.
Nevertheless, Seattle residents characterized the plan as “superficial,” the work of
“cartoonists,” and a “mini-Disneyland” (p. 102). More important, implementation
of the Disney plan would require an admission fee. Upon encouragement and
requests from the official advisory group, informal coalitions, and many citizens,
the council then asked a local architectural firm to develop three new alternative
plans, and several additional firms submitted plans, unsolicited and at their own
expense. In 1989, the council chose five plans and the Disney plan was not among
them. Disney’s involvement in the Seattle Civic Center came to an end. To Warren,
the Seattle story is “a lively hegemonic dynamic” in which “the model of urban
organization that Disney proposed engaged city residents, sometimes captivating
their imaginations and sometimes angering them, but it never dictated a
predetermined reality to them. Rather, the process opened up space for debate,
participation, and resistance” (p. 104).
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Warren’s article “Saying No to Disney” is an extension of her previous
discussion on the power dynamics among Disney, city governance, and local
people. This time, she discusses four contested Disney developments: the Seattle
Civic Center, Long Beach, Anaheim, and Haymarket, Virginia. Warren argues that
these Disney projects seemed to be guaranteed success but that they failed because
of Disney’s “almost complete disconnection with more recent planning tropes,
strategies, or even etiquette.”77 According to Warren, in the 1980s, there was a
change in city governments’ attitude toward their public’s financial support of
private development, a shift in planning roles of developers from plan makers to
negotiators, and a shift in planning theory toward emphasizing both stimulation of
the development environment and protection of citizens’ interests; Disney as a
private developer, however, still sees its power as absolute and does not adapt to
changing attitudes and situations, even in the face of resistance. In confronting
public outcry, either the government or Disney, as the case may be, eventually
dropped each of these four projects. In the case of the Seattle Civic Center, as
discussed above, Disney ignored residents’ disappointment and tried to convince
the council to waive the required Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). Since
Disney did not fulfill the EIS process, the council then called for three alternative
plans to be reviewed (p. 242).
In 1989, Disney acquired new properties in Anaheim and Long Beach. In
Long Beach, Disney wanted to build a “Port Disney” including a theme park, five
resort hotels, and shops (p. 243), while the Anaheim project was about building a
“new themed urban resort” called WESTCOT (p. 244). In 1990, Disney issued a
public statement that “the Walt Disney Company can only build one of these parks
in the 1990s.” Disney then pitted the two potential locations against each other so
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that the resulting competition would bring Disney concession packages. However,
Disney finally dropped its plans in both of the cities because of organized local
grassroots resistance.
For the Long Beach project, because over half of the proposed acreage was
underwater and needed to be filled in, the project required zoning and
environmental approvals at both the local level and the state level. Besides, the
California Coastal Commission required that a portion of all waterfront
development must be accessible to the nonpaying tourist. Although the officials in
Long Beach offered Disney US $880 million for infrastructure improvement and
pledged to support Disney to gain waivers from environmental and rezoning
regulations, environmental groups protested across the state. Eventually, the
California Coastal Commission refused to allow the coastline zoning variance, and
Disney could not build its “classic walled Disney compound” (p. 244). Disney
promptly dropped its plan.
For the Anaheim project WESTCOT, Disney planned to build a theme park
with hotel and retail shops adjacent to existing Disneyland property. To ensure
Disney’s approval of the development project, local officials offered Disney one
billion US dollars to improve public facilities. However, home owners organized
“pep rallies complete with marching bands, cheerleaders, and extensive coverage”
(p. 245). In public hearings on the matter, Disney turned debate into a showcase for
Disney, itself, just as it had in the Seattle case. Moreover, Disney dismissed serious
planning questions concerning, for example, the provision of adequate schools for
the families of the projected 17,500 new employees; and in response, one group of
families sued Disney over its unwillingness to contribute to the educational
infrastructure that would be needed if WESTCOT should be built. Although
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officials were ready to accept Disney’s redevelopment project, Anaheim residents
refused such a private-owned public-sphere project. Eventually, the plan was
dramatically scaled back into a theme park called Disney’s California Adventure
adjacent to a Disneyland park.
The fourth failed Disney project that Warren discusses is a theme park
based on American history, “Disney’s America,” located in Haymarket, Virginia,
outside of Washington D.C. and less than five miles from Manassas National
Battlefield Park, a Civil War site. Popular resistance elevated from local to national
levels, and Disney finally dropped the plan. Much as Walt Disney had bought land
in Orlando anonymously in the early 1960s, Disney in 1993 anonymously
purchased an option to buy three thousand acres owned by Exxon in Haymarket.
Because Exxon had already won zoning approval for large mixed-use development,
Disney could proceed with its plans secretly. However, rumors leaked and Disney
officially announced that it would build a new theme park called Disney’s America.
According to Warren, officials and business leaders at the state, regional, and local
levels initially supported Disney’s theme park. Despite Disney’s refusal to
participate in routine meetings about the rezoning application, the Prince William
County Planning Commission voted to authorize Disney to proceed the project.
However, the well-established and well-funded environmental preservation group
The Piedmont Environmental Council raised concerns about the loss of natural
beauty and local histories; the newly formed Protect Historic America group
comprising nationally known historians and media personalities argued against the
Disneyfication of American historical narratives. To raise the debate to a national
level, the group’s members disseminated advertisements and editorials nationally
and threatened to launch legal action. Disney’s theme park project then came before
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the US Senate’s Energy and Natural Resources Sub-committee on Public Lands,
National Parks, and Forests. Facing a deadline for the land purchase, Michael
Eisner, the Chief Executive Officer of the Walt Disney Company from 1984 to
2005,78 announced that Disney would not pursue the Virginia historical theme park
project.
By illuminating four failed Disney projects on urban planning, Warren
concludes that although the free flow of capital made communities feel a desperate
need to attract private developers that might help the communities remain
competitive, a number of other factors (culture, local conditions, and democratic
traditions and actions) played crucial roles in negotiating and resisting privatization
development. In Warren’s words, “privatization is not a monolithic cultural and
economic expression” (p. 254); instead, these privately developed spaces need to
emerge “within the same existing democratic structures” (p. 252).
When Disneyland transplanted itself to France and Japan, Jean Baudrillard79
and Fredric Jameson80 argued that Disneyfication was stifling local identity.
Jameson argued that, in relation to Singapore and Japan, Disneyfication was a
symbolic domination by the West of the non-West, ranging over themes from
architecture, cultural industry, and spatial behavior to the very idea of utopia. In
Jameson’s words, the changes resulted in:

… various things, from a new urbanism to a new kind of shopping, a new
kind of globalization, a new kind of entertainment industry, even a new kind
of Utopia itself—that Walt invented.81
Some scholars, however, argue that the seemingly cultureless Disney parks82 rest
upon definite historical (time) and geographical (space) contexts, including local
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contexts. These scholars argue that diversity—rather than uniformity—marks
Disneylands, Disneyfied work cultures, and Disneyfied consumption cultures. The
“same” park, when it transplants itself to different contexts, faces different social
relations that intersect each other and that produce different effects. This process
does not prevent Disney from gaining power inside and outside its parks but it does
contest Disney’s power.
In 1985, Disney announced its decision to build a European Disney theme
park in Marne-la-Vallée, France. Given that the French government provided
Disney with financing deals, tax breaks, transportation networks, and below-market
land prices in the Euro Disneyland deal,83 Stacy Warren argues that “the Walt
Disney Company deserves honorary colonial status.”84 According to Warren,
Disneyland Paris85 is “Disney’s most ambitious recolonization project” (p. 110).
Disney expresses its colonial voices by celebrating fabricated difference and by
speaking for others; it expresses “colonial control of local ‘othered’ populations”;
and it economically exploits the locals (pp. 112-3). Warren explores (1) the power
dynamics between Disney and local governance, (2) the “concession” that Disney
management made to workers regarding work conditions, and (3) visitors’ everyday
reception of the park; on the basis of this three-pronged examination, Warren
argues that Disney “colonization” is in fact a process of “hegemonic
destabilization” (p. 113):

If Disneyland is about the colonization of the world, Disneyland Paris is
something else again: it is about the playful recolonization of images of
itself, embedded within a quietly sinister recolonization of economic,
political, and cultural relationships between corporation, nation-state, and
locality. A close examination of Disneyland Paris’ history and everyday life
reveals what Disney’s postmodern critics have thus far missed: the theme
park actually is a site of twisted postcolonial cultural debate. The cultural
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conflicts that occur within the park echo, within their safely manufactured
confines, the conditions of postcolonial struggle in the so-called real world.
In ways that the American parks or even Tokyo Disneyland will never
approach, the intrusion of Disney into France has forced Disney employees,
guests, and the general public to confront questions of “us” and “them,”
“self” and “other,” “intelligentsia” and “subaltern,” and other tropes of
postcolonial discourse. (p. 112)
Again, we can see that employees, visitors, government, and the public not only
participate in “hegemonic destabilization” but also sometimes can successfully
challenge the supremacy of corporate culture. In this case, the first hegemonic
concession occurred in relation to onstage Disneyland events,86 when patrons of the
site insisted that Disney lift its ban on alcohol. At the workplace where the Disney
workers called the “backstage,” staff members protested Disney’s famous smile
culture and compelled Disney to relax this requirement at Disneyland Paris:
instructors of new employees advised the class, “If you don’t feel like smiling,
don’t” (p. 119-20). Owing to the media’s ridicule, to labor unions’ protests, and to a
government labor inspector’s formal complaint against Disney, Disney relaxed its
strict dress codes so that female workers won the right to wear red lipstick and
black pantyhose.
In fact, the dress-code conflict was not simply over style of dress but also
over the power that Disney as a private American-based global company could
wield in France. Rather than write the dress code into the employee contract,
Disney management presented the dress code as an attachment to the employee
contract, and it was then exempt from standard approval through government
channels. The government labor inspector who lodged the aforementioned formal
complaint against Disney declared that Disney’s dress code was a disciplinary code
applicable to all Disney employees and that, under French labor law, these codes
should be directly written into the employee contract and subject to the
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government’s approval. The dress-code conflict entered the legal realm, and a few
months before opening day, police started investigating the dress-code charges.87
Disney finally backed down and voluntarily adhered to the regulations. On this
matter, Warren quoted a Disneyland Paris employee: “I was not required to wear
my hat, scarf, or belt, tuck in my shirt, even wear black shoes. We were asked to,
but many did not and could not be punished for it” (p. 121). These changes suggest
a “complex hegemonic interplay between Disney management and employees,
colonizer and colonized, that was carried out over a period of time by various
actors” (p. 120). These changes suggest, as well, that local government does not
always ally with Disney and that local opposition sometimes curtails Disney’s
control.
The negotiations that took place over offstage Disneyland events paralleled
protests that resulted in Disneyland Paris’ modifications of onstage spectacles.
Officially Disneyland Paris recognizes six languages: French, German, Italian,
English, Spanish, and Dutch; but some prominent attractions such as Phantom
Manor were recorded in both English and French and, for this reason, received
criticism as a cultural affront to the dominant language: French. Within five months,
Disney replaced the recording with a French-only one (p. 121). Second, because
most folklore that Disney uses originated from Europe, children from different
European countries find that familiar stories undergo significant modification at
Disneyland Paris; in these cases, parents link the Disney version to the stories that
the parents’ young children learned back home. Only in this way can the children
comprehend and fully enjoy the show. In other words, visitors’ different cultural
contexts end up negotiating with and re-narrativizing Disneyfied European stories
(p. 122).
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Just as Europeans do not let Disney gain a stranglehold over European life,
nor do the Japanese in Tokyo Disneyland. Scholars such as Mary Brannen,88 Aviad
Raz,89 Shunya Yoshimi,90 and Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto91 argue that Tokyo Disneyland
exhibits not the unilateral structure of Western hegemony but the multilateral
negotiations between two dominant first world countries, that the Japanese people
import American Disneyland and edit and consume it in a unique way. These
scholars, on the one hand, discuss Japan’s cultural Americanization in history and,
on the other hand, argue that if the export of Disneyland from the United States is
seen as US global influence on consumer culture dating back to the 1920s, the
culture has—since the 1970s—undergone a translation that projects an
“ethnocentric Japanese worldview.”92 The changing meaning of America parallels
the changing Japanese responses and uses of American offerings, including Disney.
From a historical perspective, Shunya Yoshimi in his article “Japan:
America in Japan/Japan in Disneyfication” (subtitled “The Disney Image and the
Transformation of ‘America’ in Contemporary Japan”)93 demonstrates how the
meanings of “America” and “Disney” have changed in relation to Japan’s economic
development and how Japanese youth have used Disney images to create their own
lived world. In analyzing cultural Americanization in Japan, Yoshimi argues that
“Although ‘America’ was so often said to have swept over Japanese popular culture,
the latter was not reduced to dependency on American mass-cultural products, but
strove instead to naturalize and reinvent them” (p. 166). As an American symbol,
the word ‘Disney’ might have meant “richness” and “newness” (p. 168) from the
late 1940s to the 1960s. Starting in the 1970s, because of rapid economic growth
from 1955 to 1973, the word ‘America’, as it was colored by Tokyo Disneyland, no
longer symbolize either wealth or innovation but a “system of consumption, which
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constructs self-identity as consumerable, or as something to be colonized” (p. 172).
While Disney Disneyfies folk tales such as Snow White by transforming a tale
about death and rebirth into a fantasy about a young girl surrounded by lovable but
strange dwarfs and saved by a prince, Japanese girls cutify Disney characters
through their kawaii culture by taking in everything kawaii and shutting out things
that are not kawaii. Determinants of the kawaii culture include, in addition to
cultural Americanism or Disneyfication, “a system of broad colonization [that]
exists in contemporary Japan” whereby Japanese young people “sterilize” the
external within themselves to colonize strangers in their everyday practices (p. 1767).
The changes in Tokyo Disneyland’s onstage attractions can be seen as
Japanese domestication of the outside world, including of America, through
“cutification” of commodities. Yoshimoto notes that Tokyo Disneyland changes its
spectacle Main Street U.S.A. into a new spectacle: Global Bazaar. According to
Yoshimoto, Japanese turned the world (otherwise referred to as the “World
Bazaar”), not just America, into a commodity that they could consume inside
Tokyo Disneyland, now a Japanese-styled mall. For Brannen and Raz, onstage
changes in Tokyo Disneyland omitted American-specific histories or translated
them to accommodate Japanese culture and to project a Japanese national identity
for consumption. The renaming of Frontierland as Westernland and Main Street
U.S.A. as the World Bazaar functioned to omit an American nostalgia that was
meaningless to Japanese; the park’s expansion of shopping space served the giftgiving needs of the Japanese; the change of Sleeping Beauty’s castle into
Cinderella’s castle complements the Japanese “rags to riches” experiences. Raz
points out that only Tokyo Disneyland has the attraction named “Meet the World.”
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Located on the outskirts of Tomorrowland, it is a “show on history with a look to
the future.”94 Raz argues that the thirty-minute film “ignores Japan’s Paleolithic
ancestors, in favor of the traditional Japanese myth of origin, which regards the
founding ancestors as the offspring of the gods, who created the islands and came
down to inhabit them” (p. 53). It reenacts Japanese exceptionalism and cultural
uniqueness by suggesting that the beginning of Japanese civilization is the
beginning of the world and that Japan later opened itself to progress and interacted
with the rest of the world as an equal. This expression receives further voice in the
Tokyo Disneyland guidebook, which introduces “Meet the World” as a ride on
which visitors can “revolve on a carousel through time and relive Japan’s
fascinating encounters with other cultures” (p. 51). Many Japanese consider these
stories about Japan’s interactions with Chinese and Western cultures as a sign of
Japan’s successful incorporation of other cultures. For Raz, Tokyo Disneyland is
“not an agent of Americanization but a simulated ‘America,’ showcased by and for
the Japanese” (p. 200).
Rather than produce a monolithic global culture, Tokyo Disneyland enables
Japanese visitors to enjoy the park in their own ways and in relation to their own
lived world. Raz argues that scholars’ warning of commodification and of corporate
solutions to problems is partial: his research shows that (1) Japanese visitors are
rational consumers “from the aficionado to the critical, from anti-establishment to
traditional” (p. 189); (2) that some female visitors’ infantile behavior and
fascination over Disneyland is rebellion against adulthood; (3) that some repeat
visitors come in groups to Tokyo Disneyland where they play the role of
“screamers” out of a desire for disorder; and (4) that some people, such as members
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from the International Play Association-Japan, are highly critical of Tokyo
Disneyland for its emphasis on scripted play instead of on social play or free play.
Analyzing backstage themes and events at Tokyo Disneyland, Raz finds that
Disney’s strict grooming standards and strong service culture are “ordinary” in
Japanese terms because Tokyo Disneyland part-timers are accustomed to working
during holidays and to adhering to strict grooming standards (p. 84). Japanese also
are less concerned than people from many other cultures about “being phony” (p.
126) because many Japanese consider politeness a part of Japanese social life in
general. However, workers resist Tokyo Disneyland manuals, which are translated
versions of original English-language Disneyland manuals. Many part-timers do not
read them because their supervisors do not ask them questions; and the section
managers and trainers despise the numerous manuals for their symbolism of the
“infantile” younger generation, the part-timers (p. 110).

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have studied three approaches in Disney literature: the materialist,
the symbolic, and the everyday. Herein, I argue that Disney power disperses itself
in various power dimensions. In a postmodern consumerist landscape, Disney
operates as a resourceful global company that possesses a strong image
representing not only fun and family but urban redevelopment and economic
success, as well. For these reasons, Disney has gained certain advantages in
negotiations with city governments: for example, Disney has received state
subsidies and has escaped from certain local regulations and policing. However, the
overemphasis on abstract economic forces runs the risk of reductionism. There is
no guarantee that capitalism and democracy must have certain unchangeable
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relations. Foglesong’s study of the long, changing, sometimes cooperative and
sometimes difficult relationship between Orlando and Disney, and Warren’s study
of four failed Disney urban projects show that a state-Disney alliance is not
guaranteed.
Culturally, Disney’s long-running media domination around the globe may
result in audiences’ perception of Disney as innocent and fun; Disney’s ubiquity
over the course of generations makes it easy for consumers to insert the world of
Disney into their childhood memories and their sense of family. Nevertheless,
Disney does not homogenize systems of meaning throughout the globe. The
symbolic approach, unlike the materialist approach, enables researchers to
understand Disney power as a “globalness plus,” a utopian appeal. However, the
symbolic approach ignores the fact that local dreams concern more than the
untoward effects that industrialization and modernization have on safety and
cleanliness; local dreams can be various because of cities’ various political and
institutional structures, economies, histories, and cultures.
Although all these scholars have different theoretical concerns (whether in
cultural geography, political economy, or media studies), they draw similarly
pessimistic conclusions about Disney effects—the diminution of state sovereignty
and of citizenship rights. Disney’s influence on physical space and Disney’s
promotion of privatization and of centralized planning diminishes the power of city
governments and the public; Disney’s promotion of a consumerist lifestyle replaces
local identities and participatory citizenship by controlling landscape and media. In
short, by promoting consumerism and the false alternative of choice and freedom,
Disney creates for itself economic and cultural power, homogenizes culture, and
weakens democracy and society. I argue that there is neither a necessary correlation
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nor a necessary opposition between international capitalism and democratization.
Both capitalism and democracy can be expressed in different forms, as
demonstrated by J. K. Gibson-Graham in their account of economic diversity95 and
by Swank in his analysis of different forms of democratic government structure. By
citing Gidden’s idea of “life politics” and the empirical studies of Clammer and
Mukhopadhyay, I argue that the relationship between consumption and citizenship
development needs to be examined under special national context.
Rather than study Disney power as an abstract economic and symbolic force,
researchers should highlight the role that local politics, culture, history, democratic
traditions, and actors play in global-local power dynamics. As Lawrence Grossberg
argues, the changing context (“geographical and historical, political, institutional
and intellectual conditions”96) requires scholars to reject reductionism at all levels.
His advocacy of the concept of “articulation” is a call to examine different forms of
realities that have material effects on people’s real-life conditions and to study how
people’s cultural practices appropriate and work upon circumstances through
interpretation and action.
Regarding the relationship between Disney’s global ubiquity and cultural
globalization, scholars such as Warren, Brannen, Foglesong, Raz, Yoshimoto, and
Yoshimi emphasize local uptake, negotiation, and resistance. Although Disney
power is paramount in both economic terms and cultural terms, these scholars
remind us that we need to examine Disney power in process—asking how different
forces of power intersect in different contexts and periods of time. Using this
approach, Foglesong demonstrates the changing Orlando government-Disney
relationship, and Warren illuminates the changing city-planning discourse in
conflict with the Disney’s static and absolutist urban-planning discourse. Also
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using this approach, scholars examine whether the meaning of Disney changes
among locals (take, for example, Yoshimi’s study of the changing meaning of
“America” among Japanese) and how people use their own preferences to remake
Disney offerings (take, for example, Japanese cutified Disney characters).
In reviewing scholars’ studies of various local responses (Orlando, Seattle,
New York, Anaheim, Virginia, Long Beach, Paris, Tokyo) to Disney power, I have
argued that local acts significantly contribute to the power dynamics of various
local Disney projects. Moreover, “locals,” as demonstrated by Warren’s studies of
four American projects and Disneyland Paris, do not fall into one single category.
Local government, officers, journalists, Disney employees, consumers,
environmentalists, and home owners occupy different positions in relation to
Disney and can hold views that clash with Disney’s agenda. In other words, as I
discussed in chapter One, we need to study these various spaces of social relations
to understand the multiple power dynamics of local Disney projects.
In my study of the establishment, the operation, and the consumption of
Hong Kong Disneyland, I dare not say that I bear no predefined sets of political
beliefs and concerns. Hong Kong, although affluent, has no democratic elections
for its Chief Executive; and although significant in terms of its cultural exports in
Asia since the sixties, Hong Kong can never characterize itself as a dominant
cultural power comparable to France, Japan or America. Hong Kong is not even a
nation, but a Special Administrative Region under China’s sovereignty. In addition
to cultural globalization, then, I am also concerned about Hong Kong’s
democratization and about Hong Kong’s transformation of public space in relation
to HKDL.
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In terms of politics and institutional matters, I acknowledge that Disney has
pitted Hong Kong and Shanghai against each other to compel the HKSAR
government both to fund Disney and to waive certain local regulations that would
otherwise pertain to HKDL. However, I doubt the assertion that there is an absolute
alliance between the HKSAR government and the Disney Company. Certainly,
there is cultural Americanization in Hong Kong through Hong Kong’s import of
Hollywood movies, hamburgers, and shopping-mall consumption system, but the
general influence of American cultures is counterbalanced by Hong Kong people’s
everyday practice of Chinese customs (as I discuss in chapter One), and by the
overall development of regional cultures within global cultures.97 I also doubt that
Disney or other transnational corporations exercise total control over every aspect
of Hong Kong people’s lives: there is no absolute homogenization of meaning
systems, nor is there an absolute substitution of consumerism for citizenship.
However, I cannot deny that Hong Kong is a consumerist city; lacking democracy,
many Hong Kong people exercise their sovereignty through consumption rather
than through elections; living in a small city, Hong Kong people more often than
not actively accommodate global trends rather than resist them, and do so for
survival.
It was, in the first place, Hong Kong legislators and media that pressed the
HKSAR government to compel Disney to settle Disneyland in Hong Kong. On the
surface, it seems clear that Hong Kong government officials, legislators, media, and
even ordinary Hong Kong people, as shown by surveys,98 have submitted
themselves to Disney owing chiefly to its economic, media, and cultural
domination around the globe. As development progresses, conflicts arise and
different groups, including laborers, environmental groups, student activists,
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journalists, local popular stars, and even business partners and HKSAR government
officials, criticize Disney actions. This criticism circulates through popular press
and can affect the bottom line: for instance, visitors’ park attendance rocketed then
dropped drastically, perhaps because of the circulating criticism. It comes as a
surprise to some onlookers that the Disney “magic” failed in the consumerist Hong
Kong cityscape. To study Hong Kong people’s Disney dream and the failed Disney
magic, researchers can uncover a wealth of information by focusing on actors
instead of on automatic forces, by focusing on articulation instead of on
convergence.
In the next chapter, following Reichl, I study how government officials in
1999 persuaded the Hong Kong public to embrace the HKDL project, even though
the deal was undemocratic, non-transparent, and unfair, suggesting that the HKDL
project functioned to preserve Hong Kong’s cultural identity, as well as to
strengthen Hong Kong’s post-1997 economic revitalization—articulating Hong
Kong people’s desires for both economic rebound and cultural distinction after the
Handover.
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Chapter Three
The HKSAR Government’s “World City” Imaginary

Whenever Disney plans to expand and build a new Disney theme park in the hub of
a region, governments bidding for the role of host often desperately try to obtain it
by offering Disney generous setup subsidies, cheap land, low-interest-rate loans,
transportation networks, setup infrastructure, and tax breaks. These deals are not
just about financial support; instead, the successful government surrenders its
management control over Disney,1 and sometimes the local Disneyland does not
need to abide by the law2 and enjoys special consideration from the government for
future changes in legislation.3 Surprisingly, even though the media widely publicize
these deals, Disneyland supporters outnumber opponents in France and Hong Kong.
Certainly, the dream or utopia appeal that Disneyland offered the French
and the HKSAR governments was not simply an antidote to urban malaises as it
was in the case of Anaheim Disneyland, according to Zukin, Sorkin, Gottdiener,
and Findlay (see chapter One). In the post-industrial global economy, both the
French government and the HKSAR government believed that the Disneyland
projects could provide tens of thousands of jobs, lower the unemployment rate,
increase foreign exchange and tourist revenues, and establish new leisure and
tourism developments.4
However, cultural critics denounced France’s Disneyland as the “Euro
Dismal” project, while the phrase “cultural Chernobyl” circulated in the mainstream
press.5 Yet public opinion polls on the Île-de-France indicated 86% approval for the
Paris Disney park,6 and two journalists—Turner and Bumbel—described it as “an
extraordinary triumph of commerce over ideology.”7 Hong Kong’s experiences with
111

Disneyland were similar to France’s. As in France, Hong Kong had detractors of the
HKDL project. An elected legislator in the city argued that the HKDL deal was an
“Unequal Treaty”8 because the HKSAR government had invested HK$22.95 billion
compared to The Walt Disney Company’s HK$2.45 billion. However, the HKSAR
government receives 57% of the shares of the government-Disney joint venture
company Hong Kong International Theme Park Ltd (HKITP) whereas Disney owns
43%. Also in Hong Kong, local scholars and some journalists9 raised other
reservations about the HKDL project; in particular, they criticized the deal’s lack of
transparency10 and the deal’s ecological destruction of Lantau Island,11 the backyard
of Hong Kong. Despite these reservations, Hong Kong people largely supported the
HKDL project,12 and the popular press even termed the completed deal a
“millennium dream come true.” Local scholar Joseph Chan13 drew a conclusion
similar to that of Turner and Bumbel: according to Chan, the favorable reception
that Hong Kong extended to the Mouse is evidence of the prevalence of Hong
Kong’s economic logic, paves the way for cultural globalization, and weakens
resistance voices.
I would like to argue that, in the case of HKDL, lurking behind the
prevalent economic logic is the HKSAR government’s use of the HKDL project to
sell Hong Kong people another utopia—the world-city utopia. In other words, the
HKDL project was attractive to the HKSAR government not only in economic
terms but also in cultural and political terms. First, the HKSAR government used
the strong sign value of Disney—that namely, “Disney” is a famous and valuable
global brand—to brand Hong Kong itself as a “world city” and, consequently, to
differentiate Hong Kong from other Chinese cities. Second, the HKDL-based world
city ideal helps to divert Hong Kong people’s imagination away from
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conceptualizing a “better” society based on a democratization process, and toward a
Western-based reformulation of Hong Kong’s imagined “Chineseness plus”
elements. Moreover, the “Western” influence in this instance reflects Western
commercial culture instead of Western democratic culture. The HKSAR
government has effectively used HKDL to re-image Hong Kong from a colonial
city based on a symbolic “East-meets-West” economics to a post-colonial city
based on a symbolic “East-meets-Disney” economics. This repackaging of Hong
Kong city’s self-image has the potential to satisfy both Hong Kong people’s desires
for cultural distinction and the Beijing government’s decolonization project
(including the “decolonization” of the late-colonial government’s democratization
project). Third, the popular appeal of the undemocratic and non-transparent
HKSAR-Disney HKDL negotiations and subsequent deal has helped to consolidate
the HKSAR government’s wider undemocratic regime and non-transparent
institutional structure. In short, my argument about the HKSAR government’s
construction of the world-city utopia confirms Massey’s argument that although we
should conceptualize our lived world as a simultaneous multiplicity of spaces, “the
world has seen the recrudescence of exclusivist claims to places—nationalist,
regionalist and localist” since the late 1980s. These attempts aim to “fix the
meaning of particular spaces, to enclose them, endow them with fixed identities and
to claim them for one’s own” and for the justification of one’s power.14
I would argue that to sell the non-transparent HKDL project to the public,
the HKSAR government developed two existing colonial discourses on
development and cosmopolitan identity, thereby evolving a “competitiondevelopment” discourse and a “disappearing-world-city” discourse for its own use.
By using these two discourses, HKSAR government hoped to persuade the public
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that it should approve of the unequal Hong Kong-Disney deal. In this chapter, I first
narrate how the HKDL project received support from the Legislative Council even
though the government asked the Council to approve the funding in the absence of
a completed environmental-impact assessment. In the second and third sections, I
discuss the concept of the imaginary and how the government developed the
economic-oriented “world-city” imaginary by appropriating two pairs of
discourses—a “competition-development” discourse and a “disappearing-world
city” discourse. I examine how newspaper reports have circulated and have
reinforced these two pairs of political discourses in wider popular discourse. In the
last section, by examining the HKSAR government’s tourism policy, I further
discuss how the process of touristification functions simultaneously to accomplish
decolonization tasks and re-nationalization tasks, and to reshape Hong Kong as a
spectacular tourist magnet instead of a citizen-based participatory community.

The unequal deal and legislators’ fait accompli assent
In late 1998, news had it that Disney might build another park in Asia. Legislators
demanded that the HKSAR government demonstrate sincerity and determination to
settle Disneyland in Hong Kong in its negotiation with The Walt Disney Company.
The legislators hoped that, in this way, Disney would choose to build Disneyland in
Hong Kong. To facilitate these efforts, the legislators suggested that the
establishment of Disneyland in Hong Kong should mirror the financial arrangement
of Ocean Park, the only theme park in Hong Kong at that time. In other words, the
HKSAR government should provide cheap land to the Walt Disney Company so
that, at its own expense, the company could proceed with the construction of the
theme park.15 Although press and legislators were excited about the negotiations,
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the government kept related details under wraps.16 Having no chance to examine
the deal, legislators were dissatisfied with the government’s non-transparent
negotiations, for the government notified the public only about the outcome. These
critical legislators warned the government that the Legislative Council could block
funding for the Disneyland project.17
On 2 November 1999, the HKSAR government and the Walt Disney
Company officially announced that the HKDL deal had reached a successful
conclusion. As I mention in an abbreviated form above, elected Legislator Man
Kwong Cheung18 denounced the deal as an “Unequal Treaty” by paralleling it with
the 1842 treaty that transformed Hong Kong into a colony and that ceded it to the
British. Because secrecy characterized the deal-making process, the Hong Kong
people had no chance to discuss its details in public. Indeed, a public release of the
details came only after both of the parties had officially announced the deal’s
completion. At this time, the Commissioner for Tourism presented the details:19


A total of HK$13.6 billion would be spent on the reclamation and
development of Penny’s Bay (the then Sunny Bay), the infrastructure, and the
transportation links to HKDL.



A total of HK$14.1 billion would be required to pay for the park—HK$6.6
billion for the theme park itself and HK$7.5 billion for the hotels and all the
infrastructure supporting it. The division of HK$14.1 billion was projected as
follows:
Of the equity, the government would invest HK$3.25 billion into a jointventure company with Disney, while Disney would invest HK$2.45
billion therein. The name of the venture would be Hong Kong
International Theme Park Ltd (HKITP);
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HK$6.1 billion in government loans including capitalized interest (prime
minus 1.75% from drawdown to the eighth anniversary of the park’s
opening; prime minus 0.875% for the next eight years; and prime for the
next nine years) for 25 years;
The entire project would also be financed by a commercial loan of
HK$2.3 billion including capitalized interest.

The government needed to invest HK$22.95 billion in the joint venture in three
ways: investment in infrastructure and transportation, direct injection of cash, and
government loans to raise 57% of the Hong Kong International Theme Park Ltd
(HKITP) shares; The Walt Disney Company invested only HK$2.45 billion to get
its 43% of the shares. The government may recover its direct investment of
HK$3.25 billion because the agreement allows for the complete privatization of the
joint venture, but Disney must maintain $1.9 billion in the joint venture. Besides,
the Walt Disney Company would receive the following royalties once the park
began operations: 10% admission, 10% participant, 5% merchandise, 5% food and
beverage sales, 5% hotel revenue. The base management fee was 2% and variable
management fee ranged from 2% to 8%.20 What the Hong Kong public did not
know about the deal was whether or not the Hong Kong people would need to bear
the HKDL-related maintenance costs for all infrastructure; nor was the Hong Kong
public informed about the financial arrangement in case HKDL ran a deficit.
In mid-November 1999, after the official announcement of the completed
deal between the government and the Walt Disney Company, the government
needed approval from the Legislative Council for the funding of HK$13.569 billion
to complete the official contract with the Walt Disney Company. Legislators had
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three main concerns: the ability of the park to ensure a balanced budget, the shared
responsibility of the government and Disney if HKDL ran a deficit, and the
government’s fast-track action in asking the Legislative Council to approve the
funding without completing the environmental-impact assessment. The government
responded that it had conducted a sensitivity analysis by scaling down the projected
revenue by 20%, finding that the HKDL would still be financially viable; refused to
disclose the exact financial arrangement but said that both sides would pour money
into the park if HKDL ran a deficit; and warned that the finance of the project
would suffer and that the government would have to redo the whole financial
arrangement and assessment if the Legislative Council postponed its approval of
the funding until the release of the report of the environmental-impact assessment.21
Elected legislators belonging to the Democratic Party22 initially criticized
the government for its lack of aggressiveness relative to negotiations with the Walt
Disney Company; then, the legislators denounced the deal as unequal and criticized
the government for violation of the spirit of the law insofar as the government
sought fast-track Legislative Council approval of the funding even though no
environmental-impact assessment had been completed. Nevertheless, the legislators
in question abstained from voting on the Finance Committee; in effect, the
legislators abdicated their voting rights despite having criticized the government.
Furthermore, these legislators voted for the project in the Public Works
Subcommittee. Facing a fait accompli and fervent public approval of the HKDL
project (as shown from different public opinion polls),23 the Legislative Council
approved the HK$22.45 billion funding for the HKDL project. In the Finance
Committee, only three legislators, Emily Lau, Cyd Ho, and Christine Loh, opposed
the approval of the government-Disney joint-venture funding. On 10 December
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1999, the government and the Walt Disney Company signed five official
agreements—on shareholders, loan, license, management, and the master project
itself.

Concepts of the “imaginary”
Scholars provide various understandings of the concept of the “imaginary.” Jacques
Lacan conceives of the imaginary as a basis of a misrecognized selfhood; Benedict
Anderson couches the imaginary in political terms; Charles Taylor and Claudia
Strauss argue that social imaginaries are a “cultural model”, that is, the common
understandings through which people imagine their surroundings. For Lacan,24 the
imaginary is associated with ideal, illusion, and misrecognition. According to Lacan,
the self is a split self; the imaginary is an internalized image of an ideal whole self
that young people, during their preverbal stages, derive from an unfragmented
image that they have of their own selves. When an infant looks at a mirror and sees
his or her image wholly present, the wholeness of the image establishes itself in the
infant’s mind, where the image constitutes the infant’s ego, the concept of identity.
In other words, this mirror image is an image of wholeness—of completeness and
coherence—and reflects, for the infant, a complete and coherent internal self. Lacan
argues that this line of reasoning in the infant’s mind leads to a profound
misrecognition of what it means to be human.25 However, the mirror stage, which
ends with a sense of the self as complete, has an important social function: by
creating the subject (the self), the mirror stage enables the subject to recognize and
to interact with objects (the external world). Media scholars, for example, use
Lacan’s theory to explain how the subject identifies with screen images to fulfill his
or her desire to achieve oneness, to replace our permanent lack with completeness.
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Anderson interprets the meaning of the imaginary by associating it with the
concept of “nation.” He argues that the development of print capitalism in the
eighteenth century standardized and disseminated vernacular print languages and
social concerns. The common language was “fixed” as the “national” language,
through which people communicated and exchanged ideas. The common concerns
raised by the print media also constructed an imagination of a community, the
nation, in which people share common concerns at the same time. To Anderson, the
community is “imagined” because nationalism encourages members of the
community to imagine that they share not only the same language but also the same
concerns, although “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most
of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them.”26 Anderson further
explains:

It is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality
and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as
a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately, it is this fraternity that makes it
possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so
much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.27

Anderson argues that media play a critical role in the construction of these
imagined communities because the widespread nature of communication processes
help construct national identity and other forms of community.
In contrast to Anderson, Charles Taylor argues that the social imaginary is
not an idealized understanding of things but rather a matter of complex
understandings in which both facts and norms play important roles. The social
imaginary affects people’s perceptions of how things are (facts) and people’s
perceptions of how things should be (norms):28
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I want to speak of social imaginary here, rather than social theory, because
there are important—and multiple—differences between the two. I speak of
imaginary because I’m talking about the way ordinary people ‘imagine’
their social surroundings, and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms;
it is carried in images, stories, and legends. But it is also the case that theory
is usually the possession of a small minority, whereas what is interesting in
the social imaginary is that it is shared by large groups of people, if not the
whole society. Which leads to a third difference: the social imaginary is that
common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely
shared sense of legitimacy. In addition, we should note that what start off as
theories held by a few people may come to infiltrate the social imaginary,
first that of elites, perhaps, and then of society as a whole. The social
imaginary is that common understanding that makes possible common
practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy.29

Building on this theory, Claudia Strauss argues that Taylor’s social imaginary “fits
cognitive authropologists’ conception of cultural models” 30 because cultural
models are also widely shared and they are implicit schemas for people to interpret
the world and their behavior. Cultural-model theorists further argue that there is
more than one cultural model and that cultural models affect people’s behavior to
different extents and in different ways.
Although it seems that Lacan, Anderson, Taylor, and Strauss hold
conceptions of the “imaginary” that differ from one another, and although the
theorists’ use of the same word ranges from the self, to community, nation, and
culture, there are certain similarities among these distinct conceptions. The first two
theorists differ from one another in terms of their focus on the self and the
community respectively, but they both argue that the imaginary is a misrecognition:
a mind that inaccurately recognizes a complete himself or a complete herself—a
complete self; people that inaccurately recognize a community—a cohesive group.
Whereas Lacan treats the imaginary as a universal aspect of the human condition,
Anderson, Taylor, and Strauss suggest that the imaginary of a community, a nation,
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or a social surrounding, is reproduced on a regular and mundane basis. Different
from the first two, Taylor’s and Strauss’ social-imaginary model implies a dialogic
relationship between the elite minority and the “ordinary” majority—that social
theory can integrate itself into the social imaginary and, also, that the social
imaginary can derive its form and content from “below.”
Having examined various HKSAR government officials’ public speeches
and the news reports regarding the HKDL project, I argue that the HKSAR
government attempted to sell the HKDL project to the public in two ways: first, the
HKSAR government appropriated certain social imaginaries (in particular, the
“Chineseness plus” model of cultural identity) that appealed to the majority of
Hong Kong people and that encouraged them to imagine Hong Kong’s acquisition
of Disneyland as the key to Hong Kong’s transformation into a “world city”;
second, the HKDL consolidated for the Hong Kong public the imaginary according
to which a city’s status as a “world city”31 depends on the city’s ability to
successfully compete in the era of globalization. To highlight the assertion that
Hong Kong’s importation of Disneyland would enable Hong Kong to become a
world city in the twenty-first century, the HKSAR government developed two
already available discourses—the competition-development discourse and the
disappearing-world-city discourse. The first discourse reproduces the necessity for
development politics in the midst of global competition; the second discourse plays
on Hong Kong’s fears that Hong Kong, itself, was disappearing from the world
economy and it catered to Hong Kong’s dream of being a twenty-first-century
world city.
In late colonial times, Hong Kong had often been seen as a cosmopolitan
“East-meets-West” city and an emphasis on urban development was common
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because of the colonial government’s heavy reliance on property tax32 and on the
“success” and the wealth that Hong Kong people had attained33 under
industrialization that started in the 1960s. Under the post-Handover context, the
HKSAR government appropriated the colonial “East-meets-West” cosmopolitan
image of Hong Kong and the colonial politics of development to interpret the
economic doldrums that Hong Kong was facing in 1999. Hong Kong was seen as
disappearing34 in both economic terms and political terms because of urban
development in China, severe regional competition in the Asia Pacific region, and
ironically, the “successful” Handover; Hong Kong would soon disappear if the
Hong Kong people did not face competition positively—only with “development”
could Hong Kong turn “from adversity to opportunity,”35 from a disappearing city
to a world city. Hong Kong should grasp the opportunity to establish Disneyland,
for the brand “Disney” with its huge sign value, would help Hong Kong achieve the
world-city status.
Certainly, the HKSAR government’s “world city” imaginary is not
necessarily the cultural model embraced by the “people.” Following Claudia
Strauss in studying “the imaginaries of real people, not the imaginaries of imagined
people,”36 here I study imaginaries on two levels. In this chapter, I study the
HKSAR government’s attempt to characterize Disneyland as a significant import
that would help Hong Kong achieve the “world city” imaginary; in the next chapter,
I examine my respondents’ various social imaginations in relation to the HKDL
project. Although the HKSAR government followed the British colonial
government in prioritizing economic development and in offering Hong Kong
citizens limited rights,37 and although the HKSAR government consciously and
unconsciously constructed the ideal citizen-subject as economistic and
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individualistic through education reform38 and welfare policies,39 various
respondents’ uses of HKDL indicate that Hong Kong citizen-subjects are multiple
and not merely economistic.

The HKSAR government’s economic “world city” imagination
As discussed in chapter One, after the late 1960s and during British rule, a local
consciousness took shape among Hong Kong people. This local consciousness
projected China as Other. In the early 1980s, Hong Kong people’s fears of the
change of sovereignty from the capitalist British to the socialist Chinese regime
became a critical negotiation chip for the British government in the related SinoBritish negotiations.40 The negotiations resulted in the “one country, two systems”
policies, and the Sino-British Agreement of 1984 guaranteed that “the economic,
legal and social system in Hong Kong and its citizens’ way of life will remain in
force for fifty years after 1997.”41 In the mid 1980s, the colonial government,
facing democratization demands from professionals and “pressure groups,” also
initiated limited democratic reforms. In 1985, the Hong Kong government
increased the number of indirectly elected Legislative Council seats from twelve to
twenty-four. According to Alvin So,42 in late 1985, Beijing made known its
disapproval of any further democratic reforms carried out by the Hong Kong
government before the installation of the Basic Law, which was drafted in the
Mainland instead of Hong Kong and determined Hong Kong’s future political
structure. Because of the Tiananmen incident in 1989, London asked for faster
democratization in Hong Kong and in 1992, Chris Patten became the last Governor
of Hong Kong. Since the Basic Law was already promulgated, Patten announced
the Legislative Reform Bill in 1993 and reinterpreted the Basic Law’s definition of
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“functional constituencies” (occupational group) so that the election base rose from
110,000 to virtually 2.7 million adult workers, meaning virtually every adult worker
could vote for the 1995 Legislative Council election.
In 1997, however, the public experienced a backlash against
democratization. Arguing that Patten’s political reforms violated the Basic Law, on
30 June 1997, the Beijing Authorities dissolved the Legislative Council, which had
been elected in 1995 and would have served beyond 1997 for institutional
continuity. The Provisional Legislative Council also repealed and amended some
laws passed by the colonial Legislative Council and passed some new laws such as
the Public Order Ordinance, which required police permission for demonstrations
involving over 30 people. Furthermore, the Basic Law authorized by the Beijing
authorities stipulated that the Chief Executive of the HKSAR government in 1997
was to be elected by a 400-member electoral commission instead of by popular
election.43 In short, in late colonial times, Patten tried to articulate democracy with
Hong Kong’s “way of life”;44 in post-colonial times, the Beijing authorities slowed
down Hong Kong’s democratization process.45
To earn public approval, then, the new HKSAR government sought to direct
Hong Kong people’s desires away from democratization and toward economic
concerns. Right after the Handover, however, Hong Kong, as was the case with
other Asian countries such as Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia,
experienced the Asian financial crisis, which resulted in a steep decline in property
and stock markets, in asset values, in inbound tourism, and in the local economy. To
attain political legitimacy, the new regime has concentrated on strengthening Hong
Kong’s economic competitiveness and on resolving Hong Kong’s socio-economic
problems such as a bubble economy, de-industrialization, and the widening gap
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between the rich and the poor.46
To revitalize the economy, starting in 1998, the HKSAR government
attempted to appropriate part of the Hong Kong people’s existing social
imaginary—Hong Kong people’s desire for cultural distinction from other cities.
The government used this appropriation to transform post-colonial Hong Kong into
a “world city” and, thus, to avoid the possibility that Hong Kong would become just
another Chinese city after the Handover. To re-negotiate its world position,
therefore, Hong Kong needed to strengthen ties with not only the Mainland but also
with global companies such as Disney.47
In 1997, when Tung Chee Hwa, the Chief Executive of the HKSAR
government, delivered his first policy address (also the HKSAR government’s first
policy address under the People’s Republic of China), he said in his introduction
that the Hong Kong people needed to face two aspects of “the new era”48: the
Handover and the world economy. In view of China’s remarkable economic growth
since the 1978 reforms, Tung stated that the Handover brought Hong Kong only
benefits: “Our country has bright prospects from which Hong Kong is sure to
benefit” (clause 3). However, he also warned the Hong Kong people that under the
global economy, Hong Kong faced “open, free and borderless competition” (clause
4) and that the city needed long-term planning to “set new courses for
development” (clause 4). However, Tung was optimistic about global competition
because Hong Kong was a cosmopolitan city with hybrid cultures that enabled the
Hong Kong people to face challenges under global competition:

Ours is a cosmopolitan city. Our ability to embrace the cultures of East and
West is one of the secrets of our success, shaping a unique social culture of
our own. (clause 111)
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Experiencing the ailing local economy after the Asian financial turmoil, Tung in his
1998 policy address argued that Hong Kong needed to acquire more economic
connections and to re-position itself to become a cosmopolitan city. And the way to
become a cosmopolitan city was to strengthen networks with China, to become the
gateway to China, and also to become a “bridge” to the “international community”:

As China passes through the different phases of modernization, Hong Kong
will have different roles to play and new functions to perform…. We must
now consider how to reinforce our role as the bridge between China and the
international community…. We must … expand further our business links
and economic co-operation with the Mainland49…. We have studied the
roles of New York and London, which are not only the most cosmopolitan
cities in America and Europe respectively, but are also international
financial centers, tourist destinations, homes for the headquarters of multinational corporations and international communication and transportation
centers. I believe that Hong Kong too has the potential to become, not only
a major city within one country, but also the most cosmopolitan city in
Asia.50

Tung did not elaborate on the meaning of “cosmopolitan city” in his policy address,
but he cited New York and London as exemplars of his ideal cosmopolitan city. By
simply equating cosmopolitan cities to “international financial centers, tourist
destinations, homes for the headquarters of multi-national corporations and
international communication and transportation centers,” Tung restricted the
meaning of “cosmopolitan city” to strictly economic terms and ignored the
democratic and pluralistic cultural values held by these vibrant cities. Although
“cosmopolitan city” became the HKSAR government’s objective for Hong Kong,
China as a country and the neighboring Chinese cities were seen as support for—
instead of a hindrance to—Hong Kong’s objective.
In the 1999 policy address, a month before the completion of the HKSAR
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government-Disney deal, Tung re-stated the government’s determination to
transform “Hong Kong into a prosperous, attractive and knowledge-based, worldclass city”51 on a par with New York City and London, but the urgency underlying
this transformation concerned a fear of disappearance under fierce competition with
other cities, especially the Chinese ones:

Two decades of rapid economic growth on the Mainland have continued to
narrow the gap between Hong Kong and the key cities there.… Unless we
consciously improve, our lead will disappear.52

A comparison of the three policy addresses reveals that, from 1997 to 1999, the
government was modifying the idea of Hong Kong’s position in relation to the
world. In 1997, Hong Kong was a cosmopolitan city; in 1998, Hong Kong was no
longer a cosmopolitan city but struggling to be one. In 1997, China was an
important supporter of Hong Kong’s future development53; in 1999, China cities
were Hong Kong’s official competitors under the globalized economy and Hong
Kong’s leading position was disappearing because of these competitors’ rapid
development.
According to the government, the fear that Hong Kong was a city
disappearing from the global scene stemmed from the Handover, as well as from
global and regional competition. At the media briefing session of the official
announcement of the HKSAR government-Disney deal, Mike Rowse, the Tourism
Commissioner, stated directly that “Hong Kong was disappearing”:

We kind of faded from the spotlight a little bit since 1997 when I know
many people just wrote us off—that was the end of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
was disappearing and would gently decline from thereon.54
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According to this rhetoric, a “disappearing” Hong Kong would be a logical
outcome not simply of economic trends but also of politics. Right after the
completion of the HKSAR-Disney deal, Mike Rowse warned again that Hong Kong
people had lost, in addition to money during the financial crisis, their peculiar
identity after the Handover:

Then came 1997 when we suffered a double blow; the Asian economic
crisis reduced the level of regional travel; and the political transition meant
we lost our allure as the last major historical anomaly.55

By connecting with the mega-transnational brand Disney, the government
suggested that the joint-venture between the HKSAR government and the Walt
Disney Company endowed Hong Kong with huge transnational sign value and
helped Hong Kong achieve both a Chinese image and a world-city image within a
Western-dominated global system. Disney’s investment in Hong Kong reaffirmed
the hope that Hong Kong was still “alive,” according to Mike Rowse:

… what this [the Walt Disney Company] project tells the world is that Hong
Kong is still alive and kicking and we are aiming high. We are not going to
decline. We are going to grow from where we were and develop, and we are
aiming to be among the world’s top cities.56

The name “Disney” may elsewhere signal the sanitization process of Forty-second
Street in New York under gentrification57 or the affluent Japanese people’s ability to
own and manage an American Disneyland according to Japanese cultural
precepts.58 In the case of HKDL, however, Disney’s utopian appeal for the HKSAR
government was the possibility that Disney could help Hong Kong attain or
maintain world-city status, an antidote to the possibility that Hong Kong was a
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disappearing city under a globalized economy. When, on behalf of his government,
Secretary for Economic Services Stephen Ip signed the Master Project Agreement
with the Walt Disney Company, he said that the joint-venture represented “a happy
marriage between a world class tourist attraction and a world class tourist
destination.”59

Media portrayal: HKSAR city status and pro-development politics
Having examined most Hong Kong newspapers (both in Chinese and English) that
appeared between October 1998 (when rumors started to spread that Disney might
build a new park in Asia) and November 1999 (when the joint-venture contract was
signed by the government and Disney), I can attest that a majority of Hong Kong
popular newspapers and TV channels60 expressed approval of the HKSAR
government-Disney joint-venture HKDL project, although these media
simultaneously voiced reservations. Because the deal evolved largely in secrecy,
most related media discussions lacked comprehensiveness and substance. The
major reason for the media’s explicit approval of the HKDL project hinged on the
media’s general support for urban development, especially after the Asian financial
crisis in 1997; in their view, HKDL would bring Hong Kong people not only
income, through park operations, but also fame, which in turn would bring Hong
Kong society greater foreign investment and greater economic returns. In what
follows, I discuss how news reports highlighted competition between Hong Kong
and other Chinese cities, especially Shanghai, and how these media reports echoed
the HKSAR government’s pair of discourses, the competition-development
discourse and the disappearing-world-city discourse. I will show, as well, that the
media reports couch the world-city utopia only in economic terms, without
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considering the reinforcing effect that the HKSAR government-Disney alliance
would have on local non-transparent and non-democratic governance.
The HKDL project became a prominent topic in Hong Kong news reports
after October 1998, a year before the official announcement of the project. As soon
as there emerged the rumor that a Disneyland park might be built in Asia and that
Disney was considering Hong Kong for the role of host, news reports highlighted
competition between Hong Kong and other cities. In mid-October 1998, Tin Tin
Daily, Ta Kung Pao, Wen Wei Po, Sing Tao Daily, The Standard, and Ming Pao
Daily News reported that a Disneyland park would be built in Mainland China,
possibly in Hong Kong or Zhuhai.61 In reporting the news, the press highlighted the
keen competition that Hong Kong was facing for the opportunity to host the park:
Zhuhai officials actively held talks with Disney officials in Los Angeles about the
theme-park plan,62 but the HKSAR government declined to comment and local
politicians clamored over the government’s lethargic attitude. A few months later,
after news had spread that Zhuhai had withdrawn its bid, the press reported that
Shanghai was in fact Hong Kong’s major rival. In early March 1999, Hong Kong
people were reading almost daily news reports about a Hong Kong-Shanghai
rivalry over the right to host Disneyland park; moreover, these reports were
appearing in the newspapers’ main section. For example, all major newspapers
including Apple Daily, Ming Pao Daily News, the finance-oriented Economic Times,
and the pro-Beijing publication Ta Kung Pao reported on 6 March 1999 that,
according to Shanghai Mayor Xu Guangdi, Shanghai and Disney had signed a letter
of intent to conduct a feasibility study.63 After his remarks, major features reported
that Mr. Xu had openly noted Shanghai’s comparative advantages over Hong Kong;
that HKSAR Economic Services Secretary Stephen Ip had sent an affirmative reply
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to the media regarding Hong Kong’s advantages in hosting Disneyland64; that,
according to financial analysts and column writers, Hong Kong and Shanghai had
various advantages over one another in hosting a Disney park65; and that each city
could have a Disney park.66
Competition among cities or countries is prominent in the Disneyland
history, and Disney has expertly pit potential locations against each other to attain
better deals and to escape from certain government regulations. Orlando finally
won the right to host the Disney Kingdom over thirteen other venues in the eastern
United States in the 1960s; while Disney originally identified 1,200 possible sites
for the establishment of Euro Disneyland, and France, Spain, Portugal, Germany,
Italy, and Great Britain were all competitors. France’s Paris competed severely with
Spain’s Barcelona. Spain’s minister of tourism and transport once expressed
personal determination to host Disneyland, “We want to obtain Disneyland at any
price!”67 Finally, Disney opted for Paris. The Orlando case shows that cities
compete with one another within a country, and the France-Spain contest illustrates
competition between countries. Unlike Orlando and France, however, Hong Kong
competed with both other countries and domestic cities; that is, with foreign Asian
cities such as Singapore, Taipei, and Bangkok, and with domestic cities in the
Mainland such as Hengqin Island in Zhuhai, Guilin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.68
Describing the resulting bidding as “tussle,” “war,” and “rivalry,”69 press outlets
such as The HK Economic Times, The Hong Kong Standard, and Ming Pao Daily
News successively analyzed the competitive advantages that Hong Kong possessed
over other cities, especially the Chinese ones, in hosting the Disney park.70 The
emphasis on competition between Hong Kong and other cities produced a fear
among Hong Kong people that many neighboring cities such as Singapore or
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Shanghai would soon surpass Hong Kong. In evaluating Asian cities’ own
advantages with regard to hosting a Disney theme park, local press highlighted the
assertion that, in 1999, Singapore had replaced Hong Kong by receiving the highest
score of the annual Index of Economic Freedom published by the Heritage
Foundation,71 and the Chairman of the Bank of East Asia David Li Kwok Po said
that Shanghai would bypass Hong Kong in the future.72
These reports and analyses heightened Hong Kong people’s fear that their
home, Hong Kong, was plunging into decline:

Shanghai and Hong Kong compete to build Disneyland, and the competition
reminds Hong Kong people again that this Mainland industrial and
commercial mega-city is a more threatening competitor than Singapore … if
Hong Kong is complacent and does not seek to make progress, it will be
surpassed by Shanghai sooner or later…. Mainland achieved success in
finance reform and Shanghai can be the international finance center. Once
China opens its currency, transnational companies will certainly be attracted
to move headquarters to Shanghai, and such acts will strengthen Shanghai
and weaken Hong Kong, and therefore Hong Kong must prepare… 73

The competition between Hong Kong and other cities concerns not only the issues
of Disneyland but also the city’s status as an international finance center, an
international tourism destination, and a shopping and horse-racing paradise. On this
topic, one columnist wrote:

Recently, Hong Kong people felt the clutch of fear in viewing competition
around us: Singapore competes with us for the securities market, Shenzhen
for consumer market, Shanghai for Disneyland, Macau for horse-racing, etc.
The world seems to be increasingly constricted, and people increasingly not
upholding justice.74

By constantly emphasizing the severe regional and international competition
that Hong Kong was facing, these reports and analyses in the news media tended to
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support the secret HKSAR government-Disney deal, which promised to extract
Hong Kong from the economic doldrums that followed the Asian financial crisis.
News-media argued that the park would be good for Hong Kong tourism
development, for Hong Kong’s retail industry, and for Hong Kong’s employment
situation.75 Few local news-media outlets except Hong Kong Economic Times76
questioned the alleged economic revitalization that Disneyland would bring to the
Hong Kong economy. Although the press voiced reservations about the project’s
cost-and-returns,77 about the secrecy of the deal,78 and about the ecological damage
to Lantau Island,79 among other topics,80 these reservations were of secondary
importance in comparison to HKDL, which so many people and institutions
positioned as a project that could resurrect Hong Kong’s long-lost “cosmopolitan”
status (i.e. “East-meets-West” was the clichéd phrase). The day after the official
announcement of the HKSAR government-Disney deal on the HKDL project,
Apple Daily devoted four full pages—entitled “Millennium Dream Comes True”—
to cover stories that declared the paper’s full support of the project81; Ming Pao
Daily News welcomed the deal because HKDL could reinforce the image of Hong
Kong as an international tourist center and thus could stimulate other industries82;
pro-Mainland and pro-HKSAR government press such as Wen Wei Po repeated
Mike Rowse’s views: many people thought that Hong Kong was disappearing from
the international scene, but the HKDL project announced to the world that Hong
Kong was on its way to being one of the most important cities in the world.83 Other
reports affirmed that HKDL could boost Hong Kong’s international image, attract
foreign investment, raise Hong Kong’s service quality, develop Hong Kong as an
important tourist site in Asia, and change Hong Kong’s future development
trajectory.84
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Local news reports and comments tended to create a prevailing narrative
according to which Hong Kong needed to accept pro-development and pro-business
politics to reverse its ailing economy and to overcome regional competition. The
existence of this prevailing narrative does not lead me to conclude that news actors
colluded with government officials; rather, as Fred Chiu argues in his renarrativization of the Hong Kong “Handover” issue, Hong Kong media failed to
document complicated issues and succeeded in representing them in a binary
form.85 Chiu argues that, regarding the Handover, media neglected the many
different groups and local social-movement agents and concentrated on only two
groups, the official representatives of Britain and the PRC for their oppositional
stance. Because of the binary nature of the media reports, the alternative voices of
dissenters were lost in the framework of “prosperity” and “stability.” This simplistic
coverage extended to and affected the Handover itself.
In the same way, Hong Kong’s news media has used binary logic to
narrativize problems that Hong Kong society has faced since both the Handover
and the Asian financial crisis; consequently, the news media’s reports and
comments on the HKDL project reflected chiefly the government’s competitiondevelopment discourse and the government’s disappearing-world-city discourse.
The binary nature of these two discourses (that under severe city-city competition
in a world economy, only pro-development politics could transform Hong Kong
from a “disappearing” city into a world city) creates a simple framework in which
media can easily analyze the HKDL issue. Underneath the pro-growth rhetoric,
both the government and local press suggested that there is only one world system:
competing cities in a global economy86; there is also only one criterion by which we
can evaluate cities—economic power. Alliances between cities that are competing
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against one another have only one purpose: to overcome even greater competition
from another city or from another alliance of cities; hence, the extended
metropolitan region of the Pearl River Delta comprising Hong Kong, Macau, and
Zhuhai counters another of the Mainland’s extended metropolitan regions, the
Yangtze River Delta of Shanghai, southern Jiangsu Province, and northern Zhejiang
Province. By successfully connecting with powerful transnational corporations such
as Disney, Hong Kong could clear its international image from shrouds of gloom,
could better compete against other cities, and could attract more foreign
investment.87

“Chinese or not Chinese, that is the question”: HKSAR tourism policy
A significant cultural issue for the newly established HKSAR government after the
Handover was the Hong Kong people’s unwillingness to identify as Chinese and
their preference for an identity based on Heung Gong Yan (Hong Kong people). A
1997 survey conducted by the University of Hong Kong found that almost 60% of
the respondents considered themselves Hongkongese and only 38% Chinese, and
this ethnic identification did not change in 1999.88 Decolonization and renationalization become one of the major tasks of the HKSAR government after the
Handover. Re-nationalization has been difficult to accomplish because the HKSAR
government, on the one hand, would like to promote the idea of nation and to
integrate the Hong Kong people into the wider populations of Mainland Chinese,
and because, on the other hand, the HKSAR government must not harm Hong
Kong’s international status.89 This tension of re-nationalization manifests itself in
the government’s oscillation between nationalist integration and globalist economic
networking—an oscillation that has resulted in the emergence of a cosmopolitan
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business-oriented nationalism. Crystallizing this trend is the government’s civiceducation advertising campaign that began in 2004 and whose principal slogan is,
“The heart is tied to the home country; ambition looks out on the world.”90
Parallel to this oscillation between nationalist integration and globalized
economic networking is the HKSAR government’s tourism policy. In tourism, the
“identity” of the host society depends on the presence and the gaze of the tourists.
Scholarship on the formation of self and identity generally often posits that the
affirmation of the self depends on the gaze of the Other. Giddens, for example,
argues that the self is conditioned through its ongoing interactions with others;
identity is what the self conceives of itself. For the specific conditions of tourism,
Lanfant argues that host societies often “construct an imaginary place for an Other,
and an image of self which seduces both self and Other.”91 Accordingly, Edward
Bruner coins the term “touristic borderzone”92 to describe an actual place where
tourists and local performers meet and where the two perform their parts. The
formation of identity in these accounts is not as autonomous as we imagine;
however, this does not mean that only exogenous force contributes to the
re/formulation of local identity and the presentation of self. In tourism, the host
society always experiences the process of constructing its own image, and it is the
host society that decides its own image, and by communicating with tourists, the
host society guarantees the circulation of that image.93
Pang and Sum94 argue respectively that the ambiguous HKSAR “Eastmeets-West” tourism policy circulates two contrasting tourist discourses for two
types of tourists. For Western tourists, there is a discourse that stages an exotic
Oriental past and religious activities; for Chinese tourists, there is a discourse that
represents contemporary Hong Kong life as a vast array of transnational consumer
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products epitomizing modern, capitalist, and Western ways of life. Both discourses
ignore colonial history and colonial culture, and both induce visitors to feel safe as
they consume their imaginary Other. Pang further argues that although they seem to
differ from each other, the two discourses emphasize simply fantasy—not
heterogeneity, which is Hong Kong’s reality.95
Contributing to these two tourism discourses is the Hong Kong Tourism
Board, a government body whose job is “to market and promote Hong Kong as a
destination worldwide.” Part of the board’s promotion efforts is the Discover Hong
Kong website. The “Heritage” section of this website contains multiple references
to Hong Kong’s colonial past, chiefly in connection with monuments’ architectural
styles. For example, the building that houses the Legislative Council chambers
suggests both the influence that Western colonialism has had on Hong Kong and the
autonomy of Hong Kong’s government. Of course, this two-fold suggestion is
implicit. The website stresses, quite explicitly, the building’s “neo-classical style.”
Other descriptions include the “bandaged” brickwork of the Western market,
“Baroque-Rococo look” of Helena May, the “Greek revival style” of the Former
Central Magistracy. As du Cros96 argues, although the Hong Kong Tourism Board’s
tourism-marketing strategy introduces colonial and Western heritage assets, it does
not deal with these heritage assets’ role in colonial history. For example, The Peak
was an example of racial prejudice up until the Second World War, because it was a
European enclave where Chinese were forbidden to build. However, little of this
history is noted in Hong Kong Tourism Board brochures.
In promoting cultural tourism, the Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa in 1998
declared, “We need also to look at ways of better presenting to the world our
distinctive heritage.”97 However, the Tourism Board’s Discover Hong Kong website
137

either presents the old colonial buildings in reference merely to their architectural
style or it characterizes long-standing Chinese customs such as feng shui, tai chi,
and kung fu as Hong Kong’s traditions.98 As Chan, Ip, and Leung argue,

The so-called “unique flavor” of Hong Kong is simply understood as “Eastmeets-West culture,” a very broad term that is never clearly defined in terms
of its essential socio-political content…. To explain how these two forms of
culture might have met would involve a deeper understanding of colonial
history. But this historical “meeting” would never be articulated in the form
of the “cultural tourism” that the government intended to develop.99

Chinese tourists’ spending has been the biggest contributor to total tourist spending
in Hong Kong since 1997.100 Hong Kong is exotic and extraordinary to Mainlander
Chinese because it was, until recently, an essentially Chinese population under
British colonial rule. Now that Hong Kong has divorced itself from this colonial
rule, Hong Kong must—in order to maintain its distinctiveness, its exoticism and
extraordinariness—devise another powerful symbol to create an unusual, attractive
touring experience. In this context, I would suggest that HKDL has become a good
replacement for the colonial narrative insofar as HKDL, as a timeless and placeless
spectacle, enables the HKSAR government to re-narrativize Hong Kong’s “Eastmeets-West” clichés without damaging the government’s re-nationalization project.
As a tourist product, HKDL, by replacing the colonial landscape and by conjuring
up images of a glittering consumerist dreamscape, suppresses the legacy of latecolonial democratization and reformulates the image of Hong Kong as a businessoriented cosmopolitan world city. The consumerist cosmopolitan world-city image
is also offered as a self image for Hong Kong people. HKDL solidifies Hong
Kong’s reputation as a “shopping paradise” for tourists, and the narrative once
again positions Hong Kong people as both enterprising and consumerist individuals
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who are outwardly looking and upwardly aspiring: that is to say, as perfect
apolitical cosmopolitan subjects.101 Consumption-based “ways of life” seemingly
become the only right that Hong Kong people demand. The “West,” as represented
by Disney in Hong Kong, entails no democracy—no one-head-one-vote election—
but, rather, non-threatening popular-cultural industries that allow and encourage
government’s fast-track planning-and-development practices.
HKDL boosts more than local economic development; it boosts the
government’s political legitimacy, as well. The HKSAR government assumed office
on 1 July 1997 and had been functioning for only two years when the HKDL
negotiations got underway. In the immediate aftermath of colonialism, many postcolonial populations greet their new governments with enthusiasm. In contrast to
this trend, the Hong Kong people registered a lukewarm response to the HKSAR
government and even questioned and challenged the government because of its
undemocratic election procedure. Public support for the new regime initially
showed signs of promise but gradually dropped from July 1997 to January 1999.102
The Disneyland project did, in fact, raise the Hong Kong people’s confidence in
their government. Research shows that the HKSAR government’s successful efforts
to host Disneyland in Hong Kong increased the government’s popularity among the
Hong Kong people: a survey conducted by Hong Kong Policy Research Institute
Ltd. found that 37% of 967 respondents had more confidence in the HKSAR
government after the success of the Disneyland deal in 1999 than they had had
before the deal.103
The strengthening effects that HKDL has had on the HKSAR government
are evident internationally, as well as locally. On 23 November 1999, the HKSAR
government launched the tourism-promotion event “Millennium Hong Kong—The
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Dragon’s Spirit” at the Customs House in Sydney.104 At the event, Anson Chan, the
ex-Chief Secretary, said that the HKDL project demonstrated the determined
leadership role that the HKSAR government had played in directing Hong Kong’s
recovery from the Asian financial crisis. The government aimed to turn Hong Kong
away from its over-reliance on property and develop a more knowledge-based
society through the establishment of HKDL. Through implementing the HKDL
project, then, the HKSAR government strengthens its political legitimacy inwardly
and outwardly.

Conclusion
In analyzing the HKSAR government’s tourism policy, Pang argues that
Hong Kong is sold as “the city of sight”105 offering surface and spectacle “at the
expense of any historical relevance,”106 whereas Sum describes Hong Kong as “a
site of play”107 for selling “simulacrum-East and colonial-West identity”108 during
the colonial period and then simulacrum-Eastern heritage and customs to the
Westerners and simulacrum-Western ways of consumption to the Mainlanders after
the Handover. These two writers emphasize that the commodity on sale in Hong
Kong is a fantasy instead of a reality.
Instead of conceiving of the simulacrum as depthless, cultureless, and
homogeneous as Baudrillard109 and Jameson110 do, I would like to employ Gilles
Deleuze’s account of simulacrum to highlight differences among simulacra—
differences that stem from different processes of production and “conditions of their
reproduction.”111 In his reading of the theory of Platonic Ideas and the distinctions
between copies and simulacra, Deleuze argues that the Platonic view defined copies
as “well-grounded claimants” (p. 47) possessing the internal essence of the
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foundation, a resemblance to the Idea, and that this resemblance “must not be
understood as an external correspondence” (p. 48). The Platonic explanation of the
simulacrum, however, is as a “groundless claim,” that is, one having a resemblance
to the original but with the greatest degree of discernible difference from it (p. 48).
Although a simulacrum is still recognizable as a derivation from a model, it is not
actually a “degraded copy” or a poor copy of the original because, unlike the copy,
the simulacrum possesses inner dynamics different from those of the original.
Deleuze then uses the example of human beings in Christian theology to elaborate
his argument: “God made man in His own image and to resemble Him, but through
sin, man has lost the resemblance while retaining the image. Having lost a moral
existence in order to enter into an aesthetic one, we have become simulacra” (p. 48).
According to Deleuze, by inquiring into the direction of the simulacrum,
Plato discovers that “the simulacrum is not a false copy, but that it calls into
question the very notions of the copy … and of the model” (p. 47). Meaghan Morris
further argues that, in this account, simulacra “throw into question the validity of
the model/copy distinction—and thus the theory of Ideas.”112 It is because
simulacra are copies that “have successfully broken out of the copy mold”113 by
changing their own nature and by consequently becoming originals:

... the multiplied, stylized images take on a life of their own. The thrust of
the process is not to become an equivalent of the “model” but to turn against
it and its world in order to open a new space for the simulacrum’s own mad
proliferation. The simulacrum affirms its own difference. It is not an
implosion, but a differentiation; it is an index not of absolute proximity, but
of galactic distances.114

Hence, as Deleuze argues, the simulacrum contains subversive power, “a positive
power which negates both original and copy, both model and reproduction.”115
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Massumi also suggests that the danger of a simulacrum lies in its “masked
difference”; instead of in its “manifest resemblance,” because the external
resemblance is only an illusion that masks the simulacrum’s own life force. A
simulacrum is not empty in its cultural meaning but a product of a particular
context; the way to evaluate the simulacrum should focus on differences instead of
sameness.116
Disneylands, in that sense, though often characterized as timeless and
placeless, are simulacra produced in a particular time-space, which has its own
social significance. John Findlay argues that the first Disneyland’s success as a
cultural landscape in Anaheim is attributable to the Disneyland’s celebration of
southern California: that is, to the Disneyland’s role as a vehicle in which visitors
could escape from the surrounding and confusing metropolitan area.117 In Orlando,
Tokyo, Paris, and Hong Kong, each area’s Disneyland discarded this original
meaning (the escape from American urban life) because of the different cultural
processes of production. Hong Kong owns the fifth “original” Disneyland park,
which is neither the antithesis of the congested dirty urban landscape of Los
Angeles in the 1950s nor the remake of the American consumption system to be
found in Tokyo,118 but rather the deployment of both a “superficial” consumerist
popular culture and the “Disney” brand of “world-city” imagination.
To conclude this chapter, I would like to review its chief points. Under the
globalized economy, state power is far from diminishing. In the case of HKDL, the
HKSAR government made use of the global brand Disney (in the form of the
HKSAR-Disney joint-venture HKDL project) to realize four objectives. First,
through the establishment of the HKDL project, the government successfully
established its own legitimacy. Second, the HKSAR government used HKDL’s
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Western identity to rewrite the “East-meets-West” mythology and distinguish Hong
Kong from other Chinese cities on the basis not of political aspirations but of
cultural, cosmopolitan, and consumption-based ways of life. This redefinition of
Hong Kong identity does not challenge either Beijing authorities or its own
undemocratic rule. Third, the HKSAR government used HKDL and its related
tourism policy to reformulate the city’s utopian future as a business-oriented
prosperous world city. Fourth, HKDL encourages Hong Kong people to aspire to be
cosmopolitan entrepreneurs and consumerists who neither sacrifice their nationalist
sentiments nor demand democratization.
The disappearing-world-city discourse and the competition-development
discourse regulate the public’s “frame of reference” in three ways. First, the two
discourses encourage Hong Kong people, collectively and as a city, to seek
economic power in a global-local framework. Second, the two discourses together
see the extent of a city’s relative economic power as the most important criterion
for evaluating a city’s worth. Third, the two discourses articulate Hong Kong
people’s desires for both economic rebound and cultural distinctions. According to
several public opinion polls, Hong Kong people fervently embraced the project,
suggesting that the HKSAR government has, at least to some extent, successfully
reconstituted its subjects’ frame of reference regarding local and global issues and
has, with equal success, channeled potentially democratizing energies into the an
apolitical cosmopolitan subjectivity. In the following chapter, I will identify and
examine the particular dreams that Disney brought to Hong Kong people in relation
to their fears and desires, personally and nationally.
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Chapter Four
Do Dreams Come True?

In the last chapter, I argued that Hong Kong’s city-state power is far from
diminishing in the globalization process. Facing Hong Kong’s change of
sovereignty and the rise of Chinese cities, the HKSAR government established
connections with the Walt Disney Company and imported the seemingly
“contextless” and entertainment-based Disneyland into Hong Kong. The HKSAR
government has used this import to paint Hong Kong’s postcolonial landscape—
that is, to renew Hong Kong’s image as a world city of Asia whose status is based
not on democratization but on economic prowess. To win public approval of the
government-Disney joint venture, the HKSAR government mobilized two
discourses—the competition-development discourse and the disappearing-worldcity discourse—to highlight the assertion that HKDL would transform Hong Kong
into a twenty-first-century world city.
The previous chapter identifies three institutional sources of power:
HKSAR government officials, the tourism board, and media. I have discussed how
the HKSAR government appropriated three powerful aspects of Hong Kong culture:
Chineseness plus elements, fear of disappearance, and pursuit of a world-city
imaginary. We have also seen how the government narrowly defined globalization
as world economy and measured a city’s worth on the basis merely of economic
terms. Under the globalized economy, Hong Kong is developing its symbolic
economy: a consumerist landscape that attracts tourists. And in this process,
powerful cultural forces encourage Hong Kong people to become competitive,
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enterprising cosmopolitans and, thereby, to successfully face mutating global and
regional forces.
Through affect1 and knowledge, the government governs us. Power,
however, circulates around us in everyday life. In this chapter, I want to explore the
various and selective ways in which Hong Kong people use their culture either to
defend existing lifestyles or to create new lifestyles. Following Massey, I argue that
the contested “identity” of a place cannot be a single and stable source for
individuals’ personal and cultural identities. I explore this topic by examining, in
particular, the relationship between individual Hong Kong people’s interpretations
of the HKDL project and these people’s sense of self, their sense of place, and their
sense of social processes (namely, globalization and the changing Hong KongChina dynamics). I argue that despite the strong rhetoric according to which the
Hong Kong people are chiefly economic animals, my research on people’s HKDLrelated views reveals that respondents welcomed the HKDL project for cultural
reasons—whether as a source of cultural distinction from Mainlanders or as a way
to experience foreign culture. Certainly, some respondents’ cosmopolitan
aspirations may be shaped by real or imaginary institutional and economic forces or
by attendant changes, but it does not follow that their cosmopolitan aspirations
should be viewed as in themselves necessarily instrumental for capital
accumulation. Further, the intersection between instrumentalist intention for
economic advancement and everyday cultural interaction may encourage people to
reflect on their common-sense economic being. The effects that this reflection has
on cultural politics may be unexpected.
This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first section, I argue that
several opinion polls about the HKDL project suggest that Hong Kong people’s
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support of the project was not simply based on projected economic benefits. In the
next two sections, I use this study’s interviews and ethnography to identify both my
respondents’ interpretations of the HKDL project and the project’s effect on my
respondents’ sense of self.

Embracing HKDL: the economic irrationality of Hong Kong people
Numerous studies show that tourism development is not always a result of financial
cost-and-benefit calculations but sometimes a product of a complex web of
economic, political, and cultural factors.2 Let’s review the economic side of the
HKDL project: the HKSAR government presented the HKDL project as an
economic project that would diversify and revive the Hong Kong economy; media
presented the project as a solution to Hong Kong’s unemployment problem, to
Hong Kong’s allegedly fading sign value, and to difficult-to-attract foreign
investment. Various opinion polls, however, reveal that Hong Kong people did not
conceive of the HKDL project in narrow economic terms.
In February 1999, nine months before the official announcement of the deal,
the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) conducted a
telephone survey3 of 878 residents and found that respondents at that time did not
quite believe that HKDL could strengthen the Hong Kong economy; indeed, they
worried that the establishment of HKDL would lead to the importation of Mainland
workers and would, thus, worsen Hong Kong’s unemployment situation. Despite
their worries, only 4.3% of respondents opposed the HKDL project and 90% of
respondents supported it. Another survey, this one conducted by the Liberal Party4
in July 1999, also indicated the public’s inconsistent attitudes toward the deal. Of
one thousand Hong Kong respondents, 40% disagreed with the government’s
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financial concession to the Disney company and about 55% criticized the HKDL
deal’s lack of transparency, but over 80% of respondents supported the HKDL
project.
John Ap’s important surveys show us similar seemingly irrational attitudes
attributable to the Hong Kong public. Ap persistently conducted surveys
monitoring Hong Kong residents’ attitudes to the establishment of HKDL. In 2000,
Ap conducted two surveys in March and April respectively.5 The survey in March
was a non-random survey of 250 residents from Lantau and Peng Chau Islands, and
the survey in April was a random telephone survey of 582 residents. The surveys
demonstrated that respondents were not optimistic about the under-construction
HKDL’s ability to create future benefits: 38-39% of respondents commented that
the deal was unfair (p. 6), just over a third commented that it was acceptable (p. 5),
24% could not decide whether HKDL benefits would outweigh HKDL costs (p. 5),
and more than 50% of respondents stated that they “somewhat dislike” or “dislike”
the project’s ecological effect on Lantau Island (p. 6). However, three quarters
(76%) of them supported the development of HKDL and only 8% opposed the deal
(p. 5). Another one of Ap’s surveys, which took place between 27 and 29
November and 2 and 4 December 2002, showed similar dissonant results: 43% of
respondents thought that it was not fair for the government to provide the land
formation and infrastructure works to Disney but 85% supported the deal and only
8% opposed the deal.6 Although more and more people found the HKSAR
government-Disney deal unfair (from 39% in March and April 2000 to 43% in
December 2002), more and more people supported the deal (from 76% in 2000 to
85% in 2002). There was a 4 to 5% increase of respondents criticizing the deal as
unfair, but there was also a 9% increase in people’s support of the deal!
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Respondents’ support of the HKDL project shows that Hong Kong people
are not simply economic animals whose behavior and judgments are purely
economy-oriented. They supported the project even though they had reservations
regarding HKDL’s possible negative economic effects on Hong Kong: the Hong
Kong people were sure neither about whether the park’s returns could outweigh its
costs nor about whether the park could strengthen the Hong Kong economy; they
also realized that HKDL would have harmful environmental effects on Hong
Kong’s natural landscape. I will argue that some respondents in my study used the
HKDL project to distinguish Hong Kong from other cities, especially Chinese ones.
Hong Kong’s historical specificity—its colonial governance, its protracted
separation from China, its assumed superiority over Mainlanders, and its absorption
of Western capitalism and of Western modernity—made the entry of HKDL into
Hong Kong a cultural event, as well as an economic one.7

Cultural distinctions and cities in counter-position
According to the various surveys that I discussed in the first section of this chapter,
Hong Kong people embraced the HKDL project but did not clearly understand the
characteristics that made the HKDL project so attractive. But one thing is more
certain, the above surveys show that Hong Kong people’s support of the project
was not merely economic. I conducted interviews8 with people who were both from
different walks of life and connected to Disney in various domains: the respondents
included a news producer, Disney-product merchandisers and distributors, a publicrelations officer, a kindergarten headmaster, a film distributor, parents as consumers,
and Disney staff members. According to my interviews, most of the respondents
supported the project but had different degrees of enthusiasm, expectation, and
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worry regarding HKDL, then under construction. Moreover, the expectations and
the worries always corresponded to identity issues. Although almost all respondents
stated that “economic revitalization” was the chief reason for their support of the
HKDL project, I suspect that the respondents’ prioritization of this reason was a
reflexive response to media’s agenda-setting emphasis on the project’s possible
revitalization of the economy. Media helps shape the parameters of our experiences
but also clashes with our experiences.9 Although most respondents answered my
question “Why do you support the HKDL project?” by initially identifying an
“economic” reason, the respondents would immediately qualify their previous
statement by declaring, for instance, “I don’t know,” “maybe,” or “Actually, I know
little about the economy.” Then, the respondents would identify various reasons.
More important, many respondents often made vivid facial expressions while
offering responses, some about Hong Kong and some more personal. It is my
contention that the word ‘Disney’ strikes many respondents in various ways and
that emotion, in addition to economic rationality, drives them to support the
project.10
In this section, I first discuss how my respondents’ support of HKDL related
to their previous experiences of Disney theme parks.11 In general, when my
respondents recounted their Disney park experiences, they always smiled and told
me about their happy memories of a park.12 Surprisingly, there is no necessary
connection between respondents’ excitement and their support of the HKDL project.
Many respondents in my study supported the HKDL project but were not excited
about it; instead, their support of the park rested on an unsteady foundation of
worries and reservations.
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Among my respondents, Cathy,13 an experienced administrator for film
companies and film organizations, and Betty,14 a high school teacher, had greatly
enjoyed their Disneyland trips. Cathy had visited Anaheim Disneyland and
Disneyland Paris; Betty had visited Disneyland Paris and Tokyo Disneyland. Every
time I asked them to recount their Disneyland trips, they could not help showing
their big and cheerful smile. When I asked her what she thought about Disneyland,
Cathy replied:

Disneyland is superb! I like the parades, I like the buildings, and I like the
place. It’s full of color! The first time I visited Anaheim Disneyland was in
1991, and this was the first time I had a long trip in America. You know, the
second day after I arrived in L.A., I immediately visited Disneyland. People
just smiled there! And you just forget all your business when you are inside
the park. I visited Disneyland and then Universal Studio the next day. I was
so happy because it was my first time going to two theme parks on two
successive days.

Cathy and her husband and son, Fred and Adrian, visited Disneyland Paris twice in
2001 and 2006. In Cathy’s 2001 visit, although she found the park, especially the
attraction Peter Pan’s Flight and the Sleeping Beauty castle, to be a bit worn out,
she enjoyed the atmosphere inside the park and she visited the park again in 2006.
As for Betty, she had visited Disneyland Paris in 1998 with her friends. This was
her first visit to Europe; although she did not base her decision to visit Paris on
Disneyland Paris, Betty said that, during the entire trip to Disneyland, she had worn
the biggest smile:

The experience of spending a day, playing and laughing crazily [in
Disneyland Paris] like kids is unforgettable. I remember queuing up for
hours for the rides…. I like the Small World a lot, for the lovely displays
and decorations; squeezing in for a place to view the parades was absolutely
amazing. I wonder why we could stand the heat and the noise for that long
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on such a hot afternoon. The most exciting part was staying in the hotel,
which was actually a lovely little Mickey Mouse house, a very well
furnished and equipped one, where you can see the Disney cartoon
characters everywhere and Disney Cartoons were non-stop-showing on TV
too. You would never want to unwrap the little piece of soap in the shape of
Mickey’s head because you’d want to take it home to show your friends…. I
like every place I visited in Europe, but I wore the biggest smile in every
photo of me at Disneyland Paris.

With their good memories of their Disneyland trips, it is surprising that both Cathy
and Betty were not excited about the HKDL project. In explaining their
reservations, the two women explained that if Hong Kong had Disneyland, the
meaning of ‘Disneyland’ would have to change from that of a faraway fantasyland
to that of just another local theme park. All the efforts that, in the absence of HKDL,
go into a trip to Disneyland in Europe or the United States (a good education, a
good job, substantial savings, detailed planning) would, in the presence of HKDL,
become easily achievable, perhaps rendering the local Disneyland experience
mundane.
Different from Cathy and Betty, David,15 a TV daily-news program director,
had visited Tokyo Disneyland, Anaheim Disneyland, and Orlando Disney parks in
1988, 1995, and 2005 respectively. Of all the respondents, David was the one who
embraced the HKDL project whole-heartedly. Besides, he had designed a
presentation of the HKDL project that had appeared on one TV station’s news
broadcast. On 2 November 1999, the HKSAR government officially announced the
HKSAR government-Disney joint venture concerning HKDL; and for the
announcement, David designed an animated trailer in which a castle symbolizing
Disneyland raised from the Hong Kong map; once the castle settled, fireworks
glittered over the whole of Hong Kong. He was very satisfied with his visual
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representation of the deal. I asked how the idea came to him, but he immediately
responded with a question of his own:

Shouldn’t we celebrate after two years of dark ages? We’ve had no good
news since the Handover. None. I notice that not all people embrace the
project, but I don’t quite understand why they don’t support it. HKDL is the
first good news we’ve had about Hong Kong in these two years. We finally
got some good news from the government. It at least brings us hope for a
brighter future. [My design shows that] fading Hong Kong can gleam again.
I think the design is good and it resonates with Hong Kong people and
[reflects] their happiness with the project.

To David, HKDL saved “fading Hong Kong” from the “dark ages” and offered it a
“brighter future.” The “two years of dark ages” is the period between the 1997
Asian financial crisis and the November 1999 HKDL deal between the HKSAR
government and Disney. After the Asian financial crisis, the HKDL project
provided Hong Kong people with a dream—a dream of a “brighter future,” a dream
of a city of excellence, and a dream of cultural distinctions. Even though David
mentioned the economic benefits that HKDL might bring to Hong Kong, his main
concern was about the sign value that Disneyland brought to Hong Kong:

Disney’s choice of Hong Kong demonstrates that Hong Kong is still ahead
of other Asian cities including Singapore and Shanghai; we are just behind
Japan in Asia. We are good enough and professional enough to meet the
Disney standard. We should be proud of ourselves.

David, as a news-program director, did not reap immediate benefits (such as more
job opportunities) from the HKDL project. He was delighted about the joint-venture
project because he, as a Hong Kong resident, felt proud of the city status of Hong
Kong. To him, the sign value that HKDL brought to Hong Kong was not future
economic benefits but cultural distinctions. That is, in cultural terms, Hong Kong
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people could make use of HKDL as a cultural marker to reaffirm their own cultural
validity and their own cultural distinctions. According to David, the Hong Kong
people have had many strengths: an efficient administrative system, professional
managerial ability, adherence to a code of conduct, bilingual and tri-dialect abilities,
and knowledge of transnational idioms. These strengths, as well as others, earned
Hong Kong the right to host the famous brand, Disneyland park. These strengths
have stood in contrast to other big Asian and especially Chinese cities, which—
from this point of view—come across as inferior to Hong Kong in these matters.
Not all Hong Kong people have been as enthusiastic and optimistic as David.
When rumors spread that another Disneyland might be built in Shanghai right after
the official announcement of the establishment of HKDL in 1999, Hong Kong
people’s sense of cultural superiority immediately diminished; the millennium
dream turned into a wishful daydream. As Cathy commented:

If Hong Kong has HKDL, I beg Mr Tung (i.e., the ex-Chief Executive of the
HKSAR government) not to be so generous that he’d let Shanghai have
their own. It is good that Hong Kong has HKDL, but why is it also good for
Shanghai to have one? Please go eat a banana! [meaning “Please go to
hell”]…. Lee Kwan Yew said that, even after 50 years, there is no
difference between Hong Kong and Guangzhou. I hope not. I hope that we
are, in some way, superior to the Mainlanders.

Although Cathy stated that HKDL should be good for Hong Kong’s economy, she
voiced concern about the park’s future operations. Rather than treat the HKDL
project as a dream mechanism by which Hong Kong can reassert its cultural
distinctiveness and superiority, Cathy in the 2003 interview stated that the inept
HKSAR government, in addition to exposing Hong Kong people to the lower
cultural level of Mainlander and Macaunese visitors, would turn HKDL into
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international shame. As a case in point, consider the following exchange between
Cathy and me (Kim):

Cathy: I am afraid either that HKDL will be like Paris Disneyland, which
has attracted unimpressive numbers of people, or that the HKSAR
government can’t manage it well and the park will quickly close its doors.
It’s shameful. A shame…. It’s really shameful that HK people can’t manage
well…. Besides, who will come to HKDL? Most visitors would probably be
from South East Asia, but they may choose to go to Tokyo Disneyland.
Then people visiting HKDL would be chiefly from Macau or the Mainland,
and that means the park will get run down quickly. They will make the
bathrooms very dirty. This summer I went to Changzhou, where the first
dinosaur fossils were found. We went to a dinosaur theme park there. It
should be very beautiful, and the models are to scale. But once you go to
bathrooms, it is just appalling. There are too many people in the Mainland,
and the quality of people varies. The more people who come, the more
likely it’ll be that [HKDL] gets run down.
Kim: So you are not optimistic about HKDL’s future?
Cathy: No, I’m not, because the quality of Mainlanders’ culture is a lot
lower than that of people in other countries. Who goes to the US park?
Americans. Who goes to the Paris park? Europeans. You know, China,
though developing rapidly, is still a developing country. In 20 years maybe,
I mean, Mainlanders’ cultural quality may be up to a certain standard after
20 years, but there are too many people. [It is] difficult to say.

Although David and Cathy differed from each other regarding their views on
HKDL’s future, their concerns over the park in relation to Hong Kong were similar.
Each respondent stressed both the image of Hong Kong as a city and the superiority
of Hong Kong people’s culture to Mainlanders’ culture. And the respondents
discussed these issues in relation not to local economic development but to global
city competition. The Hong Kong cultural identity that rests on cultural distinctions
originated from colonial governance and, more recently, from intensifying global
city competition. Competition, not interaction, is the keyword for both David and
Cathy. Since they both believe in the idea of “winner-takes-all,” this cultural idea
affects the way they conceive neighboring cities in China as competitors of Hong
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Kong in the globalized world. Not that these respondents detest Mainland China,
but their concern over Hong Kong’s future is greater than their concern over other
Chinese cities’ future, particularly under globalized city competition.
This last point merits some emphasis. Hong Kong people’s depiction of
Mainlanders as the Other is neither entirely denigrating nor entirely alienating;
rather, Hong Kong people’s views on Mainlanders and on their “Chineseness” are
entwined but contradictory. David’s self-identification as Heung Gong Yan or
Chinese was shifting and situational; his job provided him an opportunity to
communicate with Mainland professionals, and he enjoyed working with them.
Cathy and Betty were proud to be Chinese; they fully agreed with the Handover and
espoused Confucianism.16 Cathy had persuaded her son Adrian to enjoy the story of
Sun Wukong, the Monkey King, in Journey to the West instead of Japanese
animated cartoons because she espoused Confucianism and abhored Japanese
militarism and the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong17; she enjoyed helping
Mainland tourists and speaking in Putonghua in daily life. However, Cathy’s selfidentification as Chinese did not allay her suspicion that Mainlanders’
“Chineseness” remained far less modern than Hong Kong’s “Chineseness plus.”
If we interpret respondents’ perspectives on Mainland Chinese in spatial and
temporal terms, the respondents’ preferred subjectivity—the modernized subject
who attaches importance to hygiene, public order, professionalism, and
cosmopolitanism—is not simply a product of modern city life but a technology of
discipline promoted by the colonial governance18 and by Western enterprises such
as McDonald’s.19 Although respondents may identify as Chinese and embrace an
aspect of Chinese culture, their association of development with human progress
and self-discipline reflects a Eurocentric “modern” standard and becomes the chief
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standard by which Hong Kong people evaluate themselves and the Other, the
Mainlander, whom many Hong Kong people view as uncivilized or gauche.
The entwined but contradictory social relationships between Hong Kong
people and Mainlanders affect Hong Kong people’s spatial practices; in turn, these
spatial practices generate new effects on social relationships. The HKSAR
government and Disney projected that 33% of HKDL’s visitors would be
Mainlanders. In other words, the expectation has been that HKDL will become a
node where the unsettling Hongkongers-Mainlanders relationship will evolve and
will articulate itself. Perhaps this expectation underlay Cathy’s ambivalent attitude
toward the HKDL project. Some Hong Kong people are more explicit in their
exclusionary attitude and practices toward Mainlanders. Lisa,20 a university public
relations officer who worked as a journalist in the past, characterized her own
reception of the HDKL project as “passive,” and she felt neither excitement nor
hatred toward the HKDL project. Lisa had never visited any overseas Disneyland
because, for her, visiting a theme park was a waste of time when she could stay in
the host country only briefly. She said that if she would visit HKDL in the future,
she would choose a weekend full of Hong Kong visitors instead of a Mainland
holiday: in this way, she could escape from the flocking Mainland visitors. To visit
or not to visit, and if the former, when to visit—these are emotional issues
manifested as practical issues, but their latent content remains cultural. Consider
Lisa’s specific remarks:

When everything is settled, when everybody tries out all the rides and they
are in order, and when the Mainland tourists do not flock to HKDL, we will
then go. Let’s say Ocean Park. We went there during a holiday that is
special in Hong Kong but not even celebrated in the Mainland. It’s not the
Mainland’s Golden Week holiday.
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These exclusionary practices are common among Hong Kong visitors to HKDL,
and I further discuss these practices in chapter Seven, about practices inside HKDL.
From Lisa’s comments, however, we can already see that spatial division results
from not only institutional measures such as the regulation of immigration from the
Mainland but also people’s everyday spatial practices. Many Hong Kong people
cross the Hong Kong-Mainland boundary everyday,21 and Hong Kong people have
many connections with China, for some of their relatives live there, but Pun and
Wang’s study22 on both cross-boundary managers from Hong Kong and crossboundary blue-collar workers from Hong Kong states that most respondents
resisted integrating into Mainland city life. In my interview with Sandy,23 a Hong
Kong female boss of several Mainland factories producing Disney’s plush dolls,
she made statements that were consistent with Pun and Wang’s study. Sandy lived
in the Mainland most of the time and stayed in Hong Kong only during the Lunar
New Year; she also planned to live in the Mainland after retirement. However,
when I asked about her perception of her Mainland workers, she immediately threw
the words out, “We Hong Kong people can never understand them.” Sandy
employed several Mainland-born but Hong Kong-raised employees to help her
manage the huge Mainland workforce. Living in Dongguan for more than ten years,
Sandy’s good friends are all from Hong Kong. This example is just one of many in
which spatial division results from everyday practices: rather than strive for
integration, many Hong Kong people elevate themselves over the Other: the
Mainlander.

The Other and the international: the cosmopolitan dream
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While treating Mainlanders and China as the Other, many of my respondents
voiced little concern about the American-rooted but transnational Disney company.
Before 2005, when HKDL became the target of a surge of negative news reports,
five of my study’s thirty-nine respondents voiced displeasure with the HKDL
project; and of these five, one respondent raised concerns about American cultural
imperialism. It should be noted that, of the five respondents, two were from an antiDisney group Disney Hunter,24 another two were a couple,25 and the remaining
respondent was a journalist.26 As for the thirty-four respondents who voiced no
displeasure with the HKDL project, some (such as David) felt good about the
project, others (such as Cathy and Betty) supported the deal but with various
reservations, and, yet again, others (such as Lisa) voiced neutrality toward the
project. Ap’s 2002 survey27 shows that 39% of respondents liked the “influence of
American culture on HK society” and 40% were neutral.28 Hong Kong people did
not pay particular attention to Disney or to American influence because American
popular culture and Japanese popular culture had been prominent since the late
1960s; today, the idea of American cultural imperialism is bizarre to many Hong
Kong people. Besides, to my respondents, Disney is just one of the many cultural
enterprises that market animated cartoons and merchandise. “Disney,” to some, was
an import, a readymade product that Hong Kong people could use to demonstrate
their ability to host a branded park: “Disney” was not a threatening imperialist
forcing Hong Kong to open its market. To some others, Disneyland’s attraction lay
in its otherness and foreignness. Many respondents who had visited a Disney park
had enjoyed consuming the Disneyland fantasy. However, the fantasy extended
beyond the sum of exotic Disney attractions and into the very geographical distance
between the theme park and Hong Kong. Let us recall that Betty expressed no
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particular enthusiasm for the HKDL project because a Disneyland trip, according to
her, should be a means to consume an exotic and foreign fantasy; HKDL loses the
allure of foreignness when the park is just next door. To live out their fantasies of
foreign exoticism, some university graduates quit their jobs and worked as low-rank
Disneyland cast members in Orlando, a strategy that applies pragmatic steps to the
realization of the fantasy.
In late 2004, about five hundred Hong Kong people (mostly university
graduates in their early- or mid-twenties) became the first group of HKDL staff
members and underwent six months of on-job training in Disney parks in Orlando.
The new employees’ job title in Orlando was “cultural representative,” and they all
needed to perform front-line operations instead of managerial work. I talked to ten
HKDL workers, and five of them had worked as HKDL cultural representatives in
Orlando before HKDL’s opening.29 All five HKDL cultural representatives had felt
little interest in a job at Disneyland, had found the pay disappointing,30 and, for the
most part, had never been Disney fans. Their reasons for working at Disney were
quite similar: the global aspect of Disney. The respondents who had worked as
cultural representatives in Orlando had treasured the chance to live in America for
six months. While in high school, Olivia31 had visited Tokyo Disneyland with her
family but had not found her park experiences particularly enchanting; indeed, her
favorite cartoon character had long been Hello Kitty, a Japanese cartoon character
created in 1974, and no Disney character. In light of these facts, I asked her why
she had quit her relatively high-paying social work job to be a manual low-paid
worker. She replied:
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I hadn’t had experiences living and working in a foreign place and that’s
why I took the job…. I had never been in any exchange program during my
three-year university career, and thus, I found that I lacked something. I
wanted to live with foreigners…. I didn’t like the job description, but I
treated it as an exchange program. It was only about six months…. And I
had graduated from the university only two year earlier, so I was still young,
so why not go for it? … I also wanted to improve my spoken English. Mine
is absolutely terrible.

For HKDL-employee respondents who had had no chance to be cultural
representatives, the global brand of Disney still exhibited a high sign value.
Winnie32 was a graduate with a master’s degree. She had received several job offers,
including one for a research-assistant position at a university, but she had opted for
Disney. Winnie was enthusiastic about neither Disney nor America but expressed
interest in working for a global company:

If I were a fresh graduate, I think I would be happier. I am a grown up, and I
do not have a good impression of the US, and therefore, I hesitated as to
whether I should enter Disney, an American corporation. But since it is an
MNC [multinational company], I took the job; and since I had studied
media, Disney should be good.

Another reason for these university graduates’ decision to work for Disney rested
on their hope that their Disneyland work experience might give them a chance to
change their career path. Some respondents, before working at the Disney company,
had worked in other fields, including social work, computer sales, accounting,
education, and tourism. Some respondents had many times applied for a job in the
business field but had received not even an interview because of their academic
background; some respondents had wanted to work for a famous marketing or
advertising firm but their English-language abilities did not meet standards; some
respondents stated that they felt bad about their previous job and that they wanted a
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total change. Many of the respondents thought that the name recognition of
“Disney” and that the American work experience significantly strengthened their
curriculum vitae and significantly enhanced their cultural capital, which could
facilitate their job-seeking prospects even further. Although they knew that their
Disneyland job had nothing to do with managerial, marketing, or advertising work,
some respondents hoped that they could get a transfer inside Disneyland if they
stayed on there. These respondents’ reasons for accepting a Disneyland job can be
seen as pragmatic, and the respondents’ cosmopolitan aspirations can be seen as
pragmatic, too. In fact, Marx argues that cosmopolitanism is a logical move for
bourgeoisie and a natural development in capitalism:

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a
cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country.33
Aihwa Ong studied the “flexible citizenship”34 of the transnational middle-class
Chinese and noted that this form of citizenship has been a response to the neoliberal
globalized economy. It can be seen, also, as exemplifying Marx’s argument that the
cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, travel, and displacement induce subjects
to respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions
(p. 6). To combine the study of everyday life and abstract political-economic forces
together, Ong draws on Foucault’s “regime” analysis and argues two points: on the
one hand, individuals and the state retool culture in conjunction with changing
social and economic circumstances; on the other hand, people’s daily action is
shaped by regulatory effects of cultural institutions, including family and state
apparatuses, and these social conditions facilitate transnational practices. According
to Ong, in critical studies of globalization, the most common conceptualization is
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that they treat globalization as a totalizing abstract force that imposes itself on
locals and constitutes cultural, social, and political changes. Ong problematizes this
conceptualization by arguing that Chinese diasporas are the transnational agents
who constitute the increased capital circulation in the globe. She refutes the now
extensive literature predicating a triumphant Chinese capitalism grounded on
essential cultural differences; rather, she emphasizes how global capital induces
individuals to retool and reconceptualize their cultural logic to make their
economic-based practices “thinkable, practicable, and desirable, which are
embedded in processes of capital accumulation” (p. 5).
Ong argues that overseas-Chinese communities have retooled both
Confucian ideology and Chinese culture in several ways. First, the importance of
Confucian social ethics has been replaced with the family-centered notion of
Confucianism (p. 115); to raise the family’s class position based on capital
accumulation, individuals (especially men) should study hard and abroad, shuttle
around different places to gain financial prosperity without carrying emotional ties,
allegiance, identification or commitment with any nationality defined by any states.
Second, Ong’s rich Chinese-American respondents participated in high Western
culture to build up cultural capital that might generate economic capital and
legitimize their current “elite” status inside the American business hierarchy. Third,
the elite transnational Chinese make use of Confucian ethics and guanxi (the
prioritization of networking) to extend business opportunity (p. 116). Fourth,
transnational Chinese selectively engage in “self-orientalism” (p. 81) to highlight
essential Chinese values such as diligence and family-oriented values to express
both “Confucian cultural triumphalism” (p. 135) and the “new Asian hegemony” in
contrast to the decadent West (p. 82). Fifth, Ong’s respondents strategically use
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states’ immigration policy to become a “nomadic subject” (p. 3) to maximize
capital accumulation and to acquire citizenship. The changing family-based and
economic-based instrumental Chinese culture, raised by the family regime,
articulates (1) the market regime that encourages nomadic transnational practices
and flexible accumulation and (2) the flexible state regime that redefines meaning
of national citizenship in terms not of cultural homogeneity but of economic status
to “compete more effectively in the global economy” (p. 130), all of which
contribute to transnational capitalist formations.
Ong attempts to problematize the essential cultural differences between
Western and Chinese culture by placing importance on individual agency and
everyday life practices in the globalization process. However, Southeast Asia’s
changing state policies and transnational Chinese communities’ changing cultural
practices (“flexible citizenship”) are a response to changing global capitalism. In
other words, capital accumulation is still the most important goal for both
individuals and states in Ong’s analysis. Ong assumes either market force is
irresistible,35 or she essentializes culture as capital-driven. Both arguments identify
capital accumulation as the primary and ultimate aim and the source of social
transformations, and both run the risk of economic reductionism, of viewing
cultural specificities and subjectivities as a subordinate instead of as an autonomous
domain subsumed into economic circumstances, in this case, the globalized
economy.
Certainly, my HKDL cultural representative respondents who yearned to go
abroad are significantly different from Ong’s rich Chinese diasporics. However, the
participation and active involvement of both groups in Western culture seems to be
based in economic practices: where Ong’s respondents used Western high culture
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to legitimize their privileged economic position, my respondents were attempting to
develop Western cultural sensitivity to enhance their competitiveness in the job
market. In my study of university graduates’ decisions to work in Disney, their
decisions appear to be pragmatic and for strategic ends (to change a career path or
to acquire cultural capital such as cosmopolitan sensitivity and English proficiency);
however, it is too far fetched to interpret their self-conscious acts as aiming only at
capital accumulation.
When I asked Winnie why she was obsessed with working for multinational
companies, she told me that, most of her life, she had yearned to study abroad but
that her family could not support her financially. In the past, Winnie had worked at
Nike for a summer and had enjoyed working there because she wanted to acquire
cosmopolitan attributes, as she herself noted:

I think Hong Kong is a very small place where my views and my exposure
are very limited. Perhaps what I can do in foreign places is insignificant, but
at least I can see more. I want to be a cosmopolitan person. I want to see
more and experience more; then, maybe I would settle down in a small
place. When I was young, I would have killed to study overseas, but I had
no money. So, working at an MNC has been my goal, and Disney is an
MNC.

Surprisingly, Winnie quit the HKDL job and became a volunteer student helper at a
famous annual graphic-design conference held by ACM SIGGRAPH, the
Association for Computing Machinery’s Special Interest Group on Graphics and
Interactive Techniques, in California. Her decision to leave Disney and to accept
the new position hinged on her strong belief that she could meet more interesting
people at the SIGGRAPH conference than at the Disney park. After the conference,
Winnie came back to Hong Kong for a while, but then she found another job which
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required her to work in Holland for a research project on Hong Kong. Like Ong’s
respondents, Winnie actively and opportunistically searched for chances to
accumulate Western cultural capital, and Winnie similarly prioritized the
importance of networking to achieve her dream to become a cosmopolitan. Unlike
Ong’s respondents, however, Winnie’s pragmatic acts were not aimed at extending
a business or developing a career opportunity but rather at broadening her views
and experiences.
Annie,36 another HKDL cultural representative in Orlando, studied finance
at a university and took up the job of HKDL cultural representative after graduation.
She provided answers similar to those of Winnie insofar as both Annie and Winnie
stated that they found Hong Kong small and Hong Kong people short-sighted.
Annie wanted to know and to experience what the world is. Annie participated in a
university exchange program that enabled her to live in Hungary for a half year, and
she applied for a position in the HKDL cultural-representative program because she
did not like living in Hong Kong. The following exchange between Annie and me
sheds light on her perspective:

Annie: My Hungary experience is very special. I don’t like Hong Kong. I’d
like to leave Hong Kong because it’s very small. Paris, Italy—I hope I can
go to these places. I also find Hong Kong’s pace too fast for me. In Hungary,
I lived with seven Taiwanese, and my Putonghua became so good. I was
very happy when I was in Hungary. I was very excited to decorate the
whole room. I learnt to be independent, to take care of myself, and to be
confident. [When I left] I cried madly in the plane. I just didn’t want to
come back. They [my friends] said I always smile after I came back.
Kim: Why?
Annie: Because I become more confident than before. And I have also
found that I know more about what’s happening in the world. There’s
distance between me and my classmates. When I was in Hungary, students
talked about the effects that the establishment of the European Union had on
the Italian lire, whereas Hong Kong students talk only about idols. After I
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came back from Hungary, I found the Disney program, so I applied for it. I
didn’t want a serious job at that time. I applied for the HKDL job because I
didn’t know what to do after my return to HK. The life was so good there
[in Orlando], we just earned money to go on a trip: St. Augustine, New
York, Boston, Chicago, LA, San Diego, Las Vegas. I was very free in the
US and the places I visited were beautiful, a hundred times more beautiful
than HK. I’ve never thought that Orlando or the US is desolate. And
Budapast is so convenient: subway, tram, bus, or walking. I love Europe
more than the US...

I conducted my interview with Annie in September 2006. A few days after our
interview, Annie left Hong Kong in pursuit of her “world” dream again. She found
a job in Canada and wanted to stay there at least for a couple of years. Annie
participated in the Hungary exchange program and the HKDL culturalrepresentative program not for capital accumulation but for self-development—she
sought confidence, living skills, and a wider vision of her surroundings.
Josephine,37 a committed HKDL staff member, had been a finance
accountant for a year before she became a cultural representative in Orlando Disney
parks. During her undergraduate years, she had joined a half-year exchange
program to Canada. After a year of being an accountant, she grew depressed, as she
found herself constantly in the office. She wanted to find a job working outside the
office, meeting people of various backgrounds and facing unexpected events. She
took up the Disney job in Orlando, for she thought that it would not create any
adverse effect on her accountant career; which is to say, she took the Disney job as
a short-term break from her long-term accountant career. However, after six months
of operations work in Orlando, Josephine firmly believed that her previous career
choice of being an accountant was the worst decision she had ever made in her life.
I asked her what she treasured most from her work experiences in the Orlando park:
her answer centered on neither career stability nor career advancement but the
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opportunity to meet different people everyday. Further, Josephine’s cosmopolitan
aspiration was not limited to Western first-world countries. Because Josephine
enjoyed working in HKDL, I asked her whether she would work there for a long
time. She immediately shook her head back and forth and said bluntly, “no.” She
then expanded on her one-word answer:

I am the kind of person who likes going out to see the wider world. Working
at the same company for a long time will limit my view of the world, even
though the company may be very big. However, I will stay on if I will be
sent to Shanghai to help open the park, because that would give me a chance
to work with Mainlanders and learn how they do things.

Here I would like to argue that cosmopolitan aspirations need neither derive from
an instrumentalist mindset nor constitute a pursuit of capital accumulation; even if
the respondent held an instrumentalist mindset in which the HKDL job was a
means to capital accumulation (including cultural capital such as the acquisition of
fluent spoken English), the concrete living experiences in Orlando might produce
unexpected effects.
Olivia, as I mentioned in the beginning of this section, had been a social
worker for almost two years before working as a Disney cultural representative in
Orlando in 2004. She had wanted to live in a foreign country but had had no chance
to do so during her undergraduate years. Moreover, Olivia had thought that the
brand “Disney” had a certain market value; bearing her Disney and American work
experience, her curriculum vitae would grow significantly stronger as an asset that
would help her develop a business career; if she stayed on at HKDL for several
years, she might receive a promotion to the junior managerial level.38 English
proficiency is another type of cultural capital that she wanted to acquire: “I also
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want to polish my spoken English. Mine is absolutely terrible.” Compared with
Josephine and Winnie, Olivia was highly pragmatic, highly strategic, and eager to
acquire wealth in both economic terms and cultural terms. Just consider this
conversation between Olivia and me:

Kim: Where did you find the job?
Olivia: The Career Times. And I applied. When I read the job details, I was
not interested in the job, frankly speaking.
Kim: What’s it about?
Olivia: All operations are front line. It has different sections. It’s like
primary school allocation…
Kim: (laughs)
Olivia: …and you fill in your priorities, ranging from 1 to 8: merchandising,
restaurant. It describes clearly what you do, such as cashier work, cooking,
fastfood, and so on. One is really bad, and I gave it a number 8, custody,
and it tells you to do the cleaning.
…
Olivia: One of your questions is whether I will work in Hong Kong
Disneyland after coming back. It highly depends on what benefits it gives
me and the nature of the job. What I demand is stability. I need my boss to
treat me well…. I would like to develop my career in the business field, but
my background is not that relevant, and that’s why I would like to see what
I can get from working in Disneyland. I would also like to know what
management is. If you ask me to work as a frontline worker for three years,
of course I won’t do it. If it treats me very well, I don’t rule out that I may
work at this job for the rest of my life. Therefore, it depends on Disney’s
offer.

As I have just noted, an employee’s pragmatic strategizing in their American
Disney job can undergo unexpected cultural effects, including self reflection and
personal transformation produced during everyday cultural interaction. In fact,
these effects can encourage the employee to question even the initial aim of capital
accumulation. Consider, for example, the discrepancies between the conversations
that Olivia and I had before her Orlando experiences and the conversations that we
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had afterward. Although Olivia treated the US trip as an exchange program, she
placed greater emphasis on her efforts to improve her English and to change her job
from social work to business, especially business management. After her return to
Hong Kong, I conducted another interview with her, this time in August 2005.
When I asked her to evaluate the US trip, she stated that the aim of the trip had
changed:

Kim: How do you evaluate your US Disney trip?
Olivia: How do I evaluate it?…hmm…I haven’t lost anything. No loss. My
purpose was very clear and I got what I wanted. Some people felt bad about
joining this program because Disney doesn’t treat you well and Disney
didn’t offer what they promised before the trip, such as rewarding your
work experience and offering you a promotion. People are angry about it.
That’s not my style. Instead, I appreciate the chance to play around and to
live in the US and to get to know US lifestyles. My purpose was to try
something I hadn’t tried before.
Kim: You mean, you made foreign friends, and you could experience living
in the US?
Olivia: And I also had my US trip, I went to many US cities: L.A., St.
Augustine, Key West, New York, and so on. I treated the Disney trip as an
exchange, I exchanged my work for my journey, and I got what I wanted.

In the above dialogue, Olivia did not mention polishing her spoken English or
changing her career. Before going to Orlando, Olivia mentioned that she wanted to
work in business management. After the Orlando trip, Olivia preferred working on
a part-time basis so that she would have more time for everyday-life reflection. She
increasingly realized that she might not be suitable for work in the business field:

Kim: So, overall, you’re positive about your US trip?
Olivia: Yes, positive. I didn’t come out of it with less that I’d had at the start.
Even in terms of salary, I didn’t lose much.
Kim: How much exactly did you earn each month in the US?
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Olivia: Depends on if you worked hard. I generally could work only about
30 hours. But I also worked about 50 hours on occasion. I could cover only
the rent. Ha, ha … In Hong Kong, of course, my salary is lower than before,
but the pressure of my previous job was a lot greater. Now, the job is taskbased. You know, tomorrow is another day. If you asked me to choose, I’d
prefer staying in Orlando. I had more space for myself, more time for selfreflection. I don’t know whether or not I am a very business-oriented or
target-oriented person. My friends and teachers think that I am aggressive
and am suitable for work in the business field, but I now feel that I am not
suitable to be a strong business woman.
Kim: Or you don’t like being a business woman?
Olivia: Yes, you are right. I can do business: I can manage people, I can
plan ahead, and I can be aggressive and competitive. But I don’t want to do
these things now. In fact, I want to be a secretary. I just do what you tell me
to do. I will do best what you tell me to do, but please don’t ask me to think
what to do.

Olivia realized that she was not the person that she had thought she was: a targetoriented, career-oriented, and aggressive person working in the business field. The
above conversation echoes what she wrote on her blog39 when she was in Orlando:

Life is short
Humans always chase something abstract and think it is important
[I must] enjoy life
[I’ve] decided after several years
to leave the work place
to have a long vacation
to feel life
to feel tranquility and the time to talk to myself
I will remember the words I said to myself
I don’t like the hardworking person I am in Hong Kong
Love staying here
This kind of life lets me have time to reflect on life
Part-time work allows me to have more space to broaden my personal space
No competition
I just want stability and life
I once believed that ambition was important to one’s life
but I don’t like competition anymore
I’d love to have good relationship with colleagues
I don’t think that my change is out of laziness
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Olivia’s changing self-awareness can be traced back to the cultural conflicts and,
indeed, the culture shock that she experienced everyday in Orlando. It was Olivia’s
curiosity regarding the practices of the Orlando Disney parks’ visitors that first
triggered changes in her self-awareness, which was both critical and reflective of
cultural discourses. She had visited Tokyo Disneyland in the past; and on that trip,
she and her friends would first plan an itinerary so that they could participate in as
many attractions as possible. Consequently, the trip had been hasty. However, in
the United States, she found that the most American guests did not plan an itinerary
and that they sometimes only strolled around. In her blog, she wrote,

They [US guests] take everything in stride … they pay so much to visit the
park, but they don’t make any plan before the visit. They just feel free.
Compared with them, we are so calculating that we must play as many rides
as possible. I should learn from them, learn to relax, like people all around
here. Sometimes I thought that, once I paid for a park visit, I would have to
play hard. But they [US guests] can really give the feeling of being on a
vacation because of their relaxed attitude. It [consuming the park in a
leisurely way] is worth the cost of admission.

By meeting and working with people of different personalities and by experiencing
cultural differences and conflicts, Olivia also gradually changed her own
personality in regard to interpersonal conflict: whereas in the past, she would be
critical of others, she would now reflect on the roles that both her own personality
and her own cultural values played in creating these conflicts. During the first few
weeks of her work, Olivia had found it difficult to communicate with some black
colleagues because of their different English accent and because of their bad
tempers; she once cried in front of her white colleagues after being scorned by two
black colleagues. A few weeks later, she asked her black colleague to make two
breakfasts for guests; finding him unresponsive to her request and feeling anxious
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about the task at hand, Olivia said, “I’ll do it myself.” Her colleague then replied,
“Calm down.” Olivia then understood that her value and practices of “efficiency”
caused her trouble. She recounted the event and her response to it in her blog:

He said he was getting ready to do it … he asked me to calm down
That got me thinking
Actually … I always use my own standards to judge others
I demand of myself that I work fast and well
To a certain extent, I demand that my colleagues approximate my work
standards
I have to learn not to use my own standards to judge others

During her stay, Olivia also discovered that her ideas about Mainland Chinese were
one-sided. Before her American trip, she sometimes went to Shenzhen to relax and
shop; yet she rarely communicated with local people. She noticed an official notice
that was posted in a Shenzhen subway and that read, “Please wait politely.” At that
time, she commented to herself that Mainlanders should review their queuing
behavior. Later, in Orlando, she met cultural representatives from Beijing
University and Tsing Hua University and found these students to be brilliant and
cultured:

We then went to the home of a Hunan colleague, Emily
Wow …….. it’s … such … a … big… house …….
…
The dinner opened my eyes
They talked about buying the house, applying for the visa, how to use gas to
produce electricity, Chinese history, the GRE, TOEFL, etc.
Although I could understand only 60% of their Putonghua
I found I learned a lot
Well …… Beijing University or Tsing Hua University students are not
simple
HK’s university students … couldn’t keep up with them
This dinner has made me reflect on my views of Mainlanders
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Olivia also changed her attitudes toward some places. Initially, Olivia did not plan
to go on many trips while working in Orlando, but she followed others and visited
many cities including St. Augustine, San Diego, Los Angeles, New York, and
Washington D.C., as I mentioned earlier. Her trips changed her attitude toward Los
Angeles, for example:

I don’t quite like LA…. In the past, I thought LA is a prosperous metropolis
but indeed it’s quite rough and backward
There are many old buildings where nobody lives
It’s like no one lives in the whole city
San Diego feels more prosperous
We even equate LA with some Mainland cities: LA is fading

Her imaginary of the first-world United States underwent changes during and
because of her short-stay in the country—the United States was not as prosperous,
technologically advanced, safe, and health-conscious as she had once thought. On
one occasion, she wondered whether or not the strawberries she was eating in a
restaurant were fake!
In summary, the experiences that Olivia underwent during her six-month
stay in Orlando fall into one of three categories: people of different ethnicity, places,
and herself. Olivia liked to plan everything and control the results (she took the
Disney job to improve her English, to enhance her transnational capital, and finally
to strengthen her prospects of finding a good business job); she had liked to
compete with colleagues, had received attention from superiors, and had earned
promotions—but she wanted to transform herself because she found that being
competitive is not the only path that one must follow in a career. Her experiences in
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Orlando critically changed her wants and her values. In place of career
advancement (or, in Ong’s term, capital accumulation), Olivia now wanted to relax,
to experience life, and to learn to face cultural differences. Her everyday
experiences in Orlando—culture shock and thus self-reflection and selftransformation—apparently clashed with her earlier instrumental intentions of
career advancement and capital accumulation. Olivia had wanted to stay in the
United States, and during her stay, an American colleague who knew of her desire
to staying there offered to marry her, but she stated in her blog that she refused to
marry the man for a green card. Perhaps, Olivia’s American colleague saw Chinese
culture as hardworking and family-oriented, a view that conforms to Ong’s
argument about the essentialization of Chinese culture in terms of triumphant
Chinese capitalism. And perhaps, he also essentialized Chinese people as having an
obsession to acquire capital, such as US residence. Is it true that, by and large,
Chinese or transnational Chinese obsessively strive to acquire capital, and if so,
why? In her related analysis, Ong does not give us an answer. What we are left with,
then, is the understanding that, under capitalist economy, the cultural logic of
transnational Chinese culture might rest on capital accumulation. And the obsession
with capital acquisition, as Ong proposes, is like another prevalent discourse about
Chinese in American society.
Although culture is changing to adapt to changing social, political, and
economic circumstances, culture is also sufficiently powerful to induce subjects to
use it to formulate and to examine their lives under particular contexts.
Exemplifying this process is the case of Olivia. She changed some of her
conceptions of place, other people, and self. Here I do not mean that Olivia
abandoned pragmatism and whole-heartedly embraced free-spiritedness. In our
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conversation after her return from Orlando to Hong Kong, I asked her to evaluate
her American-Disney experience, and Olivia’s first reply was, “I haven’t lost
anything” (p. 183), and she added, “I exchanged my work for my journey, and I got
what I wanted” (p. 183). When I asked her again if she evaluated her American trip
as positive, Olivia gave me a similar answer: “I didn’t come out of it with less that
I’d had at the start” (p. 183). Pragmatism still shaped Olivia’s evaluation of her
American trip; this pragmatic mindset functioned in contestation with discourses
emphasizing freedom, positive interpersonal relationships, and self-reflection. The
critical point not only in Olivia’s case but indeed throughout this thesis is that a
person’s particular action reflects the contestation of different perspectives, which
takes place in a particular context. Whereas Ong treats diasporic Chinese
transnational culture as an instrumental tool transformed and conditioned by global
economic forces, I treat respondents’ pragmatic move to work both for Disney and
in America as a produced desire and even a regulated response to the various and
intersecting institutional practices and structure: Hong Kong as a city is too small to
accommodate youths’ adventurous spirit; state propaganda encourages citizens to
be cosmopolitan, nationalist, enterprising subjects40; recent university policy
encourages students to participate in foreign exchange during their three- to fouryear undergraduate studies; and big companies prefer to employ university students
who have foreign-living experience.

Conclusion
In analyzing Hong Kong people’s cultural identity, scholars such as Lau Siu Kai
with his concept of “utilitarian familism”41 and Ong with her “flexible citizenship”
reinforce the assertion that Hong Kong people are “economic animals” who are
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interested only in costs, returns, and efficiency for family advancement. Other
scholars who are critical of HKSAR governance, on the other hand, argue that the
HKSAR government actively promotes this assertion by constructing Hong Kong
people as “enterprising individuals” who are “always on the lookout for resources
and new opportunities to enhance their income, power, life chances and quality of
life in order to take advantage of the rapid changes of economy and society.”42 In
the case of the HKDL project, Joseph Man Chan43 researched the media’s
circulation of related public discourse. To this end, he examined the opinion
columns, editorials, and letter sections of several different types of newspapers and
magazines: namely Ming Pao, Hong Kong Economic Daily, South China Morning
Post, Apple Daily, Oriental Daily, Next Magazine, and East Weekly as they
appeared between 1 November 1999 and 30 November 1999. According to his
examination, the public discourse in these publications substantively addresses
neither cultural imperialism nor resistance to this imperialism’s destructive effects.
The dominant patterns of the public discourse concern accounting, costs and
benefits, feasibility and fairness, and employment. Chan coins the term
“economization of culture” in reference to the public discourse. Except for Ming
Pao, the newspapers neglected the resistant voices of scholars and activists. Chan
concludes that Disneyland is a symbol of cultural globalization, that this economic
logic prevails in the midst of Hong Kong, and that the economic logic strengthens
cultural globalization and weakens resistance voices. In short, the globalized
economy so fiercely economizes Hong Kong culture that Hong Kong people, first,
evaluate culture according to its economic value and, second, preserve only
economically viable cultural elements.
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In his re-narrativization of the issue of Hong Kong’s Handover, Fred Chiu
argues that by Orientalizing and domesticating China as “the master Other,”
academic discourse creates little room in which the one-country-two-systems idea
can operate imaginatively. Chiu argues that journalists, as well, tend to represent
the Handover in a binary way by concentrating on official British arguments and
official PRC arguments. Together, these two arguments, or narratives, “formed the
master narrative hegemonizing the populace, literally mastering the entire imagery
of ‘Hong Kong’ as a fate, a destiny. No variation or any [sic] improvisation could
be allowed to deviate from the tune of ‘Hong Kong’s way of life!’ or ‘Tomorrow
will be better’!”44 In examining Hong Kong Disneyland in relation to Hong Kong
people’s cultural identity, scholars may look for more possibilities and more
imaginative and novel ways to discuss the relationships among culture, governance,
and global economy. In other words, scholars may distance themselves from such
grand theories as economization of culture, which itself subsumes culture under
economic reductionist logic.
The above study of people’s different views (expectations and worries) and
uses of the HKDL project argues that, first, meanings of cultural material such as
the meanings of HKDL should be seen as plural. Respondents appropriate these
meanings in ways that continuously change the meanings, and these changes reflect
adaptations to varied lives. Second, Hong Kong culture should be seen as plural and
contesting. The HKSAR government’s characterization of Hong Kong people as
enterprising, nationalistic, transnational subjects is one among many
characterizations on the drawing board. On the symbolic level, some respondents
such as David used HKDL as a cultural marker, a unifying power to reaffirm Hong
Kong as a particular city-state apart from Mainland China. For David, HKDL was
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not chiefly an important instrument for economic revitalization. Other respondents
such as the young upwardly mobile university graduates appropriated the HKDL
project according to their concrete everyday practices. These respondents sought to
make their cosmopolitan dreams come true, and these cosmopolitan dreams were
far more complex than the academic discourse prioritizing the economy-driven and
opportunistic characteristics of Hong Kong people.
Hong Kong culture has been embracing both China-based cultural learning
(especially the learning of Putonghua) and internationalization. To a certain extent,
economic forces may account for this embrace. However, we cannot then say that
culture as a whole changes to adapt to economic forces. My study above shows that
some Hong Kong people, though they call themselves Chinese, embrace Chinese
culture, and speak Putonghua fluently, distinguish themselves from Mainland
Chinese by identifying themselves as superior to Mainland Chinese. In ironic
contrast, respondents who had faced the non-transparent HKSAR governmentDisney HKDL deal objected hardly at all to the role that Disney had been playing
on the local-global stage. Most respondents stated that Western countries—not
Chinese cities—were places for cultural enlightenment. Legislator Mandy Tam
commissioned a research company to conduct a survey in April 2007 and found
that, of 375 respondents, 62% were unwilling to work in the Mainland and only
12% were positively willing to work in the Mainland.45 This hierarchical cultural
global order has stemmed not solely from economic forces but also from available
discourses that constrain the possibility that people will consider China an
enlightening place. Colonial education, immigration laws, and economic
development in the past helped Hong Kong people use lifestyle culture to place
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themselves in categories different from—and superior to—the categories in which
Hong Kong people placed Mainlanders.
I argue that culture as a way of life should be seen as incoherent and be
analyzed in various levels. If we adopt this approach, we can rigorously explain
both Hong Kong people’s self-differentiation from Mainland Chinese and Hong
Kong people’s increasing interest in China’s cultural capital. In examining Hong
Kong local consciousness, Ng Chun Hung46 divides Hong Kong culture into four
levels. The first level is tone and timbre and helps describe Hong Kong people’s
daily expressions and practices, such as speaking loudly. The second level is
common sense and helps explain Hong Kong people’s prioritization of studies and
networking (guanxi). These types of common sense often accumulate over the
course of many years of experience. The third level is ideological elements. For
example, one type of ideology is any systematic body of knowledge that governs
the arrangement of space. Thus, Chinese feng shui and Western interior design are
two concrete ideologies. Moreover, ideologies can overlap with one another. For
example, Hong Kong people can furnish their home according to feng shui and to a
Western style at the same time. The fourth level is “systematic discourse.”
Systematic discourse encourages and inclines subjects both to review history and to
move ahead. Ng argues that three types of systematic discourse about Hong Kong
local consciousness were circulating in the 1990s. The first type attributes Hong
Kong’s economic success to Hong Kong’s big market and small government
practices; the second type emphasizes the connection between Hong Kong and
China, asking Hong Kong people to accept political and economic reality, and to
embrace their Chinese national identity; the third type criticizes Hong Kong’s
heavy reliance on a market economy reproducing social injustice.
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Experiencing both their culture’s prioritization of cosmopolitanism and the
growing China-Hong Kong economic integration, Hong Kong people who seek
career advancement or career survival equip themselves with new cultural tools,
such as fluency in Putonghua, sensitivity to Mainland cultures, and cosmopolitan
attributes: all in all, a basic life strategy that has undergone recent changes in
emphasis. However, changes in basic life strategy do not mean that individuals
must change their life tone, their common sense, their ideology, or their systematic
discourse. The acquisition of a Mainland dialect and of cosmopolitan sensitivity
functions in line with Hong Kong people’s common-sense adaptability to changing
social circumstances. However, Hong Kong people’s ideology-based privileging of
Hong Kong culture over “Chineseness” can stay the same or change, depending on
individuals’ self-reflection and actions.
In addition to analyzing culture through a multi-level analysis, we should
examine people’s various ways of using culture and how these ways affect
individuals’ course of action and their self-perception. In my study, some
respondents use culture in a defensive way: they use an existing cultural resource to
direct their action. Even though social circumstances may undergo change and even
though the changed social circumstances may change behavior, the content of
cultural resources may undergo little change. David and Sandy had many chances
to work with Mainlanders and had good relationships with them, but did not
problematize their conception of homogeneous Mainlanders. On the other hand,
some individuals such as Olivia use culture in a reflexive manner such that the use
changes the ideological elements of her perception of the Other (the Chinese and
the blacks) and even of her own self.47 Therefore, it would be a rush to judgment
and an overgeneralization to say that global economic forces or structural changes
194

(such as the Handover in the case of Hong Kong) determine cultural changes in
general; we need to exhume, identify, and examine the cultural elements that adapt
to changes, the cultural elements that resist changes, and the political effects that
result from this adaptation and this resistance.
As I argued in chapter Three, the HKSAR government used HKDL as an
icon to disarticulate the process of democratization during late colonial times, to
disarticulate “Hong Kong way of life,”48 and to re-articulate the linkage between
the “Western” consumption lifestyle supported by “Disney” and the Hong Kong
way of life. The HKSAR government also used HKDL to distinguish Hong Kong
from other Chinese cities. My study finds that the government’s discourse
resonated with some respondents, who used the HKDL project as a cultural marker
to distinguish themselves from Mainlanders. Besides, only five of thirty-nine
respondents (and three are social activists) indicated their displeasures with the
HKDL project and two criticized, in particular, the non-transparent, undemocratic
practices that the HKSAR government applied to the public project. I must admit
that citizens can use “cultural distinctions” in both a progressive way and a
reactionary way: Hong Kong citizens can use their demands for transparent
governance as a way to distinguish Hong Kong from China, but they may also use a
consumption-based undemocratic HKDL to make the distinctions. Both of the ways
may also indicate the Hong Kong people’s attachment to Hong Kong but have
different effects on the people’s acts (to embrace the project or to resist it) and on
local governance (to continue administration-led government or to pursue
transparent democratic governance).
In the following chapter, I will concentrate on parents’ pragmatic use of
Disney merchandise as a way for the parents to achieve their cosmopolitan
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aspirations for their children. Following the current chapter’s argument, I will argue
that parents’ persistent use of Disney merchandise is not equivalent to their
acceptance of Disney’s conception of family, child development, or morality. We
have to consider respondents’ behavior from various perspectives to understand the
behavior. I also argue that parents’ selective use of Disney and their parenting
methods reinforce local hierarchical parent-child relationships, local class disparity,
and the imbalance in power and status between globalizing Disney media and local
popular culture.
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This chapter will explore respondents’ views on the HKDL project. These
interviews were conducted before the opening of the park, and therefore,
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respondents had not been adversely affected by all the later negative reports on
HKDL.
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Not all respondents in my study had gone to Disney parks. Among the thirty-nine
respondents, sixteen had gone to Tokyo Disneyland, Disneyland Paris, Anaheim
Disneyland, or Orlando’s Walt Disney World. Among these sixteen respondents,
four were children who, at the time of my first interviews, were between the ages of
four and eight. I did not ask the children questions about whether they supported
the HKDL project.
12

These good memories include (1) the fun that respondents had had because of the
attractions of the park, (2) the memories concerning friends or their children, and (3)
the available Disney merchandise. Of twelve respondents (David, Cathy, Fred,
Betty, Agnes, Katie, Ada, Judy, Ms Leung, Susanna, Olivia, and Winnie, not
counting children) who had visited a Disney theme park, six respondents (David,
Cathy, Fred, Betty, Agnes, and Katie) had visited more than one Disney park.
Among these twelve respondents, six (David, Cathy, Betty, Agnes, Katie, and
Susanna) expressed to me the excitement that they had felt during their first park
visit, two (Fred and Ada) said that they had not chosen to visit Disneyland
themselves but that they had visited for their wife (Cathy) and daughter (Angel)
respectively. They had enjoyed their experiences in the park because their wife or
daughter had enjoyed the park experiences. And the other four respondents (Judy,
Winnie, Olivia, and Ms Leung) had not found Disney park particularly exciting,
although they all said that the design and the color of the park had made them
comfortable. Of twelve respondents, Judy was the only one visiting Tokyo
Disneyland for business; she had worked as a reporter of a children’s magazine and
had gone to Tokyo Disneyland to write a report on the park.
13

In 2002, I began conducting an ethnographic study of five middle class families
with the aim of studying two topics: first, the parents’ approaches to the process of
parenting, particularly in relation to family consumption of Disney products
(including movies, merchandise, and theme parks), and second, their views on the
HKDL project. I invited Cathy to be my respondent in 2003, because both she and
her husband Fred worked in the film industry and because I thought that they might
evaluate Disney movies differently from other parent respondents. Between 2003
and 2006, I conducted four formal interviews and several phone talks about Disney
with Cathy, Fred, and their son Adrian, who was age six in 2003. The first
interview that I conducted in 2003 took place in a McDonald’s restaurant near her
apartment. I asked Cathy, Fred, and Adrian for their views on Disney movies and
characters. I held the second interview in Cathy’s home, and she showed me Disney
merchandise that her family owns. I also witnessed what methods Cathy used to
persuade Adrian not to watch television. In the second interview, Cathy told me
about her ambivalent views on the HKDL project. I conducted a third interview
with Cathy in a Chinese restaurant in 2004, about her parenting methods and what
movies and television programs she allowed or did not allow her son to watch. In
2006, I conducted a fourth interview with her in a restaurant near her office. This
time, I asked her opinions of Hong Kong Disneyland after its first year in operation.
14

I conducted three interviews with Betty between 2005 and 2006. The first
interview took place in May 2005. I had not known Betty before the interview. A
common friend had introduced Betty to me. I invited Betty to be my respondent
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because I realized that the middle class parents whom I interviewed were all firstgeneration middle class members, that they all came from a relatively humble
background. Because I wanted to examine whether there were differences between
parents’ views on Disney because of their class background, I intentionally
searched for second generation middle class parents who would be my respondents.
However, the search was difficult because my acquaintances who were secondgeneration middle class members had not raised children; those parents whom I
knew and who had children between the ages of five and ten were first-generation
middle class. Betty’s father had come to Hong Kong from Shanghai in the 1950s
and had worked as an accountant in Hong Kong. She had lived in Happy Valley, a
place for affluent Hong Kong people, before she had married; at the time of the
interview, she lived in Shatin. Betty was a high school teacher teaching English in a
famous girls school on Hong Kong Island. She therefore was concerned with her
son Henry’s English. I will discuss this issue in chapter Five, which concerns
family consumption of Disney offerings.
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In 1994, I worked as a daily-news production assistant at a local TV station, and
David was a senior program director there who was responsible for operating live
newscast, preparing news presentations, and working with the graphic department
in designing visuals presented in the newscast. Before starting my PhD thesis, in
1999, we had casual chats on the HKDL project, and I remember the excitement on
his face as he described his design for a story about the completion of the HKSAR
government-Disney joint venture. After I started my PhD study in October 2001, I
invited David to be one of my respondents, and he kindly accepted my offer.
Between 2001 and 2006, I held three formal interviews with him: one in his
apartment, one in a restaurant, and one in my apartment in December 2002,
December 2005, and December 2006 respectively. In the first interview, I focused
on his exposure to Disney offerings and his views on the joint venture; the second
interview was about his four Disneyland trips and his views on the negative news
coverage of HKDL during the early period of the park’s operation; the third
interview focused on his views on Hong Kong Disneyland after the park had been
open for a year and on his comparison of various Disneyland parks—the Magic
Kingdom in Orlando, Tokyo Disneyland, and Hong Kong Disneyland.
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Cathy espoused Confucianism because it asks people not to be too radical but to
take a middle-of-the-road stance, whereas Betty embraced Confucianism for its
emphasis on propriety, righteousness, trustworthiness, and benevolence.
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The period of Japanese occupation has often been represented as the dark ages of
Hong Kong history. The Hong Kong Museum of History has eight permanent
galleries narrating “The Hong Kong Story”; gallery 7 is about Japanese occupation.
See Hong Kong Museum of History, unknown, “‘The Hong Kong Story’
Exhibition Materials,” Hong Kong Museum of History,
http://www.lcsd.gov.hk/CE/Museum/History/download/the_hk_story_exhibition_m
aterials_e.pdf (accessed 17 September 2006), p. 71.
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Starting in 1948, the colonial government launched the campaign “Keep Hong
Kong Clean.” In the beginning, the campaign was a two-week clean-up operation
carried out across the territory each year. In the 1970s, the campaign extended its
strategies from the distributing of poster and leaflets to the broadcasting of
programs on television and radio, the use of mega posters on public transportation
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and on the exterior of buildings, and the use of popular stars and artists such as Sam
Hui, Josephine Siao, and Lydia Shum Din Ha for promotion. See Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region Government, “Clean Hong Kong History,” Food
and Environmental Hygiene Department,
http://www.fehd.gov.hk/pleasant_environment/chk/index.html (accessed 16 May
2005).
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James Watson argues that McDonald’s socializes people of different parts of the
world to develop consumer discipline. In Hong Kong, queuing for services was not
a common practice until the mid seventies and McDonald’s has the distinction of
introducing the queue to Hong Kong customers. In Moscow, McDonald’s
employees distributed information sheets to teach customers the process of ordering
food, including the custom of standing in line. See James Watson, “Introduction:
Transnationalism, localization, and fast foods in East Asia,” in Golden Arches East:
McDonald’s in East Asia, edited by Watson (Stanford, California: Stanford
University Press, 1997), pp. 27-9.
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Lisa worked as an English-language journalist and later changed careers to be a
communication officer at a university. I conducted formal interviews with Lisa four
times between 2005 and 2006. The first interview took place in a restaurant near
Lisa’s office. I interviewed her about her exposure to Disney offerings in the past
and about her views on the HKDL project. I conducted the second interview in
Lisa’s home. I interviewed her views on Disney and Disney merchandise and her
parenting methods. I also talked to her two daughters, Dorothy and Stephanie,
about their likes and dislikes of Disney characters. Because Stephanie was only
three years old in 2005, I talked more to Dorothy. In the first interview, because
Lisa did not want her daughters disrupting our interview, she showed them The
Lion King and I had a chance to observe how the two young girls watched The Lion
King together. During the second interview, Lisa also demonstrated how she used
Disney’s World of English every night, which will be discussed in chapter Five. I
conducted the other two interviews in a restaurant near Lisa’s office. The third
interview took place in early 2006 because she had visited HKDL in Christmas
2005 and had enjoyed the park experience. After one year’s operation of HKDL, I
interviewed Lisa again about her views on the negative portrayal of HKDL in the
press.
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According to the Planning Department survey “Cross-boundary Travel Survey
2001,” Cross-boundary passenger trips have risen sharply from 36.9 million in
1990 to 116.6 million in 2001; on average, there are some 333,000 daily trips
(whether departures or arrivals). See Planning Department (HKSAR), 2001,
“Cross-boundary Travel Survey 2001,” Planning Department (HKSAR),
http://www.pland.gov.hk/p_study/comp_s/travel01/xbts_e.htm (accessed 19
September 2006), 1. introduction and 2.1 daily flows.
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潘毅 and 黃洪, “跨境空間：在中國大陸工作的香港人的階級政治和身份認
同,” in 香港．文化．研究, edited by 吳俊雄, 馬傑偉, and 呂大樂 (香港: 香港大
學出版社, 2006), pp. 233-55.
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I did not know Sandy personally before my interview with her. Sandy was
introduced to me by my friend who told me that Sandy owned a factory producing
Disney character plush dolls. I conducted an interview with her in February 2006.
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At that time, HKDL had already been open for five months, and I asked her for her
views on HKDL and on her working relationship with the Disney company. Sandy
had not visited any Disney parks, including HKDL. In the interview, I asked Sandy
whether or not she had supported the HKDL project in 1999, and she replied that
she certainly had supported the project and that, in 1999, she had believed that
HKDL could bring her more business. However, she found her assessment was
wrong because after HKDL opened in 2005, Disney characters in Hong Kong did
not become more popular and her licensee did not request that her company
produce more products.
24

I interviewed Susanna and Billy in February 2006 individually. Before joining
the local anti-Disney group Disney Hunter established in June 2005, Susanna was
the executive member of Hong Kong Federation of Catholic Students in the past
and an active member in a university labor concern group. Billy was a chairperson
of the Hong Kong Federation of Students Resources Committee and university
student union representative in 2006. I interviewed Susanna and Billy because both
love Disney characters; Susanna likes Belle in Beauty and the Beast and Winnie the
Pooh, and Billy has been loving Mickey since he was about five. With permission, I
use their real names instead of pseudonyms in the thesis. I will further discuss their
views on Disney in chapter Seven.
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This couple is Judy and Jacob. In the interview in 2002, it was Jacob raising the
issue of American cultural imperialism. They have a boy Leo who was seven years
old in 2002. I met Judy in 22 March 1994 in a protest fighting for the amendment of
the New Territories Ordinance, which restricted women having inheritance right.
Judy is a freelance writer. She has published a book about everyday practices of a
nurse (her husband) in an emergency room in public hospital. She now writes for
in-flight magazine in a regular basis and works as a part-time research assistant in
university. I had my first interview with Judy, Jacob, and Leo respectively in their
home in 2002 and I asked their views on Disney movies, merchandise, and their
views on the HKDL project. After the first interview, I conducted two formal
interviews, one with Judy, and another with Judy and Jacob about their parenting
methods in 2004, and the last formal interview was held in 2006 about Judy’s views
on HKDL after it opened in September 2005. I also did baby-sitting for Judy so that
I had several chances to watch movies with Leo, to talk to him in a shopping mall
and in his school, seeing how he interacts with his classmates.
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I did not know Sammie personally before I interviewed her. After reading a news
reportage by Sammie, I asked my journalist friend to invite Sammie to be my
respondent and she kindly accepted my invitation. I interviewed Sammie in October
2006 and with several follow-up phone talks. In the interview, I asked her questions,
most of which concerned one of four main issues: (1) how she had developed the
news story, (2) how her encounter with Disney staff members had affected the
story’s content, (3) her perception of Disney and HKDL, and (4) whether or not the
relationship between reporters and HKDL public relations was improving. On
another occasion, this time in April 2007, I asked Edith to share her Orlando
experiences with my students; she again kindly accepted my invitation. Sammie
told me that while she was studying journalism in university, she also took a few
courses concerning the power of global companies. Although she did not
particularly abhor the Walt Disney Company, she was concerned about Disney’s
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power in the globe. Because Sammie’s company prohibited unauthorized
interviews with staff members, the name ‘Sammie’ is a pseudonym. To protect
confidentiality, I also withhold the name of the media company for which Sammie
worked.
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John Ap, “Residents’ Opinions of Hong Kong Disneyland” (HK, press embargo:
2002), 20 December 2002, p. 2.
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Interestingly, in my study, two respondents’ first experience of a Disney park
was Japan’s instead of America’s because they had visited only Tokyo Disneyland.
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These five cultural representatives are Josephine, Olivia, Richard, Pat, and Annie.
These people, before becoming HKDL cultural representatives, worked in diverse
fields or had just finished their university or college studies. Olivia had been a
social worker for two years; Josephine had worked as a finance accountant for a
year; Richard had been a computer salesperson; Pat had been a tourist guide; and
Annie was a fresh graduate from a university’s finance-studies program.
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The minimum working hours for a cultural representative is thirty hours per week
and the hourly pay is US$6.70. Cultural representatives can work ten additional
hours to get overtime pay, which is 1.5 times the normal hourly pay. They live in
same-sex dormitories where strict rules govern behavior. For example, visitors of
the opposite sex can visit only during a certain period of time and the dormitory
closes at midnight.
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I had known Olivia since December 2004; that is, before she went to Orlando to
become an HKDL cultural representative. Before working at HKDL, Olivia had
been a social worker for two years. I conducted three formal interviews with Olivia,
the first one took place in a restaurant in January 2005 and concerned her exposure
to Disney offerings and her role as an HKDL cultural representative in Orlando.
Before HKDL officially opened in September 2005, I conducted the second formal
interview at my home and asked her about her experiences in Orlando. Because
there was dissatisfaction among cultural representatives and some cultural
representatives had written criticisms on on-line forums, I asked Olivia to evaluate
these criticisms. The third interview took place again in my home in December
2005. I asked her to compare the similarities and the differences between working
at Disneyland in Orlando and working at Disneyland in Hong Kong, and I also
asked her to evaluate critical comments made by scholars and activities held by an
anti-Disney group, Disney Hunter.
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I conducted one interview with Winnie in May 2005. At the time, she had already
quit her HKDL job and was waiting to go to a San Francisco conference, at which
she would work as a student helper. In the interview, I asked her about her interest
in the HKDL job, about her training, and about her decision to quit the job.
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Karl Marx, Manifesto of the Communist Party, the Revolutions of 1848: Political
Writings, Vol. 1 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p. 71, emphasis added.
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Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999). Further references are in parentheses
in the text.
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In Ong’s words, “Despite the claims of some American scholars and policy
makers that the emergence of the Pacific Rim powers heralds an irreducible cultural
division between East and West, these parallel narratives, I argue, disguise common
civilizational references in a world where the market is absolutely transcendental.”
Ong, Flexible Citizenship, p. 7.
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Annie is another cultural representative whom I met in September 2006. I made
her acquaintance about six months after Annie had quit the HKDL job. The
snowballing method enabled me to make Annie’s acquaintance; that is, another
HKDL employee introduced Annie to me for an interview. After the interview,
Annie left Hong Kong, and we wrote each other through e-mail to keep in touch.
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I conducted my first formal interview with Josephine in June 2006 at a restaurant.
In the first interview, Josephine shared with me her reasons for taking the job of
cultural representative, her work experiences in both Orlando and Hong Kong, and
HKDL’s changing media policy. After that, I conducted three interviews with her
over the phone in October and December 2006 and in February 2007 respectively.
The second interview concerned the management culture and the relationships
among workers inside HKDL; the third interview concerned the details of the work
environment (such as the size of the break room) in HKDL; the fourth interview
concerned her recent HKDL work experiences. In August 2006, I visited the park,
where I observed how she worked.
38

This was a promise that Olivia got from HKDL management at the opening
reception. Here, ‘managerial level’ means supervisory role.
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As I mentioned in the introduction chapter, Olivia had a habit of writing in a blog
to express her feelings toward daily life. She gave me her blog address so that I
could gain some insight into her thoughts about her life in Orlando. In her blog,
Olivia usually did not write in paragraph form and seldom used punctuation marks,
except ellipses. If the ellipsis is used within a paragraph, it is used by Olivia and it
does not mean that I have abridged her writing. If I abridge her writing, I open a
new paragraph and use the ellipsis to indicate that I cut some parts of the content
from her blog.
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As I mentioned in chapter Three, starting from 2004, the government launched a
series of civic-education advertising campaigns that appeared throughout Hong
Kong and that bore the title “The heart is tied to the home country; ambition looks
out on the world.” The quote is an embellished translation from Chinese, “心繫家
國, 志在四方.”
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Lau Siu Kai, Society and Politics in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: The Chinese
University Press, 1982), pp. 72-4.
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Agnes S. Ku and Pun Ngai, “Introduction: Remaking Citizenship in Hong
Kong,” in Remaking Citizenship in Hong Kong: Community, Nation and the Global
City, edited by Ku and Pun (London, NY: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), p. 1.
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Joseph Chan Man, “Economizing Culture: the discourse on HK Disneyland,” a
seminar held at Y7544, City University of Hong Kong on 29 March 2004.
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Fred Chiu, “Combating the Double Processes of Decolonisation/Recolonisation
in Hong Kong, or ‘Postcoloniality’ as a Double-pronged Politics,” in Cultural
Studies Review 8, issue 2, p. 50.
45

Legislator Mandy Tam commissioned a research company to survey Hong Kong
people’s work conditions in the Mainland. Of 373 respondents, 40% needed to
work in the Mainland, and 12% needed to work in the Mainland for more than 20
days. Of the 373 respondents, 62% indicated that they were unwilling to work in
the Mainland. Of those who worked in the Mainland, 40% said they worked in the
Mainland because of the growing China-Hong Kong economic integration, and
24% said their Mainland working experiences were good for their career
advancement. See “六成港人不願北上工作,” 23 April 2007, Apple Daily, A06;
“北上工作者憂治安醫療,” 23 April 2007, Hong Kong Daily News, A04.
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吳俊雄, “尋找香港本土意識,” in 閱讀香港普及文化 1970-2000, edited by 吳
俊雄 and 張志偉 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press (China), 2001), pp. 87-9.
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People can be open in one way but can resist an unfamiliar idea in another way.
As I mentioned in chapter One, my practice of dialogic ethnography led to a
defensive response from Olivia. Her insistence on confirming the wisdom of her
decision to work at HKDL pushed her to argue against negative criticism of HKDL,
including criticism from her fellow cultural representatives. Some cultural
representatives were disappointed because before going to Orlando, an HKDL
cultural-representative senior staff member told all five hundred cultural
representatives that they would be promoted after working in Orlando. However,
the promise did not come true, thus triggering the anger. Rather than think that
HKDL management was problematic because it had broken its own promise, Olivia
commented that her colleagues were unintelligent because the promise had been
only verbal, not written as a valid contract.
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Fred Chiu, “Combating the Double Processes of Decolonisation/Recolonisation
in Hong Kong, or ‘Postcoloniality’ as a Double-pronged Politics,” in Cultural
Studies Review 8, issue 2, p. 49. Fred Chiu argues that colonial governor Chris
Patten channeled the Post-June-4 Hong Kong mood and articulated the linkage
between the democratization processes and “Hong Kong ways of life.” The
Democrats’ landslide victory in 1991 was an achievement of this articulation.
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Chapter Five
Pragmatist Cosmopolitanism: Parents’ Use of Disney Merchandise

In the previous chapter, I argue that the attractiveness of the HKDL project is not
merely economic but also cultural. The “world city” or “cosmopolitan city” image
offered by Disneyland promises my respondents various dreams. First, it makes
available a “dream” in which they can re-enact their presumed “Chineseness plus”
cultural identity (an identity through which some “Hong Kong people” may
distinguish themselves from other Chinese).1 Second, it offers a way to reconfirm
some of their “Hong Kong supremacist” belief that Hong Kong is a city of
excellence surpassing other Asian cities, and that Hong Kong people are competent
and “professional” (up to world standard) enough to host a world-class
entertainment complex. Third, the American-based global Disney company
significantly provides some people (most of whom are recent local-university
graduates) with opportunities to live and work in the United States, to strengthen
their curriculum vitae, to change career paths, to encounter cultural differences, and
to broaden their own cultural orientation. Because Disney is a household name with
which Hong Kong has long been in contact, in this chapter, I focus on the middle
class family consumption of Disney offerings, including movies and merchandise. I
ask how Disney texts connect to Hong Kong families’ lived experiences and to the
families’ larger social, economic, and political environment; in particular, I examine
how Hong Kong middle class parents appropriate Disney products for their own
uses while simultaneously being subjected to various discourses that shape the
parents’ lived sense of themselves and their child-rearing practices. In this chapter, I
also discuss middle class struggles and the micropolitics that the middle class
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exercises to maintain its privileged position.
It is evident that Disney, through its various merchandise and through its
gigantic photogenic sets in malls, manages to insert itself into different Hong Kong
families. In 2002, I began conducting an ethnographic study of five middle class
families. My aim was to study parents’ approaches to parenting, particularly in
relation to family consumption of Disney products (comprising chiefly movies,
merchandise, and theme parks). All these five families had various Disney
merchandise, including DVDs, clothes, and household appliances. Although Disney
merchandise is ubiquitous both in Hong Kong generally and, at least at the time of
my study, in my respondents’ homes, my respondents as parents felt ambivalent
toward the Mouse.
I conducted an ethnographic study of several families only, and I chose to
concentrate on middle class families.2 There are two reasons for the choice. First,
Disneyland has been recognized as a site that is accessible to the middle class, that
suggests the desire of the American middle class to safely and predictably consume
“exotic” landscapes,3 and that promotes American middle class values such as
individualism.4 Second, scholars differ about role played by the middle class in
political transformation.5 In the context of this chapter’s concerns, I discuss
whether middle class parents’ consumption behavior, in general, and Disney
merchandise, in particular, materializes the middle class “self-help” culture and
local family power dynamics within both the market and the existing global order
as it affects Hong Kong. I also ask whether this consumption behavior fits the
authoritarian, administration-led management practices of the HKSAR government.
All eight parents in my study were between the ages of thirty-five and fifty.
During their childhood, they all had had contact with Disney offerings; one parent
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had joined the Hong Kong Disney Club as a child, and another parent had delighted
in classic Disney animated cartoons. Of the eight parents, however, six were
reserved in their opinion of Disney animated-cartoon values and consciously
resisted the consumerist culture that Disney had promoted. Nevertheless, Disney
merchandise surrounded the children’s rooms and the families’ TV cabinets. In
these parent-respondents’ eyes, Disney was no longer just about entertainment but
about their children’s formal, effective, and entertaining education. My middle class
family respondents all had two or more Disney learning products such as bilingual
Disney picture-story books or English-language-instruction VCDs, in addition to
the respondents’ Disney plush dolls, action figures, computer games, costumes, teeshirts, and DVDs. It is the parents who selected Disney merchandise, produced
certain Disney meanings, and thus helped mold their children into certain types of
cultural beings.
This chapter’s respondents—middle class parents—were more pragmatic
than the previous chapter’s respondents, who were (for my study’s purposes)
university-graduated HKDL workers. The middle class parents emphasized formal
education, and their pragmatic use of Disney merchandise as edutainment can be
linked with two important factors: first, their own lived experiences of upward class
mobility (due to their attainment of education qualifications); and second, their
recent declining career-advancement opportunities (due to, in their view, their lack
of cosmopolitan cultural capital). Living through the Britain-to-China shift of
power, riding the property-price wave from crest to trough, facing the Asian
financial crisis, and coping with—among other things—severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS), economic restructuring, and a shrinking employment market,
both my middle class respondents and I, being a Hong Kong resident myself, have
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considered ourselves the “crippled” privileged: we have reflected on our “lack”
instead of on our “gains” in the global economy. At the same time, respondents’ use
and interpretation of Disney can also be attached to other more general discourses,
such as the culture of market individualism, which rewards individual material
success and condemns personal failure.
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section examines
Disney’s synergistic marketing strategy, whereby Disney has inserted itself into
Hong Kong families’ everyday life through ubiquitous products and family-oriented
celebrations. The second section and the third section discuss these parents’
perception patterns and consumption patterns relative to Disney movies and
merchandise. Parents in my study perceived Disney-based moral values, and some
parents, as I just noted, were reserved toward, or even resistant toward, some of
these perceived values. This latter group of parents were willing to act as cultural
gatekeepers to scan out values that they did not want their children to inhabit, in
particular, values concerning violence and consumerism. In the fourth section, I
examine families’ consumption of Disney educational kits, especially the Englishlanguage learning kits. I discuss how parents’ behavior connected with their own
lived experiences and discourses and how their acts (1) sustained their middle class
privileges, (2) reinforced the local hierarchical parent-child relationship, (3)
reproduced local pragmatist and flexible economic-based cultural practices, (4)
reproduced the cultural ideal of American “success,” (5) affirmed the importance
for their children of the emerging China-based regional economy, and (6) decreased
their children’s encounters in the domestic sphere with local popular culture,
thereby reducing the potential means for them to relate their pop cultural affect with
a local identity and a place-based sense of community. In fact, the complexity of
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these parents’ consumption behaviors in relation to their lived world demonstrates
the value of Massey’s argument against making an essentialist connection between
place and culture.

Hong Kong: city of Disney consumption6
Hong Kong is famous as a big shopping mall; the International Herald Tribune
calls the Central District the “Fifth Avenue of the Far East.”7 In “revitalizing Hong
Kong’s economy and strengthening community cohesiveness following the SARS
outbreak” in 2003, different trade organizations of the tourism, retail and catering
industries launched a three-month “community self-help” campaign, “We Love
HK,” to “call upon the Hong Kong public to ‘go out and spend’ and help the ailing
economy.”8 In contrast to many South Koreans,9 for example, Hong Kong people
reportedly feel little guilt over their consumption of American or Japanese
imports.10 Living in a big mall landscape, Hong Kong people’s shopping culture is
incorporated into their daily spatial practices. Whether Hong Kong residents live in
public housing or on a private estate, there are malls nearby that the residents can
walk past, peer into, and buy from. In 2005, over one third of the housing estates
managed by the Hong Kong Housing Authority had shopping malls.11 A ride to any
district center will reveal another mega-mall. The most successful district mall is
the New Town Plaza in Shatin (one of Hong Kong’s eighteen districts).12 With
200,000 square meters comprising three internal mega-malls, New Town Plaza is
one of the largest shopping centers in Hong Kong.13
In November 1999, the HKSAR government officially announced that the
government and the Disney Company would initiate HKDL, and ever since then,
Disney has undertaken a “synergistic”14 marketing strategy to boost its local and
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civic image in Hong Kong. This strategy has included extensive promotion of
Disney movies, the refurbishment of local Disney Stores15 in 2001, frequent publiclibrary retellings of Disney stories, and regular Disney-related activities held for
children and high school students.16 Disney’s largest marketing functions took place
during the 2001 and 2002 Christmas seasons.
The 2001 Disney Christmas function “Snow White’s Magical Christmas”
was held in the center of New Town Plaza on 24 November 2001 and 1 January
2002 (figure 1). The site was decorated as a mini-Disney park, at the center of
which stood a castle. Surrounded by tall trees, the outside environment was blocked
and the site maintained a self-enclosed narrative. Inside this medieval edifice,
visitors walked through a dark corridor featuring a Walt Disney biography and a
production history of Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs (1937); played with an
interactive magic mirror in which the Queen would appear when visitors stepped on
a particular part of the floor; visited the Seven Dwarfs’ house; watched a Snow
White promo; played computer games; and bought Disney merchandise. The flow
of visitors to “Snow White’s Magical Christmas” was controlled so that visitors
could walk only in one direction: visitors needed to pass through the written
introductions about both Walt Disney’s Disney-authorized biography and the Snow
White production history; after making it through this “rite of passage” (the
corridor), visitors could engage in various types of physical entertainment and, in
particular, consumption activities.
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Fig. 1: “Snow White’s Magical Christmas” in 2001

The visitors were well under Disney’s control. The site structured visitors’
spatial practices in an enclosed space. However, we should not then conclude that
the Disneyfied Snow White Christmas site exercised total control over visitors’
behavior. During my visit, most visitors would stay at the site for ten to fifteen
minutes. They carried a camera (i.e., not a cellular phone but a digital camera,
which means the visitors knew well beforehand that they would like to take
pictures there) and immediately took pictures of the site. With their “functional”
goal achieved, very few of the visitors bothered to read either the authorized
biography of Walt Disney or the Snow White production notes, although the
information was located at the entrance of the castle through which visitors had to
pass. I stayed at the entrance for half an hour and found out only two out of fifty
people that I observed bothered to read the history. These two people were in their
twenties. Whereas the other visitors quickly filed through, the two visitors in
question stayed at the entrance for several minutes and only thereafter did they
proceed into the site to take photos. In general, adult visitors busily snapped photos,
and no parents tried to explain the Snow White story to their children, who seemed
oblivious to the written information. To see the Queen appear, older children kept
on stepping on the part of the floor that activated the magic mirror. Visitors clearly
subordinated the Snow White story and Walt Disney biography to their snap-taking
and play. As a result, the “Snow White” function may have successfully promoted
neither Walt Disney’s biography nor the Snow White name; however, the function
successfully became a platform for family gathering, aroused certain pleasant and
felicitous experiences, and encouraged families to associate Disney with local
family festival celebrations.
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Lok Fu Shopping Centre

Tsz Wan Shan Shopping Centre

Lei Yue Mun Plaza

Stanley Plaza

Fig. 2: “Disney’s Magical Moments” in 2002

To create in people’s minds a link between Disney and Hong Kong family
rituals, the Walt Disney Company (Asia Pacific) Limited and the Hong Kong
Housing Authority (HKHA) co-produced “Disney’s Magical Moments” in 2002
(figure 2). Running from 21 December 2002 to 5 January 2003, this event remains
the largest function ever held by the HKHA.17 Networking 131 of the HKHA’s
shopping centers, the event issued souvenirs to those customers who purchased
over HK$200 worth of Disney products. Four shopping malls, Stanley Plaza, Tsz
Wan Shan Shopping Centre, Lok Fu Shopping Centre, and Lei Yue Mun Plaza,
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were lavishly decorated with gigantic sets and models that served as stages for
Cinderella, Belle, Snow White, and the Little Mermaid. Disney merchandise
occupied every corner of these malls and their department stores. Disney perhaps
had learned from “Snow White’s Magical Christmas” that families privilege
picture-taking over reading in the Disney landscape, and Disney made onstage
adaptations to local needs. Different from “Snow White’s Magical Christmas” in
2001, “Disney’s Magical Moments” did not ask visitors to familiarize themselves
with Walt’s biography or with Disney movies’ production histories but rather to
memorize the huge, exotic Disney caricatures by taking a snapshot of their happy
Disney moment. These Disney caricatures and visitors’ photos with Disney icons
signified both the omni-presence of Disney characters and the particular types of
pleasant experiences that stem from a visit to the Disney landscape. Not long after
this grandiose event, Disney icons appeared in all major local festival celebrations:
the Mickey Mouse Garden featured in the 2003 Hong Kong Flower Show, the big
lantern of Sleeping Beauty Castle took part in the 2003 mid-Autumn festival in
Victoria Park (figure 3), and since 2001, the Hong Kong Disneyland float has
graced the Chinese New Year parade.

Fig. 3: 2003 HK mid-Autumn Festival,
Victoria Park
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The opening of Hong Kong Disneyland gave rise to a Mickey Mouse craze,
elevating the cartoon rodent from modest to high fashion, emblazoning the icon on
everything from tee-shirts to jewellery, and generating a market even for counterfeit
Mickey Mouse-themed goods; indeed, the International Herald Tribune describes
the ubiquitous appearance of the Mickey icon in Hong Kong as “a Disney mania.”18
Disney merchandising also includes character-themed candies and grooming
products in pharmacies and in beauty chains such as Mannings and in local
supermarkets like Park N’ Shop; Disney-related toys, computer games, and books
in Toys ‘R’ Us; similar household products, soft toys, and gifts in thirteen
Trendyland chain stores19; inexpensive youth fashion in ‘It’s Mickey’ chain stores
and eighty-six Giordano fashion shops20; uptown high-fashion in Moiselle chain
stores; jewellery in forty-five Chow Sang Sang shops; and Disney merchandise in
over two hundred McDonald’s restaurants in Hong Kong. Other merchandise
featuring Disney characters that Hong Kong has imported from Japan can also be
found in trendy youth shops inside MTR stations, Japanese department stores, and
small shopping malls in every corner of the metropolis. Counterfeit Disney
merchandise can be found in small stationery stores in every public-housing estate,
in the famous Ladies Market in Mong Kok, and in markets in Causeway Bay, Wan
Chai, North Point, Sham Shui Po, and so on.
Disney’s commercial success is due largely to its synergistic approach,
whereby the company first produces movies treated as merchandise advertisements;
then it makes TV series, comics, soundtracks, and musicals and sells a range of
movie-character merchandise in Disney Stores, theme parks, and local stores.
Throughout the process, Disney operates an extensive and penetrating series of
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marketing and promotional activities. As the biggest licensor in the world, Disney
exercises control over a host of instantly recognizable characters, each of which
corresponds to hundreds of kinds of products; therefore, it is no surprise that crossmedia marketing helps Disney turn great profits. Mickey Mouse’s face sells US$4.5
billion worth of merchandise every year21; The Lion King grossed US$756 million
at the box office worldwide, but its soundtrack, live stage shows, cartoons on the
Disney Channel, a Toontown attraction at Disneyland, a vast array of merchandise,
and home video and DVD sales raked in more than US$1 billion22; the production
cost of Toy Story (1995) was about US$75-100 million,23 and the film grossed
US$356.8 million at the worldwide box office24 and, subsequently, grossed over
US$3 billion25 during ten years of further profits, including ancillary earnings.
It is evident that Disney—because of its differentiated merchandise, its
shifting aesthetic sense, and its adaptive application of contradictory popular
discourses to local needs and desires—has managed to successfully insert itself into
different Hong Kong families’ lives. On the one hand, the American-based firm
links up the brand “Disney” with Hong Kong’s local festivals and family rituals and,
on the other hand, the firm advertises its characters by presenting them in various
promotional activities, movie screenings, and product sales in every corner of Hong
Kong. The commercial operation is massive. However, if the core aim of
Disneyization26 is to sell successfully and to ask consumers to consume happily and
thoughtlessly, then a Disneyized culture is hard to find in Hong Kong; instead,
Disney merchandise becomes a vehicle by which parents can mold their children
into a certain type of cultural being. Moreover, as we shall see, parents’ uses of
Disney products reproduce the existing power order, including local class
differences and a cultural ideal of American superiority at success.
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Hong Kong parents: the cultural gatekeepers
Hong Kong people generally regard family as the most important component of
human life27; in particular, both having children and child-centeredness in a family
setting are norms in Hong Kong culture.28 Children’s status in Hong Kong society,
as Ng Chun Hung argues, has changed over time, “from a beginning of neglect,
then to alarm and protection, and, since the 1970s to a view of children as the pillar
of the future society and hence an asset to be invested in.”29 Such shifts as the one
from child-neglect to child-centeredness have become possible both under the
changing state policies30 and amidst the proliferation of TV programs, games and
toys, clothing, and other products—a proliferation that treats children as consumers
who have their own tastes and wants.
Living inside this “Shopping Paradise,” Hong Kong parents may refrain
from shopping for themselves so that they can save for their children’s future.31
Also, parents frequently disagree with and reject the consumerist attitude promoted
by children’s TV programs and the mega-mall landscape of Hong Kong, although
they allow their children to have their own tastes to different degrees; as I will show
later, the parents encourage their children to consume particular edutainment
products, and even provide an “environment” for them to do so. Thinking of
children as passive, vulnerable, and dependent, parents also frequently state the
importance of “environment” in children’s development. In discussing their childrearing methods, parents presume that they should provide their children with an
environment conducive to a “healthy” childhood and should protect their children
against environments that affect the innocence of children “negatively.” Commonly
listed among these environments are Hong Kong shopping malls and especially
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Disney’s consumerist landscape, viewed as containing mainly “low cultural capital”
commodities.
Cathy32 and Lisa33 are two mothers who consciously act against malling
behavior; that is, these mothers oppose parent-child visits to and wanderings
through shops inside malls, visits that can last for hours and result in a bevy of
purchases. Because of the economic doldrums that seized Hong Kong after the
Handover, Cathy consciously changed her consumption practices into a pragmatist
approach.34 For example, to save money her family dropped the Sunday family
ritual of having dim sum in a Chinese restaurant; she also consciously refrained
from shopping for “unnecessary” goods (such as clothes) or services (having
beauty treatments or joining a gym). As full-time working mothers, both Cathy and
Lisa expressed concern over their lack of child-centered time. To develop parentchild intimacy, the two mothers planned activities such as outings and storybook
readings, as well as casual activities such as sandwich making, and the two
considered these activities to be more valuable than malling. As Cathy, for example,
stated:

I’m not in the habit of taking him [her son] shopping because he can’t quite
control himself.… It’s a waste of time, since we don’t have much time to be
together … I have to go to work on alternate Saturdays. On Sunday, we
wake up at about ten and eleven. After lunch, he has to study, since we just
do it once a week. After studying, it’s about three. What can we do? At most,
we go to the park or to the public library. After a while, it’s time to have
dinner. It is a waste of time if we also go shopping at the mall and play
stupid things in Jumpin Gym U.S.A.35.… Now I know some of his
classmates’ parents, and we go to the park together. Those parents also think
like me. Going out to the park is better than spending time in the mall.

Given her intention to spend less money in everyday life, it is easy to understand
why Cathy rarely goes to the Disney Store to shop for her son Adrian. In 2003, I
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visited Cathy’s home, where she showed me her Disney merchandise and
commented that Disney merchandise is not worth the expense:

You see the Buzz notebook. Once, his classmate’s mother brought me to the
Disney Store. It was on sale and I bought it. But actually not everything is
cheap. Only some stuff. And Disney clothes are still more expensive than
clothes at the market. The one he [Adrian] wears now costs only twelve
dollars in Po Ling Street. He doesn’t have to dress up at home, right? A teeshirt around forty dollars is good enough for going out, and you can’t buy
Disney clothes for about forty dollars, right?

In my casual talks with Cathy, we seldom talked about consumption activities. In
contrast, my talks with my single, childless girlfriends often concern consumptionrelated topics. Important to Cathy were Adrian and her work life, which she
mentioned during every one of our talks. Family and work occupied Cathy’s life,
and consumption became a rare and marginal daily-life practice. Adrian has some
Disney clothes, but many are gifts36 from relatives and friends. Cathy had bought
some Disney movies in the VCD medium, such as Toy Story, Snow White, Peter
Pan, and The Lion King. Cathy carefully chose these VCDs: she would buy them
only if she had concluded that the movie would be good enough to re-play many
times. And even though Cathy, her husband Fred, and Adrian visited Disneyland
Paris in 2001 and 2006, the family did not change into big spenders. In 2001, for
example, they bought only a balloon. That is, they successfully resisted the park’s
design, which encourages visitors to play happily and to shop “naturally” and
extravagantly.
Seeing children as innocents who need to be constrained with discipline,
parents discipline their own lifestyle. Fighting against ideas of consumerism and
materialism, Lisa and her husband Tom seldom went to a mega-mall. When they
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did go shopping, they tried their best to go alone, that is, to avoid bringing their
daughters along; this strategy reflected the parents’ effort to prevent their children
from developing the desire to shop. Since the birth of their first daughter, Dorothy,
the family would eat dinner at home except during festivals. As did Cathy, Lisa
refused to treat shopping in malls on weekends as a family ritual. Lisa and Tom told
me separately and together on three separate occasions that “we never buy products
based on characters.” In Lisa’s words, “We absolutely do not buy products because
of the characters. They [the children] know the rule and therefore they don’t whine
to buy things with a character.” All products that Lisa and Tom purchase are based
on the products’ usefulness, instead of on appearance.
Consequently, Dorothy and Stephanie, the two daughters of Lisa and Tom,
seldom went to a mall, even though their residence in Shatin is less than a tenminute drive from New Town Plaza. Dorothy was a bit different from the other
children discussed in the study and from ten kindergarteners whom I talked to in a
nursery school,37 for she recognized Disney characters but had no special
preference for any particular character. She exhibited no strong desire to own a
product with a character image. There were Winnie the Pooh plastic plates in Lisa’s
home, but these were gifts from friends.
Judy and Jacob,38 another couple, enjoyed dining out with their son, Leo,
and three of them frequently visited malls. Aside from the members of the antiDisney group, Judy and Jacob were the two interviewees who most worried about
the HKDL project’s contribution to American cultural imperialism. Compared with
Cathy and Lisa, Judy and Jacob were more liberal in the sense that they allowed
their child to visit malls and his favorite shops, but at the same time they were more
explicit in criticizing Disney’s promotion of child-centered consumerist behavior.
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Characterizing Disney as an institution that is “dredging money from children by
tantalizing them,” they practiced the “no buy” policy. Consider the following
conversation that we had:

Kim: You bring Leo to the Disney Store. Does he ask you to buy him things?
Judy: Yes, he does. We just say, “We won’t buy it. No buy.” (Judy smiles.)
Jacob: He is not fond of those things.
Judy (smiling): Sometimes he is. After seeing the movie, he wanted to have
a toy, such as Buzz Lightyear…. Every time he goes there [Disney Store],
he touches them. We keep on saying, “We won’t buy it because it is
expensive and we don’t need it. You can come but only to look at them.”

Leo accepts his parents’ teachings and puts them into practice. After watching Lilo
& Stitch (2002), Leo and I visited a Disney Store. When he saw the Stitch plush
dolls, he ran to that counter and played with the dolls. His fondness for Stitch
instilled in him a powerful desire to own a Stitch plush doll, but he decided not to
buy it finally because “mother likes it least.” Again on this topic, I conversed with
Leo:

Kim: Do you like Stitch?
Leo: Yes.
Kim: Why?
Leo: Because it is cute.
Kim: Do you want to have a Stitch soft toy?
Leo: Yes, but mother said we have soft toys at home. We don’t need to have
more soft toys. But the fact is, my home doesn’t have a Stitch soft toy.
Kim: If you had money, would you buy a Stitch soft toy?
Leo: No, because mother likes it least of all.

Leo displayed the “look but don’t buy” behavior again when we stepped outside the
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Disney Store and back into the mall, where a temporary counter was selling Bossini
casual wear featuring images of Stitch and Lilo. Leo asked me to accompany him to
the counter to have a look. When we arrived, he said, “Actually, I don’t really like
short-sleeved shirts. I have a lot at home. I don’t need any more.” His desire to own
the tee-shirt was suppressed by his rational evaluation of needs.
With regard to Disney offerings, Betty39 was less ambivalent and more
positive than other mothers. To Betty, Disney movies are good for both parents and
children: “After watching Finding Nemo, parents should learn that we shouldn’t be
too strict to children and children should also know that they should listen to
parents’ advice.” As the only second-generation middle class parent in my study,
Betty had joined Hong Kong’s Mickey Mouse Club when she was a child and she
was the only respondent in my study to voice the belief that “It [Disney] belongs to
my generation”—although her fondness for Japanese cartoon characters was
greater than her fondness for Disney ones.40 Perhaps because of her relatively
affluent background, Betty was also the only parent who did not insist on training
her son, Henry, to refrain from consumption activities. When I first visited Betty
and Henry, I was stunned by the huge number of Disney videos in their home:
above the TV set, there were many Disney DVDs, including The Lion King and its
sequels, Lilo & Stitch and its sequel, Dumbo, Toy Story I and II, A Bug’s Life,
Finding Nemo, The Incredibles, some sing-along English learning videotapes, and
some “It’s Mickey” short animated cartoon videotapes; on the left, there were two
big boxes with the big words “Disney’s World of English” and many Disney
storybooks. Besides, there were three Pixar/Disney action figures (Buzz Lightyear,
Emperor Zurg, and Mr. Incredible), a Buzz toothbrush, and a Shrek sofa. Betty
explained that Henry liked watching the same movies repeatedly and that the cost
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of going to the movie theater was more than the cost of buying a DVD; deciding to
forego the movie-theater experience, she opted to wait for the release of a film on
DVD. As an English teacher at a famous girls’ school, Betty was lenient toward
Henry’s Disney-watching practices because she found that Henry improved his
English by imitating simple dialogue in the movies.

Hard-working workshop: stickers collection
Though attractive, Disney’s countless pieces of merchandise are not many parents’
objects of desire; in fact, some parent-respondents in my study tried their best to
guard their children against the desire both to shop and to own these vast arrays of
goods. Although it may not be easy for them, children still can get what they want
by requesting a particular product as their birthday gift or by behaving well in
return for a reward. To instill in children the understanding that “there is no free
lunch in the world,” mothers Ada41 and Cathy presented their children with an
alternative way to get rewards: sticker collecting. If their kids collected a certain
number of stickers, they got a reward.

Ada: “Do your homework and have your dinner quickly!”

Ada: “Read test questions carefully!”
Ada: “Be careful in working on assignments!”

Angel: “Stop your temper!”

Fig.4: Ada’s home
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Like many parents, Ada was concerned with Angel’s academic standing.
Angel sometimes received physical punishment because she would not concentrate
on doing assignments or because she was careless in her test-taking (figure 4). To
ensure Angel’s academic standing, Ada spent most of her time in line with Angel’s
tightly crammed school schedule and bought books and educational kits for Angel.
Ada noted that she gave Angel ten dollars of pocket money each week and that
Angel could spend her money according to her wants. If she did not want to use her
allowance, Angel could behave well to get star stickers. After collecting a certain
number of star stickers, Angel would earn a gift such as stationery. If her conduct
fell below expectations, stars would be deducted and she would have to behave
better to earn the stickers back.
Ada used sticker collecting to encourage Angel to be docile and to do well
in school, whereas Cathy saw it as a practice-based reflection of the “winner-takeall” world in which we live. Cathy and I spoke about the matter:

Kim: What kinds of gifts do you give him [Adrian] on his birthday?
Cathy: They vary from year to year. Last year, it was a plant. I wanted to
train him to have patience. Sometimes I give him a gift that he longs to have,
such as computer games. Kids are never satisfied. They are accustomed to
receiving lots of gifts, but they still feel that they don’t have enough.
Recently, I’ve intentionally bought him fewer things. Lots of these [Disney
products] were bought by others…. Adrian has to collect 100 stickers for a
Digimon game.42 He tries his best to be the best. He has to be the best in
school. And if he doesn’t behave well that day, he will ask, “How many
stickers can I get today?” He is aggressive in this respect. He has to win. If
he loses, he will cry. But it’s OK, since everybody experiences failure while
growing up.
Kim: You want to train Adrian to be aggressive?
Cathy: I want him to know that there is no free lunch in the world, that you
have to work hard for your dreams.
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In the consumerist world, children are seen as full-fledged consumers who have
their own tastes and who deserve some freedom of choice. The Hong Kong parents
whom I interviewed for this study strove to protect their children from such a
consumerist attitude by limiting their exposure to shopping-mall environments and,
therefore, to the ubiquitous Disney products. Although nine Disney Stores were
located in major Hong Kong shopping malls by 2004, these parents seldom
shopped there, for they found that Disney merchandise did not live up to its
billing.43 According to the sum of their views, children who desire something need
to act well, a dictum that runs parallel to the “work hard, play hard, spend hard”
mentality of these Hong Kong parent respondents.

No killings, no disobedience, no laziness: failed Disney movies and stories
Shopping and watching TV are two interrelated daily behaviors—the more
exposure children have to TV, the more consumer power children will demand.44
Parents whom I interviewed try their best not only to obstruct children’s
introduction to the consumerist world but to keep them away from the television set,
as well. Many Hong Kong parents consider television viewing a negative influence
on children’s development: it takes away from children’s homework time, promotes
consumption, and broadcasts explicit depictions of sex and violence.45
In the family, it is the mothers who perform “the mediating role of
‘gatekeepers’ in creating a reception context”46 and who thus rule over children’s
media use. Choi and Lee argue that women—both at-home workers and
marketplace workers—are more responsible than men in Hong Kong for
childrearing and for domestic work.47 In one of my own studies,48 I further argue
that mothers control what children can and cannot watch; mothers talk to the
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children about what they should or should not learn from television and movie
characters; and mothers even change their own watching habits to cater to their
children’s development.49 The increase of families’ VCR ownership,50 the rise of
home-rental markets for videos in the 1980s, and the subsequent rise of VCD and
DVD markets have greatly helped parents select particular programs for children to
watch. As the world’s largest provider of child-oriented content, Disney releases
movies that, most recently in the VCD and the DVD mediums, have impressed both
parents and children in Hong Kong, especially when these parents consider local
movies and TV soaps to be mind-numbingly pointless but consider Disney movies,
presenting little sex or horror, to be safer for children.51 For example, Cathy liked
Snow White and Peter Pan a lot, and therefore, Adrian had watched these two
Disney classics many times. As a film buff and film-company administrator, Cathy
liked the elegant depiction and cinematic style of Snow White. She cited the death
scene as an example:

When he [Adrian] was two or three years old, we watched Snow White [the
movie] many times, and I saw every detail. Snow White does not show
Snow eating the apple, and you just see the apple dropping from her hand. It
is very elegant. It is different from today’s movies, where you see a knife
lodged inside the corpse. The film is worth many viewings. There is a little
turtle in the movie. At one point, Snow raises her hand and the turtle crawls
down. It is funny, and the song is so beautiful. You cannot find another film
better than this film.

As I mentioned, Judy and Jacob had bad impressions of Disney animation because
they feared American cultural imperialism. Judy argued, also, that Disney animated
cartoons emphasize a binary way of reading goodness and badness, heroism and
cowardice, all of which simplify children’s views of the world. However, compared
with other characters such as Bionicle,52 whom Leo liked, Disney’s characters
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sometimes held a greater appeal for Judy and Jacob. For example, Judy and Jacob
recounted an incident in which one of Leo’s classmates had hit him twice: the first
time, hitting Leo in his stomach and testicles in the classroom; the second time,
hitting Leo in the testicles in the restroom. During one of our conversations, both
Jacob and Judy linked this incident to their concern over media’s promotion of
violence:

Jacob: The main problem is why the child was being so violent. Because
things around us are so violent. Media images are so problematic. Media
just keep on showing fighting and fighting, and children just copy, just
imitate. They may know it is wrong, but they still imitate.
Kim: Then how do you face the fact that Leo likes watching Buzz Lightyear
and Bionicle, characters that have the right to conquer?
Judy: We tell him directly our attitude toward these characters. But he can
love these characters. I told him “your Bionicle looks very ugly. It is about
biological warfare. If humans have to face this situation, it will be very bad.
Jacob: Disney basically is very American. Even Buzz Lightyear is an idol, a
so-called hero to protect and to save human beings. In Toy Story, Buzz is
there to save other toys. But it’s better than Bionicle. There is also another
side to Toy Story, it also talks about the relationship between him [Buzz]
and Woody. But I still think that it is a very big corporation making these
animations. But it is not totally bad… [emphasis mine]

Although Jacob did not quite like the character Buzz Lightyear because it
legitimises violence based on self-defense, Jacob found that other productions, such
as Bionicle, can be worse. By frequently using the disjunction ‘but’ to describe his
views on Toy Story, the above dialogue reveals Jacob’s disjointed, ambivalent
attitude toward Disney movies. Both Judy and Jacob emphasized liberal parenting
and open discussion instead of traditional parenting and rule-giving; consequently,
Leo, unlike other children in this study, had chances to watch his favorite television
programs, which Judy and Jacob perhaps frowned upon personally as “bad.”53
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It should be noted, however, that while establishing a family-entertainment
market in which the whole family can enjoy a movie together, Disney movies fail
to deal with local family agendas in detail; the Hong Kong parents in this study
expressed concern that Disney’s feature-length animated cartoons are too long for
children’s healthy viewing and that the movies’ romance and revenge themes and
some of the characterizations work against Hong Kong parents’ idea of children’s
entertainment. To protect children from the harm that might arise from their
exposure to fear, confusion, anger, and disgust, parents establish household rules
about screen-media use. For instance, although Lisa enjoyed songs from The Lion
King and although her daughters liked the film, Lisa had reservations about this big
Disney hit. She declared that it contains “too many killings”:

… in The Lion King, the two brothers kill each other. I watch the film with
the children and I have to explain why this or that happens; but I can’t
explain why the two brothers need to kill each other …

Except for Judy and Jacob, other parents in this study carried with them a sense of
Chinese traditionalism.54 To them, parents are superior to children and should teach
their children the difference between right and wrong; children are innocent and
should receive an education and an upbringing based on talks, controls, rewards,
and punishment, which can be physical. Because of this traditionalism, children’s
entertainment in parents’ eyes should teach children to be polite, docile, honest,
gentle, cultivated, and hardworking, instead of naughty, wild, deceitful, violent,
uncouth, and lazy. Some Disney characters such as Tinker Bell are famous and
popular for their mischief,55 and Hong Kong parents do not view such characters as
positively as do parents in a Western context, which might be more likely to exhibit
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relatively liberal child-rearing practices. Cathy, the administrator of a local movie
company and a fan of Snow White, disliked Pinocchio (1940) because “Pinocchio is
not a good kid and I don’t like a bad kid,” and she abhorred Lilo & Stitch for
Stitch’s disruptive behavior:

I really don’t like the film. It’s unacceptable. The first whole hour is about
how that thing [Stitch] destroys things. Children should not watch the film.
This cartoon animation is made for children. However, he [Stitch] is so
naughty. Is it that you [Disney] want the children to be as naughty as Stitch?
I really wanted to leave the theater. I will be picky in choosing Disney
movies in the future.

Afraid that her child would imitate inappropriate behavior, Cathy argued that
Disney had failed in recent years to produce “good-children” movies and that she
had become suspicious of Disney productions altogether. Judy and Betty, as did
some other parents, raised concerns about Stitch’s naughtiness, but did not prohibit
their boys, Leo and Henry, from watching the movie; instead, these mothers talked
to the children and directed them to interpret the movie. As I mention above, Leo
followed Judy and Jacob’s “no buy” policy because he knew that his mother did not
like Stitch. In fact, Lilo & Stitch was not well received at the Hong Kong box office.
Before the release of Lilo & Stitch, Disney launched an aggressive
advertising campaign to promote this film: TV advertisements on both Cantonese
channels and English channels,56 continual reports in popular lifestyle magazines
such as East Touch57 and Milk ,58 family-oriented magazines such as TVB Weekly ,59
and children’s magazines such as Ming Po Children Weekly 60 and X-kids Express
Weekly.61 Disney also had tie-in toys and tie-in activities available through
McDonald’s restaurants, Kjeldsens cookies, and local popular fashion brand
Bossini.62 In conjunction, shopping malls and Disney held promotional activities63
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wherein shoppers who spent a certain amount of money on purchases would
receive Stitch merchandise. Outside trendy movie theaters in Causeway Bay,
passers-by would see a giant-sized Stitch plush doll. Disney also invited one
popular Taiwan group, F4, to sing one song for the movie. Despite an avalanche of
promotional activities and the golden movie-release time of the summer holidays,
Lilo & Stitch reached a disappointing 29th place at the local box office in 2002,
grossing a mere HK$8.64 million. That same year, the second-highest-grossing film
was Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets (HK$38.26 million), and rounding
out the top-five highest-grossing films was Monsters, Inc. (HK$25.77 million).64
The merchandise of Lilo & Stitch was not well received either. Lilo & Stitch
was in Hong Kong theaters from 11 July to 21 August 2002. In June and July 2002,
I conducted my fieldwork on all nine local Disney Stores 65 (Tsim Sha Tsui, Shatin,
Festival Walk, Tai Koo Shing, Whampoa, Diamond Hill, Causeway Bay, Tsuen
Wan, and one in an airport). I made a total of twenty-four separate visits to these
stores during the two-month period. In each visit, I spent about one hour to see
whether or not different populations came to Disney stores at different times and
behaved differently. During this period of intensive fieldwork, Lilo & Stitch
merchandise was on prominent display in the stores: Stitch plush toys, bean dolls,
interactive dolls, music dolls, figure sets, computer games, glass globes, stationery,
school bags, card holders, drawing kits, candies, clothes, dress-up costumes,
canteens, tumblers, plastic cups, and activity kits. My observations strongly
suggested that customers either did not recognize the two characters, Lilo and
Stitch, or were not very keen on Stitch:

A teenage girl about twelve years old talked to her mother, commenting that
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Stitch was “cute” and that “it only costs $145.” Her mom replied, “What is
it? It isn’t a koala, nor is it a monster.” The mother walked away while
continuing with her comments, and the girl followed. (Shatin, 23 June 2002,
Sunday)

Two teenage girls looked at the Lilo & Stitch glass globe, one asked the
other, “Oh, this one, this is the new one, what is it called?” The queried girl
replied, “What? New? I don’t know. It’s so ugly!” (Kowloon Tong, 29 June
2002, Saturday)

After the film appeared on the big screen, more customers recognized the
characters Lilo and Stitch. However, few customers stayed at the Stitch corner of
the stores for more than 10 seconds; instead, they looked for clothing on sale66;
many customers clustered around the Pooh corner, where some newly arrived
Winnie the Pooh soft toys could be found.67 Few people actually purchased the Lilo
& Stitch merchandise. During my visits, there were only three purchases of Stitch
merchandise and no purchases of Lilo merchandise. Aggressive promotion
activities might strengthen the recognisability of new Disney characters, but ensure
neither positive public reception of the characters nor desirable sales of related
merchandise. From my observations, the advertising did little to offset the
decidedly mixed perceptions of Stitch’s cuteness factor:

A girl about ten commented that Stitch was “cute” as she was holding the
plush doll, and she kept on saying “It’s very soft” while touching it. Her
mother commented, “It’s so ugly!” They, then walked away. (Kowloon Tong,
10 July 2002, Wednesday)

With his sharp teeth, pronounced nostrils, fins, and four weapon-like hands, Stitch
is a cross between an adorable koala and a terrifying alien: the concept of “cute”
encounters the concept of “ugly,” good and evil. One parent who had also worked
in a film marketing organization commented that the unpopularity of the film was
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due largely to parents’ disapproval of the characterization of Stitch, a mischievous
alien. The film had a sequel but skipped a theatrical release and went straight to
DVD.
Stitch and other Disney characters display a good deal of violence and
mischief, to which my respondent Lisa objected. As a mother who worked outside
the home and as a firm believer in meritocracy, Lisa objected, as well, to Disney’s
princess stories because, she argued, they teach girls to think about only romantic
affairs and marriage. In a conversation with me, Lisa argued that girls who
daydream of romance and marriage are naughty and lazy:

Kim: What do you like or dislike about Disney stories?
Lisa: Too many love stories and too many killings. For example, in The
Lion King, the two brothers kill each other … You asked me if Disney is
American. Well, these nonsense love stories are very American. And this
thick book on Disney classics—the stories just ask girls to get married.
What is the point of these stories? Isn’t it sick to ask small girls to daydream
about getting married as soon as possible? I don’t know how to tell them the
stories when I find that I can’t educate them through these stories. Therefore,
I don’t use them anymore.… We try to find stories that are more educational,
and we are afraid of popularizing certain ideas, you know, materialism and
violence.… That’s why I stopped telling them these stories.

Disney’s princess stories ran counter to Lisa’s “work hard” mentality and the ideal
that she projected onto her two daughters—an ideal that substitutes a marketable
career woman for a non-marketable married wife. As a result, traditionalism (which
emphasizes hierarchical parent-child relationships based on children’s obedience)
and a middle class mentality (which emphasizes self-made success based on hard
work) encourage parents to restrict their children’s exposure to some Disney
movies because these movies purportedly have negative effects (disobedience,
laziness) on children.
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Parents are aware of and feel uneasy with some Disney values and the
consumerist discourse in general. Surrounded by this threat, the parents resist it by
negotiating with it: the families watch and buy some—but not any—Disney movies
and products. Underlying this strategy, however, is not only an actively local
negotiation with global discourses but also the abrasion of local cultural formation
by transnationally circulating values—in this case, either parental authority in Hong
Kong’s “traditional” family practices relative to a more recently adopted childcenteredness and the emphasis on egalitarian family relationships based on the
“modern” domestic ideal, or frugality and hard work as family virtues relative to
market-based consumption as a child’s right. In the next section, I will demonstrate
that parents’ active consumption shapes their own middle class ideas on parenting
and, at the same time, reproduces the privileged status of those ideas by instituting
a “good environment” (or, as in Bourdieu’s terms, a good habitus68) for their
children.

Hong Kong parents: the “good English-learning environment” providers
It is quite common for affluent families to have Disney movies at home. It is also a
widespread practice for parents in Western countries to set rules limiting children’s
media use.69 However, what distinguishes Disney merchandising in Asia from
Disney merchandising elsewhere is the greater market presence (relative to
English-speaking countries) of Disney educational products in Asia.70 This
presence earns Disney a privileged status for many Hong Kong families.
Coming from the intermediate and the lower classes, most present-day
Hong Kong parents have attained an education, worked hard, and climbed the
social ladder. It is these parents who dominate the first generation of Hong Kong’s
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current middle class: administrators, managers, and professionals in related fields.
Without inherited economic capital, these parents are deeply concerned over their
children’s social identity and make a concerted effort to maintain their children’s
middle class status by acquiring capital of both the economic kind and the cultural
kind: the core of their sense of attainment centers on their children’s language skills,
and an important supplement to this core concerns the nurturing of their children’s
competence in high culture. Parents in my study believe that if they provide a good
learning environment for their children, their children will have a greater chance of
developing the competence and cultural capital needed for their future careers.71
Parents attach great importance to their children’s adeptness in oral and
written English because it signifies that these children can enter a better school and,
later in life, find a better job. Furthermore, since the Handover in 1997, many Hong
Kong parents see Putonghua as increasingly important, particularly given the
emergence of China as a power to reckon with in the global economy. Not far
behind language on the importance scale is “cultivation” in high culture, which
children are expected to possess if they are to gain entrance to prestigious schools.
As a result, all five families that I worked with were paying for piano lessons for
their children, and four for private English lessons, and three of the five had
enrolled their children, starting at the age of five, in Putonghua classes. The
extreme case was Angel, Ada’s daughter. When she was in Primary one (which is a
grade for students who are about six years old), Angel not only spent a full day at
school but also managed to take nine additional classes every week: piano on
Monday, English on Tuesday and Wednesday, ballet on Thursday, mathematics and
English on Friday, and Putonghua, English pronunciation, and ballet on Saturday.
Of the nine private lessons, four involved English, and one was in Putonghua.
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Because Angel’s family was Catholic, Angel attended church and did not need to
have additional classes on Sunday, but normally she swam with her father for an
hour to strengthen her body.
Because these parents were pragmatic consumers, they consumed products
that could heighten their children’s learning initiative and abilities. Hong Kong
parents will not use a Disney movie as a babysitter, but they do treat Disney
educational kits as babysitters. All the families in my study had Disney educational
products: Judy had bought Leo Winnie the Pooh 123’s and Winnie the Pooh ABC’s
so that her son could learn counting and letter recognition when he was three years
old; Cathy had bought bilingual Disney storybooks and Disney’s Read Along CDand-storybook series to help Adrian learn both English and written Chinese; and
Ada had bought Disney’s Sing Along Songs and several of Disney’s Englishlanguage storybooks for Angel to learn English.72 Parents bought Disney
edutainment kits because, even before the purchase, both the parents and their
children were familiar with the characters. People’s familiarity with Disney
characters because of long-time encounters and because of the omni-presence of
the Disney image, as discussed in a previous section, encourages parents to
purchase the Disney brand instead of other edutainment products. Betty discussed
this very topic:

It [Disney] belongs to my generation.… These characters are attractive to us.
We watched Disney when we were growing up. The BBC also has a set of
teaching-English materials. Its main character is an owl and it’s cheaper, I
should say a lot cheaper. But as a mother, I think what attracts me can
attract my son. Perhaps this is the wrong idea. Perhaps the owl also attracts
him. But who buys the set? The mother, not the son. They [Disney
characters] are attractive to me, and therefore, I bought this set.
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Disney’s World of English is my focus here because the first set, which is for
children aged three to six, recommends daily use over the course of three years.
Consisting of twelve English learning books and many vocabulary cards, the set
costs HK$14,000, which is slightly below Hong Kong’s average household
monthly income of HK$15,50073 and which is about ten times the cost of another
brand’s English learning VCD set. Among the five families I have studied, Lisa and
Betty used the first set and Betty had paid the full price for it.
Disney’s World of English is not developed by the Walt Disney Company
itself but by a licensee, World Family Ltd. The English kit emphasizes children’s
ability to learn American English as their mother tongue through “listening,
absorbing and copying.” The kit asserts that its approach to learning is not complex;
the claim is that children aged three to six who play it everyday for three years can
learn to speak English as their mother tongue and can do so easily because the kit
successfully creates an English-language learning environment. It was first
introduced in 1980 in Japan and has served over 100,000 families across Japan and
Taiwan.74 Introduced to Hong Kong in the late 1990s, it soon became popular with
middle class families.
Attracted to the concept of an English learning environment, both Betty and
Lisa bought Disney’s World of English. Each had a Filipina maid who took care of
their children and who communicated with them in English, but Betty and Lisa
remained unsure of the maid’s English-language teaching skills and, therefore,
bought the Disney set and asked the maid to play the disc and sing the songs with
the children in the morning. At night, the mothers read to them from the same
books. Betty commented on the topic and responded to one of my follow-up
questions:
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Betty: This is the pack for learning English. We can sing all songs taught by
the kit. We use them rarely now, but we played them every morning when
Henry was young. He did not have much to do at home and we needed to go
to work. The maid did not know what to do with him, but with this
[Disney’s World of English], the maid played the disc and sang with him.
Grace [Betty’s ex-maid] can sing all the wake-up songs and bedtime songs.
Kim: How long can it be used?
Betty: It can be used until [the child is] six years old. There are vocabulary
cards and these words keep repeating in all the songs and stories. The whole
idea of the learning set is to recycle these words continuously so that
children can learn all these words. I know this method works. For example,
children don’t know what ‘acrobat’ means. But there’s a book called the
circus show. And it contains acrobat songs. The child watches it and then
knows who the acrobat is and what a circus is. The words they teach can be
used in daily life. We had already taken him to a circus.

The parents were suspicious of the content of Disney movies but were not
suspicious of the content of the Disney English-languge learning kit. Mickey,
Minnie, Donald, Goofy, and Pluto become an important entry point through which
two-year-old and three-year-old children begin their English-language learning. In
my study, the parents allowed their children to watch the same disc, day after day
and week after week, until the children memorized all the linguistic details of each
speaker. Lisa tried out book Eight in front of me (the following dialogue was in
English unless indicated):

Lisa: The second section is about acrobats. “… can we do that?”
Dorothy: Of course I can. I am an acrobat.
Lisa: I can hang by one knee.
Dorothy: I can stand on one hand.
Lisa: I can swing and …
Dorothy and Stephanie: … and so can she.
Lisa: I can fly in the sky, and …
Dorothy: … and so can I.
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Lisa and Dorothy: We are the acrobats.
Lisa: Can you lift a hundred pounds?
Stephanie (lowering her voice to imitate a man’s voice): Of course I can.
Lisa: I am a …
Stephanie (lowers her voice): … a strong man.
Lisa: I can lift …
Dorothy and Stephanie: … a hundred pounds.
(Then Dorothy and Stephanie speak themselves.)
Dorothy: Can you lift two hundred pounds?
Stephanie (lowers her voice): Of course I can. I am a strong man.
Dorothy: Can you lift three hundred pounds?
Stephanie lowers her voice: Of course I can. I am a strong man.
Dorothy: Can you lift four hundred pounds?
Stephanie (lowers her voice): Of course I can. I am a strong man.
Lisa (to Kim, in Cantonese): Every night is like that. I want to finish it as
soon as possible and then I can go to sleep.
Lisa: five hundred, six hundred …
Dorothy (in Cantonese): No, only the last three are like that, not now!
(Lisa then follows the book and talks.)
Dorothy (in Cantonese): No, it’s not like that. You should ask a question,
not just talk to yourself.
(Stephanie sings an English song after awhile.)
Lisa (in Cantonese): She is singing a song from another book.
Dorothy (in Cantonese): It’s in book Six.
Lisa (in Cantonese): And she learns the word hippopotamus.

From Lisa’s perspective, the “pure entertainment” of Disney movies contains
gender stereotypes that would encourage her daughters to think only of marriage;
the Disney English-language kits, in contrast, are educational and the cultural
concerns are of secondary importance. On this point, Lisa fielded several of my
questions:
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Kim: When I played back the Disney kit’s tape that you tried in front of me,
I was a bit scared because the children learn not only the pronunciation but
also what it means to be a man—you know, “I am a strong man.” Have you
thought about it?
Lisa: You mean gender stereotypes? No, I have not thought about this
before.
Kim: Have you ever worried about this?
Lisa: For pronunciation, they also watch other English-language learning
programs, and I hope that they won’t just believe in one system of phonetics.
As for stereotypes, I always tell them about alternative ways of thinking.
For example, regarding men, I told them that they just need to find a good
man to marry and that daddy is a good man. Being a good man means so
many things: a rich man, a handsome man, or a strong man does not
necessarily make a good man.

Language acquisition is more important here than cultural issues. While cultural
critics have criticized the post-Handover use of Putonghua as the medium of
instruction in Hong Kong schools and have attributed this use to the Mainland’s
cultural imperialism, Lisa accepted such changes because she considered them
pragmatic: “What’s the problem? They speak Cantonese at home. Their English and
Putonghua must be better than ours so that they can earn a living.” We should note
here that neither were Lisa’s actions the direct result of unconscious acts nor was
she thoughtlessly adopting other parents’ behaviors. Rather, she understood clearly
the “lack” that characterized her and her husband; because of their lack of “world
exposure,” and because of their sub-standard English (the two factors were closely
related in her eyes), the career choices available to Lisa and her husband were not
as broad as those choices available to “better” counterparts in society. We spoke
about this issue:

Lisa: The most ideal case for me is that … they can get a scholarship to
study overseas. In the globalized world, they should have world exposure.
Their parents do not have it, and we feel bad about this.
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…
Kim: How about Putonghua?
Lisa: She has not started learning Putonghua, but we found one school for
her … We accept the idea that Putonghua is the medium of instruction in
school. What’s the problem? They speak Cantonese at home. Their English
and their Putonghua must be better than ours so that they can earn a living.
Kim: Do you think that you can’t earn a living?
Lisa: Of course I don’t.
Kim (expressing astonishment at the answer): What do you mean by having
the ability to “earn a living” then? After all, you know that speaking good
English and good Putonghua can’t guarantee you a good job.
Lisa: I don’t know. Let’s say, if my oral Putonghua is as good as a native
speaker’s, then I can work for Phoenix TV,75 and I won’t need to work for
TVB Jade, ATV, or Cable. I get more chances. If my English is very good, I
get more opportunities.… You know, HK’s media. Of eleven Chinese
newspapers and two English newspapers, only one English newspaper is ok,
but how come I can’t be one of those top reporters? English is the barrier. I
am in grade C but they are in grade A. I mean, only grade-A people can
work at Reuters: I can’t … Actually, if I tell you I’m not a pushy parent, it’s
a lie. I would very much like them to do something I can’t do.
Kim: Such as acquiring better English than you and I have?
Lisa: Yes, because we both know so clearly the limitations of people living
in Hong Kong. You must have professional skills to survive in this
globalized world.… For me, children need to leave Hong Kong because,
you know, [the job market of] Hong Kong will get saturated after twenty
years. If they don’t have the ability to go outside Hong Kong, their
development will be more limited than ours.
Kim: But where does one go?
Lisa: At least a condition for leaving Hong Kong is language, right? Other
skills should also be acquired, but the most important thing should be
language.

The parents in my study attributed their successful ascent on the social ladder to
academic achievement, but they qualified this success as “partial” and were
conscious of their “lack,” which hindered their further success in, for example, the
job market. They also knew that the globalized economy does not empower all
people; the process empowers a few but dispowers many, depending on whether
the subjects can be flexible enough to adapt to the globalized environment; for
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example, flexible enough to speak foreign languages fluently. In our conversations,
Lisa lamented several times her “sub-standard” English. Lisa had graduated from
her university thirteen years earlier and had never stopped studying since. After
earning her bachelor’s degree in history, she completed her law degree and a
master’s degree in journalism. The former degree reflected Lisa’s interest in the
field, whereas the latter degree reflected her pragmatic efforts to tune up her
English.
Lisa worked as a reporter for two local English newspapers, The Standard
and The South China Morning Post. After several years, when opportunities for
promotion at the newspapers grew rare, she changed jobs and became a public
relations officer. It was in this job that Lisa was working while I was conducting
my fieldwork on her. Lisa saw herself sometimes as a successful market player and
sometimes as a failed market player. Whatever the case, it was through her work
experiences that she continually reinforced her self-reliance ethic, which was the
key to class advancement or just to “survival.” She had grown to believe that
Western education, especially English-language acquisition, was a necessary
condition for “earning a living.”76 Lisa’s workplace experiences had become a
significant part of the cultural schemas from which she framed her sense of the
global and the local and from which, therefore, she selected her “strategies of
action”77 toward her two little daughters. Lisa’s comments on her own lack shed
light on her intention to build a material and social environment that would shape
her children’s habits and (language) skills in a way that would successfully prepare
them for careers in the increasingly competitive labor markets of the transnational
economy.
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From Lisa’s perspective, being local is an impediment. For instance, a Hong
Kong person whose native dialect is Cantonese and who refuses to master English
or Putonghua will lack the cultural capital necessary for economic viability.
Bombarded by talk of a dominant global arena and of struggling local arenas, Lisa
made every effort to shape her two little children into “cosmopolitans” who, rather
than remain in the “saturated” locale of Hong Kong, could go to and stay in the
English-speaking world or the Putonghua-speaking world. If being local cannot
strengthen one’s career options, then such cultural identity loses its importance.
Convinced that local pop culture is mind-numbing and that Cantonese has no
economic value, many Hong Kong parents rid their domestic spheres of local pop
culture and urge children to learn foreign languages (English and Putonghua)
diligently.

Conclusion
According to Baudrillard, consumption is based on lack. This may be questionable
as a general model, and theories of desire as a positive force have much to offer.78
However, living in a small city, facing an ailing economy, and acknowledging the
growth in regional and international competition, the parents in my study strongly
sensed a lack that continues to induce Hong Kong’s high consumption of
economically valuable cultural goods, including language kits like Disney’s. The
consumption patterns of middle class families indicate that consumption is not just
about leisure and lifestyle in symbolic and material terms but also about fulfilling
the changing and adaptive local cultural imaginary, which accords preference to the
cosmopolitan figure who uses global cultural capital to navigate the world.
It is evident that these parents do not accept Disney values as a total cultural
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package and that they are partially successful in negotiating and resisting certain
cultural meanings offered by Disney. In the “cultural supermarket,”79 it seems that
parents can select their favorite cultural products for their child-rearing practices.
However, consumer power is not absolute. Because a few transnational
conglomerates dominate the media market and because parents cannot access with
equal ease the offerings of all cultures, parents will find it much easier to “choose”
which particular Disney merchandise to consume than not to consume any Disney
products at all; because parents’ consumption of a particular culture is determined
largely by the culture’s market value, they have greater agency to decide to use or
not to use Disney learning kits than they do to choose not to teach children English
or Putonghua. Consumer agency, in this sense, is constrained by both the media
and cultural domination of Disney and the global order. At the same time, parents’
consumption behavior reinforces cultural hegemony in a specific way. As the
economic viability of local identity (being Heung Gong Yan) decreases, Hong
Kong’s middle class parents actively and reflexively purchase those glocalized
products that address their cosmopolitan desires, that amplify their economic and
social needs, and that forge meaningful and distinguishable social identities and
relations. As a way for these parents to maintain their privileged but insecure local
class positioning, such local actions not only maintain local class disparity but
reproduce a relatively low level of local cultural and media consumption in relation
to the intensive use of global commercial media products.
In this sense, the relations between the local and the global are more
dynamic and more complicated than we might expect. In order to understand these
parents’ consumption practices in terms of cultural globalization, we need to
consider them from four perspectives. First, there is always the consumerist, fun242

seeking element in Disney—no cultural imperialism writ large, but part of a range
of such diversionary practices churned out by global culture today. The parents in
my study occasionally purchased expensive, globally sourced diversions, and in
this, the parents’ behavior was not resistant.
Second, I suspect that the Disneyfied consumerist landscapes such as
shopping malls, merchandising, and Disney animation are a contested site for a
more mundane moral project of passing on moral guidelines and of teaching and
learning how to be a human being. Here, parents’ resistance to Disney’s promotion
of consumerist behavior and their locally inspired family standards regarding
screen violence, mischief, and morals might offer some resistance to globalized
consumption on the one hand, and a reassertion of local mundane morality on the
other.
Third, the parents in my study used cultural goods self-consciously to
achieve class distinction; their aspiration to become modern and cosmopolitan was,
like the process itself, laden with the local class context and the parents’ lived sense
of their experiences of upward mobility. Parents’ use of Disney (and other) products
is a way in which parents solidify their distinctive position in a newly proclaimed
global order. Uptake is not equal to resistance.80 When a local university graduate
cannot get a job in a prestigious local hotel because of his or her lack of non-local
experiences and non-local ideas, then the local culture and the local identity must—
precisely in order to be successful—give way to a particular kind of
“cosmopolitan” under the real and perceived imperatives of a globalized
economy.81 At this point, some members of the local community actively and
consciously begin to acquire globalizing cultural capital (such as proficiency in
certain languages) and these “local” actions develop a distinctively pragmatist
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cosmopolitanism devoted to the accumulation of economically viable cultural
capital.
Fourth, this cultural consumption is also a local identity project involving
two facets; the government’s re-deployment of cultural symbols and ordinary
people’s own local use of these. The parents in my study fit the HKSAR
government’s imagineering project in that they try their best to become the modern,
competitive, cosmopolitan beings promoted by the government after the Handover.
Parents are turning their children into cosmopolitans who can “earn a
living” in the world’s near-future workforce. In this sense, the conscious
acquisition of “foreign” languages through consuming Disney and other education
kits reconstitutes the deterritorialized hybridity of local Hong Kong culture and
heightens Hong Kong’s “cosmopolitan” ways of life. Unfortunately, such ways of
life are not the ways of life that many scholars attribute to cosmopolitanism, if by
this we mean that people consider themselves world citizens, concern themselves
with all humanity, and respect cultural pluralism based on democracy.82 Language
is the core of a culture, but one’s knowledge of a language does not transform one
into a proud bearer of the language’s corresponding culture; language acquisition
does not equal cultural competence. Parents who ask their children to excel in
English do not want their children to excel in individualism and democracy; instead,
these parents’ child-rearing methods emphasize hierarchical parent-child relations
in which the child embodies obedience.
I suspect that the hierarchical parenting method works in tandem with
government’s authoritarian regime, and parents’ currency-based evaluation of local
culture also coincides with the government’s city planning of Hong Kong, whereby
Hong Kong should develop as a world city based on consumption instead of civil
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citizenship. As Ku argues, the postcolonial HKSAR government reinterprets Hong
Kong history as an economic success story.83 To maintain this economic miracle,
the HKSAR government strives to develop Hong Kong into a world-class city
comparable to London and New York, and such a city must provide “soft and hard
infrastructure” and an improved business environment84 for “multinational
companies and Mainland enterprises.”85 Therefore, the task at hand for Hong Kong
is to establish rule of law, efficient administration, political stability, and language
proficiency in English and Putonghua. The interests of transnational corporations
are protected by low tax rates, minimal government control, minimal disclosure
requirements on businesses, and discouragement of union membership. Hong Kong
will be an optimal space in which transnational corporations can do business.
Nothing serious is said, however, about the desirability of a local community whose
values stray outside the laws of supply and demand.
HKDL was built under such circumstances. Putting the deal together in
secrecy, the government, without public consultation, withdrew HK$22.95 billion
from the public coffers to sign the deal with the Walt Disney Company, financing
10% in return for a 43% stake. After the Asian financial crisis, the HKSAR
government admitted that Hong Kong’s bubble economy had burst. Trying to
recoup from the downturn, the government promised (1) to restructure Hong
Kong’s economy, on the basis of consumerism, from a reliance on the property
market to tourism development and (2) to commodify the city into a dreamscape
for “touristic voyeurism.”86 Through the Disneyland project, the government
successfully but temporarily builds its own legitimacy and redefines Hong Kong’s
distinction from China in terms based not on political aspirations but on cultural,
cosmopolitan and consumption-based ways of life.
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Agency in regulating Hong Kong’s cultural consumption does not equate to
democracy; self-assertion in commodity culture is not the same as human rights.
Consumption of certain Disney products in a certain way is an acceptance, a
resistance, or an uptake, depending on which perspective we emphasize, but it
cannot be equated to political resistance. Many consumption studies have deployed
the concept of agency, but as I have tried to suggest, it is not a useful concept when
it is predicated on a continuum that lacks built-in gradations and conditions. The
consumption of Disney goods, like that of any good, can be a site of both liberation
and domination, depending on what aspects of power the researcher addresses.
Hong Kong families’ consumption of Disney goods does not necessarily reflect a
love for Disney’s conception of family, child development, and morality; but Hong
Kong parents’ consumption of certain Disney products does forge a link to their
aspiration to realize a particular type of “good life” with cultural and political
effects.
Parents hope to mold their children into the type of pragmatist cosmopolitan
who has little contact with local popular culture (the relatively low-cultural-capital
world of cheap commodities targeted at child consumers) but who can access the
relatively high-cultural-capital world of expensive commodities (piano lessons,
fluency in English and in Putonghua) that all but determine where one lives, what
one eats, what one listens to, and so on. I must admit that this pragmatist
cosmopolitanism has little to do with not only citizenship rights, but also belonging,
commitment, and the passion of a community. As Turner asks,

What is HK ‘life-style’? A taste for fashion, gossip magazines and karaoke?
A paradise for consumers and polluters? Or does life-style suggest
something deeper, perhaps the subjective texture of identity? Is life-style
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like citizenship, the rights of association and forms of representation that
underlie civil society, and make it possible for citizens to shape policies of
common concern? Or is life-style like fashion, changing from moment to
moment?87

When a community believes in authoritarian parenting, and has relatively little
agency, commitment, and passion to protest against corporatism, against “expert
system”88 solutions, and against dictatorial planning for tourism development,89 it is
hard to imagine how parents’ ambivalent attitudes and consumption practices
toward Disney products (sometimes acceptance, sometimes resistance, and
sometimes appropriation) might target the corporate transformation of the
community into a dreamscape. We have the right to choose neither which
companies and which experts plan our city, nor which type of government and
which representatives decide our community’s present and future. Our right to
choose is limited to consumer products. In democracy’s cities, citizens may fall into
the habit of thinking that consumers should make choices on the basis of
professional advice, rather than be active producers of knowledge.90 In Hong Kong,
the public does not have the right to choose between political parties, and no
cultural supermarket can provide products that compensate for a lack of both
formal democratic citizenship rights and passion for community.
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Chapter Six
Disney Management: Fairy Tales of Cultural Globalization

In chapters Four and Five, I argued that respondents consume the HKDL project
and Disney offerings in various ways: some appropriate the HKDL project as
symbolic cultural marker, whereas others make use of HKDL or Disney
merchandise to help construct cosmopolitan selves for themselves or their children.
However, since the official opening of HKDL on 12 September 2005, it has proved
far from successful in fulfilling Hong Kong people’s dreams of cultural distinctions
through cosmopolitan realization and economic revitalization. For the first few
months after HKDL’s Rehearsal Days,1 the commentary from various press sources
(ranging from scholars2 and local stars3 to common people4) characterized the park
as too small,5 the park operations as chaotic,6 the management as highhanded,7 as
disrespectful of local legislation,8 and even as Americanism.9 Some press sources
stated that HKDL was turning from Hong Kong’s “millennium dream”10 into a
“Hong Kong shame.”11
Hong Kong did not, in fact, undergo Disneyfication. Rather, a variety of
local actors actively resisted various Disney corporate practices. These local actors
ranged from the press, popular celebrities, and pop-culture producers to anti-Disney
groups and to ordinary HKDL workers and consumers. In the following two
chapters, I discuss these acts in detail. The unfolding dialectical relationship
between Disney and various local actors narrated in these two chapters also
confirms Massey’s argument against the dualistic conception that “place” is local
while “everywhere” is global. Rather, place is where various cultures meet and
multiple social relations articulate and intersect. In this chapter, I focus on HKDL
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media practices and local media actors’ reactions to a particular Disney
“philosophy”—“Disney Realism”—and to Disney’s accompanying management
practices of scientific management. HKDL management’s hierarchical and
bureaucratic system effectively renders a strategy of localization difficult to
implement in HKDL. I further show how Disney values and practices were caught
up in conflicts with local production values and practices, and how local critics
interpreted HKDL’s various acts as Americanism. Among these critics were
members of the local press, local scholars, local celebrities, and even local Disney
production staff. Their chief complaint concerned HKDL’s adherence to Disney’s
management practices. Then in chapter Seven, I go on to discuss how both HKDL
staff and HKDL visitors practice various uptakes inside HKDL, and I examine
Disney management’s difficulties in “Disneyfying” local staff and local patrons.
Because chapter Six and chapter Seven work as a pair, the chapter titles are
similar: I use “fairy tales” and “pixie tricks” to describe cultural globalization in the
case of HKDL. “Fairy tales” can be read in two ways: first, it suggests a magical
and extremely happy story; second, it can be interpreted as an imaginary story for
children only. As I discuss in chapters Three and Four, the joint venture between
the HKSAR government and the Walt Disney Company was seen by the
government as “a happy marriage between a world class tourist attraction and a
world class tourist destination”12 and was seen by Hong Kong people as a cultural
marker by which they could both distinguish themselves from Mainlanders and
attain cosmopolitanism. The opening of the park in 2005, however, has turned the
fairy tale into a comedy of errors. Furthermore, Hong Kong people interpret Disney
management practices as Americanism and resist certain Disney acts. “Pixie tricks”
refers to mischievous fairies who deceive people. Here, I reverse the dynamics that
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usually characterize the relationship between Disney and Hong Kong people. For
me, HKDL workers and consumers are fairies who play tricks on Disney’s
scientific management practices.
In these two chapters, I argue against scholars’ emphasis on Disney’s
alleged overarching influence over local cultural landscapes. Then, I narrate many
local stories that my interviewees provided to me or that I experienced by myself to
identify the dialectical local-global relationship that has been unfolding in various
social spaces. On the one hand, these stories tell us that Disney brings Hong Kong
not only a physical park but also its non-transparent values and scientific
management practices. And under current local laws, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to demand that HKDL disclose some of its company information that
locals may consider important to Hong Kong’s monitoring of tax-based
expenditures. On the other hand, these same stories demonstrate that local people,
including media actors and government officials, are not simply “receivers” who
read Disney values and practices in preferred, negotiated, or oppositional ways.13
Rather, these actors produce and circulate the changed local meanings of “Disney”
as “arrogant” and “highhanded,” and contribute to the ongoing remaking of local
identities and culture; meanwhile, some other actors, such as HKDL workers and
visitors, work and consume the park in a mischievously “local” way that
Disneyland management finds difficult to control.
This chapter is divided into three main sections. In the first section, I discuss
Disney’s management philosophy, Disney Realism. To maintain Disneyland’s
status as a dreamland, HKDL management exercises different skills to control
publicly circulating information. I argue that under current Hong Kong law, the
Hong Kong people have no right to monitor the HKDL financial situation although
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the HKSAR government is the biggest shareholder of the park. I then focus on how
local journalists and local pop stars viewed and resisted Disney Realism, Disney’s
character-centered production values, and its administration practices. In the second
section, I discuss the contribution that HKDL’s bureaucratic work system made to
the slow media response to HKDL’s problems. I discuss, also, local media’s
semantic transformation of “Disney” from a “millennium dream” (which dominated
the semantic field during the project’s planning stage) into a “Hong Kong shame”
(which dominated the semantic field during the project’s operational stage). In the
third section, I interview Disney production staff and HKDL staff and reveal that
although Disney has tried to “glocalize” its products, to make them pertinent to
“local” concerns, Disney’s bureaucratic work practice, transnational work-force,
and division and subdivision of labor make localization difficult. Disney’s weak
adaptation to the local environment then created chaos and turned off visitors (both
Hong Kong people and Mainlanders), journalists, and government officials. I also
argue that the HKSAR government, compared with the Oriental Land Company,
which owns Tokyo Disneyland, has little institutional power in either the masterplanning or the operating of HKDL and, thus, has little power either to cater to
local flavors or to change unpopular HKDL management practices.

Joint-venture HKDL: from Disney Realism to HKDL “kingdom”
“What we create is a ‘Disney Realism’, sort of Utopian in nature,
where we carefully program out all the negative, unwanted elements
and program in the positive elements,”
said Disney designer and artist John Hench.14

There are various kinds of “realism” advocated by film scholars and critics,
including Siegfried Kracauer’s cinematic realism, André Bazin’s photographic
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realism, and Georg Lukács’s critical realism. Kracauer argues that an aesthetic
medium must build from its basic “properties.”15 The basic property of film is its
capacity for “recording” (p. 41) and “revealing” (p. 46) physical reality. However,
reality and human experiences are fragmented. Therefore, cinema should represent
the indeterminate nature of reality; that is, cinema should represent the natural
world as “unstaged reality,” “chance,” “the fortuitous,” “the indeterminate,” the
“flow of life,” and “endlessness” (pp. 60-74). Similar to Kracauer, André Bazin’s
photographic realism argues that cinema’s essence is in recording and revealing
“the ambiguity of reality.”16 Bazin argued that the development of long-take and
deep-focus photography from 1940 to 1950 highlighted the spatiotemporal
continuity and integrity of perceptual experience and that this photography marked
“a decisive step forward of the language of the film” (p. 38) because filmmakers
can be explorers and observers who integrate “ambiguity into the structure of the
image” (p. 36). Bazin expects that viewers of realist films, by using their own
freedom of thought and of action, can link a film’s complex structure with the
film’s dense content and that the viewers, thus, can achieve a degree of self
realization (p. 36). Different from Kracauer and Bazin, Lukács argues that realism
must represent a historically specific, multi-layered, and concrete social reality. By
employing exemplary situations and typical characters, the dialectic in Lukacs’
critical realism pits the person as individual against the person as social being.17 By
making a connection between particular events (for example, an individual person’s
action or thought) and general contexts (namely, a historically rooted society),
realist films encourage readers to be aware of their own place within a complex,
interactive web of society-based relationships. Despite their different emphases,
Kracauer, Bazin, and Lukács are similar in their view that reality is complex
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(empirical richness, undetermined nature, and complex relations between individual
events and social structure) and that realism in film should represent reality’s
complex nature and unpredictability.
Film scholars and filmmakers know well that, even with the mechanical
reproduction of photography, “truth” and “reality” in films are constructs because
frame composition, mise-en-scène, and editing—among other factors—manipulate
any authentic mirror of the world around us, if indeed any such mirror is possible.
Some documentary filmmakers choose to practice cinéma vérité to reveal the
process of filmmaking (how the director shoots the film and what to do with what
was filmed) and to highlight the authorship of the director. These directors reveal
that the presented reality is not a pure and objective reality but a particular truth
socially constructed by—or perhaps through—the filmmaker. Classic Hollywood
cinema, however, preferred coherent characters, controlled the mise-en-scène,
practiced the 180-degree rule in cinematography, practiced eyeline matching, and
edited for continuity. The resulting narrative would present reality as causality that
unfolds in a continuous temporal-spatial, albeit fictional, world. Film scholars such
as Stephen Heath18 and Bill Nichols19 argue that the self-containment of the
narrative and the manipulative style of classic cinema obscure the constructedness
of cinema and represent cinema as transparent. Classic cinema’s self-contained
narrative also explains away real contradictions. Rather than refer to classical
cinema as “realism,” early-cinema scholar Tom Gunning refers to it as “realistic
illusions of the cinema.”20
“Disney Realism,” to a certain extent, is a phrase that invokes many of the
meanings attributable to realism in classic cinema, but Walt Disney pushed
“illusionism” to an extreme in the establishment of Disneyland. According to
264

Disney’s official publication Imagineering, Walt Disney’s idea of Disneyland
stemmed from his desire to build a park where visitors could feel that they were in a
magical world:

Driven by the desire to take his passion for storytelling far beyond the
confines of two-dimensions, he [Walt Disney] landed on the idea that
visitors who stepped into this new park should feel as though they stepped
into a movie. Every inch of the place should be part of a story, as in a movie
or television show.21

To persuade visitors that they are like Alice stepping through the Looking Glass
and entering another world, the design of Disneyland employs such cinematic
techniques as powerful images from movies, familiar movie plots, cinematographic
techniques, scale manipulation, and forced perspectives, all of which are built into
the environment and all of which integrate visitors into a “seamless, apparently
logical, whole.”22 However, this magic world must look realistic, or so declared
Walt Disney: “what we’re selling is a belief in fantasy and storytelling, and if the
background [i]sn’t believable, people wouldn’t buy it.”23 To construct its “reality
effects,”24 Disneyland features concrete details that secure its authenticity. As is the
case with classic realist films, Disneyland effaces all traces of the work to
naturalize the fantasy world. It is worth noting again that the park is divided into an
onstage area and a backstage area and that patrons can visit only the onstage area;
in other words, Disney prohibits the visitors from visiting the backstage area, where
magic is produced. Rather than reveal reality’s richness and its contradictory and
complex nature, Disney Realism is a style that conforms to Disney’s own standard
of “utopia”: Disneyland as “a magical escape” where “families everywhere,
regardless of boundaries or culture” can experience “a world of fantasy and
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imagination,”25 and where “the guest walks through an atmosphere of order and
cleanliness and comes away feeling that things must be all right, after all.”26
Therefore, Disney Realism is a style that helps produce the image of Disneyland as
utopia. It is thus not surprising that applications of Disney Realism “program in”
positive elements (i.e. elements favorable to the Disney image as “fantasyland” and
“the happiest place in the world”) and “program out” negative elements (which
have adverse effects on the Disney image). Furthermore, the “embellishment” and
the “modification” of “reality” include manipulating and sanitizing history or, in
Michael Wallace’s words, “to vacuum clean the past.”27 The park area “Main Street
USA” exemplifies “sanitized, good-spirited and inaccurate nostalgia” regarding the
nineteenth-century American small town.28
To construct the brand “Disney” according to the idea of “fantasy,” Disney
Realism affects not only park design but also the company’s everyday management
practices. Reviewing the history of the Walt Disney World in Orlando, Foglesong29
warns readers that based on Disney Realism, Disney shows only a positive
surface—that Disney obstructs the public’s view of negative elements (as Hench
freely admits in the quotation above). Disney has considerable power to impose
“Disney Realism”: Disney is tantamount to a private government controlling the
autonomous political district of Orlando’s Reedy Creek Improvement District, and
Orlando’s citizens have limited ways to monitor Disney. Foglesong, in Married to
the Mouse,30 warned the readers that Disney, to uphold both its favorite image and
the widespread belief that Disneyland is a safe dreamland, may try to prohibit the
dissemination of negative information pertaining to Disney. According to
Foglesong, on 10 July 1985, The Orlando Sentinel published an editorial entitled
“Magic Kingdom of Aloof” both criticizing Disney executives’ requirement that
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visitors stay inside Disney hotels and urging the executives to be more involved in
county boards and commissions. On the morning the editorial appeared, a Disney
employee removed Sentinel newsracks from Disney property and a Sentinel
delivery truck was refused entrance onto Disney property (p. 111). Disney also
improperly used its private security guards, the “cast members,” to perform police
functions involving serious crimes such as burglary, rape, and robbery without
reporting the findings to any government law-enforcement agency because Disney
has had no inherent obligation to release such records (pp. 141-4).
Unlike Orlando, HKDL is not an autonomous political district and should be
subjected to Hong Kong laws. Nevertheless, at least eight local newspapers
denounced “Disney highhandedness” on 10 September 2005,31 two days before the
official opening of HKDL. This unified criticism occurred when Rhonda Lo,
assistant director of the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department (FEHD),
confirmed on a radio program32 on 9 September 2005 that, on 30 August 2005,
HKDL security had forced two FEHD health inspectors to “dress down” (to take
off their caps and epaulettes) before they could enter the park to investigate reports
of food poisoning. Disney’s efforts to preserve the park’s magic and to program out
negative elements were, in this case, seen as manipulative and drew fire from
government officials, legislators, and scholars: Lo said that the park’s request was
“unacceptable”;33 Secretary for Security Ambrose Lee said, “Disneyland does not
stand above the law of Hong Kong”;34 Legislator Fred Li was astonished35 by
HKDL’s “out of line”36 behavior, while scholars commented that Disney’s
American management practices treated Disney as an “independent kingdom” and
had certainly violated citizens’ rights.37 When I asked my reporter respondents38
why, in their news stories, they had highlighted HKDL’s violation of Hong Kong
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law instead of HKDL’s apologies to the FEHD, one reporter admitted that she had
been astonished and enraged by the news, whereas the other reporter said that the
interview process of questioning “relevant” and “legitimate” interviewees
(government officials, legislators, scholars, and HKDL) created an imbalance that
favored critics of HKDL, who outnumbered spokespersons for HKDL management.
He denied that media had painstakingly produced the idea of Disney
highhandedness; reporters had just reported and circulated criticism about HKDL
actions.
The nature of HKDL and the nature of the HKSAR government-Disney
joint venture made it difficult for Disney to implement Disney Realism in Hong
Kong without facing criticism. Hong Kong Disneyland is the only Disney park to
enlist a government as a shareholder.39 Because of the HKSAR government’s huge
investment in the park, many legislators and members of the press have viewed
HKDL as a quasi-public business, which, in their view, means that the public has
the right and the responsibility to monitor the government’s tax-based investment in
HKDL. The public’s right-to-know demands contradict Disney Realism’s emphasis
on non-transparent management practices. Keith,40 a local news reporter, said,

If HKDL received all its investment from the Disney company, HKDL
would be a private investment and its returns, whether good or bad, would
be none of our business. However, because the park received a huge
investment from the HKSAR government, media—though this may sound
hackneyed—has the responsibility to monitor the government’s investment,
to confirm that it isn’t wasting public money. This is why we’re worried
about, not merely interested in, the park’s attendance figures, its image, and
its returns.

By 1999, the park had consumed HK$22.95 billion of tax-payer money; however,
ownership of HKDL has been the responsibility of a private company named Hong
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Kong International Theme Park Ltd (HKITP), in which the HKSAR government is
the largest shareholder. Because it is a private company, under Hong Kong
company law, it has no obligation to disclose things that it views as sensitive
information, including those facts that the public views as necessary information:
attendance figures and the park’s revenue. In December 2005, for example, when
Margaret Ng, a member of the Legislative Council, asked whether or not HKITP
would publish all the directors’ reports and audited financial statements of HKITP,
the Secretary for Economic Development and Labour, Mr Stephen Ip, clearly
spelled out the impossibility of such a request:

HKITP is a private company, there is no requirement under the Companies
Ordinance for a private company to publish its directors’ reports and audited
financial accounts. Although TWDC [the Walt Disney Company] invests
jointly with the Government in HKITP, the Government has to respect the
company’s interests, and its operation under commercial principles will not
be compromised due to the disclosure of commercially sensitive
information. As an international financial and business centre, we have to
respect the right of a private company to protect its commercially sensitive
information.41

In 1999, while persuading the public of the benefits of a future HKDL, the HKSAR
government claimed that HKDL would attract millions of tourists to the park and
get HK$148 billion in “net economic benefit,” a 25% net economic return, and a
benefit-cost ratio of 8:1 over forty years of operation.42 However, without the
audited financial accounts, the public has had no way to verify whether or not the
economic promise has come to fruition.43 While HKDL enjoys the right of
protecting its “commercially sensitive information,” it also enjoys right to use
public funds for expansion of a government-Disney joint venture.
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In addition to tension between the Hong Kong public’s right to know and
the Disney Realism strategy of revealing only information that is beneficial to the
company, tension between Disney and journalists has accumulated through
journalists’ everyday mundane reportage practices. When the idea of Disney
Realism is translated into everyday management practice, the realism becomes a
series of manipulative acts controlling what can and cannot be seen or narrated, an
approach that has triggered enormous criticism from the park’s communication
“partners,” the reporters—especially from those upholding the idea of freedom of
the press. As would occur with “a landowner of a kingdom” (in the words of Keith),
HKDL initially required that reporters receive permission before they cover events
inside HKDL. If reporters wanted to interview HKDL staff, Disney would select
particular staff members to conduct the interviews while other staff members were
prohibited from answering any reporters’ questions. Throughout the whole
interview process, a public relations officer had to accompany and monitor the
reporter. A prominent example was HKDL’s three-day celebratory opening
activities during 10 and 12 September 2005, during which one thousand and two
hundred reporters from around the world came to HKDL, and HKDL appointed to
each news agency three Disney “media hosts” to arrange activities for journalists. If
these media hosts did not see the journalist around, they would phone the journalist
and ask where she or he was.44
The journalist Sammie45 recounted a vivid story about her efforts to cover
HKDL before its opening in September 2005. In April 2005, HKDL invited several
media companies to report on HKDL cultural representatives who had been
working in Orlando since late 2004 and who would come back to work in HKDL
for at least six months. Sammie’s company accepted the offer. Before the trip,
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Sammie had had meetings with Edith, a representative of HKDL public affairs.46
They discussed the arrangements of the trip. In the meeting, Sammie and Edith
agreed, without written confirmation, that Sammie would interview one or two
individual cultural representatives as a way to explore their lives in Orlando in
depth.
According to Sammie, tension between Sammie and Edith arose with the
first interview in Orlando. Sammie interviewed a female HKDL cultural
representative in her room. On Sammie’s account, she asked the interviewee to sit
on her bed so that they could have a casual interview, but Edith requested the
interviewee to sit on the sofa and adopt a formal pose. Again according to Sammie,
Edith’s numerous interruptions and prohibitions marred the three-day interview
period. On one occasion, Sammie says, she asked the Magic Kingdom manager his
views on the small size of HKDL relative to the Magic Kingdom. When the
manager started to answer, Edith allegedly stopped the camera filming and
requested that the manager not answer any question involving comparisons between
Disney parks.47 Another situation occurred at Disney University. During recess, a
male cultural representative, after learning that Sammie was a reporter from Hong
Kong, commented (according to Sammie): “We cannot say anything here. It’s
horrible.” Sammie recalled that while the man was talking to her, Edith was talking
to another reporter and, for that reason, could not hear the man’s remark. However,
once Edith noticed that the young man was talking to Sammie, Edith immediately
came over to them and asked the man to return to the classroom. According to
Sammie, Disney even prohibits normal conversations between staff and reporters
who have no recording devices in hand. On this occasion, Sammie then wrote her
phone number on a piece of paper and told Edith that she needed to return to the
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classroom herself because she had left a camera there. To ensure the success of her
plan, she asked the other reporter to divert Edith’s attention by talking to her. Upon
entering the classroom, Sammie quickly gave her phone number to this young man.
Disney controls not only particular questions or dialogues but also the
structure of the news story. Although Sammie wanted to base an in-depth story on
the working lives of one or two Disney park cultural representatives, Edith (says
Sammie) was not willing to allow “deep” interviewing to take place. Edith and
Sammie argued over the latter, and Edith reduced the next day’s number of
interviewees from three to two. Sammie described the first young man she met as a
“robot” (in fact, when describing this man to Edith, Sammie rather daringly used
the same words). The young man stated matter-of-factly, “Hello. I have had great
fun and am happy everyday here. Thank you.” Sammie refused to conduct an
interview with this man and asked Edith to arrange for her (Sammie) to interview
another male cultural representative, James, whom Sammie had met in the park.
According to Sammie, Edith’s first reply to the request was, “James is not on my
checklist.” At the end of that day, Edith claimed that James had taken a sick leave
and was, in fact, too sick to participate in an interview. On the third day, refusing to
interview “robots,” Sammie told Edith that, as matters stood, she (Sammie) could
not develop a successful story, would leave Orlando one day early, and would write
no news story about HKDL cultural representatives. After Sammie’s veiled threat,
Edith arranged for James to come. However, James’ statements were not unlike
those of the “robot,” and Sammie suspected that James’ responses had been
scripted.
Efforts to record these kinds of interviews create obstacles that are no more
problematic than the obstacles that arise when outsiders try to film Disney parks
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themselves. Inside the park, to protect “character integrity,”48 Orlando staff told
Sammie that she could neither photograph nor film Disney characters. She could
not even film a music band’s performance because Disney, as a media company,
wanted to ensure that all of Disney’s publicly displayed images were in conformity
with the Disney Realism image, that is, an image that contributes to the conception
of Disneyland as a “fantasyland.” In the Orlando park, Sammie and her colleagues
found surrounding them not only Edith and her assistant, but also a public relations
representative from Orlando Walt Disney World, a manager from Orlando Magic
Kingdom, a staff member of the Disney International Program, and a local crew
filming the behavior of Sammie and her colleagues. Furthermore, they found that
their behavior was under the surveillance of the park’s security service in civilian
dress. On another occasion, Sammie was watching a BBC television documentary
on North Korea, and in the documentary, a BBC reporter stated that it was terribly
difficult to interview and to film inside North Korea. Drawing a surprising parallel
between the BBC reporters’ efforts and her own recent efforts, Sammie commented
that her experience of Orlando Disney parks’ controls was similar to the BBC
reporters’ experience of controls in the militarized dictatorship of North Korea.
Standardization is a pervasive Disney practice. In Hong Kong, Disney’s
production standards are published as manuals, and any action that strays from the
checklist is prohibited. In every Disneyland park, every cast member has to meet a
Disney-appearance standard, which is published in a handbook entitled The Disney
Look; guest service has guidelines and cast members need to follow seven steps
governing the members’ interaction with guests; operation guidelines and a
corresponding detailed checklist govern every ride inside a Disney park. None of
these facts seem unusual or even objectionable. After all, standardization can
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strengthen efficiency, effectiveness, and safety. But surface appearances can be
deceptive. Standardization can over-indulge itself and can, in this way, have
harmful consequences. Take, for example, the way in which Disney not only
controls its workers and standardizes Disney characters’ movements but it also
obligates its staff (including Disney show producers, entertainment operations staff,
public relations personnel, and even marketing and sales staff) to “uphold” the
Disney standard against other parties’ “misrepresentation” of Disney Realism.
These Disney workers control the way directors film Disney characters and the way
journalists introduce Disney characters. In her story about Disney, Sammie
mentioned that the public relations management had an exclusive interviewee
checklist and that names outside the checklist were normally unavailable for
interview. In Sammie’s story, Edith prefers the “robot” staff and prevents James
from being interviewed by Sammie. Such acts could potentially discriminate
against people on the basis of some manager’s personal bias. Besides, Disney’s
control and manipulation of Disney Realism extends beyond its Kingdom to other
domains such as news media, presumed to highlight objectivity and the presentation
of truth. In upholding Disney Realism, Disney not only controls news media in
representing Disney, but masks a more complicated reality, potentially censoring
the contested truth.
It seems that the tighter the control that Disney exerted over journalists’
behavior, the greater the resistance that journalists exhibited. To strike a balance
between the Disney approvers and the Disney disapprovers, my reporter
respondents conducted either undercover interviews with visitors and workers who
were inside HKDL or open interviews with opponents of Disney. Sammie initially
centered her news story only on cultural representatives’ experiences, but because
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of her experience in Orlando and the problematic responses of the HKDL public
relations officers, Sammie packaged the news story in two parts. She first discussed
HKDL cultural representatives’ lives in Orlando and then discussed her interview
with local scholar Iam Chong Ip, who had edited a Chinese book, Disney Is Not a
Happy Park,49 and members of a local anti-Disney group, Disney Hunter.50 In this
way, Sammie hoped to portray the different faces of Disney.
HKDL has faced criticisms not only from reporters but from local
celebrities, as well. The relation between Disney and celebrities should be
reciprocally beneficial so that, while the celebrities bolster their fame, Disney can
use this fame to promote HKDL. However, a month before the park opened, local
film actor Daniel Wu wrote, in his blog, an entry advocating that people “Boycott
Disneyland!” He issued the statement because his band, Alive, had helped to
celebrate HKDL’s opening but had received no payment—only a “rude and
impolite” reception from “Disney staff specifically the ones from America.”51
Another local and Mainland China superstar, Kelly Chan, followed Wu’s example
and, in a radio program, disparaged HKDL’s disrespect of local stars.52 According
to her, HKDL had invited her to make a music video inside the park but several of
Disney’s higher-ranking officers from America were rude to her when they oversaw
her music-video shoot. They reproved their local co-workers for having let Chan
and her crewmembers use—without official permission—a hotel room; the officers
also argued that Chan had broadcast her song too loudly although there were no
guests in the park. Kelly Chan found her Disney dream shattered, and she pledged
that she would never again promote the American Disney company.
After facing resistance from journalists who described HKDL as
“highhanded” and “Americanism,”53 HKDL management attempted to improve its
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relations with local media by implementing Disney Realism in a more lenient way.
As I mentioned above, when HKDL first opened in September 2005, journalists had
to get permission from HKDL before entering the park to do an interview, and a
HKDL worker had to accompany a journalist during his or her trip. Both my
journalist respondent and an HKDL staff respondent told me that HKDL had
changed some media policies around ten months after HKDL’s opening in
September 2005.54 Henceforward, if HKDL holds a press conference inside the
park, reporters after the conference can stay in the park to go on rides without being
followed by an HKDL worker, and reporters can interview HKDL guests if these
guests are willing to be interviewed. On normal days, if an HKDL staff member
finds a reporter conducting interviews unauthorized by HKDL, the staff member
should simply note a few facts about the reporter and report these facts to the
manager or public relations staff rather than immediately stop the reporter’s
interview. If the interview that the reporter is conducting is simple and if guests are
willing to be interviewed, HKDL staff should not obstruct the interview. Staff may
provide the reporter with a room for the interview to minimize disturbance to other
guests. HKDL also hired experienced local journalists such as Lee Chan Wing to
teach staff ways to deal with journalists. Now, when HKDL holds a press
conference, it is held in a restaurant with air-conditioning instead of in a temporary
tent without air-conditioning, as was the case during the opening of the park in
2005.
It is true that HKDL’s hospitality has improved: HKDL has a more
comfortable center for news media, sends premiums55 and videos to reporters, and
attempts to be generally more open toward reporters. Nevertheless, Disney Realism
as a work philosophy easily fosters resistance on the part of journalists because of
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its manipulative practices. Some reporters have voiced their grievances in public. In
her newspaper column, one female anchor criticized HKDL public relations for
treating reporters as advertising agents.56 She wrote in September 2006 that HKDL
had once invited reporters to cover HKDL backstage stories (about HKDL’s new
developments) but that, on accepting the invitation, the reporters had gained access
only to a few Disney staff members’ scripted introductions to cartoon characters in
the backstage area. As soon as a reporter had begun to film the cartoon characters,
an HKDL public relations officer had stopped the shoot, requesting that the reporter
use the expression “Disney friends” rather than the expression “cartoon character”
to describe the cartoon characters. The officer had then emphasized the assertion
that these Disney “friends” are not in costume but actually born as they appear. In
her newspaper column, the anchor summarized the event thus:

It is acceptable to ask reporters to introduce Disney cartoon characters as
“Disney friends,” but it is truly intolerable to demand reporters to distort
facts and to instill ideas that cartoon characters are real creatures. As a result,
that reporter gave up reporting and the park lost a chance for promotion….
If public relations people demand an unreasonable request or restriction, it is
an interference with freedom of the press.57
Facing HKDL’s “bad show,”58 reporters sometimes boycott interviews or actively
report HKDL’s inconsiderate acts as experienced by the reporters. On 11
September 2005, a day before HKDL’s official opening, a foreign security guard
behaved rudely and stated that only journalists with huge, professional cameras and
video cameras might conduct interviews about the opening ceremony. Journalists
boycotted the interview, and the guard was compelled to apologize; nevertheless,
newspapers reported the whole event.59 On 12 September 2006, a year after the
opening of HKDL, the HKDL management insisted on holding a press conference
277

outdoors, and reporters and their recording equipment were drenched in the pouring
rain; the recording equipment stopped working and twenty reporters from ten
organizations boycotted the interview session for an hour. Following this boycott,
HKDL moved the press-conference venue indoors; HKDL indemnified reporters’
losses and issued a press statement in apology. However, these actions did not stop
journalists from writing about HKDL’s inconsiderate media arrangement, the
reporters’ losses, and the boycott.60
Besides direct confrontations, journalists can construct a relatively negative
image of HKDL by playing with rhetoric. News media commonly compare the
management of HKDL with that of another popular Hong Kong theme park, Ocean
Park.61 The former came to be known as “highhanded park” whereas the latter
began to figure as the “people’s park.”62 Press frequently compare the two parks in
terms of their provision of facilities for disabled visitors,63 their pricing,64 the
quality and the number of their attractions,65 and their attendance figures.66
Attendance figures constitute one of journalists’ major concerns because of the
HKSAR government-Disney HKDL joint venture. When reporting HKDL’s annual
attendance figures on 5 September 2006, fourteen out of the eighteen local
newspapers stated that HKDL fell short of the first-year target of 5.6 million and
only four press outlets said that HKDL had received over five million visitors or
that the HKDL attendance figures were close to meeting the visitor target in the
first year of operation.67 HKDL’s failure to meet its target has encouraged
journalists to search for and report on the limited benefits that HKDL has had for
Hong Kong’s transport industry, hotel industry, and economy in general.68

HKDL tension and chaos: Disney bureaucratic and scientific management
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“The management of the modern office
is based on written documents (‘the files’),
which are preserved in their original or draught form.” Max Weber69
I once asked Andrew,70 a staff member working in the Hong Kong Disney
production office,71 to identify the most important lesson that he had learned during
his four years of work at Disney. He replied without hesitation: writing e-mails. His
boss had spent two months teaching him about effective e-mail composition
because the first rule of working or surviving successfully in Disney is to manage
everything in written form; the boss had also prohibited the deletion of any business
e-mails concerning Andrew because they might serve as evidence in case of some
related dispute years down the road. Because Disney production practices division
and sub-division of labor, a local low-ranking staff member can receive more than
two hundred e-mails in three days, even if she or he is not directly involved in any
of the projects. Andrew said that he needed to spend every morning replying to and
writing e-mails. He knew that the e-mail-writing practice was a way to protect
himself from troubles, but he also found it time-consuming and to a certain degree
useless, because it is not a local customary practice to invite—by e-mail—
celebrities to help Disney promote itself. To simplify the process and to accomplish
the task, he normally sent e-mails to agents when the topic involved negotiations
and decisions.
Disney treats written documents seriously, because written documents can
always be used as evidence against chicanery. Thus, my journalist respondent,
Sammie, failed to secure an official letter confirming that HKDL had invited her to
interview Disney’s cultural representatives in Orlando. In contrast, to protect its
own rights, Disney asks its partners to sign many legal documents, and this
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bureaucratic management practice annoys many local celebrities and producers.
Andrew told me that a Mainland superstar wanted to visit HKDL and stay in the
HKDL hotel for a night, a series of events that supposedly would be excellent
publicity for HKDL. This Mainland star agreed to greet the media inside the park,
but then the park management asked the star to sign many contracts. As a result, the
star refused to sign the contracts and to visit the park.
Disney’s e-mail-writing protocol applies to HKDL. Julia,72 a HKDL
customer-services staff member, said that her supervisor would type all phone
inquiries and complaints that were not immediately executable and would e-mail
them to the public relations department or to other departments. Afterward, the
concerned department would respond to the supervisor via e-mails. At HKDL,
phone conversations are strongly discouraged. When I asked her what “Disney
magic” is, she said that she had neither created nor tasted Disney magic (the
Disneyland service philosophy of bringing unexpected happiness to guests) because
she did not think that HKDL workers wholeheartedly tried to help guests solve their
problems. She related to me a pertinent story: on several occasions, public relations
officers had criticized an employee for telephoning them in search of an answer to
some guests’ inquiries. To Julia, “Disney magic” expressed her puzzlement at the
disappearance of administrators, whom she found extremely difficult to find when
she needed an answer to inquiries from customers. In other words, unless inquiries
or requests are easily executable (such as an enquiry regarding the time of the
HKDL firework display), HKDL’s replies are not quick. For serious matters,
HKDL public relations will ask for advice from its consultancy firm and even from
the US Disney headquarters, and these protracted communications further slow
down the response time. My reporter respondent Keith mentioned that the slow
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response attributable to Disney’s bureaucracy has a secondary effect: the slow
responses to handling and managing crises creates a pool of disgruntled visitors and
staffers where reporters can go trolling for grievances73 and can dig out a cover
story.
The HKDL management marked 4 September 2005 as a trial-run day to test
the capacity and the operation of the theme park. All revenues from the day’s
events were to go to charity, and a thronging mass of about 30,000 people—a
number that the management insisted HKDL’s efficiency and capacity could
handle—swamped the park for a hot humid intermittently rainy and sunny rehearsal
day.74 Queues were everywhere—at MTR station,75 at the entrance,76 at rides,77 in
front of restaurants,78 and outside restrooms.79 Without adequate measures to
manage crowds and visitors’ complaints efficiently, disgruntled guests complained
about HKDL in front of the press and voiced grievances on radio programs.
Visitors resented the discomfort because they had paid full price but were treated
merely as herded cattle in Disney’s rehearsal “stress test.”80 They compared
queuing inside the park unfavorably to the famously stressful queuing for “peaceful
rice”81 (an annual free public hand-out gift of lucky rice), which had, only a few
days earlier, resulted in the accidental crushing of an old woman. Promotions that
had hailed a fantastic park experience ceded place to visitors’ complaints. However,
because Disney’s bureaucratic practices encourage neither formal apologies nor
written documents such as apologetic press releases, HKDL president Don
Robinson neither apologized for the situation nor explained it in public. It was
rather the HKSAR government, in the person of Financial Secretary Henry Tang,
that explained the chaos in public,82 the day after the Charity Day chaos. Moreover,
it was also the HKSAR government that issued a press release, stating that the
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HKSAR Financial Secretary was having “an extensive discussion” with HKDL
management that afternoon about improvements of and adjustments to “the theme
park capacity, entry arrangements, queue management, food and beverage facilities,
seating area, car parking arrangements, etc.”83
The slow and reluctant HKDL response and HKDL’s lack of crisismanagement measures also encouraged people to raise sensitive cultural issues such
as Americanism. HKDL’s 2006 Lunar New Year chaos is a prominent example of
this process. To increase ticketing flexibility and to boost visitor numbers, HKDL
was the first Disney theme park to offer two-tier pricing, which distinguishes
normal calendar days (with flexible tickets that could be used any time within six
months after, on this occasion, 1-3 February 200684) from holidays and peak days
(marked by date-specific tickets) such as Hong Kong public holidays, the Christmas
holidays, and the Mainland Golden Week (1-7 May and 1-7 October every year).85
Flexible tickets allow but do not guarantee entry on any particular day; only datespecific tickets guarantee entry on that specified date. On the basis of “the October
2005 Golden Week experience,”86 Hong Kong International Theme Park
Company87 designated as special days only the period ranging from 28 to 31
January 2006 (i.e., the eve and the first, second, and third days of the Lunar New
Year, these four days being Hong Kong public holidays). In contrast, HKDL
designated as regular days the period ranging from 1 to 3 February 2006—even
though these three extra days are still Golden New Year holidays for Mainlanders
(but not in Hong Kong).
Because HKDL did not designate the dates 1 and 2 February as Special Days,
guests using Regular Day tickets could gain admission to the park on those days.
HKDL overbooked visitors, chiefly because of the many Mainlanders still
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holidaying in Hong Kong; in consequence, HKDL refused entry to more than (in
total) two thousand people holding valid entry tickets for these two consecutive
days. Gates were locked at 11:30 a.m. on 1 February 2006 and again at 10:30 a.m.
on 2 February 2006,88 and the temporary closure of the park elicited angry outbursts
from the disappointed crowd. Most of the local press reported the HKDL chaos in
detail on 2 February 2006: some disgruntled visitors refused to leave and clamored
outside the park while others rocked the main gates, climbed over the iron gates,
and helped children to get over. And police officers were called in for help to
maintain order. However, at this stage, only several press outlets presented the story
as headline news.89 But HKDL management did not apologize; indeed, a Disney
spokesperson said only that HKDL’s policy was in line with the policy of other
Disney parks around the world and that visitors to HKDL should arrive early if they
want to visit the park.90 Nor did HKDL provide appropriate measures to prevent the
chaos. So, when similar chaos occurred a second time on the following day, an
increasing number of papers made headlines out of the HKDL chaos.91 Reports
harshly criticized HKDL-management practices on 3 and 4 February for causing a
“Hong Kong shame,”92 and these reports also raised international concern about the
chaos at HKDL.93
HKDL was slow to issue a formal apology. The executive vice-president
and the managing director of the theme park Bill Ernest’s formal press statement
expressing apologies released only on 3 February 2006,94 two days after the chaos
had begun. In contrast, the HKSAR government intervened in HKDL’s difficulties
in a quick and high-profile manner. The government sent out a press release on 2
February 2006,95 in which the government expressed concerns about the chaos,
admitted that the sales arrangement had “caused a lot of inconvenience to guests,”
283

and “requested them (i.e. the senior management of HKDL) to make
improvements.” Press reports discussed Financial Secretary Henry Tang’s deep
dissatisfaction with the reluctance of HKDL’s senior management to listen to
advice inside the Board of Hong Kong International Theme Park Ltd (HKITP).96
These reports, in addition to HKDL’s widely reported slow response to the whole
affair, prompted the press to begin reporting overtly that the HKDL chaos was the
result of the HKDL senior management’s ignorance,97 highhandedness,98 reluctance
to admit faults,99 and even Americanism.100
To equate both HKDL’s inefficiency in tackling problems and a two-day
crowd crisis with Americanism seems to be an exaggeration. Disney as a US-rooted
company practices organizational hierarchy and bureaucratic management whereas
another US mega-brand, Hewlett-Packard, practices “networked teams”
organization, which makes decision-making and communication efficient.101
However, the New Year ticketing chaos, to a certain extent, reveals that the HKDL
senior management was concerned more with data and statistics than with local and
cultural knowledge when making important decisions. As revealed by the
Economic Development and Labour Bureau in the Legislative Council Panel on
Economic Services on 27 February 2006, HKDL’s sales arrangement of
designating 1 to 3 February 2006 not as date-specific tickets but as regular tickets
was “based on the October 2005 Golden Week experience at HKD [Hong Kong
Disneyland].”102 The senior management had full knowledge that these three days
were Mainlanders’ Golden New Year holiday, but the management chose to
calculate the sales arrangement on the basis of previous HKDL-visitor figures and
to ignore both government warnings and their own local cultural knowledge in this
regard. However, HKDL’s scientific data had not made explicit the difference
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between October Golden Week and Lunar New Year Golden Week, for the latter
one is the only Mainland golden week holiday that occurs at the same time as
Mainland students’ public holiday. As a famous family entertainment provider,
HKDL was highly likely to operate at capacity in these circumstances.103 The
HKDL management’s reliance on contextless quantitative data instead of on local
knowledge caused the overbooking chaos; it seems that it is not that Disney
management was culturally ignorant but that Disney’s “scientific” management
practices culturally blinded the management when there was a conflict between
HKDL’s quantitative models and local cultural knowledge.

A transnational system’s destabilization of onstage localization
After offending the French by refusing to sell wine at Euro Disney when it first
opened, Disney Imagineers claimed that, at HKDL, they worked hard to tweak the
park design, including food and facilities, on the basis of local food and local usage.
Localization is the park’s highlight: the shape of the Mickey and whale fountain
outside the entrance is like bauhinia, a flower representing Hong Kong; one
Chinese restaurant in the Disney hotel was designed according to the concept of the
five elements (of metal, wood, water, fire, and earth) used in ancient Chinese
cosmology; only after consulting with masters of feng shui did HKDL set the park
design in general and the opening date and time of the park. Hong Kong is rainy,
humid, and hot. This weather pattern differs from most weather patterns at Disney
parks in the United States and in other places; therefore, concrete—rather than
stone—was the preferred building material for the classic village inside
Fantasyland.104 Because HKDL’s target demographic is Hong Kong people,
Mainlanders, and guests from South East Asia, the ride Jungle River Cruise is
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performed in three languages: Cantonese, Putonghua, and English; English
performances of The Lion King are translated into Chinese and broadcast with
Chinese subtitles. To accommodate Mainland tourists’ personal hygiene habits,
HKDL even built a certain number of squat toilets inside the park. As for cuisine,
the park has three restaurants and five fast-food diners providing more than three
hundred cuisines, the widest variety of food at any of the company’s parks.105
Besides hamburgers, most dishes that HKDL provides are Asian and include
Cantonese noodles, Shanghaiese dumplings, Sichuanese dan dan noodles, Japanese
sushi, and Indian Kashmiri chicken curry. HKDL also provides Hong Kong-style
egg custard tarts and invented some Hong Kong-Western snacks and fast foods
such as char siew pork-burger with rice in Tomorrowland’s Starliner Diner.
Because Hong Kong people and Mainlanders like eating Chinese-style roast meat,
congee, noodles, and rice, the park’s upscale Victorian-style building Plaza Inn
serves classic Cantonese cuisine. Disney Imagineers even studied street hawkers in
Mong Kok and, accordingly, dressed cast members up as these vendors and
instructed them to sell sanitized local snacks, such as fish balls, from carts—all
within HKDL.
Onstage localization is significant to Disney’s transnational business, but its
US-based transnational workforce, the Disney Imagineers and producers, may not
be adept at accommodating local environments and needs so quickly when they
design and produce attractions at HKDL, especially when HKDL is operated and
managed by the Disney Company, instead of by locals (as is the case with Tokyo
Disneyland Park).106 Let us note, again, that HKDL has specialized and divided its
management and has refused to entrust power to local senior management and
production officials. These actions have made it difficult for HKDL to identify,
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consider, and implement local suggestions. In this section, I discuss two new
attractions, Stitch Encounter and Autopia, built inside HKDL and available since 13
July 2006, to illustrate how HKDL attractions, after almost one year’s operation,
still encounter problems of localization because of HKDL’s management system
and power hierarchy, both of which reflect trends at the US headquarters. I then
compare two Winnie the Pooh attractions—one at HKDL and the other at Tokyo
Disneyland—in order to argue that the localization problems that HKDL is facing
are due largely to the HKSAR government’s lack of institutional power—a rather
startling admission insofar as the HKSAR government is the park’s largest
shareholder of the park.
Stitch Encounter is an indoor interactive cartoon show, where the on-screen
character Stitch from Disney’s animated cartoon Lilo & Stitch (2002) appears on a
large rear-projection video screen and, for the twelve-minute show, converses with
the audience in real-time. A cast member, hidden backstage, performs Stitch’s
voice; the action of the on-screen Stitch derives from a computer that tracks the
backstage performer’s movements on a real-time basis. For these two reasons, the
show enables the character Stitch to perform differently in every show: Stitch’s
dialogues are not totally scripted and Stitch’s actions differ from one show to the
next. The show is offered in English, Cantonese, and Putonghua, and audiences
need to check for the show time that is in their preferred language. Although the
Magic Kingdom in Orlando offers an attraction with the same name Stitch
Encounter, the two shows are quite different in that Orlando’s Stitch is an audioanimatronic one and the Orlando show is not interactive.107
Stitch Encounter has encountered problems of localization. Although Stitch
Encounter has been offered in three languages, the show’s three most important
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contributors—the transnational-Disney-show producer, the Walt Disney
Imagineering (WDI) director-scriptwriter, and the WDI technical director—could
not understand Cantonese or Putonghua. According to my Disney production-staff
respondent Rebecca,108 the show’s producer asked the local Hong Kong Disney
production office to suggest possible script translators, but finally did not employ
people from the list provided; rather, she used two film directors and scriptwriters,
Alfred Cheung and Wong Chun Chun, to translate the English script into Cantonese
and into Putonghua respectively. According to Rebecca, the latter’s Putonghua was
not fluid enough for the task of writing an adequate Putonghua script. Whether true
or not in detail, that this story could circulate at all suggests that despite HKDL’s
onstage localization, the process is only partly successful at best.109
The localization problem that plagued Stitch Encounter has plagued the
efforts of many local Disney production staff to domesticate Disney movies for
release in Hong Kong. Local staff can give suggestions relative to these matters but
cannot, in the end, determine whose voice will speak which Cantonese lines of
dialogue; as stated by Andrew and Rebecca, two staffers working for Disney
movies in Hong Kong, it is senior officers at Disney’s US headquarters—not staff
members in the Hong Kong regional office—who make these critical decisions.
Andrew’s and Rebecca’s experiences110 led them to apply “Americanism” to
Disney’s hierarchical organizational culture and to Disney’s production process.
Stitch Encounter and Disney movies may be localized for local consumers, but the
hierarchy and the production process are not always regionalized, much less
localized. Atop the hierarchy and governing the process is the American
headquarters.
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HKDL’s Autopia faces a similar localization problem. Although Autopia “is
based on the original Autopia ride that opened at California Disney in 1955,”111
Disney Imagineers, according to my HKDL worker-respondents, differentiated
HKDL’s Autopia from other Autopia rides, for it is the first Autopia powered by
electricity instead of gasoline. By using electricity, each car then needs to re-charge
its store of electricity for one minute at the boarding area of the racetrack although
the ride lasts only about four minutes. Local Disney production staff objected to the
suggested use of electricity because Hong Kong’s hot and wet weather is not
suitable for electricity-powered racing cars. Nevertheless, the US-based Disney
Imagineers insisted on the new Autopia. Successful tests of Autopia were to take
place in June, but the cars experienced severe recharging problems. Consequently,
Autopia could not begin operations on HKDL’s scheduled opening date, which was
moved forward from 1 July to 13 July 2006. To compound the problem, HKDL
failed to notify the HKSAR Tourism Board, whose booklet Hong Kong Shopping
Festival Activities Guide announced that three attractions would open on 1 July
2006 , information that proved to be wrong because of the aforementioned delay.112
It is understandable that this kind of scenario would play out: Disney Imagineering
creates groundbreaking designs; therefore, Disney perhaps does not prioritize
pragmatic operational considerations. And yet, it is as obvious as it is
understandable that, because of the Autopia cars’ need for lengthy recharging at the
boarding area, very long queues would inevitably result, especially insofar as
HKDL has the fewest rides of all Disneyland parks in the world.113
If Disneyland aims to provide patrons an escape from the existing world,
HKDL’s small size may illustrate that the California-based Disney Imagineers have
failed to grasp locals’ need for a larger park in which they might effectively escape
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Hong Kong’s usual crowded spatial experiences. HKDL was modeled primarily on
Walt Disney’s original plan for a Disney park. As I learned from my HKDL staff
respondents who manage characters’ parades, the footprint of HKDL (visitors’
walking path inside HKDL) follows that of Anaheim’s Disneyland Park. Supporters
of the Anaheim park have praised its lesson-teaching potential: cities might “be
saved by a mouse”114 because the park’s walkable streets and pleasing public
spaces aim to enhance people’s communication and nurture people’s better angels,
as it were. Findley115 argued that the Anaheim park had been constructed as a
Southern California-based suburban enclave, an antidote to the eastern metropolises
of American civilization. However, when HKDL has imitated Anaheim Disneyland,
problems have occurred. The approximately fifteen hectares of HKDL116 can hardly
be imagined as an antidote to or a substitute for the high-density, hot and humid
Hong Kong urban space. In contrast to Tokyo Disneyland, which changed “Main
Street” to “World Bazaar” and protected it from rain under a glass canopy,117 the
uncovered pedestrian-used areas of HKDL make it difficult for locals to believe
that HKDL is an escape from the hot rainy Hong Kong summers, let alone a
plethora of fantasy worlds.118 In place of visitors’ better angels, HKDL’s crammed
and chaotic space lends strength to visitors’ unpleasant natures, triggering daily
quarrels inside HKDL. This turn of events constitutes an infamous irony in that
Disney parks have won fame for their order, hygiene, and safety.
I do not mean to suggest that localization never happens successfully in
HKDL. At the operational level, HKDL has adapted to local culture and to visitors’
behavior. For example, local visitors like taking photos and, to take them, would
sometimes disrupt the rides by disembarking from their individual carriages; in
response, the park installed additional scenic spots for snapping photos; and a
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stationary “cup” was placed in the Mad Hatter Tea Cups ride so that passengers
could take photos before going for a spin.119 Another factor that contributes to
HKDL’s local adaptability is the HKDL operation manual. According to my HKDL
worker-respondents, every three months, this confidential and important asset to
HKDL’s success updates adaptations to local needs. Each attraction has one
operation manual; if the update is immediate, a notice will be published to override
a particular point in the manual. For example, the theater entrance door of Mickey’s
PhilharMagic, a 3-D animated cartoon attraction, was initially automatic. Because
local patrons do not leave the theater immediately and because some want to stay to
watch the show once again, the automatic entrance created chaos by automatically
opening itself for a new group of incoming guests when some previous guests still
had not exited the theater. After noting the chaos and identifying its source, HKDL
changed the theater door from an automatic one to a manual one. These kinds of
changes can be made by more than one or two people. HKDL staff, including castmember trainers,120 Lead (a supervisor and a peer coach of hosts),121 and guest
service managers can, with the approval of the operation-development staff, change
the operation manual. However, the decision to make any onstage change that
creates an adaptation to local circumstances is, to a large extent, limited to
operations personnel.
Although the Walt Disney creative-development vice president Tom Morris
said that HKDL “benefits a lot from its new technology,”122 my HKDL staff
respondents, especially those who worked in park operations, understood and
experienced the so-called “cheap” construction that characterizes HKDL’s onstage
attractions. A particular twist to the theming accounts for this construction. In 2001,
the Hong Kong Tourist Association held a two-day conference entitled “Preparing
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for Disneyland,” and Paul Pressler, chairman of Walt Disney Parks and Resorts,
said that research in Hong Kong and the mainland showed a strong desire there for
classic Disney characters and themes.123 To build HKDL with the “original”
American flavor, the Walt Disney Imagineers tried to recreate the “original”
version of Walt Disney’s Disneyland in HKDL. Many onstage details of the
attractions derive from technologies in use in 1955, although the technology at
work behind these attractions may be contemporary. The Many Adventures of
Winnie the Pooh at HKDL, for example, is most similar to the first version of the
Pooh attraction in Orlando’s Magic Kingdom in June 1999. To build a 1955 park at
the turn of the millennium, however, the Disney Imagineers built a mechanical
turnstile for HKDL’s Pooh attraction. Because the turnstile was mechanical, staff,
themselves, had to collect attendance figures every hour, whereas other Pooh
attractions and all turnstiles elsewhere have been computerized so that the computer
can generate an hourly or daily attendance report.
Of all the Pooh attractions, Tokyo Disneyland’s (TDL) Pooh’s Hunny
Hunt124 is seen as the epitome of the “new generation” of dark rides. The name of
the Pooh attraction in Tokyo Disneyland differs from the names of other Disney
parks’ Pooh attractions; the technology used in TDL’s Pooh’s Hunny Hunt, which
premiered in September 2000, also differs from—and is, indeed, far more advanced
and sophisticated than—other Pooh attractions, including HKDL’s The Many
Adventures of Winnie the Pooh, which premiered in September 2005. Disneylands’
other indoor dark rides are built on tracks and move at a constant speed; in contrast,
TDL’s Pooh’s Hunny Hunt has no rail track or bus line, and the audience has no
way to know or even to guess whether the “free ranging” honey-pot-ride vehicle
will move, move or pause, move straight and then swerve or spin, simply go
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forward, or bounce. Because of the different speeds of the movement and the
sudden pauses, Pooh’s Hunny Hunt tells the Pooh adventure story with rhythm and
generates unexpected spellbinding excitement. At the boarding area, three honeypot cars move together, but then, each one moves on its own. This is possible
because all of the attraction’s grounds correspond to an electric map, and thereby, a
positioning system detects each vehicle’s movement and location. The Pooh rides
in HKDL, Anaheim Disneyland, Orlando Magic Kingdom, and Paris Disneyland
are the same traditional ride: vehicles with tracks. Many visitors would argue that
none can compete with the interest and the excitement that TDL’s Pooh’s Hunny
Hunt generates.
However, although Walt Disney Imagineering designed and produced both
Pooh’s Hunny Hunt and The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh, the Oriental
Land Company (OLC) has total operational control of Tokyo Disneyland and
enjoys rights to master-plan the park and to develop attractions with the
Imagineering staff. Pooh’s Hunny Hunt is an outcome of both requests by OLC125
and concepts by Imagineering. OLC, with its master-planning right, was eager to
invest more money into the development of new attractions and to renew existing
Disneyland attractions, the goal being to attract audiences; at the same time,
HKSAR government’s negotiating power regarding such issues as park
development, management, and operations is far more restricted than that enjoyed
by OLC. This state of affairs remains the case even though the funding for HKDL’s
attractions comes from HKITP, in which the HKSAR government has a 57% share.
Imagineers knew as early as December 2002 that HKDL’s attractions would consist
“mostly of what Imagineers call ‘direct lifts’—copies of attractions built for other
Disney parks.”126 As a result, although the cost of Tokyo Disneyland’s Pooh’s
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Hunny Hunt was nine times more expensive than HKDL’s The Many Adventures of
Winnie the Pooh,127 the former has been the most popular attraction in Tokyo
Disneyland, whereas Disneyland Paris’s The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh
disappeared from that park in 2006.128 In short, OLC has a greater degree of
decision-making power than the HKSAR government in designing, budgeting, and
producing rides to meet local needs and standards. Even when local HKDL
operation staff commented that their own Pooh attraction was “cheap” and that the
HKSAR government should be willing to pay for an expensive attraction when it
was willing to invest HK$22.95 billion for the reclamation and the building of
HKDL, the irreducible fact was that the HKSAR government as the biggest
shareholder of HKDL has had a definite say in neither the development nor the
operation of their park.

Conclusion
Scholars emphasize Disney’s global reach: Disney’s ability to dominate global
media, to homogenize global culture129 (e.g., the organization of meanings of
difference),130 to constitute popular discourses in favor of its own image and
business131 (e.g., commodification promotion),132 and to transform public spaces
into privately controlled entertainment and consumption spaces.133 The operation of
HKDL demonstrates that Hong Kong imports not only Disney images and
technologies but also Disney corporate culture, Disney Realism, and Disney
management practices. Hong Kong Company Law does not require Disney to
disclose any financial statements at the Companies Registry, and so HKDL can
continue its non-transparent corporate-management practices. Although the
294

HKSAR government is the biggest shareholder of HKDL, bounded by the
contractual terms, the former has no definite say in HKDL’s design, development,
and operation. In this chapter, I have also discussed how Disney’s hierarchical
corporate culture inhibits localization despite its transnational workforce; it limits
localization of transnational cultural forms—in this case, HKDL onstage
attractions—to the operational level.
Owning vast transnational power and arrays of global media networks,
Disney possesses power that is not absolute; there is interplay among sites of power.
Significant interplay takes place between Disney and local media actors, as they
struggle with each other for the power to interpret, organize, and circulate the
meaning of “Disney.” I have shown in this chapter that local media actors have
worked to change HKDL’s transnational corporate image by interpreting Hong
Kong’s import of Disneyland not as a “millennium dream” but as “Americanism”
and as a “Hong Kong shame.” This interpretation illustrates that Disney’s control
over the organization of both the meaning of “Disney” and the meaning of
“Disneyland” is far from total. The “local” remains crucial in shaping both local
cultural meanings and the image of the global corporate giant. The Hong Kong
press has criticized HKDL as cramped, parsimonious, and unresponsive to Hong
Kong people’s needs and dreams for a spectacular and extravagant HKDL. Also,
the press has pointed out that HKDL’s response to crises has been slow,
highhanded, and reminiscent of Americanism. The press treatment of HKDL can be
seen, in this light, as local resistance to Disney Realism, to Disney’s manipulation
of media, and to Disney’s failure to satisfy Hong Kong people’s desire to
distinguish themselves from other cities and from non-Hong Kong people, as I
discussed in chapter Three.
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By criticizing certain Disney management practices as manipulative
corporate practices and as Americanism, local media actors not only have
problematized and demythicized Disney innocence but also have contributed to a
continuous reshaping of local culture and identity. Alongside the press has been the
HKSAR government, which has criticized the HKDL chaos. Government officials
characterized HKDL security’s actions as “unacceptable” after the 2005 dress-down
incident,134 and following the Lunar New Year chaos of February 2006, the
government issued a statement of concern and then made an official “request” to
HKDL regarding the need for improvements.135 The HKSAR government’s actions
have helped reconstitute Hong Kong identity as one capable of rejecting a totally
subsumed role in preference to a role that creates criticism of Disneyized
management culture. A case in point concerns comments that the host of a popular
local radio program made in her newspaper column. In reference to HKDL’s first
anniversary in September 2006, she wrote,

Last year Disney experienced a magical year, in that it received a barrage of
negative comments but still earned two to three hundred million dollars,
whereas the HKSAR government has run up deficits. However, the Hong
Kong people should not feel stupid: we should thank Disney. Disney
reinforces the Hong Kong people’s international image. Now, the whole
world knows that Americanism does not work in Hong Kong; Hong Kong
people do not blindly adore American culture. We have independent
thoughts and are astute consumers…. Each of us spends three thousand
dollars [to build HKDL], and we can defeat an international brand…. [the
expenditure] exceeds our billings!136

Certainly the above remarks exaggerate the setbacks that Disney had faced in
handling the Hong Kong people’s views of HKDL management practices and of the
international position and image of Hong Kong, but the remarks reconstitute Hong
Kong’s imagined communities and identities: they are not inferior and subsumed to
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global or transnational corporate forces, in particular Disney regulations. It is local
actors, including government, journalists, scholars, stars, and local production staff,
who have requested that Disney management adapt its corporate culture to the
Hong Kong context, especially insofar as HKDL is a joint-venture company and
insofar as defects, chaos, and lower-than-expected attendance figures have
characterized the park since its first year of operation.
I do not think that our reaction to local actors’ resistance should be joyous.
In the wake of HKDL’s opening, media have widely circulated comment about a
side of Disney with which many media consumers were unfamiliar; and since the
opening, Hong Kong people have developed a more complicated reading of what
“Disney” is. Nevertheless, media’s and even local scholars’ comments on Disney,
as I have shown, complicate the meanings of Disney but rarely rise to a higher,
more penetrating level, one that would promote important discussions about local
laws’ ineffectual monitoring of companies’ acts. Hong Kong has yet to demand, in
a unified voice, that HKDL practice greater transparency, that the HKSAR
government better monitor HKDL management practices, and that, in place of overgeneralized anti-Americanism rhetoric, there be open and thoughtful discussions.
Let us discuss—as a community—the relationship between non-transparent local
governance and HKDL’s privatized practices, and let us discuss—as a
community—the effect that this relationship has on Hong Kong people’s
citizenship rights.
In the following chapter, I continue to examine local work culture and local
consumption practices inside HKDL. “Labor exploitation” was one of the popular
HKDL topics publicized in news media,137 but few HKDL workers have joined the
HKDL labor union. Dissatisfied with the job owing to various reasons, HKDL
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workers have developed their own practices, some with resistance potential. On the
whole, these worker-developed practices enable the workers to remain in HKDL’s
employ but to fall short of Disney’s service standards, quite a feat given Disney’s
all-encompassing work checklists. Consumers, on the other hand, constitute the
other, less-recognized party performing on the Disneyland stage. Cultural tensions
between Hong Kong people and Mainlanders are pronounced in HKDL, and the
two demographic groups’ different cultural scripts make it difficult for HKDL to
become the “happiest place in the world.” Enthusiastic consumers may disrupt the
orderly and safe atmosphere of Disneyland unexpectedly, while sophisticated
consumers may find HKDL inferior to other Disneyland parks around the world
and may, as a result, seldom or never visit the park.
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Chapter Seven
Work and Consumption: Pixie Tricks of Cultural Globalization

I discuss in chapter Six how Disney management practices—namely, Disney
Realism, Disney’s bureaucratic system, and Disney’s transnational but US-based
hierarchical power distribution— turn localization into a fairy tale; local media
actors (such as local journalists, stars, and production workers), on the other hand,
publicly characterize “Disney” as arrogant, highhanded, and Americanism. In this
way, the local media actors try to counter certain HKDL business practices. In this
chapter, I turn to the perspectives of HKDL workers and consumers.
Few HKDL staff respondents characterized the park as Americanized. Some
HKDL workers, especially those who had worked in Orlando Disney parks before
HKDL opened in September 2005, felt disappointed with the local park’s loss of
the American flavor. To them, HKDL’s middle management was one major factor
leading to the un-Disneyfied park, while local consumption acts constituted another
major factor. After working at HKDL, some acknowledged their “mistaken” views
on a “famous” “big company”: they believed that such a “big company” as Disney
should possess—but, in fact, lacked—a good and fair system that provides workers
with good working conditions. Facing a toilsome job every day and sometimes
unfair treatment from management, some HKDL workers joined the HKDL labor
union, voiced their grievances to the media, and demanded better treatment from
the company, but many other workers remained silent and stayed out of the labor
union. However, workers’ reluctance to join the union does not mean that the
HKDL management exercised full control over its workers; on the contrary,
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workers turned their smiling faces into sullen faces and appropriated Disney’s
scripted spiel to air grievances to the visitors.
Disneyland sells happiness, but happiness needs cooperation from
customers to make the sale work. Visitors’ behavior is the most difficult parkrelated aspect for HKDL management to tame and control. As with other Disney
parks, the space of HKDL derives from a rational design (by Disney Imagineers)
and functions to encourage HKDL visitors to consume. However, customers
unpredictably disrupt both the orderly, other-worldly, consumerist Kingdom and
HKDL workers’ “show” by taking photos in the “onstage” space, by queue jumping,
and by engaging in other caviling and thrifty behavior. Enthusiastic mass
consumption unexpectedly ruins mass entertainment, Disney’s Hong Kong Magic
Kingdom.
This chapter divides into two large sections—one on work inside HKDL,
and the other on consumption activities inside HKDL. In the first section, I examine
the orientation training in which HKDL forges high-quality performers, and I then
discuss the ways in which frontline workers consciously or unconsciously resist
being “Disneyfied” and thus affect HKDL’s service standards. In the second section,
I first examine the ways in which different local and transnational social campaigns
challenge HKDL’s wholesome and innocent image. Then, I examine the limitations
of a local anti-Disney group’s efforts to attract collective support in a local context.
Finally, I then go back to examine how local mass-consumption activities disrupt
the Disney magic inside the Disney park.
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Semi-Disneyfied HKDL work system and management practices
“You can dream, create, design and build
the most wonderful place in the world…
but it requires people to make the dream a reality,” said Walt Disney.1

Disney has won fame as the “epitome of excellent customer service,”2 and this
praise gave rise to the 1986 establishment of the Disney Institute, which provides
courses about the Disney service-management approach to leadership development,
quality service, customer loyalty, people management, organizational creativity,
and teambuilding.3 In an ex-Disney manager’s view,4 Disney’s reputation for
service that exceeds visitors’ expectations rests on several factors. Two of those
factors are managers’ well-stated mission to communicate with workers and the
cultivation of a positive team-spirit work environment. For many scholars, however,
Disney’s mobilization of workers who adhere to the Disney way of service5 may
rather be due to strong organizational discourse developed in staff training,
scientific management practices targeting the part-timers,6 peer pressure, and strong
supervision and surveillance7 from supervisors over frontline workers’ interactions
with visitors.
My interviews with ten HKDL staff respondents show that HKDL workers’
possession of a common Disney language and a strong organization discourse
stems partly from training and the manual.8 All HKDL workers must receive
orientation training before they can work in a specific division; and all HKDL
workers, during orientation training, must read the manual Disney Traditions,
which contains information on topics such as corporate values, traditions, behaviors,
and Walt Disney history. Given the importance of this manual in the all-important
orientation training, I compare three versions of Disney Traditions: the HKDL
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version, the Orlando Disney parks’ version, and the Walt Disney World College
Program version.9 My objective is to identify any similarities and any differences
pertaining to Disneyland work philosophy as it operates outside Hong Kong and as
it operates in Hong Kong.
The teaching content and the format of the three versions of Disney
Traditions are largely the same.10 Trainees need to fill in important points to
remember the model answer. For example, the “common goal” for the three
versions is the same: “We create happiness by providing the finest entertainment
for people of all ages everywhere.”11 All three versions introduce “4 keys to Disney
quality standards,” also known as the SCSE codes: safety, courtesy, show,
efficiency.12 In the section on courtesy, for example, Disney training emphasizes
that every visitor is a “guest” and a “VIP”: a very important person. Regarding
“show,” the Orlando manual is blank, but the HKDL manual teaches trainees the
meaning of “show,” that workers are not workers but “cast members” dressing in
“costume” in the “onstage” space—the area where visitors visit. Cast members
should perform a “good show,” meaning that they have “to deliver flawless and
professional presentations everyday, for every guest, and to maintain a clean, neat,
and organized work location.” The manual also states that a good show needs
“cleanliness,” “the Disney look,” and “character integrity.” Regarding “efficiency,”
the manual emphasizes team work and team spirit by asking workers to remember
two words: reliability and communication. The three versions also have “7 service
guidelines for guest service”13: “Make eye contact and smile,” “Greet and welcome
each guest,” “Seek out interaction with guests,” “Provide immediate service
recovery,” “Display a sincere and friendly tone of voice and body language,”14
“Preserve the integrity of the ‘magical’ guest experience,” and “Sincerely thank
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each and every guest.” The “7 service guidelines for guest service” are so important
that they were printed in a pocket booklet for the rehearsal days of HKDL between
16 August and 8 September 2005.
The difference among these three versions of the Disney Traditions manual
lies in HKDL’s relative neglect of workers’ safety and rights. The two Orlando
versions devote three pages respectively to the meanings of and the official
responses to sexual harassment,15 equal employment opportunities,16 and general
complaints,17 but the HKDL manual mentions not one of these three issues. The
HKDL manual’s neglect of workers’ rights suggests that HKDL management may
be comparatively unaware of two important managerial functions: to listen to staff
members’ demands and to provide staff members with a good working environment.
Aviad E. Raz18 argues that the manual is important to Disney’s strong
organizational culture. In the case of Tokyo Disneyland, the service manual is
integral to the organization, which comprises enormous numbers of part-timers, for
the service manual reminds workers of the service standards. In the case of HKDL,
HKDL orientation training helped my ten HKDL staff respondents correctly
identify the common goal of Disneyland workers (to create happiness). In our
conversations, many respondents always used Disney words such as ‘CM’ (cast
members, meaning HKDL workers), ‘guests’ (visitors), ‘good show’, ‘LOB’ (line
of business), and ‘GSM’ (guest service manager) to describe their work. Many also
remembered, in varying sequences, the “4 keys to Disney quality standards” (safety,
courtesy, show, efficiency). One respondent could even articulate the “7 service
guidelines for guest service,” and other respondents mentioned two to four
guidelines (one respondent explained that the “7 service guidelines” facilitate the
annual appraisals of HKDL staff members’ work performance). Disney orientation
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helped my respondents, so they stated, to grasp certain corporate values and
standards, but the respondents’ knowledge did not necessarily translate into their
wholehearted adherence to the guest-service guidelines.
Of all my ten HKDL staff respondents, two enjoyed working at HKDL,19
but all respondents, to different degrees, criticized the park, and four of the ten
respondents had quit the HKDL job, one planned to quit the job for studies, one
planned not to renew his contract with HKDL, and one worked as a seasonal
worker at HKDL during the peak season. Of the remaining three HKDL staff
respondents, all three had worked as HKDL cultural representatives in Orlando,
two had been promoted to Lead, and one had been promoted to Host 1. Among
these three same respondents, two enjoyed working at HKDL and one had tried—
but failed—to find another job and thought that her lack of a bachelor’s degree
explained the failure. In short, of the ten respondents, seven had already quit or
planned to quit, and only two enjoyed working at HKDL. Respondents’ criticisms
of work conditions fall into one of three categories, two of which concern culture:
physical hardship, dissatisfaction with the “un-Disneyfied” management system
and practices, and dissatisfaction with the “un-Disneyfied” HKDL visitors.
Physical hardship seems to be universal in every Disney park.20 My
respondents, especially those who worked or had worked in the park’s operations
division, commented that HKDL during the early operations period had had an
inadequate workforce. Workers’ long shifts (ten to twelve hours) and infrequent
short breaks21 (workers had access only to undersized, overcrowded break rooms22)
caused physical problems for some HKDL workers. For example, workers whose
job was to endlessly repeat spiels or to stand for hours at a time experienced throat
problems or joint and muscle aches and pains respectively.23 Only a few days after
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the official opening of the park, the non-government organization the Hong Kong
Confederation of Trade Unions received one hundred and forty HKDL workers’
inquiries and complaints about long shifts and chaotic shift duties.24
Regarding HKDL management, the interviewed staff members’ criticisms
fall into two categories: management-system issues and management-practices
issues. Respondents found that the management contradicted the Disneymanagement philosophy, according to which the management should maintain
meritocratic, participatory, and good working conditions for junior staff. To provide
good working conditions, a staff booklet introducing HKDL states: “we provide
opportunities for all Cast Members to … quickly progress to senior positions.”25 In
general, the internal promotion system and senior management’s success stories
help workers believe that HKDL provides a meritocratic work system; indeed, the
system articulates Hong Kong people’s general belief in the overall meritocracy of
the Hong Kong class structure. People “may not have believed in the complete
equality of chances, openness and fairness of their society ... but they believe it to
be the case to such a degree that they will strive hard to better themselves and their
families.”26 In HKDL, the organizational hierarchy (from least important to most
important) comprises “Host” (which can be divided into Host 2 and Host 1, and
Host 2 is the junior staff member, and most HKDL employees inside the park are
Host 2), Lead (supervisor), Guest Service Manager (GSM), Operations Manager,
and executives.27 After working inside the park, some workers realize that HKDL’s
internal promotions are not as plentiful as they expected and HKDL’s pay policy
and promotion policy may be based not on meritocracy but on seniority and on
friendships with managers; workers who spend their two-year vocational training in
food and beverages work inside the kitchen and receive a lower salary than do
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frontline workers, who attained only high school (form five) qualifications; hosts
speaking three languages (English, Cantonese, and Putonghua) receive the same
salary as do those who speak only Cantonese; character performers playing the
same characters as show performers receive lower salaries.28
Another criticism that my respondents raised concerned the “unDisneyized” management practices of the local mid-level managers (GSMs). Inside
the team “Park Operation,” each “land”—namely, Fantasyland, Adventureland, and
Tomorrowland plus Main Street U.S.A.—has about eighty-five Host 2s, five or six
Host 1s, eight Leads,29 four GSMs, and one Operations Manager, a list that reflects
the positions’ relative importance, from least to greatest, in the management
hierarchy. HKDL managers do not receive these positions through internal
promotions; rather, HKDL employs the managers from outside HKDL. Many of the
managers had previously worked for government departments such as the Hospital
Authority or for big companies such as MTR Corporation, Cathay Pacific Airways,
and the Airport Authority. By June 2006, according to my HKDL workerrespondents, only three out of twenty GSMs30 trained in Orlando. Some disgruntled
HKDL workers who had trained with Disney in Orlando alleged that these GSMs
knew but neither believed in nor performed Disney values. HKDL requires, as do
other US Disney parks, that once a month managers dress and perform as Hosts so
that the managers can experience junior workers’ problems. However, these
managers initially opposed the idea; when their opposition failed, they resisted by
performing as Hosts for only a few hours instead of for a full day’s shift.
According to my respondents, some managers would ask junior workers to
perform the “7 guest service guidelines” but would not perform the guidelines
themselves: the managers would request that junior workers keep the onstage area
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clean but would not even clean tables; they would ask junior workers to create
magic—unexpected happiness for guests—but could not or would not do so
themselves. In dealing with industrial relations, because HKDL provides no clear
specification as to what mistakes lead to what disciplinary actions, each team can
develop its own disciplinary system, and different managers exercise disciplinary
action differently; consequently, junior workers suffer unfair disciplinary actions.31
In October 2005, some HKDL “divisions” managers listed ten workers who had
applied for the most sick leaves in their divisions on the division’s own notice
board. It is possible that such action violated the Disability Discrimination
Ordinance.32 In short, some hosts were dissatisfied with contradictions between
HKDL’s relatively open organizational structure emphasizing communication (such
as the Cast Advisory Council and the Cast Forum where junior staffers voice
suggestions and criticisms) and HKDL’s strong GSM-developed hierarchical
organizational culture.33
My respondents also recounted to me stories about some grossly
unsatisfactory workplace conditions. Because of the inadequate workforce during
the park’s early days, managers prohibited some of my respondents from using the
restroom and one respondent waited for forty-five minutes and another for two
hours to relieve themselves. Annie,34 who worked as a log raft and boat skipper for
two attractions, Tarzan Island and Jungle River Cruise in Adventureland,
commented, “We all hate the environment a lot. There are so many mosquitoes, and
you got no way to escape from the sun. It burns us.” Annie, together with her
colleagues, had asked their managers to request a parasol for them but one manager
immediately refused their request because a parasol would not suit the theme of
Adventureland. When the park was still under construction, Annie was employed as
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a test-and-adjust (T & A) operator. She needed to ride the log raft for contractors
between the main dock and the island dock to construct Tarzan’s Treehouse, the
artificial tree covered in vines and moss. One day, it rained heavily. All contractors
received raincoats but no junior staff had one. Annie asked her manager to provide
raincoats for her and her colleagues. Upon request, the managers sent her three
raincoats although there were more than ten junior workers working on the site.
Once, Annie’s colleagues demanded a greater number of short breaks because boat
skippers in Jungle River Cruise needed to deliver spiels and, consequently,
developed throat irritation, but according to her, the manager said, “You always go
to sing karaoke and have no throat problems, so why do you have problems now?”
Annie was disappointed with the manager’s inconsiderate refusal and eventually
left the company although she loved the Orlando Disney workplace life.
The third major problem that HKDL workers face is the varying client
profile. If Disneyland has stages on which its characters and cast members perform
in front of and, indeed, among guests, the guests are also performers on the stage.
To provide and sell happiness to guests, HKDL hosts need to follow their guestservice guidelines—to smile, to greet, to interact with guests, and to thank them
profusely. However, the service guidelines, as James Watson argues in the case of
McDonald’s restaurants,35 assume that customers have been educated and
disciplined, as it were—that they, as guests, know the proper scripts and the
grateful behavior expected of them. But if customers deliver off-script
performances, and if hosts do not receive “appropriate” responses from guests (for
example, no “you’re welcome” smiles or statements), these hosts can hardly see
their service guidelines through to completion. In other words, both hosts and
guests need to know and to follow their scripts well in order to have a “good
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show”—in order to generate Disneyland happiness.36 HKDL’s major clients are
Hong Kong people and Mainland Chinese, and some of these guests may be
unfamiliar with the Disneyland culture. In these cases, problems often occur. Many
of these local customers differ from local Orlando customers insofar as the former
are unaccustomed, in particular, to the culture of “service with a smile.” My
respondents said that when hosts make eye contact and smile at local customers,
customers may feel suspicious of the smile and some even feel intimidated and
reply, “What are you laughing at?” Others may feel nervous and go away.
To create an entertainment park that makes movie magic a reality, HKDL
workers need to encourage visitors to immerse themselves in the fairy-world
atmosphere. If rides are out of order, HKDL staff should not tell visitors the truth
but make up a story (a practice that is taught in training) so as not to break the
magic spell. During the early days of HKDL, HKDL staff said “Buzz Lightyear
suddenly feels uncomfortable and he needs to have a rest. He will lead visitors to
journey to infinity” if the ride Buzz Lightyear Astro Blasters was out of order; for
another popular ride, The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh, HKDL staff would
say, “Winnie the Pooh has broken the honey pot and he is cleaning up the place” if
the ride was out of order. As stated by my respondents, Orlando visitors, after
hearing the spiel, may just keep compliantly waiting in line; in HKDL, however,
visitors criticized HKDL management by declaring that it had lied to cover up
management’s faults. For the ride Jungle River Cruise, the skipper needs to present
a humorous narration as he or she leads on “the adventurous journey through an
African jungle.”37 When skippers do their job, they expect visitors to feel joyful and
to laugh. Many local visitors, however, ignore the skippers’ spiel and take photos
instead, and some visitors loudly declare that the spiel is not funny and that the
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animatronic scenes look fake.38 Many of my HKDL staff respondents, especially
those whose work required them to be in contact with customers, told me that they
had been chastised, offended, or intimidated by local customers to different degrees.
Some Hong Kong visitors spoke foul language, and some visitors jumped queues.
One visitor even told one of my respondents to watch her back when she left the
park. Audrey, who was still working at HKDL and who wanted to quit the job but
could get no interview, said:

Guests are so important. Initially I wanted to have a happy and smiling face
to serve them, but then I was greeted with rude responses and foul language.
I didn’t do anything, so why are you yelling at me? The problems [of
malfunctioning machines and queue jumping] weren’t my fault. And I can’t
help you even though you’re yelling at me. I can’t say that I’m disappointed
with the park because, now, I don’t have much hope for HKDL.

Disneyland demands that customers line up, behave in an orderly manner, enjoy
themselves, smile, and interact with others in a friendly way; the park design and
hosts’ guest-service guidelines are ways in which HKDL leads visitors to meet
these expectations. Without discipline from the visitors, the park can hardly be a
fantasyland for both visitors and HKDL workers.

Localized services
Disgruntled workers negotiate with HKDL working conditions and management
practices in various ways. Some workers voice their grievances directly to
journalists and some workers established the labor union. The Hong Kong
Disneyland Cast Members’ Union (HKDLCMU) was established on 29 November
2005,39 but no respondents in my study had joined the HKDLCMU, and no
respondents knew any colleagues who had joined the union. According to Elaine
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Hui, the Organizing Secretary of HKDLCMU, around one hundred junior workers
out of five thousand HKDL workers had joined HKDLCMU, and Elaine noted that
more than ninety-five of them worked as Host 2s and that fewer than five union
members were Host 1s. No Leads, GSMs, or higher-ranking employees had ever
joined the labor union.
My respondents provided me with different reasons for their decision not to
join the union: they said that the union gathered incomprehensive information about
HKDL employment conditions (that not all divisions treat workers badly40 and that
there are different work loads among HKDL workers41); they feared that their
participation in the labor union would negatively affect their careers; and they
suspected that the union’s negotiation power was weak.42 Besides, although
workers may see the social relation between HKDL management and themselves as
a relation of domination and subordination, their attitude toward HKDL
management is ambivalent. Although some respondents in my study experienced
management’s unfair practices, HKDL’s management problems such as the semimeritocratic system and management’s unfair treatment of workers, the respondents
said that HKDL’s management problems were, in a general form, common among
other companies. Some respondents found that the HKDL’s employee benefits
(such as medical insurance and overtime payment) were superior to those offered
by local small enterprises; and most of my HKDL staff respondents enjoyed the
workers’ relationships with one another and the team spirit inside the park. And as I
mentioned earlier, HKDL management would hold a Cast Forum every quarter and
a Cast Advisory Council at which junior staff could raise questions, make demands,
and voice criticisms. Improvements may be small but junior staff members, in
general, have an impression that the company—through its management—is
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responding to employees’ needs and demands gradually. The establishment of more
break rooms, for example, greatly pleased park employees, who praised
management for the improvement.
For my respondents, “labor union,” however, implied “resistance,” which in
turn implied a confrontational stance toward the HKDL management. Workers’
ambivalent attitudes, in addition to their limited job alternatives, encouraged
workers to avoid taking risks and, thus, to avoid challenging authorities. Before the
establishment of the HKDLCMU, a university-based, student-organized antiDisney group, Disney Hunter, helped the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade
Unions (HKCTU) distribute leaflets to HKDL workers. The leaflets were to
encourage the workers to establish a labor union. Some HKDL workers told
HKCTU members that if Disney Hunter involved itself in the establishment of an
HKDL labor union, the workers would not join it because they were not
confrontational toward the management even though they disapproved of some
HKDL-management practices. As a result, workers’ ambivalence toward HKDL
management, labor unions’ reputation for confrontation, and workers’ fear that
labor-union membership would negatively affect their careers, all resulted in the
labor union’s low participation rate. Believing in the free market and free choice,
some of my HKDL staff respondents did not join the union and, moreover, asked
dissatisfied workers to resign; some of my respondents also criticized workers’
demands for pay raises or for additional employee benefits because, according to
these respondents, the dissatisfied workers were making demands that lay outside
the lawful status of the contract.
Many workers faced physically toilsome work, certain inconsiderate
management practices, undesirable visitors, and conflicting beliefs concerning
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social fairness, meritocracy, rule by contract, rule by law, and free choice in a
market economy. In light of these themes, as well as the workers’ overall hesitation
toward labor unions, many of the workers chose to leave HKDL. HKDL staff’s
turnover rate is high,43 especially in the park’s operations, merchandise, and hotel
services divisions. As one of my respondents noted, during one particular month in
Adventureland, ten of one hundred hosts left HKDL; in Fantasyland, some workers
would leave within seven days of starting, and some would leave after completing
only their three-month work probation.44
But some choose to stay, with resentment. Because some HKDL workers
cannot find a better job despite several months of frustrating searching, these
workers may react to their unsatisfying work in a passive way. According to Elaine
Hui, the Organizing Secretary of the HKDLCMU, HKDL workers know that the
labor union cannot solve many management problems in which no violation of
labor laws has taken place; therefore, some workers do not join the labor union but
make use of the union forum to voice grievances. Sometimes, workers strategically
use the forum to retaliate against their supervisors because the workers know that
senior management, human resources officers, and public affairs officers read the
forum regularly. For instance, security officers complain in the forum that their
managers are lazy, unfair, authoritarian, immoral in their private lives, and so on.
One story was that the managers cut off internet access inside the security room
after learning about the allegations that workers had raised in the forum.45
In the work environment, cast members work in their own way to make
their work life happier. The most common way for HKDL workers to escape from
physical hardship and emotional distress is to take a two-day official sick leave
every month. In Fantasyland, for example, almost half of the workers take a two329

day sick leave every month. There should be about fifty-five workers working
inside Fantasyland at any given time; however, in the most extreme case, about
eight to ten of the needed fifty-five workers call in sick on one day. It is generally
the case that, during the end of the month or on busy days, these workers call in
sick. During peak times, supervisors (Leads) need to rearrange manpower
immediately, and as a result, the workers may have fewer breaks and experience an
even more unpleasant work environment.
Many Disneyland workers know that “they are part of the product being
sold,” argued Van Maanen.46 These workers may respond to their various
grievances by putting on a glum face for customers, as I mentioned. Because the
four most important keys to Disney quality standards are, as I have mentioned,
safety, courtesy, show, and efficiency (ordered in decreasing importance), all
workers know that safety is the most important element in Disneyland. Smiling or
courtesy is not. From their experience, workers also know that there is a high
possibility that they will be chastised if they make mistakes relating to safety issues,
but a low possibility that they will receive even one warning if they fail to return a
smile or if they pout on the job. One respondent, as a Lead, told me that the stricter
the managerial discipline, the more frequent the workers’ passive-aggressive
actions. Once she asked a Host 2 to greet a guest, but as soon as she turned her back,
the worker would offer visitors a glum face; when another colleague—
exemplifying Disney’s surveillance method—informed my respondent of the
worker’s passive-aggressive behavior, she could only ask the worker to leave the
onstage area and to take a break backstage. During busy periods, many HKDL
workers exhibit indifference so that visitors will be less likely to seek help from
them. On one busy day during Christmas in 2005, I was queuing up for fastpass
330

tickets for Buzz Lightyear Astro Blasters, but the fastpass ticket machine broke
down. I told an HKDL worker about the problem, and she just said, “How many
tickets?” I said “five,” and she gave me the tickets and went away immediately. She
said nothing other than “How many tickets?” In fact, she did not bother even to
look at my face, and I could find only indifference from her demeanor. No smile.
No interaction. And it was clear to me, as well, that she wanted to convey
indifference at that moment. Normally, junior workers do not exhibit such
indifference in front of the Lead or the manager, whose duties include appraising
the junior workers’ professionalism: a bad appraisal can negatively affect a pay
raise.47
To protect the junior workers or to reduce the turnover rate, some HKDL
managers (as did a trainer in Disneyland Paris48) would tell the hosts, “If you don’t
want to smile, don’t. But you must ensure the proper execution of safety
procedure.” Staff members’ smiles become a bonus instead of a mandate for HKDL
management. “Hard-core” safety procedures include detailed inspections of
machines and unerring enforcement of safety-belt rules. Almost all HKDL workers
strictly adhere to the operation manual’s safety regulations. In addition, workers
must communicate—out loud—the safety rules to visitors: “Please remain seated”
or “Please fasten your seatbelt.” These spoken narratives are requisite, even for a
relatively safe ride like Cinderella Carousel. However, my numerous visits to
HKDL revealed that even during the slow season, some workers would give the
safety spiels so fast that I could not make out a single word. When it comes to
safety, workers act according to instruction and operation guidelines, but their
performances vary.
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HKDL workers can also alter or shorten spiels to make their lives easier and
less disappointing. For HKDL’s ride Jungle River Cruise, the boat skipper should
finish the ride in about eight minutes. When some skippers notice that the whole
boat is full of bored visitors who would prefer simply to take photos rather than
listen to the spiel, the skippers may shorten their humorous narration and ride to
different scenes, where visitors can witness explosions and an animatronic elephant
spurting water. The skippers reduce the spiel to simplify their lives—and to save
their sore throats. Because they are allowed to ad-lib comments to create a funny
atmosphere, skippers may make use of their self-created spiel to express their work
conditions. Once, I took the ride, and after the skipper went back to the unloading
area, we—the audience—applauded, and she said, “Please come back and visit me
more frequently. I think that I’ll end up working on this ride forever. I never get a
shot at a promotion.”
HKDL workers may try to lighten their work life by showing up for work
without committing to the work: according to one of my respondents, “to do the
important basic tasks only [to offer spiels about safety and to perform safety checks]
and to pass the time by waiting for the next break, by talking, by joking around with
colleagues during a shift, by waiting for the end of a shift, and by going out with
colleagues after work.” Junior park operators and hotel waiters usually have smallgroup gatherings after work twice a week. Talking to each other during shifts and
outside of shifts seems to be one of the greatest comforts that workers take from
their work at HKDL.

Global consumer politics and the local anti-Disney movement
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After 1999, Hong Kong people grew enthusiastic about the establishment of HKDL.
Basking in this enthusiasm, Disney management perhaps registered surprise when
they learned that some people in Hong Kong were struggling against some Disney
business practices and that these people had spread their protest worldwide to stop
or to intervene in these practices. A case in point: HKDL planned to serve shark’s
fin soup for wedding banquets and drew fire from environmentalists. In May 2005,
the conservation organizations Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), Greenpeace,
and Hong Kong Marine Conservation Society requested that Disney reverse its
decision, but the management rejected the appeal and said “Hong Kong Disneyland
takes environmental stewardship very seriously and we are equally sensitive to the
local cultures.”49 Green groups threatened to mount a global boycott of Disneyland
until Disney reversed the decision.50 WWF Hong Kong intended to organize a
20,000-person (mostly local students) petition; alongside it would be held a global
online signature petition targeting its five million members, starting at the end of
June 2005. WildAid and Peter Hughes Diving also took part in the action; and
nearly one thousand people from around the world, including Disney shareholders
and scuba divers, sent e-mail complaints to Disney’s board of directors to protest
against its decision to serve shark’s fin at HKDL. Under pressure, HKDL said it
served only that shark’s fin that came from “sustainable” shark fisheries; HKDL
added that it would still serve shark’s fin soup by request. Because HKDL
management said that the park’s decision to serve shark’s fin soup at wedding
banquets was to be “sensitive to the local cultures,” in late June 2005, more than
five hundred primary and secondary students drew up a petition against Disney’s
use of Chinese culture as a scapegoat for Disney’s decision in this regard, and the
students called for a boycott of HKDL until Disney dropped shark’s fin soup from
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the menu.51 On 24 June 2005, Disney announced its decision to abide by the
demands.52
Another case in point centers on Students and Scholars Against Corporate
Misbehavior (SACOM), which accused Disney of global outsourcing of
manufacturing to supplier factories in China, without “independent and
participatory monitoring and training mechanisms.”53 SACOM went on to argue
that the outsourcing had resulted in the maltreatment of Mainland workers and a
flouting of workers’ rights. A local NGO founded in June 2005, SACOM is a
variation of American human-rights groups and American labor groups that,
especially in the early 1990s, have exposed and protested sweatshop conditions
attributable to Nike and Gap, two major companies in the apparel industry;
SACOM’s activities are similar, also, to American college and university students’
anti-sweatshop movement, which took off after 1995. These students demanded
that “workers who make these goods be paid a living wage, no matter where in the
world industry operates.”54 On 18 August 2005, SACOM organized a press
conference and released a report named “Looking for Mickey Mouse’s Conscience:
A Survey of the Working Conditions of Disney’s Supplier Factories in China.” The
group studied four of Disney’s supplier factories in Shenzhen, Zhongshan and
Dongguan in July 2005 and found that workers in Disney’s supplier factories were
forced to work long hours, were paid below the minimum wage, and were denied
holiday pay, overtime, and maternity pay. Industrial accidents were common in
these sweatshops. For instance, crushed fingers were common injuries at Nord Race
Paper International Limited.55 The group stated that Disney’s “corporate social
responsibility” overlooked sweatshop conditions and that Disney’s self-monitoring
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system enabled factories to produce fake pay slips, fake time sheets, and fake
copies of contracts.
“Would the American people ever associate this book [Disney’s story book]
with crushed fingers?” asked Charles Kernaghan, the executive director of the
National Labor Committee. He posed the question in New York on 19 August 2005,
just twelve hours after Hong Kong SACOM’s anti-Disney-sweatshop press
conference. Collaborating with SACOM, the US group held a protest in front of a
Disney store on Fifth Avenue in Manhattan, with three activists dressing as Mickey
Mouse, Minnie Mouse, and Winnie the Pooh. Owing in large part to the SACOM
video documentary Those with Justice,56 which brought mainland workers’ voices
to the front stage of the campaign, the story became globalized and made headlines
in The International Herald Tribune,57 in The New York Times,58 on Fox News,59 on
BBC News,60 in The Washington Post,61 in Forbes Magazine,62 in The Guardian,63
and on CNN,64 among others.65 Disney swung into emergency-response mode and
pledged investigations. It responded by commissioning Verité [sic], a non-profit
social auditing and training organization that analyzed and built Gap’s extensive
system of factory monitoring. Verité issues the detailed annual Social
Responsibility Report about violations of labor rights in Gap’s supply chain and
how Verité handles violations. Verité’s objective is to investigate relevant claims
and to “take the appropriate actions to remediate violations found.”66 According to
SACOM, although a representative from the Disney Asia Pacific Region Corporate
Social Responsibility Department contacted SACOM, and although the two parties
met several times to discuss their views and concrete worker-based monitoring
systems, Disney refused to provide a public list of contractors and their addresses.
Disney also declined to provide a detailed report of Verité’s findings, but Disney
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revealed that two factory owners had refused to cooperate and that Disney had
subsequently stopped doing business with them.67 Verité helped the remaining
factories improve safety conditions, deliver training to workers, and set up a worker
helpline.
The partial success of these efforts to mitigate or to stop certain Disney
business practices reflects the convergence of two critical factors: consumption and
the expanding role of citizenship in consumer societies. Consumption may help big
business spread “the ideology of choiceoisie”68 in Probyn’s words: consumers may
believe that we can choose our lifestyle by consumption, but our consumption acts
maintain the status quo because we lose control over the provision of commodities.
Politicized consumption activities, however, extend civil activities from organized
resistance against the state to organized resistance against the marketplace. The
market gives consumer citizens some chances to say “no” to corporations whose
behavior clashes with their lifestyles and beliefs in justice, equity, and the
environment. According to Antony Giddens’ “politics of lifestyle,”69 we consumers
may turn our everyday private and mundane activities—our consumption—into
meaningful public acts to stimulate change in corporate policy, and, in Yúdice’s
words, we do so “to counter alienation in at least one sense: the separation of the
consumer from the rest of society.”70
Also critical is the strategy behind the successes of politicized consumption:
transnational protest and campaigns. Environmentalists’ victory in the shark-fin
issue is attributable to the threatening global protest targeting, of all things, Disney.
Supporting this protest was a host of green-group websites, e-mails, and blogs that
aimed to hit the company’s profits. Also of support were children, who threatened
to boycott the Disney market. By contrasting different consumer models of
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different countries, Yúdice argues that a country’s successful and influential
consumer movement needs to fulfill three objectives: first, the country needs to
institute affirmative action laws; second, the country’s culture should support and
promote the reproduction of political identity through consumption; and third,
markets should be extensive. For example, consider Yúdice’s comments:

… if Latinos can sue Disney World over “English Only” policies, and if
deaf people have sought recognition not as a handicapped minority but as an
autonomous culture, it is because there is an imbrication of politics and
culture that works through the terrain of state, media, and market that has
been internally structured, so to speak, in radically different ways than in
Brazil and, for that matter, other developed nations such as Britain, as is
evident in a comparative study of McDonald’s U.S. and McDonald’s U.K.
John Gabriel cites not only the existence of affirmative action laws in the
United States as a fundamental distinguishing feature, accounting for the
greater number of minority franchises than in Britain, but he also notes that
the size of minority communities cannot be overlooked when considering
the bottom line.71

Politicized consumerism alone could not successfully put sweatshops on to the
world political agenda. The catalyst was the White House’s initiation of the
Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP), which comprises apparel firms, several
nonprofit organizations, and various trade unions. The AIP released a set of
monitoring guidelines. Because of the strength of the anti-sweatshop movement
across the country,72 the AIP helped create the Fair Labor Association, which
agreed to try to improve working conditions worldwide to a certain extent.73 The
coalition among student unions, organized labor unions, human rights groups, and
institutional investors stimulated big companies to be socially and environmentally
responsible.74 In the case of Hong Kong, there are close ties between university
students and labor organizations, Christian and Catholic human rights
organizations,75 and women’s groups. However, since the Handover, the HKSAR
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government has removed laws to protect collective bargaining and anti-union
discrimination; organized and influential consumer leagues and institutional
investors are almost extinct species in Hong Kong.
In evaluating the success of the US-campus anti-sweatshop movement, an
anti-sweatshop student activist Rachel Paster commented that the success of the
movement was due to the moderate character of the student groups, or it would not
have gained vast support from so many students on the campuses:

One of the biggest reasons why USAS [United Students Against
Sweatshops] and local student groups opposing sweatshops have been as
successful as we have been is that opposition to sweatshops isn’t that
radical…. If we were a “radical” group, university administrations would
have brushed us off…. The fact that they don’t is a testament to the fact that
we have support, not just from students on the far left, but from students in
the middle ground who don’t consider themselves radicals. Without those
people we would never have gotten as far as we have.76

If the campus anti-sweatshop movement owes its success, in part, to the moderate
character of the movement, then perhaps we can infer why a confrontational Disney
Hunter failed to attract the vast support of local Hong Kong university students.
Given this possible explanation, we can examine Hong Kong culture more widely
in relation to politicized consumerism.
When the HKSAR government signed its contract with the Walt Disney
Company about the establishment of HKDL in 1999, scholars and activists
published a book called Disney Is Not a Happy Land (written in Chinese)77 arguing
against Disneyfication of the landscape and striving for alternatives. Concern was
raised, but no group or organized action objected to HKDL until mid-2005. Around
this time, university professors initiated a group, the Disney Concern Group, which
students then wholly organized. During April and June of 2005, the group delivered
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talks at different universities to raise students’ interests and critical views on
HKDL’s effects on Hong Kong. On 23 June 2005, eighty days before the opening
of HKDL, students concerned about Disney’s labor exploitation, environmental
vandalism, and cultural colonization formed the group Disney Hunter to monitor
Disneyland’s operation and to organize public-oriented educational campaigns
about the many facets of this transnational giant. As of this writing, the group
comprises about twenty students, and I am one of the members.78

Fig. 1: Disney Hunter
logo

In contrast to the US-campus anti-sweatshop movement, Hong Kong’s
Disney Hunter lacks mass support. To begin with, the group’s membership is small.
Its “resistant” image—its logo features a black silhouette of Mickey Mouse, with
the ears on fire and the silhouette drawn inside a gun’s sight (figure 1)—and its
adversarial stance toward Disney corporate policy politically, economically, and
culturally79 may explain the group’s lack of popular support. Starting in June 2005,
Disney Hunter undertook many activities to communicate their message to the
public: they held a press conference, conducted university and secondary school
talks, wrote articles for newspapers, participated in interviews held by the media,
participated in demonstrations, organized a public forum, joined the Hong Kong
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Confederation of Trade Unions to ask HKDL workers to establish a union, and
protested at the park entrance twice in 2005.
Although the group has kept on participating in newspaper interviews, radio
talks, and school talks, local public support remains limited, as is most evident,
again, from the group’s membership numbers. On the Disney Hunter internet forum,
web visitors argued against Disney Hunter’s criticism of HKDL management
practices. Believing in “professionalism” and free choice, some visitors argued that
the smile-ready culture and all its offshoots constitute not exploitation but
professionalism; laborers can quit the job if they do not like wearing heavy
character costumes and the like at HKDL.80 In our school and university tours,
when we argued that the private park discriminates against people of the lower
classes, students argued that a certain degree of material inequality provides
incentive for economic production. Regarding cultural issues such as gender
stereotypes, many audience members found the argument strange because they did
not find stereotypical images problematic. And not a few disagreed that Disney has
a gradually but extensively expanding influence over our subjectivity, on the
grounds that such concentrations of power are offset by the entertainment market’s
and the media market’s provision of extensive choices and “alternatives” to
consumers.
On 11 September 2005, Disney Hunter protested at the HKDL park entrance
and faced a violent response from HKDL security. The security guards used water
hoses to crush protestors. Disney Hunter members videotaped the whole process,
broadcasting the footage through the local independent media web publisher
Inmedia and sent video footage to TVB news, the most popular free TV station in
Hong Kong, but TVB did not broadcast the video footage,81 nor did it report HKDL
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securities’ violent acts. Many newspapers sent only photojournalists to cover the
story, but many of these left before HKDL management reacted to the student
demonstration violently. News media’s coverage of the demonstration was
negligible.

Sense and sensibility: contested feelings, compartmentalized acts
Among members of Disney Hunter, Susanna,82 Billy,83 and I have experienced
tension between our affection for certain Disney characters and our participation in
Disney Hunter. We criticize certain Disney practices but sometimes remain silent
on other issues, especially the cultural ones, because the multi-faceted, contested,
and contradictory nature of Disney offerings provides us comfort, identification,
and even empowerment at different times in our lives. That is, we like Disney, as
well as object to it.
We three are attracted to the extraordinary characteristics of the ordinary
characters: Belle in Beauty and the Beast, Winnie the Pooh, and Mickey Mouse.
Initially, it was Belle’s beauty—and her yellow gown—that attracted Susanna to
the character; but then she found that Belle differed from other Disney princesses:
that Belle was born an ordinary village girl but that she transformed into an
extraordinary queen because of her love, courage, learnedness, and innate
intelligence. As a middle-class hard-working girls-school student, Susanna
identified with and aspired to be like Belle. Susanna joined the Disney Concern
group, the precursor of Disney Hunter, because she both liked Disney and wanted
to know more about this company. It was out of curiosity, then, that Susanna joined
the group.
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Another member, Billy, has been in love with Mickey since he was about
five. Referring to the time when he was about eight or nine, Billy stated, “I read
some Mickey books, and Mickey has many roles. He’s a detective and a magician.
He’s knowledgeable. He’s a smart hero, but he’s not as exaggerated as superman,
not as aggressive or masculine. He’s ordinary but still a hero.” Mickey became
Billy’s “hero” and “friend” with whom Billy could identify. Billy joined Disney
Hunter out of curiosity and out of responsibility. As a Mickey lover, as Acting
Chairman of the Social Movement Resource Centre of the Hong Kong Federation
of Students, and as the City University Representative of the Management
Committee, Billy did not know how to position himself in facing both Disney as a
company and the establishment of HKDL when many members inside the Hong
Kong Federation of Students Resources Committee abhorred Disney. The Disney
Concern Group was to hold a public lecture in the City University of Hong Kong.
Billy, as a student union representative, considered it his responsibility to make
contact between the student union and university students. So he went to the talk
and participated in the first joint-school Disney Concern Group student meeting. In
his eyes, the first student meeting was chaotic because, perhaps, students were
unused to being organizers. Soon thereafter, he decided to participate in the group,
whose name had changed to Disney Hunter in June 2005.
As was the case with Susanna, I was attracted to Belle because she reads. To
me, Belle is like Jo in Little Women. Jo has fascinated me since I was about ten.
Another favorite, Winnie the Pooh, is a figure with which I identify in order to
resist contemporary lifestyles that promote specific brands of efficiency and of
competitiveness; Piglet, Pooh’s friend in Disney’s The Many Adventures of Winnie
the Pooh, is tiny in size and timid in personality but the cleverest of all when it
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comes to solving problems in the Hundred Acre Wood. Pooh and Piglet are my and
my husband’s companions, with whom we play and talk everyday, and through
whom we develop our intimate selves and our relationship with each other. I joined
Disney Hunter in August 2005, but before the group established itself, a member of
the Disney Concern Group invited me to give an HKDL-themed talk in April 2005
to her group members.
Because of our love of particular Disney characters or Disney movies,
conflicts are an inevitable outcome of our anti-Disney acts. Both Susanna and Billy
are active members in Disney Hunter. Susanna explicitly articulated her struggle in
our anti-Disney action:

I like Disney things, though I don’t consider myself a Disney fan. I think I
really like Disney products…. I can’t imagine myself hating Disney because
I consume so much Disney merchandise. Actually, I can’t accept seeing
myself pitted against Disney. Whenever we have direct confrontations, I get
all wound up inside and feel conflicted.

To lessen his contested feelings, Billy told Disney Hunter members and the press
clearly that what he resisted was the Disney Company, not the Mouse. Declaring
that Mickey Mouse had done no wrong, Billy swore that he would not allow Disney
Hunter to smear Mickey’s image.84 My own participation in Disney Hunter hinges
on my research efforts and my related public presentations. My presentations on
behalf of Disney Hunter focused on Disney’s global media domination, HKDL’s
unequal deal with the HKSAR government, and HKDL’s simultaneous use of
public money and refusal to disclose its financial accounts. I did not focus on
Disney’s homogenizing effect on people’s, especially children’s ideas of imaginary
and real worlds.
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We three have not only affection for certain Disney characters but also a
great deal of Disney merchandise. After joining the group, we changed our
consumption practices regarding Disney merchandise. Although Susanna felt happy
whenever she wore clothes featuring her favorite Disney characters, she stopped
buying Disney merchandise; after learning from the press that Disney might sue
Disney Hunter for infringement of intellectual property rights, Susanna became
increasingly hostile to things related to Disney and she stopped using her Disney
stationery and stopped wearing Disney clothes. Although Billy’s affection for
Mickey Mouse has not diminished, he hesitates to buy Mickey merchandise
because he is afraid that its existence owes much to exploited Chinese labor. I try
my best to buy neither Pooh dolls nor Piglet dolls, but recently, some well-made
dolls tempted me, and, after joining Disney Hunter, I bought one Pooh doll in Japan,
wishing that my purchase might not be a sweatshop product.
If this kind of tension and compartmentalization characterizes Disney
Hunter members, it is not surprising to see much of the Hong Kong public similarly
compartmentalize their responses, sometimes criticizing HKDL’s various policies
and sometimes defending Disney. That is, at times, the Hong Kong public plays the
role of citizen, critical of unjust practices; at other times, the Hong Kong public
plays the role of consumer, desirous of attractive goods and pleasing services.
Although Disney may not be as innocent as the public thought in the past, a survey
by John Ap shows that the respondents criticized certain HKDL management
practices but kept on visiting the park.85 Ap conducted a phone survey of 524
residents between 13 and 16 March 2006. The survey shows that 70% of
respondents held impressions of HKDL that had turned more negative and that 63%
thought that the park’s benefits outweighed its costs, down thirteen points from
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2004. Only 27% of respondents agreed that the Disney-HKSAR government
HKDL deal was fair, almost half (47%) disagreed with the assertion that Disney is
a socially responsible company, 93% agreed that HKDL should be accountable to
the Hong Kong public for the publicly funded project in question, and—in
contrast—86% supported HKDL’s further development, the highest support for this
question among related surveys since 2000. Finally, approximately one-third (31%)
of these respondents, with all their criticisms and disappointments, had already
visited the park.
This issue of compartmentalization is critical and merits more attention here.
HKDL’s performance in its early days further illustrates the Hong Kong public’s
self-compartmentalization insofar as the public criticized HKDL’s poor public
image and then, gently placing their dissatisfaction to the side, visited the park.
Although people’s impression of HKDL grew increasingly negative, over one
million people, 14,000 people a day on average, visited HKDL between 12
September and 27 November 2005, seventy-seven days after HKDL’s official
opening.86 With all the allegations concerning, for instance, chaotic management
and even Americanism (see chapter Six), Hong Kong people constituted a relative
majority of the patrons: the projection was that they would account for 40% of
patrons, but in fact, they accounted for 49%; only 26% were from the Mainland,87
far below the projected 44%.
My middle-class-parent respondents’ expression of their consumer identity
differed from their expression of their citizen identity. Of five mothers whom I
interviewed, two simply considered themselves consumers and declared that they
have what Bauman calls “right to enjoy, not a duty to suffer.”88 Their decision
about whether or not they should visit HKDL rested on a cost-benefit happiness
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analysis instead of on an ethics deliberation concerning, for example, HKDL’s
practice of Americanism.89 Cathy, who enjoyed her Anaheim Disneyland and
Disneyland Paris trip in the past (see chapter Four), said that she, as a consumer,
cared only about the effect that a day inside the park would have on her happiness.
If she experienced unhappiness in the park, she would not go there again; but if she
felt happy in the park, she would visit again even if the park management was
arrogant and disobeyed local laws. Ada, another mother who had little interest in
visiting the theme park but who had enjoyed her Tokyo Disneyland trip because her
daughter had been happy on the trip, said that the negative HKDL image has some
influence on her interest in visiting the park, but because her child’s many
classmates had already gone to HKDL, for her child’s sake, she visited the park.
Lisa, who tried best to struggle against the Disney consumer products but who used
Disney’s World of English in teaching her two daughters English, shifted between
her role as consumer and her role as citizen according to the topic at hand. She
criticized the park’s management practices (commenting that, by asking journalists
to conduct an interview in the rain, the management had exhibited its arrogance).
However, Lisa also recounted the story in which she, as a consumer, had joyfully
experienced the park during her first visit to HKDL around Christmas 2005:

It [the HKDL visit] was a happy trip. Very happy. We saw Buzz. He’s
funny. We played Buzz Lightyear Astro Blasters twice. This was my first
time [visiting Disney park]. We were so happy. Very happy. We were really
very happy. Even adults were very happy. I was most happy to see the
Parade. It’s like every character walks right in front of you. We were so
happy that once my daughter waved her hands at Chip and Dale, and they
waved back. Very happy….
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In briefly recounting her HKDL experiences, Lisa used the word ‘happy’ nine times,
and of all the features in the park, Disney characters most appealed to her. Again as
a consumer, Lisa commented that the park was worth the price of admission. In our
casual talk in September 2006, she said that she and her husband planned to visit
HKDL again in the coming Christmas in 2006 because she had missed some shows
the last time. When I asked her whether or not she would support HKDL’s further
development if the HKSAR government, as the biggest shareholder, needed to
invest in the park again, Lisa quickly shifted from her role as consumer to her role
as Hong Kong citizen, declaring “no” and explaining that a government should not
pour money into a private corporation. On this topic, she and I had the following
conversation:

Lisa: My husband and I agree that, if the government needs to shell out
money again, the government should invest in Ocean Park. As for HKDL,
the management is so bad. Since Ocean Park is not supported by a big
corporation and its conservation philosophy is good, we agreed that the
government should support Ocean Park. But HKDL belongs to Disney and
Disney is a corporation, and of course, we should not support a corporation
by drawing from the public coffers.
Kim: But many people have said that if we don’t further develop HKDL, the
coming Shanghai Disneyland may surmount HKDL and HKDL may need to
close.
Lisa: But we can’t just keep on investing in a private company only because
HKDL can’t compete with others. If that’s the case, HKDL should fold up.
And it [HKDL] is not the only thing that makes Hong Kong attractive.

Lisa’s consumer-to-citizen shift is evident in the above passage. As
consumers and as citizens, the remaining two mothers brought the roles together,
but the mothers differed from each other regarding their comments and their actions.
Judy, the left-wing feminist mother, politicized her consumption practices by
boycotting HKDL. In this way, she expressed her anti-Disney attitude. As was the
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case with Lisa, Judy disagreed with the government’s further investment in the
park’s further development. Betty, a Disney fan, was not enthusiastic about HKDL
from the outset (see chapter Four), and she was dissatisfied with HKDL’s
highhanded and chaotic management. However, she visited the park twice during
HKDL’s first year in operation. Although Betty was not excited about her HDKL
trips, she said that she would definitely visit HKDL because she is a Hong Kong
person. HKDL is a joint venture between the HKSAR government and Disney, and
HKDL represents Hong Kong; its failure would suggest Hong Kong’s failure. To
her, HKDL had already settled in Hong Kong, so that the souring image of Disney,
the boycott of Disney merchandise, and low attendance at HKDL would only bring
harm instead of benefits to Hong Kong society. To express her love of Hong Kong,
Betty chose to visit HKDL.
As a result, of the five middle-class families that I studied in relation to their
family consumption of Disney products, two families had already visited HKDL
twice within the first year of the park’s September 2005 opening; one family had
visited the park during Christmas 2005 and was already planning to stay in one
HKDL hotel for two nights during Christmas vacation in 2006; one family had not
visited the park but also was planning to visit HKDL and to stay in a HKDL hotel
for a night during the 2006 Christmas; only one family (that of Judy) had never
visited and had no plans to visit HKDL.
Because of the organized threat of a global boycott and because of
shareholders’ pressure, HKDL shifted its policy, both declaring that the park would
not serve shark’s fin soup and pledging to investigate the China supply chains.
Participants in the green movement and others see themselves as responsible
consumers and see consumption as not just an activity expressing individual rights
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but an ethical and civil responsibility to the environment, to society, and to
justice.90 Nevertheless, three critical sources of evidence—my discussions with
Susanna and Billy, my own internal struggles over Disney, and my parentrespondents’ different reasons for visiting HKDL—show that our consumption
activities regarding HKDL can equally well be grounded in individual expressions
of identity (i.e., our civil and our consumer identities), in our emotions over Disney
characters, or in communal expressions of identity (involving the development of
family and group bonds).91 Consumer interests are neither coherent nor unified.92
Hong Kong people may criticize Disney’s highhanded and non-transparent
management practices and its smallness and lack of rides, but for reasons ranging
from self gratification to children’s instant enjoyment to the Hong Kong-Disney
link, many people do not want to see HKDL record low attendance and many
people, in spite of their qualms, keep on visiting HKDL.

Mass consumption, enjoyment, disruption, and disillusionment
Not many Hong Kong people politicize their consumption practices and oppose
Disney by boycotting HKDL for its ecological damage, its labor exploitation, its
non-transparent accounts, or its highhanded practices. However, this absence of
politicized opposition does not mean that HKDL visitors either passively submit to
the Disneyland landscape or actively conform to Disney management wishes.
Disney and Disneyland sell not just rides but also—in the abstract sense of
fantasy—good times, communal experiences of togetherness, inter-generational
bonding, consumer value, spectacle, and pleasure of the product. To create a clean,
orderly, beautiful, safe, fun, and perfect fantasyland, Disneyland needs patrons’
cooperation. Patrons need to follow Disney’s moral regulations—to queue up and
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wait in line in an orderly and peaceful way, to follow ride instructions, to smile
back, and to interact with such strangers as cast members, to refrain from smoking
except in a designated area, to stay clear of cast members’ areas: in short, to respect
and adhere to the organized and rationalized processes of fun consumption and to
the spatial practices provided and controlled by the park. In return, patrons can find
release from everyday life tension inside the organized and controlled park. As Eco
argues:

An allegory of the consumer society … Disneyland is also a place of total
passivity. Its visitors must agree to behave like its robots. Access to each
attraction is regulated by a maze of metal railings which discourages any
individual initiative. The number of visitors obviously sets the pace of the
line; the officials of the dream, properly dressed in the uniforms suited to
each specific attraction, not only admit the visitor to the threshold of the
chosen sector, but, in successive phases, regulate his every move (“Now
wait here please, go up now, sit down please, wait before standing up,”
always in a polite tone, impersonal, imperious, over the microphone). If the
visitor pays this price, he can have not only “the real thing” but the
abundance of the reconstructed truth.93

Alan Bryman argues that behind all these controls and regulations is
Disneyization’s heart: the enhancement of consumption.94 Disneyland’s site design
asks visitors to immerse themselves in the park’s total themed narrative, wherein
work cedes place to a merger between entertainment and consumption activities.
The instructions are simple: treat consumption as fun and have fun—that is,
consume.
For different reasons, Hong Kong people have indeed visited HKDL. But if
one of HKDL’s design aims is to squeeze money from patrons’ pockets, local
patrons also invent ways to consume Disney fantasy without paying. To ensure
consumption of Disney food and beverages, the park does not allow patrons to
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bring in food; nevertheless, patrons bring empty bottles to the park and then fill
them up with free drinking water. In most rollercoaster rides, Disney Imagineers
have installed cameras that capture visitors’ enjoyment of the ride. These images
are purchasable, bringing HKDL considerable profits; yet again, local visitors
sidestep the expense, this time by using their own cameras to capture the monitor
image—for free. The money-saving strategies can be ingeniously simple: parents
place their children next to a balloon seller and then photograph the posed group so
that the family, having purchased not one single balloon, will have a photo of the
balloon-framed children.
Inside the Disney stores, many people buy Disney merchandise, but many
do not. Many treat HKDL’s stores as a playground. Without buying anything, some
children play with and touch almost all the displayed toys and dolls before their
parents insist that they leave; adult visitors, as do child consumers, hold the dolls,
wear the characters’ wigs, smile, and take photos. During the summer, because of
the scorching heat and the humid weather and HKDL’s lack of shaded areas, many
children and adult visitors stay more than thirty minutes in air-conditioned stores to
browse and to touch merchandise without buying. “Serious” consumers may not
buy merchandise because of these window-shopping consumers. Several times, I
witnessed consumers give up buying their favorite soft doll because they saw
sweaty children holding it tightly and posing for photos with it. These children used
the doll, itself, to wipe off their sweat. The “serious” consumers asked staff to give
them a new doll from the storeroom, but all the toys and the dolls were on display;
in the end, the would-be consumers purchased nothing.
Casual consumers like to play, to touch, and to try on the Disney
merchandise without paying, whereas sophisticated and serious consumers do not
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feel interested in shopping at the HKDL shopping mall because of the ordinary
quality of the merchandise. Two of my respondents, Agnes95 and Katie,96 who were
fans of Disney characters, who would bid on limited-edition Disney merchandise
on the net, and who regularly visited Tokyo Disneyland (TDL) as a shopping
destination commented that HKDL’s merchandise is ordinary in terms of design
and quality. The costlier, higher-quality Disney merchandise that HKDL sold—
merchandise such as Swarovski Disney jewelry—was not designed and sold
exclusively for HKDL. But shoppers can shop for particular Lenox or Wedgwood
handmade Disney china-bone tableware only at Orlando’s Walt Disney World or
can shop for Seiko watches only at TDL, for example. The ordinary design and the
ordinary quality of HKDL merchandise, according to my respondents, lacked
“sincerity.”
HKDL faces problems not only in luring consumers to consume as much as
possible but also in maintaining HKDL’s orderliness and cleanliness, the signature
of Disneyland, especially during the early days after the park opened. By
comparing Disneyland and the Centre Georges Pompidou, Baudrillard argues that
the Pompidou center’s transparent structure (of displaying air conditioning ducts,
water pipes, and electricity lines, for example) suggests the dream of
democratization of culture—a transparent structure. When it opened in 1977, the
public structure incited the fervent masses to flock in and to consume the mass
culture on display. Baudrillard sees visitors’ passionate behavior as a sign of their
actual desire to destroy the building and as, in fact, a cultural death:

The masses rush toward Beaubourg as they rush toward disaster sites, with
the same irresistible elan. Better: they are the disaster of Beaubourg. Their
number, their stampede, their fascination, their itch to see everything is
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objectively a deadly and catastrophic behavior for the whole undertaking.
Not only does their weight put the building in danger, but their adhesion,
their curiosity annihilates the very contents of this culture of animation. This
rush can no longer be measured against what was proposed as the cultural
objective, it is its radical negation, in both its excess and success. It is thus
the masses who assume the role of catastrophic agent in this structure of
catastrophe.97

In the early days after the opening, HKDL also found the public’s passionate
welcome threatening, if not fatal, to the orderly but mass entertainment
environment in which zealous visitors fancy all things Disney. Before the park
opened, the HKDL management taught staff ways in which they could ask patrons
to smoke in a designated area and to avoid squatting when using the restroom
facilities. However, the staff then realized that Mainland patrons urinate not in
toilets but in basins or even in lakes. The patrons do this when the park is jampacked because they want to avoid squandering their precious time—they want to
play every HKDL attraction possible—and because they do not care to urinate in
public restrooms. Once, one of my HKDL staff respondents was riding the boat for
the ride Jungle Ride Cruise, and she saw a Mainland child urinating at the end of
the boat. In this way, the child succeeded in attending to bodily functions and in
seeing the sites—simultaneously. In Baudrillard’s words, “The consumerist man is
haunted by the fear of ‘missing’ something, some form of enjoyment or other.”98
Another HKDL staff respondent commented that the destructive power of Mainland
patrons is so great that they would love to touch and examine every decor, but that
the act of touching fades the painted surface. Another prominent example is the
Lunar Year chaos that took place between 1 and 3 February 2006. The angry
Mainland ticket holders brawled outside the park, rocked the main gates, climbed
over the high fences, and helped children over them. As was the case during the
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early days of the Pompidou center, consumers’ enthusiasm for consuming
everything Disney, the mass culture of Disney, turns into an all-out assault on the
supposedly fun-filled fantasyland.
Because some local and Mainland guests aim at playing all HKDL
attractions within the one-day time limit, queue jumping becomes a necessary trick
for them. If crowd control is supposedly famous in Disneyland, then HKDL’s
queue jumping undoubtedly does Disney management a disservice. Queue jumping
is usual in HKDL. Every time I visited HKDL, I observed visitors (adult
Mainlanders or Mainland children without accompanying adults) jumping queues.
Hong Kong patrons, however, were no better, but they broke the rules cunningly.
One or two patrons enter a queue on behalf of a large group of patrons who are
elsewhere in the park; then, the remaining members of the group suddenly appear at
that point in the queue and quibble with other patrons who are behind them in the
queue that no park rule prohibits the use of queue representatives: that is, no park
rule prohibits one or two people from holding an advanced place in a queue for a
large group of people who are enjoying rides elsewhere. Staying in the park as long
as possible is an option for patrons who do not jump the queue but who want to
play as many attractions as possible. After nearly twenty dry runs, HKDL
management found that Hong Kong visitors spend 9.3 to 9.4 hours at the park on
average, and more than 90% of the visitors remain until 9 p.m. to see the fireworks
displays. This figure is 30% greater than corresponding figures at Disney’s other
theme parks.99 Hong Kong visitors also stay longer in restaurants than Americans
do, and some occupy a table for a whole day, using it as a base camp where they
can periodically rest. Long queues form in both attractions and restaurants.

354

Clashes between HKDL’s scientific management practices and HKDL
consumers’ unscientific and sometimes uncontrollable acts result in tremendously
long queues and in ride suspensions. Under its scientific management, HKDL, just
like other Disney parks, emphasizes the hourly operational ride capacity to ensure
efficiency and standards. For attractions labeled as “E” ticket rides100 such as Space
Mountain and The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh, workers need to handle
two thousand visitors an hour. The management controls not only the duration of
each ride but also the period of loading and uploading. And patrons also need to get
on and get off the ride within a certain period. However, HKDL visitors do not
allow such scientific management practices to govern their ordinary ways of
consumption. As Hong Kong people like to take pictures, visitors may snap one or
two before getting off a ride, and this action slows the disembarkation past the
allotted period of time set for the computerized ride; consequently, the ride is
automatically suspended.101 In short, the scenario is thus: during the ride, patrons
get out of their barricaded seats to take pictures, the breach automatically halts the
ride, and the computer system requires a reboot that further elongates the period of
suspension. Local visitors’ long stay and their enjoyment in photographing every
object for posterity both clash with HKDL’s scientific management and result in
long queues and in ride suspensions.
When all is said and done, Disneyland sells happiness. While the HKDL
website promises visitors that the park is “the happiest kingdom of them all,”102
visitors’ disappointments over crowdedness, queue jumping, and seating disputes
are typical emotions that interweave with visitors’ joyful encounters with Disney
characters. One hot spot is the fairytale castle during the “Disney in the Stars”
Fireworks, because patrons used to sit on the floor to look at the firework display,
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the laser performance, and Disney character projections on the wall of the Sleeping
Beauty Castle altogether, but some might stand up and obstruct others’ view. The
hot-blooded patrons demand that the standing patrons sit down, and the standing
patrons refuse to do so, and then a fight breaks out. Brawls also take place during
“Disney on Parade” where floats, dancers, and costumed performers offer
extravaganzas and excellent photo and video opportunities; zealous patrons jump
the queue to fight for and to occupy better positions, and assaults ensue. On my
numerous visits to the park, I observed that passionate mass consumption
threatened to put an end to many patrons’ desire to journey through Disneyland. For
instance, people initially lined up properly for the musical Festival of the Lion King,
but when more than two hundred people wound up having to wait outside the
official line for the musical, enchanted visitors turned into restive visitors. Once
operators started to let the disgruntled visitors enter the theater, I heard some Hong
Kong twenty-something visitors saying, “Let’s squeeze in!” They then squeezed
through the dense crowd to enter the theater as fast as possible and to get seats with
better views. I got increasingly frightened while, for more than ten minutes, people
pushed and plunged into the hut-like theater. And at the firework displays, I was
one of the many spectators who were booing a pair of lovers blocking our view.
Because certain visitors conduct themselves—or “perform”—in an
improper way, the park is the site of frequent frustration, verbal disputes, and even
physical assaults. My HKDL staff respondents said that there is at least one fight
inside HKDL every day and that, between January and September 2006, eighty-two
fights involving the police had broken out inside the park.103 Quarrels and fights
not only undermine the park’s cheerful and relaxed atmosphere and visitors’ happy
journey, but also can cause delays and even suspensions of park rides and shows.
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For example, newspapers widely reported a fight that broke out over seating
disputes and that led to the delay and the shortening of the live show when families
were celebrating the Mid-Autumn Festival inside HKDL.104
To complicate the situation further, these conflicts and fights often take
place between locals and Mainlanders. Locals lament Mainlanders’ lack of
etiquette—smoking wherever they like, spitting, littering, talking loudly in public,
queue jumping, and so on. My visits informed me, however, that both Mainlanders
and locals perform queue jumping, compete for desirable seats, and speak loudly: at
the same time, I also met some friendly Mainland and Hong Kong visitors with
whom I had pleasant chats. I even witnessed a Mainland lady cleaning up a sink
after she had used it as a toilet. In fact, all my HKDL staff respondents said that
they found Hong Kong people more difficult to serve than Mainlanders because
Hong Kong people would criticize everything; they always broke regulations (such
as queue jumping) but quibbled that their vexatious conduct was proper. Some
respondents even said that Mainland visitors were “more lovely” than Hong Kong
visitors because the former immersed themselves in the Disneyland environment
and listened to cast members’ spiels and even took cast members’ advice. Facing so
many visitors every day, most of my HKDL staff respondents said that they had
changed their essentialist views on Mainlanders and on Hong Kong people,
learning that Mainlanders can be considerate and Hong Kong people can be
unimaginably unreasonable and troublesome. Because there are so many different
personalities and characteristics within any one cultural group, the common Hong
Kong way of thinking about Hong Kong-Mainland cultural differences and about
Hong Kong cultural superiority is a naïve one.
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My HKDL staff respondents explained to me that Hong Kong people and
Mainlanders may simply have different ideas on the proper way of lining up.
Because the width between railings must be wide enough for a wheelchair to pass
through, there is always space between people in the line. Whenever there is certain
amount of space, some Mainland visitors will occupy that space, and because they
do not push other visitors, they do not consider the act to be “jumping queue.”
Many Mainlanders stop (although sometimes grudgingly) occupying these spaces
whenever workers clarify the rules about these spaces. But the workers must, first
of all, catch the attention of the Mainlanders, speak audibly, and use the Putonghua
accent, which gives the Mainlanders a sense of zamen, meaning “we.” Conflicts
always occur between Hong Kong and Mainland visitors because Hong Kong
people speak in an exceptionally loud voice to express their hostile attitudes, and
Mainlanders may not understand Putonghua spoken in a Hong Kong accent.
Tensions rise when the Hong Kong people keep on criticizing Mainlanders but fail
to realize that the criticized party may not understand the criticizing party’s
Putonghua; moreover, Mainland visitors sometimes feel that the residents of Hong
Kong are discriminating against the Mainlanders as outsiders. Once I witnessed a
quarrel between a Hong Kong visitor and a Mainland visitor. In a loud voice and in
his Hong Kong-style Putonghua, the Hong Kong visitor accused the Mainlander of
having jumped the queue. In response, the Mainland visitor yelled back and finally
exclaimed, “You think that you’re different from us because of your brief colonial
history, you stupid Hong Kong people!”
Although both Mainland visitors and Hong Kong visitors break the rules
(though somewhat differently, in general), it is typically the Mainlanders whom
Hong Kong media blame when singling out problematic HKDL visitors. Whenever
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the topic “Disneyland” comes up in my casual talks with my local friends who do
not work inside HKDL, the subject of Mainlanders automatically comes up, as well:
the talk strays onto the subjects of Mainlanders’ loud talking, of Mainlanders’
queue jumping, and of Hong Kong people’s strategies for escaping from Mainland
tourists at the park (i.e., entering the park not in the morning but after lunch because
Mainland visitors always visit the park early but leave the park around 3 or 4 p.m.).
In fact, these interlocutors often caution me not to visit the park during the peak
season (because the news reported that some Mainland thieves had bought HKDL
summer passes and had then stolen visitors’ wallets inside the park105). Most Hong
Kong-centered conversations about Mainlanders in the park reaffirm the
Hongkonger identity as “Chineseness plus” (etiquette) or as “Chineseness minus”
(infractions) and mark the difference between the two parties, whether or not the
discrimination is accurate. Hong Kong people appropriate “cultural differences” in
order to legitimize Hong Kong people’s discriminatory attitudes and acts.
Disneyland’s park design is supposedly a “continuous reproduction of a ‘happy
present’,”106 a placeless hyper-real fantasy environment offering everything
timelessly better and brighter, helping visitors “escape their unnatural present day
cares, ‘drop their defenses,’ and ‘become more like themselves’,”107 and “nurture a
better human nature.” By fortifying boundaries of cultural particularity, patrons’
behaviors in HKDL—laden with real cultural and ethnic supremacist thinking,
misunderstanding, prejudice, and tension—inject into HKDL a Hong Kong-specific
anxiety.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I describe several types of resistant acts at HKDL, from formal
labor-union negotiations and consumer politics (a global boycott) to informal
mundane everyday work (taking sick leave, replacing smiling faces with sullen
ones, changing and shortening scripts) and consumer practices (play-but-nopurchase, disruptive play leading to mechanical breakdowns, confrontational
behavior sapping environments of their happiness). In the concluding section, I
would like to review first, the incongruity between formal resistance politics and
popular sentiments and, second, the political connotations of these acts.
The lack of labor support and of public support for the HKDLCMU and for
Disney Hunter, as shown by the two organizations’ small membership size,
illustrates the limitation of existing local formal politics in addressing the
ambivalent attitude of HKDL workers and of Hong Kong people in general toward
HKDL. Moreover, this lack demonstrates the entwined relationship between the
Hong Kong people and HKDL in relation to their livelihood and their popular
pleasures. The HKDLCMU may wish to position itself not as a party whose chief
function is to resist Disney management but as a labor union whose chief function
is to negotiate with the management for the improvement of laborers’ working
conditions via union-company negotiation. However, the composition of the
union’s membership (only junior-grade staffers) together with the media portrayal
of the union as a confrontational party have colored many HKDL workers’
perceptions of the union. Moreover, most of these workers have neither a good
understanding of the labor union nor easy access to the union. In the end, the
workers view the union as an organization that either opposes whatever acts the
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management implements or as a promoter of vexatious workers’ unreasonable
demands.
Disney Hunter situates itself as the counter-culture in the “bipolar logic of
resistance,”108 in Tony Bennett’s words, and criticizes Disney’s labor exploitation,
environmental vandalism, and cultural domination and colonization in the globe.
By holding an alternative truth, we, the university students and teachers with better
access to information, presume to know better and clearer than the public of the
destructive Disney effects on selves and on society. The varied ways in which
Disney Hunter resists—through school presentations, public forums, street drama—
demonstrate the limitations that impose themselves on the group’s general notion of
resistance. Implicitly assuming a dichotomous model of truth versus false
consciousness, we, the Disney Hunter members, need to educate them, the public,
to confront critically their “commonsense,” and we need to help them to construct
critical consciousness by which they might resist Disney’s political, economic, and
cultural power. The total-resistance approach fails to receive collective support
from Hong Kong people who, for the most part, find popular culture liberating
instead of dominating. Also, the total-resistance approach fails to acknowledge
consumers’ active interpretation of and active appropriation of Disney offerings,
regardless of whether the offerings are movies, merchandise, or theme parks. Users’
appropriations of Disney offerings are often a contingent result of the interplay
among multiple sets of power networks—and rarely of non-contingent brainnumbing consumption. It is not surprising to see the public, including the HKDL
workers, feel skeptical about Disney Hunter’s defensive sermons and annoyed by
its allegations over Disney power.
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Michel de Certeau’s idea of tactics provides another way to account for
people’s everyday creative efforts to adapt the external world “to their own interests
and their own rules”109 when “individuals [are] already caught in the nets of
‘discipline’” (p. xv). To develop his idea of tactics, de Certeau contrasts it with
another idea, “strategy,” which refers to administrative projects and systems based
on “political, economic, and scientific rationality” (p. xvi). Strategies are able to
“produce” and “tabulate” places (p. 30) because places are the property of
institutional power (p. 36). Tactics, in contrast, occur fleetingly in time, and not in
place. In de Certeau’s words:

I call a “tactic,” … a calculus which cannot count on a “proper” (a spatial or
institutional localization)…. The place of a tactic belongs to the other. A
tactic insinuates itself into the other’s place, fragmentarily, without taking it
over in its entirety, without being able to keep it at a distance…. The
“proper” is a victory of space over time. On the contrary, because it does not
have a place, a tactic depends on time—it is always on the watch for
opportunities that must be seized “on the wing.” Whatever it wins, it does
not keep. It must constantly manipulate events in order to turn them into
“opportunities.” (p. xix)

To illustrate the idea of tactics, de Certeau provides us ample examples that range
from talking and reading to shopping, cooking, and walking. When we read, we
turn reading into a silent production where we interpret and improvise meanings;
when we cannot own a home owing to structural and institutional constraints, we
rent an apartment that we furnish so that it reflects our goals and our memories (p.
xxi). In a similar string of thought, HKDL’s size, attractions, and spatial design
derive from the Walt Disney Company’s “strategic” plans, not from any notable
participation of either the HKSAR government or the public;110 the aims, the values,
the workers’ behavior, and the scientific operating procedures all reflect
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“standards” set by the HKDL management; visitors’ behavior is also under
surveillance, and only certain “proper” types of behavior—of performance—are
allowed. Disney created HKDL and imposed its own standards on HKDL by
relying on structural and institutional domination. HKDL workers and consumers,
however, appropriate their model of permissible behavior and convert it in time into
behavior that resists the dominant-subordinate relationship in time. In Japan, lowerranking female office workers recognize their poor job prospects and use kawaii to
justify or to inform their slouching on the job—or simply to face these less-thandesirable prospects;111 at HKDL, some workers in a similar situation use
characteristically immature and irresponsible behavior to face their poor job
prospects and to circumvent HKDL standards: unjustified sick leaves, moody
interactions with visitors, abbreviated scripts and spiels, and grievance-laden scripts
and spiels.
As consumers, we consume, which is most important to corporations, but
we also appropriate the structural domination through play and creative
interventions: we take photos, jump queues, and engage in play-but-not-purchase
behavior. Through consumption practices, we simultaneously confirm and disrupt
the system’s smooth operation.112 These consumption practices aim not at rejecting
and transforming113 but at hijacking and disrupting the existing dominant system
guaranteed by Disney’s spatial, structural, and institutional control. Disney trades in
signs, but consumption practices re-signify Disneyland’s meaning through
improvisation and disruption.
Mass passionate consumption does not always construct passive subjects
who obey the park’s controlled representation of space; some zealous consumers’
uptake can be destructive in breaking the fantasyland’s magic spell; likewise,
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consumption tactics are not always celebratory. To get their way in a number of
regards, visitors use a number of tactics inside HKDL: visitors jump queues to play
all the HKDL attractions within the one-day time limit, and Hong Kong visitors use
“cultural difference” both to escape from Mainland visitors inside the park and to
legitimize Hong Kong people’s discriminatory attitudes and acts. These tactics “are
not intelligibly described as resistive,” in Tony Bennett’s words.114
De Certeau reminds us also that the populist approach of tactics operates
fleetingly and has little effect on structural and institutional change. In the case of
HKDL, the visitors’ tactics seem to have little effect on Disney’s spatial, structural,
and institutional control. After all, HKDL visitors purchase the tickets, purchase the
park’s food and drink (one HKDL rule is that visitors cannot bring “food, alcoholic
beverages, and beverages in cans or bottles” into the park115), and sometimes
purchase the park’s merchandise. If Hong Kong residents argue that the HKSAR
government-Disney deal regarding HKDL is unfair and non-transparent, and if the
residents criticize certain HKDL management practices (including environmental
damage, the non-accountability of a publicly funded project, labor exploitation) but
keep on visiting HKDL as shown in Ap’s 2006 survey (p. 354), and if HKDL can
maximize its bottom line, HKDL management has no need to change its strategy.
Organized workers’ tactics, however, may have some effects on the
corporation-worker relationship, and sometimes these tactics could change certain
Disney-management policies. On 10 April 2006, some HKDL character performers,
with the help of the labor union, staged a press conference where they railed against
the working conditions and they demanded a pay raise. Moreover, eighty of the one
hundred and twenty character performers responsible for the daily parade and the
meet-and-greet visitors’ sessions had signed a petition demanding that their pay and
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the pay for character performers hired for the live stage show be equitable.116 In late
April, some HKDL character performers told journalists that they were considering
hijacking a daily costumed parade with banners to demand higher pay.117 In June
2006, HKDL raised character performers’ salaries from HK$9,000 to $10,000 and
extended the breaks between performances during the summer months.118 Because
of HKDL character performers’ organized threat of disrupting the park parade,
HKDL management changed certain management policies. This incident signaled a
dynamic power relation between HKDL management and HKDL frontline workers,
although there was no structural or institutional change of the power relation
between workers and management, and although workers’ tactics and criticisms
regarding long working hours, occupational hazards, and insufficient compensation
have not changed the HKSAR government’s labor laws.
In the absence of profound structural and institutional changes, we should
not lose sight of the fact that the interactions between Disney and Hong Kong
people (whether they are journalists, workers, or consumers) produce and
complicate the images and the meanings of “Disney.” Through journalists’ articles,
activists’ calls, workers’ on-the-job behavior, and visitors’ consumption behavior,
local actors have multiplied, expanded, and complicated the meanings of
‘HKDL’—meanings that range from “the unfair American corporation-HKSAR
government deal” and “the non-transparent, non-accountable, and sometimes
exploitative park-management practices” to “the small, chaotic, and insufficient
attractions and sophisticated merchandise at HKDL.” As argued by Doreen Massey,
there is “mutual interaction” between local forces and wider processes.119 Local
actors’ quotidian acts in HKDL may affect the wider process of Disney expansion.
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The production and the circulation of multiple meanings of “Disney” condition the
future Disneyland development in Hong Kong.
In May 2007, in reporting results for the second-quarter revenues of 2007,
Disney said that its parks-and-resorts division had an operating income of US$254
million, up 19% from the previous year. However, Disney also said that the
increases were partially offset by a decline at HKDL during the second quarter,
which ended 31 March 2007: “Hong Kong Disneyland recognizes the attendance
and guest spending have fallen short of initial expectations.”120 Besides, the
California-based Disney said in a filing with the US securities regulator that “Hong
Kong Disneyland may require alternative sources of financing to meet its operating
and development needs.”121 Because additional funds from the HKSAR
government need approval from the Legislative Council, the spokesperson of
HKDL said that the discussion between the Walt Disney Company and the HKSAR
government regarding financial options “does not involve seeking additional funds
from the government,” and the Tourism Commission said that the HKSAR
government had no plans to use public funds to increase its investment in the Hong
Kong Disneyland joint venture.122 In other words, in considering whether or not to
expand the park and to build more attractions as ways to lure visitors, the
California-based Disney, rather than ask the HKSAR government for public
funding, has expected to provide HKDL with additional funding as part of HKDL’s
new financial arrangement with the HKSAR government. It seems that locals’
tactics have had some important effects: Hong Kong taxpayers at least are less
likely to pay the bill for HKDL’s further development because HKDL has acquired
a relatively bad public image and because the HKSAR government’s huge
investment in HKDL (HK$23 billion plus a HK$6 billion loan) has created less
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concrete economic benefits for Hong Kong society than Hong Kong people and the
government had expected. However, legislator Fred Li wondered whether or not the
HKSAR government’s reluctance to put money into HKDL development was due
to the fact that such a government act, requiring approval from the Legislative
Council, would compel legislators to request HKDL’s disclosure of financial
records.123 In other words, the HKSAR government’s decision not to put money
into HKDL development could still maintain the non-transparent and nonaccountable management practices of HKDL.
If the HKSAR government publicly monitors HKDL’s operations, then the
government should institutionally and legislatively change some local company
laws and labor laws. Legislators in the Legislative Council should press the
government to be more transparent in HKDL management issues; facing a
transnational company, NGOs need to organize—and have successfully
organized—global pressure among shareholders, workers, and consumers to
confront Disney for its labor exploitation and for its degradation of the environment.
However, in advancing a politics of everyday life, I also assert that an elitist
pedagogy may not always be effective, especially in the Hong Kong context, in
which people feel that they can know nothing under non-transparent governance,
and that they can do nothing under existing institutional and political constraints.124
Furthermore, my study of actual HKDL happenings shows that we should
not only study local Disney power dynamics but also problematize the very idea of
“local.” First, “local” is not a single entity; second, it has no necessary correlation
with authenticity and empowerment; third, local views can be conservative,
progressive, ambiguous, egalitarian, or discriminatory. In the case of HKDL, under
the post-colonial context, some Hong Kong people use HKDL as another stage on
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which they perform exclusionary acts that target Mainlanders: the foundation of
these acts goes by the name of “cultural differences.” If “democracy” means more
than universal suffrage, if “democracy” means transparent governance and
accountable governance and citizens’ acceptance of pluralistic ideas, then Hong
Kong people’s exclusionist cultural beliefs and practices are themselves major
obstacles toward the democratization process. In studying popular culture, if we
should not reduce locals’ consumption of HKDL to simply mind-numbing activities,
we should also be, as Nick Stevenson argues, “accepting [of] the legitimacy and
complexity of popular pleasures while protesting against material and cultural
exclusion.”125
In the next and concluding chapter, I argue that although global-local power
relationships should be viewed and examined as dynamic and as varied,
domestication or localization does not necessarily translate into empowerment of
locals. Struggles against increasing corporate power over the landscape must be
accompanied by the struggle for democratization and for greater transparency and
accountability of, in this case, the HKSAR government. By using Nick Stevenson’s
idea of cultural citizenship, I further argue that the entitlement of citizenship rights
is a necessary condition for the development of democratic society, but that having
citizenship rights is not sufficient to encourage people either to participate in public
policy or to embrace pluralistic culture.
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Chapter Eight
Remade in Hong Kong: Our Place, Our Park

When I started this Disney research in October 2001, I was not hostile to Disney
offerings; rather, my most favorite character was (and still is) Winnie the Pooh, and
in the 1990s, I enjoyed watching Disney movies (in particular, Beauty and the
Beast and Pocahontas, as well as the contemporary version of Cinderella, Pretty
Woman). Believing that every cultural text is polysemic in nature and that
audiences interpret and use a particular text in their own ways, I started this
research by studying not Disney’s global media domination but how local parents
consume and use Disney products in a domestic context. In my first post-graduate
presentation in January 2003, I discussed how Disney attempted to insert itself into
local rituals through its Christmas functions (as discussed in chapter Five), and how
local families’ practices de-commodified Disney commercial culture. In the
question-and-answer session, one member of the teaching staff in the Department
of Cultural Studies, Ip Iam Chong (who had co-edited the Chinese book Disney Is
Not a Happy Land in 1999), asked me why I did not discuss any issues concerning
the HKDL project. I still remember my answer at that time: “I’m just not prepared
for it. It’s not the right time for me, but I will examine the HKDL project soon.”
I must admit that after over one year’s part-time study, I was still “not
prepared” to examine the HKDL project critically. Although I did not think that
Disney belonged to my generation (I had grown up with Japanese animated
cartoons, Japanese comics, and Hong Kong TV dramas and movies), I resisted
studying how popular culture—including Disneyland, as I had visited Anaheim
Disneyland, Disneyland Paris, and Tokyo Disneyland before starting this study—
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dumbs down a people (including me). However, cultural studies (in particular,
studies that attack the “consumption-is-passive-and-disempowering” line) and
recent globalization studies (emphasizing cultural flows instead of domination and
homogenization) seemed to provide me with legitimate approaches to Disney:
approaches that did not deny me my own pleasures and my own agency in using
popular cultural texts.
However, the more I studied real world cases (especially the Orlando case)
about how Disney’s private corporate practices have negatively affected the public
domain, the more I began to realize that the study of popular culture should not
restrict itself to the study of the production, the circulation, and the usage of popular
cultural texts: these studies should also address matters of politics—in this case,
how corporate practices affect civil society. In my research on Disney, I should
study not only Disney offerings but also how Disney’s corporate practices, under
specific Hong Kong conditions and in Hong Kong political and institutional
contexts, sometimes articulate and sometimes challenge Hong Kong society, and
how Hong Kong people perceive, interpret, and react to (appropriate, negotiate, and
challenge) these Disney practices.
Doreen Massey’s concepts of space-time and of a simultaneous multiplicity
of spaces affected the way I examined Disney power. Her concept of space-time
asks researchers to examine the spatial production of social effects and history.
Accordingly, the Disney space in Hong Kong is not static and researchers should
study Disney power in process. Furthermore, Massey’s concept of a multiplicity of
spaces challenged me to look at Disney spaces in a plural sense, because Disney
has many facets (as entertainment provider, as employer, as cultural marker) and
because different local actors (as consumers, as workers, as seekers for distinction)
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occupy different social-spatial relationships with Disney. By integrating
ethnographic research in my study of how various locals (government, media,
parents, HKDL cultural-representatives, Disney employees in general) use Disney
in their specific conditions, I not only challenge the concept of a “global-local”
dichotomy but also study how locals use Disney and HKDL to develop their own
notions of self, identity, and place.
In the following, I once again appropriate Massey’s concepts of space-time
and of a multiplicity of spaces to conclude my research on three aspects in
particular. The first aspect is the changing social-spatial relationship between Hong
Kong people and Disney between 1999 and 2007: between 1999 and mid-2005,
Disney articulated the HKSAR government’s desire and many Hong Kong people’s
desire to distinguish Hong Kong from other cities, especially Chinese cities.
However, since mid-2005, Disney has tended to negotiate with and sometimes to
live in tension with Hong Kong people. Second, rather than examine the Hong
Kong-Disney encounter in a general framework of cultural globalization, I examine
the Hong Kong-Disney relationship in a more specific sense. That is, I review how
the multiple spaces that Disney occupies in Hong Kong (spaces such as
entertainment and consumption-goods provider, as media corporation, as global
employer, and as American cultural babysitter) interact with Hong Kong people’s
consumption behavior, work-services culture, media practices, and the larger idea
of local, national, and cosmopolitan culture. These encounters suggest that HKDL,
to a certain degree, has indeed become a local theme park that reflects Hong Kong’s
cultural specificity; whereas Hong Kong people’s consumption behavior, workservice practices, media practices, and larger cultural bearings have not
correspondingly undergone a significant change. In the third and final section, I
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evaluate the effects that Hong Kong people’s uses of HKDL have had on Hong
Kong’s limited development of a more participatory community and on Hong
Kong’s prospects for a more participatory political culture.

Remade in Hong Kong: The HK-Disney relationship, HKDL, and HK culture
Over time, changes in the relative power dynamics between Hong Kong and Disney
have developed within the wider, and also changing, Hong Kong-Disney
relationship. In 1999, even though many newspapers commented that the HKSAR
government-Disney deal regarding HKDL was non-transparent, and even though
some newspapers labeled the deal unfair, HKDL won considerable public support
in Hong Kong. I have argued that this support resulted from Disneyland’s selfrepresentation as “the happiest place in the world” and as a boon for Hong Kong’s
cosmopolitan image and for Hong Kong’s tourist economy. The utopian appeal that
the HKDL project created for Hong Kong people hinged on a promise of globalness
plus happiness, a globalness plus cosmopolitan aspirations, and a globalness plus
economic development.
In 1999, the HKSAR government used the Hong Kong people’s fear of
disappearance and their desire for cosmopolitanism in order to earn public support
for its HKDL joint-venture with Disney. Hong Kong’s local press supported the
deal because of the local economic downturn, because Hong Kong and Shanghai
were competing with each other for the right to host Disneyland, and because Hong
Kong was competing for economic power, in general, with other Chinese cities,
with Singapore, and with Taipei. Many of my respondents supported the HKDL
project not just because of the government’s economic promise but also because
Disney’s investment in Hong Kong signaled the maintenance and even the re385

establishment of the city status of Hong Kong as a cosmopolitan city after the Asian
financial crisis and Hong Kong’s economic downturn.
On a more personal level, globalization encourages some Hong Kong
middle class youth and middle-aged parents to aspire not simply to acquire
modernized Western consumer products but also Western- and Chinese-language
skills and cultural sensitivity so that these Hong Kong people might better
“survive” in their locality, as well as in the world. In my interview process, I found
that many respondents, in fact, revealed no “Hong Kong supremacist” local
consciousness; instead, they considered themselves to be victims of a “Hong Konglack”: a lack of English-language skills and of Putonghua-language skills, a lack of
exposure to foreign culture, a lack of “world” visions, and thus a lack of
competitiveness and of job opportunities. My respondents tried to acquire and to
possess different kinds of cosmopolitan sensitivities by participating in exchange
programs such as Disney’s international program and by undertaking Englishlanguage studies with the aid of such materials as Disney’s World of English
educational kits. Their perception of the globalization process as inter-city
competition reinforced their desire to connect with the culturally and economically
powerful Disney. In other words, the cultural and economic power of Disney
articulated my respondents’ desires to be cosmopolitan in a global economy.
In mid 2005, as the opening date of HKDL was approaching, many Hong
Kong people realized that their views on Disney were in need of a reality check.
HKDL, after all, is a theme park for entertainment. However, HKDL is the smallest
Disney park and provides the fewest rides among all Disney parks in the world. The
HKSAR government initially expected that the HKDL project would bring Hong
Kong not only the “hardware,” the actual Disney theme park, but also the
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“software,” Disney’s famed and branded management philosophy and management
practices. However, it seems that, to a large extent, HKDL has not “upgraded”
Hong Kong service standards to the level of Disneyfied services; indeed, the local
labor union and the media criticized HKDL management as an exploiter of workers.
Furthermore, despite maintaining Disney Realism, HKDL’s non-transparent media
policy and HKDL’s slow media response created a tense relationship between
HKDL management and media practitioners. In 2005, local media turned the local
millennium Disney dream (globalness plus happiness, globalness plus wealth, and
globalness plus fame) into “Americanism” and “Hong Kong shame.” In summary,
HKDL’s settlement process shows that local-Disney power has relied less and less
on articulation and more and more on negotiation and on domestication, although
always in tension with each other.
To delineate the aforementioned multiple local-global encounters, I would
also like to ask what particular aspects of Hong Kong people’s cultural practices
may have domesticated particular Disney practices, and whether Disney corporate
practices have, conversely, Disneyfied some of Hong Kong people’s specific
cultural practices; and whether, also, some specific Disney corporate practices and
Hong Kong people’s cultural practices have escaped change and, yet, live in tension
together. I focus my closing examination here on three levels of analysis:
consumption, work, and ideology.
At the level of consumption, I will argue that, on the surface, Disney has
localized HKDL but that Disney’s main aim for profit maximization has not
changed. However, while Disney is famous for luring visitors into pronounced
spending patterns, HKDL has not “Disneyfied” Hong Kong visitors in the sense
that it has not successfully encouraged them to engage in excessive spending.
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Moreover, Hong Kong people’s prejudicial and exclusionary practices have also
changed and remade the park atmosphere. At the level of work (specifically
service-labor and management practices) I argue that neither has Disney
successfully Disneyfied HKDL service culture nor have local media accepted
Disney’s corporate practice of Disney Realism. At the third level, the ideology level,
I argue that Hong Kong people’s encounter with Disney, the American cultural
babysitter, has aroused not their national sentiments but their various cosmopolitan
aspirations.
Before delving deeper into the discussion, I would like to stress once again
that, as Massey’s concept of “a multiplicity of spaces” suggests, each level
(consumption, work, and ideology) involves various particular groups, and because
of these different social groups’ different structural positions, their responses
toward the multifaceted Disney are necessarily different. In other words, different
local respondents direct various and sometimes even contradictory responses
toward the same global corporation, Disney.

Consumption
At the level of consumption, I argue that if Disney Imagineers localized the design
of HKDL, the design’s aim would be to lure park visitors into conspicuous
spending patterns. However, Disney, despite its dominant position in the children’s
consumer market, its massive advertising, and its fame, has failed to successfully
Disneyfy Hong Kong people’s consumption behavior, to turn them into great
spenders; rather, Hong Kong people “Hong Kongized” Disney offerings by
practicing both their money-saving strategies and (in the “happiest place in the
world”) their exclusionary cultural practices toward Mainland visitors.
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As a global corporation, Disney aims at maximizing profits and making
consumers consume. Since 2001, Disney has been applying its synergistic
marketing policies to Hong Kong. To boost its local image and to insert itself into
local rituals, Disney placed its icons in major local celebrations, including those for
the Lunar New Year, for Christmas, and for the mid-Autumn festival. As for HKDL,
in 2001, Disney conducted research whose findings showed that respondents in
both Hong Kong and Mainland China expressed a strong desire for classic Disney
characters and themes.1 As a result, Walt Disney Imagineers, on the one hand,
recreated the “original” version of Walt Disney’s Disneyland and, on the other hand,
localized the park to signify respect for the local culture. They consulted feng shui
masters to design HKDL; HKDL has provided visitors with various Asian foods
and Hong Kong-Western hybrid foods such as char siew pork-burger; HKDL even
built a certain number of squat toilets to accommodate Mainland tourists’ personal
hygiene habits. All of these glocal changes, however, have not changed Disney’s
central aim: to earn as much profit as possible. Beginning in 2007, to increase
visitors’ spending, HKDL management in fact abandoned the localized carts
imitating Mong Kok hawkers selling snacks inside the park. This decision pressed
visitors to purchase and consume food inside HKDL’s restaurants.
Given Disney’s dominant market position, my parent-respondents
purchased some Disney merchandise for fun-seeking consumption and for
pragmatic American-English learning, but they also resisted Disney’s promotion of
consumerist behavior and Disney’s representation of mischievous characters and
screen violence. Despite Disney’s global media domination, these parents did not
accept Disney values as a total cultural package.
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HKDL has also failed to lure Hong Kong people into making repeated visits
to the park and into making extravagant purchases inside the park. According to
HKDL’s park-attendance figures and operating-income figures, HKDL
management seemed to miscalculate the degree of cosmopolitan-consumerist
experiences and practices already available to Hong Kong people. Because of Hong
Kong people’s experienced cosmopolitan consumer behavior (many of them had
visited other Disneyland parks in the past) as well as because of the HKSAR
government’s huge investment in HKDL, local media widely reported on the
smallness of the park only three or four days after HKDL’s official opening.2 The
media revealed that HKDL had two major distinctions: it was the smallest
Disneyland park in the world, and it provided the fewest attractions. Regarding the
operating income that Disney could draw from HKDL, except for big festivals such
as Christmas and the Lunar New Year, HKDL attendance figures were not
satisfactory. The figures did not meet HKDL’s first-year target of 5.6 million,3 and
Disney admitted that a decline at HKDL offset an increase in the operating income
of Disney’s parks-and-resorts division during the second quarter of 2007.4
Disney miscalculated not only the attendance projections but the guest
spending as well. My ethnographic research inside the park revealed that visitors
have used various ways to consume park “facilities” without paying more than the
ticket price. Hong Kong visitors bring empty bottles and fill them up with free
drinking water inside the park; they play with toys inside HKDL’s shops and wear
characters’ wigs for photos but purchase neither the toys nor the wigs. As a result,
HKDL’s guest spending also fell short of Disney’s initial expectations.5 In order to
play all HKDL’s attractions within the one-day time limit, Hong Kong visitors have
spent more per-day time in HKDL than visitors spend in other Disney parks. Long
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queues, queue jumping, disputes, and even fights have thus resulted in the “happiest
place in the world.” These fights often take place between locals and Mainlanders.
Rather than “nurture a better human nature” through park design and control,
HKDL is a site where Hong Kong people’s prejudice has remade the park into a
veneer of Hong Kong-specific cultural tensions. In short, at the consumption level,
HKDL has been localized on the surface. However, Disney’s profit-driven aim has
not changed; and neither have Hong Kong people inside HKDL evolved into big
spenders nor have Hong Kong people’s cultural prejudicial practices toward
Mainlanders changed—even though Disneyland was designed to control human
behavior.

Work
At the level of work, I have examined the encounter between HKDL and Hong
Kong culture by dividing my discussion into two types of spatial-social relations:
first, the relationships among HKDL junior workers, mid-level managers, and the
Disney organization system; second, the relationships between local journalists and
Disney management. The HKSAR government expected that its import of HKDL
would also be an import of Disney’s famous human-resource and management
skills. Disney, too, expected to transplant the general Disneyland work culture in
Hong Kong, and in late 2004, nine months before HKDL officially opened, Disney
employed five hundred Hong Kong people so that they would work as HKDL
cultural representatives in Orlando, would introduce HKDL to the Orlando park
visitors, would learn about Disney work culture, and would spread their learnt
Disney culture to Hong Kong. My study, however, finds that Disney management
has failed, to a large extent, to Disneyfy HKDL workers’ work practices; in fact,
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some aspects of HKDL’s management and work policies (the service ethos in
particular) have been Hong Kongized. As for the relationship between journalists
and HKDL management, Disney media culture and local media culture have
maintained their relationship in tension. Disney has maintained its non-transparent
corporate practices, and local journalists have consistently used widespread and
entrenched Hong Kong attitudes to evaluate the practices of HKDL management.
HKDL is operated and managed by the Disney company, and the park’s
service quality supposedly expresses the Disney company’s Disneyfied world-class
standard of excellence. However, because HKDL senior management employed
local mid-level managers from Hong Kong businesses, these mid-level managers,
according to my HKDL cultural representative respondents, neither believed in nor
performed Disney values. As a result, HKDL workers seldom actually provide
Disney services, such as Disney’s “magical moments,” to HKDL guests. And
because the senior management has provided the local mid-level managers with a
relatively high degree of autonomy in which they can implement team-based
policies relating to disciplinary actions, some junior workers suffer unfair
disciplinary actions. Without providing a positive work environment, junior staff
may indeed fail to provide Disneyfied service.
Because of physical hardship, toilsome workloads, sometimes unfair
disciplinary actions, and un-Disneyfied visitors, junior workers may wear a glum
face rather than convey Disney’s “magical moments” to visitors. And this deviance
occurs although all workers learn—and many remember— the “4 keys to Disney
quality standards” (safety, courtesy, show, efficiency) and although a good number
remember the “7 service guidelines for guest services.” However, I do not mean to
suggest that HKDL workers have completely escaped being Disneyfied because in
392

my conversations with HKDL staff respondents, they used Disney terms such as
“guests,” “cast members,” “good show,” and “magical moments” to describe their
work. Nevertheless, I do not believe that the evidence suggests that HKDL’s
Disneyfication of HKDL workers has been successful.
HKDL’s top management recognized that guest services were unDisneyfied, and, in late 2006, the management started to ask the mid-level
managers to train their team members to produce “magical moments.” In early 2007,
different teams (merchandise, park operations, food and beverages, guest relations,
hotel operations) appointed twenty representatives in total to study how to improve
and “Disneyfy” HKDL guest relations. A concrete example of these efforts is
illuminating here. Starting in November 2006, Fantasyland managers asked each
team member to perform at least one magical moment once a week. Ironically, the
managers finally eliminated this practice in February 2007, not simply because of
workers’ resistance to it but also because of the reduction of the number of
employees. According to my HKDL worker respondents, Fantasyland had about
ninety junior staffers in 2006. This number declined to about sixty by May 2007.
The decline reflects Disney’s efforts to reduce HKDL’s operating costs. Before
February 2007, there were two shifts among junior workers (Host 2). The first
batch started at 9:15 a.m. and ended between 4:30 p.m. and 6 p.m.; the second
batch started between 12 p.m. and 2 p.m. and ended at 9 p.m. The shortest shift in
the past had been seven hours. Since February 2007, however, there has been only
one shift, and almost all junior workers start working at 9:15 a.m. and end their
work between 7 p.m. and 9 p.m.
All of these figures mean that HKDL workers need to work between nine
and eleven hours a day, without counting the forty-five-minute no-pay lunch break.
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In an extreme case, workers may work for eleven hours forty-five minutes, without
counting the forty-five-minute no-pay lunch break. Because HKDL management
reduced workers’ paid sick leaves from two days per month to six days every six
months starting in January 2007, some HKDL workers have applied for not fewer
than four consecutive days of sick leave. This trend stems from the fact that
workers in Hong Kong are eligible for sickness allowance under the Employment
Ordinance if the sick leave taken is not less than four consecutive days and if the
sick leave is supported by an appropriate medical certificate.6 According to my
respondents, of sixty junior workers at Fantasyland, about five to six workers took
not fewer than four consecutive days of sick leave between January and May 2007.
I suspect that HKDL top management can never “Disneyfy” HKDL workers
so long as HKDL workers need to work even longer hours than in the past. Besides,
according to my HKDL worker respondents, HKDL started to employ permanent
part-timers in 2007, and the hourly payment decreased from sixty-three dollars per
hour at Christmas 2006 to forty-six dollars in May 2007. Given the longer working
hours, the reduced payment, and the regular low-paid part-timers, I cannot see how
HKDL management can create a positive team-spirit work environment in which
workers can meet Disney’s guest-service standards. In summary, at the work level,
both mid-level managers and junior staffers, to a large extent, have not been
Disneyfied, and I suspect that no such Disneyfication will occur in the near future
provided that HKDL management does not improve the work environment.
Disney’s world-famous media management practices, as well, have met
challenges in Hong Kong. Most famous among these practices is Disney Realism. I
argued in chapter Six that, after receiving negative coverage about its early
operations, which were chaotic, crisis-prone, and disrespectful of local lived
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experiences and the rule of law, HKDL modified its media policies to some degree.
For example, after drawing fire from government officials, legislators, and scholars
regarding HKDL security’s demand that two health inspectors “dress down,”
HKDL management apologized and said that HKDL would adhere to Hong Kong
law. After a series of negative press reports discussed HKDL’s smallness,
highhandedness, Americanism, manipulative acts toward journalists, and
exploitation of workers, the HKDL management attempted to become more
“transparent.” For example, a few days before the official first-year anniversary of
HKDL, the executive vice-president and the managing director of HKDL, Bill
Ernest, announced that HKDL’s annual attendance was “well over five million
visitors … and we’re getting close to our attendance target.”7 However, these
concessions do not suggest to me that HKDL management has abandoned its efforts
to implement Disney Realism in Hong Kong; in fact, after these press-based
revelations, HKDL management sought to escape from further questions on
attendance figures by declining, in 2006, to disclose not only the real attendance
figures but also the management’s projected figures.8 In this respect, the nontransparent business practices of HKDL have worsened, not improved.9
HKDL management has not changed Disney’s major management
practices, nor have local journalists been so Disneyfied that they report news only
favorable to HKDL; rather, journalists criticize HKDL management’s
highhandedness and Americanism, as I have mentioned. However, local
journalists ask neither general questions about the power of global companies in
the global economy nowadays, nor more specific questions about, for example,
private companies’ power in post-colonial Hong Kong; the journalists turn their
criticisms regarding Disney’s management practices into an over-generalized
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anti-Americanism. By simply criticizing Disney corporate practices as
“Americanism,” local journalists neglect general critical issues concerning, for
example, local laws’ ineffectual monitoring of companies’ acts, and also specific
critical issues concerning, for example, the dampening effect that the close
relationship between Hong Kong businesspeople and the HKSAR government
has had on public monitoring of HKDL’s acts.
Owing to concern for the public interest, in 2001 the HKSAR
government-appointed Standing Committee on Company Law Reform proposed
to amend the law so as to require all private companies in Hong Kong to file their
financial statements for public inspection, a reform that would lead to “annual
disclosure in the form of the annual directors’ report, profit and loss account.”10
Given the significant role that private companies play in the Hong Kong economy,
the Committee has seen the change of company law as “one of the key elements
in good corporate governance.”11 The Committee showed that different countries
vary in their filing requirements for company financial statements. Jurisdictions
in the United Kingdom and Singapore require private companies to file financial
statements at the Companies House (the UK) and at the Registry of Companies
and Business (RCB, Singapore), each of which is equivalent to the Companies
Registry in Hong Kong. The Committee proposed that “private companies with
limited liability should file their financial statements with the Companies Registry
(CR) for public inspection.”12 The government, however, has not amended the
Company Law. In other words, Hong Kong law does not require the Hong Kong
International Theme Park (HKITP) company, a joint-venture of the HKSAR
government and Disney, to disclose its financial statements related to HKDL
because the HKITP company is private.
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While severely limiting the public’s access to Hong Kong private
companies’ financial records, current Hong Kong laws also fail to guarantee
workers’ economic and union rights.13 In May 2001, the United Nations Committee
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights commented on the HKSAR government’s
neglect of citizens’ economic rights:

The Committee also raised questions regarding policies in relation to
unfair dismissal, rest breaks, maximum hours of work, equal pay for equal
work and overtime pay rates. The HKSAR was asked to review its policy
and legislation in relation to these areas, and to ensure that they are in line
with its obligations under the Covenant.14

Before the Handover, the colonial Legislative Council passed laws guaranteeing
that workers would have collective-bargaining rights and that workers whose
employer had dismissed them for union activities would be reinstated. On 30 June
1997, the Chinese government dissolved Hong Kong’s Legislative Council,
which had been elected in 1995, and replaced it with the pro-Beijing provisional
Legislative Council. In July 1997, the Provisional Legislative Council suspended
the above-mentioned laws that the late colonial Legislative Council had passed; in
October 1997, the Provisional Legislative Council repealed the above laws under
the Employment and Labour Relations (Miscellaneous Amendments) Ordinance.
Without a legal-institutional framework for either collective bargaining or union
recognition, the current legislation renders both employees and labor unions weak
in relation to management. And because current Hong Kong labor law sets neither
maximum working hours nor minimum wages, HKDL management breaks no
laws when it requires staff to work long hours. Because the current Occupational
Safety and Health Ordinance does not categorize the physical pain suffered by
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many HKDL employees as an occupational injury, those suffering employees
who need hospital treatment cannot obtain compensation from HKDL
management under the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance.15
However, local journalists have failed to grasp the major factors that allow
HKDL’s management practices to be non-transparent and sometimes exploitative:
these practices are not “Americanism,” as many journalists have argued, but are
rather reflective of local company practices and local labor laws: the practices
undermine citizenship rights tenaciously, and the laws protect those same rights
ineffectively. Local laws’ failure to protect citizens’ rights is due largely to the
partnership between local government and businesspeople—a partnership that
maintains the “corporatist democracy” model, in Alvin So’s term.16 Hong Kong
people under current laws cannot influence the policies of either Disney or the
HKSAR government. Rather than ask the HKSAR government to intervene in the
non-transparent and exploitative market, local journalists’ criticism regarding
HKDL’s “Americanism” is, to a certain extent, merely an expression of “Hong
Kongism.” Their generalized cultural criticisms reinforce a widespread belief in
Hong Kong about Hong Kong’s self-fashioned success: small government, big
markets, and a culture of self-reliance. For example, in criticizing HKDL’s slow
response to the Lunar New Year chaos, Apple Daily’s editorial criticized HKDL as
a government enterprise, the idea being that the government aspects of the
enterprise resulted in a highhanded and slow-to-respond attitude:

Any Hong Kong people who traveled in the Mainland in the 1980s must
remember the [Mainlanders’] non-merit-pay service attitude. These
uncivilized phenomena, which follow from state-run enterprises, should
have been eliminated through competition. However, in Hong Kong, highly
acclaimed as “the world’s freest economy,” the government dug up this
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hangover, the state-run enterprise, from socialism’s garbage dump … and
once again exposed to visitors the state-run service attitude, which should be
found only in history books. Hong Kong people, in fact, experienced
HKDL’s chaos and humiliation during its rehearsal days … during HKDL’s
two days of Lunar New Year chaos, HKDL fully displayed its deeply rooted
tendency to operate as would a state-run business: it sits on its laurels and
has no desire to improve itself…. If private enterprise cannot or is not
willing to run a business, state-run enterprise will only make things worse!17

Local media actors seldom reflect upon their own Hong Kong cultural bearings, but
criticize Disney management on the basis of a general belief widespread in Hong
Kong, that small government and big markets generate efficiency, profit, and thus
the Hong Kong success story. The commentator who authored the above-cited
passage saw markets as the only legitimate platform for the distribution of
resources, and he argued that governments’ intervention in markets will lead only
to degeneracy.

Ideology
At the third level, that of ideology, I argue that my respondents’ encounters with
Disney offerings (including HKDL) have not aroused the respondents’ national
sentiments; rather, the respondents’ particular approaches to Disney demonstrate
the respondents’ different cosmopolitan aspirations.
In my study, two respondents (a couple) raised concerns about the spread
of Disney’s Americanized notions of combat and of heroism. My parent
respondents also raised concerns about screen violence in general, consumerism,
and mischief. However, no respondents in my study ever voiced any worry or
concern to me that Disney culture was invading Chinese culture or that Disney
offerings were Disneyfying Chinese culture.
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These findings contrast vividly with others that I came across while
teaching a graduate class in 2007. The class had twenty students and about half of
them came from the Mainland. In one student presentation, a Mainland student
discussed the Disney animated cartoon Mulan. She pointed out more than twenty
“mistakes” that Disney made about Chinese culture. For example, in the film, the
manner in which Chinese folklore heroine Mulan writes Chinese characters is
inaccurate; the side character dragon Mushu has a snake tongue; and in a matchmaking scene, Mulan and other girls wear geisha makeup. When I asked how my
students felt about these “misrepresentations,” the Hong Kong students did not
say much but one Mainland student expressed anger over the “mistakes” that
Disney had made, especially the inaccurate conflation of Japanese culture with
Chinese culture—always an issue that triggers fierce resentment insofar as
imperial Japan militarily invaded China in the 1930s. Compared with the
Mainland students, the Hong Kong students and I exhibited a lower national
cultural sensitivity in our examination of the Disneyfication of Chinese folktales,
although all the Hong Kong students and all the Mainland students in my class
knew well the Mulan poem and the story. In my class, the Hong Kong students
also displayed less upset about the Disneyfication of Mulan than did the Mainland
students. I would finally note here that, among my respondents, very few
expressed upset over Disney animated cartoons’ Disneyfied representations of
different ethnic groups. Such cultural conflict, whether isolated or writ large at the
national level, is not expressly discernable in my study.
Whereas my respondents’ Disney consumption has not aroused their
national identification, their varied use of Disney (its merchandise and its symbolic
power culturally and economically) demonstrates their varied cosmopolitan
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aspirations. My research suggests that after experiencing a few years of local
economic doldrums, Hong Kong people’s widely held view that the globalization
process fuels the ferocity of competition among cities and individuals has
intensified Hong Kong people’s desire to become cosmopolitan. At the same time,
however, some local scholars, university students, and activists attempted to use
HKDL’s settlement to induce Hong Kong people to think about global
corporations’ exploitative acts in other places.
My HKDL cultural representative respondents and my middle-class parent
respondents aspired to possess cosmopolitan language skills and cosmopolitan
cultural skills in order to survive in Hong Kong and in the world. Perceiving the
globalization process as an intensification of competition among workers and cities
around the world, these two types of respondents tended to possess and to develop
relatively high levels of cosmopolitan cultural skills and of sensitivity to earning
potential, whether in Hong Kong or in another part of the world.
Affirming their pragmatic mindset and self-reliance ethic, the parents used
Disney merchandise specifically to improve their children’s English-language
skills, their children’s competitiveness, and their children’s future career choices.
In fact, parents’ pragmatic use of “cosmopolitan” cultural goods (that is, of
English-language learning kits and of English- and Putonghua-language classes)
may broaden the children’s cosmopolitan horizon, but I suspect that these
“cosmopolitan” encounters have nurtured in neither the children nor even in their
parents an elevated concern for humanity at large. For example, Lisa’s use of the
products helps her critically examine neither the values promoted by those
products nor, indeed, her own cultural values (such as her cultural prejudice
toward Mainlanders). Her mode of Disney usage reinforces Hong Kong
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pragmatic values, authoritarian parenting methods, and the family-based selfreliance ethic. I call this type of cosmopolitan aspiration “pragmatist
cosmopolitanism,” because the chief purpose underlying Hong Kong people’s
acquisition of cosmopolitan cultural skills is capital accumulation.
Whereas the respondent parents’ use of Disney learning kits helped the
parents’ children acquire economically viable cultural skills, the six-month
Orlando work experiences that my HKDL cultural-representative respondents had
brought them positive pragmatic returns (confidence and living skills) and
positive cultural returns (a wider vision of their surroundings and self reflections
on how Hong Kong culture bears on their actions). In the case of Olivia, cultural
clashes between her Hong Kong-style work-hard-play-hard behavior and what she
perceived as her US colleagues’ laid-back behavior created certain unhappy
incidents between her and her colleagues. After six months’ American training,
Olivia felt that she not only had acquired certain cosmopolitan cultural capital
(such as better oral English), but also had broadened and deepened her selfreflections on her own cultural bearings and had become more accepting toward
different cultures. I call this “reflexive cosmopolitanism.” Although the Orlando
experiences of none of my HKDL cultural representative respondents led the
respondents to question Disney Realism or to encourage them to think about the
effects of private and corporate governance over the public domain, some
respondents rethought Hong Kong culture’s emphasis on efficiency, instrumental
rationality, and the self-reliance ethic. This, too, exemplifies what I would call a
“reflexive” cosmopolitanism.
These two kinds of cosmopolitanism, in my view, have long existed in
Hong Kong, so that HKDL’s points of reference complement—rather than
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corrupt—Hong Kong people’s existing belief systems. However, because of the
settlement of HKDL, some university teachers, students, and activists grasped the
chance to strengthen the Hong Kong public’s concerns about global companies’
sometimes exploitative acts around the world. These people’s protests have been
transnational, and the orientation of their concerns has been cosmopolitan in a
third and different sense. Related activities include petitions and even threats to
mount a global boycott against Disney because HKDL planned to serve shark’s
fin soup for wedding banquets and because Disney’s global-outsourcing practices
resulted in mistreatment of Mainland workers, in violation of their rights. In my
view, these transnational activist campaigns have functioned in three ways. First,
they have pressed Disney to change its corporate acts. Second, their campaigns
strengthened the Hong Kong public’s concerns about certain global issues. Third,
these anti-global companies’ global exploitative acts encouraged Hong Kong
people to question their common-sense beliefs: namely, the widely held assertion
that a free-market economy yields social benefits that outweigh social drawbacks.
Besides, environmentalists’ and SACOM’s resistant acts against Disney
constitute recent acts by local activists who use globally networked tactics in the
struggle against transnational corporate acts; and Disney Hunter is the first local
activist movement to struggle against a particular transnational company. The
establishment of HKDL has prompted local movements to embrace an even greater
cosmopolitan orientation. I call the practices of these recent local, globally
networked activist campaigns that possess a cosmopolitan orientation “activist
cosmopolitanism.” However, activist cosmopolitanism has not yet achieved
significant popularity in Hong Kong. For example, in 2005, the Disney Hunter
group could boast only about twenty members, a number that did not significantly
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increase after one year of school and street campaigns. In fact, as I mentioned in
chapter Seven, some HKDL workers told the labor-union workers that if Disney
Hunter had involved itself in setting up the HKDL labor union, they would not have
joined it because they themselves were not confrontational toward HKDL
management.
In summary, then, since the opening of HKDL in 2005, the local-Disney
power has relied less and less on articulation (Disney’s cultural and economic
power articulated with Hong Kong people’s desires for cultural distinction and
economic revitalization) and more and more on negotiation (Disney Realism and
HKDL management’s relatively slow media practices in conflict with Hong Kong
media’s expectations) and on domestication (HKDL junior workers’ localized
services). Nevertheless, Disney and various local actors always remain in tension
with each other. At the consumption level, although HKDL management localized
certain HKDL practices, Disney’s global profit-making goal of course remains
unaltered; HKDL’s park design also fails to change local cultural prejudice against
Mainland visitors. At the work level, although HKDL workers have been
Disneyfied to a certain extent, their managerial practices and guest-service
standards are still local. At the ideological level, Disneyfied representations of
Chinese folklore neither aroused nor agitated my respondents’ national
identification; rather, my respondents’ cosmopolitan aspirations, because of the
globalization process, manifested themselves through the respondents’ use of
Disney merchandise and the respondents’ US work experiences. Their
cosmopolitan aspirations varied (from pragmatic to reflexive to activist), but only a
handful of the respondents stated that their “allegiance is to the worldwide
community of human beings.”18
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Hong Kong people use HKDL for entertainment, for an income source, for
acquiring cosmopolitan cultural skills, or for exposing global companies’ profitdriven and sometimes exploitative corporate acts. And, indeed, not a few Hong
Kong people use HKDL for a combination of these reasons. These various uses are
expressions of Hong Kong culture; many of these cultural practices are not cultures
Disneyfied by Disney. Nevertheless, HKDL has remade and has complicated Hong
Kong people’s perception of Disney itself. No longer just about “happy”
entertainment, Disney is now a quasi-public enterprise that has brought to Hong
Kong both the fewest Disneyland attractions of any park and disappointing
economic returns.

Hong Kong culture and the development of a democratic pluralistic society
The settlement of HKDL in Hong Kong reveals that a global corporate power such
as that of Disney may be so enormous that its possessor could ask the local
government to grant it financial subsidies, to support infrastructural setup, to
surrender management control, and to consider future changes in legislation.
However, we should note that, except for the above mentioned “special” rights, the
HKSAR government-Disney joint venture concerning the HKITP company enjoys
certain other “rights” which include the right of non-transparency and which have
their justification in Hong Kong laws. Local company laws and local labor laws
contain no requirements either that Disney disclose HKDL’s annual financial
statements or that Disney reduce HKDL workers’ working hours and provide the
workers with more breaks. It is difficult to change these practices in the absence of
both legislative reform and intermediary quasi-public watchdog bodies. I turn here,
then, to the wider implications of my research.
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The struggles for citizenship rights and for legislative reforms are
important in the democratization process of Hong Kong society generally, and
culture plays a vital role in the way in which citizens may push government for
various reforms. According to T. H. Marshall,19 societies that grant their people a
modicum of political rights, civil rights, and social rights are, in effect, entitling
the people to full and equal participation via legal frameworks. However, the
people’s entitlement to rights does not automatically transform the people into
actively engaged citizens who exercise their rights; a society enjoying the
possession of these rights does not necessarily become a community of openness
and communication. As Nick Stevenson argues, the definition of ‘citizenship’
should not rest exclusively on political meanings because culture strongly
influences the meaning of citizenship in different contexts and in shaping the
ways in which people exercise their rights:

Whether we define citizenship through questions of rights, notions of
obligation and duty, membership of overlapping communities or
normalization, questions of culture are not far away.20

Stevenson argues that citizenship should denote not only entitlements and
obligations but also “questions of imagination, identity, recognition and
belonging” (p. 36). He argues that societies, in order to strengthen global
conceptions of cultural citizenship, address “the need to create and revive a
radical model of the public sphere” (p. 152), and he makes it clear that his model
does not emphasize rationality and “consensus” alone, because civil society “is
not merely an institutional realm, but is constructed through symbolic codes of
inclusion and exclusion” (p. 23). Therefore, cultural citizenship concerns the
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symbolic dimension of inclusion and marginalization. Stevenson further
emphasizes the role that affect plays in constructing an active civil society. The
term ‘cultural’ in Stevenson’s “cultural citizenship” refers to Raymond Williams’
model of cultural democracy, in particular the latter’s idea that popular
participation should be encouraged through new democratic institutions and
communicative channels to develop a common culture capable of promoting
reflexivity and pluralism (pp. 19-20) as well as community and belonging (pp.
32-3). For the context of globalization, Stevenson fleshes out this model to make
an important point: rather than limit itself to the national level, civic solidarity
should strive for a cosmopolitan civil society based on human rights. However,
Pedro Nunes notes the important point that Stevenson provides “no systematic
account of what, in practical terms, constitutes cultural citizenship.”21
When I bring the idea of cultural citizenship to bear on my study of my
respondents’ various uses of and responses to HKDL, the majority of their cultural
practices seem to have little relationship with cultural citizenship in Stevenson’s
sense. First, my respondents, in general, believed in market individualism and the
culture of (family-based) self-reliance. The culture of community belonging and of
organized collective action (such as industrial action) was not popular among the
respondents. This observation is consistent with some surveys on Hong Kong
values.22 Second, their responses suggest that the respondents prioritized material
values (such as “economic and physical security”) over other post-materialist
enjoyments (the “self expression and the quality of life”23). Perhaps for this reason,
organized and politicized consumption activities have had a difficult time taking
root in Hong Kong. Third, my study of HKDL shows that some of my respondents
had a relatively low level of tolerance toward people of different cultures,
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especially toward Mainlanders. Possibly consistent with my finding, a survey
reveals that a majority of Hong Kong people do not accept different lifestyles (such
as homosexuality) either.24 These Hong Kong attitudes may negatively affect the
development of a democratic society that embraces pluralistic cultures.
First, as discussed in chapter Seven, my HKDL staff respondents were
reluctant to join a labor union to negotiate either pay raises or additional employee
benefits, and I would argue that underlying their reluctance in this instance was
their own ambivalent attitude toward HKDL management. Although my
respondents admitted that some HKDL workers, especially the character performers,
might face undesirable work conditions (long working hours, chaotic shifts, and
occupational injuries or diseases without company compensation), these same
respondents also insisted that not every division treats its staff poorly and that they
themselves felt no compelling need to join the labor union: why give voice to other
workers’ problems, challenge authorities, and risk a backlash that would negatively
affect their own careers? Believing in market individualism and self-reliance, some
of my respondents preferred to ask those dissatisfied workers to resign rather than
organize protests against the company. In other words, it seems unlikely that, in the
near future, HKDL workers will concertedly undertake negotiations with the
management.
The middle class parents whom I interviewed emphasized that individuals
should rely on themselves to negotiate their own economic value. Some of the
parents relied on Disney’s World of English, private English lessons, Putonghua
lessons, piano lessons, and sometimes their own child-rearing disciplinary actions
in order to shape their children into competitive market agents, to solidify their
class position, or just “to earn a living” in the globalized economy. Because some
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parents in my study saw local culture as “non-educational” (i.e., local popular
culture is mind-numbing and it lacks cultural capital for economic viability), they
tried to distance their children from Hong Kong local popular culture. Middleclass-parent respondents demonstrated an instrumental mindset according to
which they would train and mold their children to be cosmopolitan—that is, to
“survive” in the globalized world. If this training were to be successful, it is likely
that the children would rarely consider themselves as exponents of Hong Kong
culture. If democratic civil order depends not only on citizens’ rational consensus
regarding civic values but also on “the possibility of passionate encounter” as
Nick Stevenson argues,25 I wonder whether or not the decrease in children’s
encounters with local popular culture will reduce the potential means by which
the children will relate their popular-culture affect to a local identity and a placebased sense of community.
Second, because Hong Kong people, according to Ho and Leung, “tend to
focus on economic stability, economic growth and maintaining order,” and because
Hong Kong’s economic affluence has not yet fostered in Hong Kong people a
strong sense of environmental awareness,26 I argue that politicized consumption
activities are not popular among the Hong Kong people when their embrace of
material values is stronger than their embrace of post-material priorities.
Facing HKDL’s non-transparent corporate practices, sometimes exploitative
management practices, and as yet unfulfilled economic promises, the Hong Kong
people to whom I spoke generally exhibited little eagerness to say “no” to HKDL.
Although my parent respondents criticized certain HKDL corporate practices (such
as HKDL’s violation of the rule of law and HKDL’s long working hours), only
Judy’s family had decided to boycott HKDL; indeed, Judy had been actively
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participating in a local feminist movement for more than thirteen years. All the
parents—except Judy’s family—agreed that HKDL should expand, despite
HKDL’s environmental damage and the non-transparent quasi-public nature of the
enterprise. This finding parallels the findings from John Ap’s March 2006 survey
(as I discussed in chapter Seven). Many respondents (70%) indicated that their
“opinions toward HK Disneyland have become more negative due to the problems
that have been experienced since its opening,”27 but 86% of the respondents still
expressed “support for the development of Hong Kong Disneyland,” and this
percentage of support was actually the highest recorded when he compared it with
his previous surveys since 2000.
Third, my study of HKDL respondents’ aspirations to become cosmopolitan
shows that their life-strategy changes (the acquisition of Putonghua and English, as
well as of Mainland and cosmopolitan sensitivity) did not necessarily change the
respondents’ conception of what Hong Kong is and should be, nor did the life-style
changes necessarily change how the respondents perceived Hong Kong and the
Other, especially the Mainlanders. The exclusionary cultural practices of many
Hong Kong people extend to the people’s vast support for the HKSAR
government’s limits on family-reunion immigration.28 In 2005, the United Nations
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights “urged the Government to
extend the protection afforded by a proposed racial discrimination law to internal
migrants from the mainland.”29 In fact, Hong Kong people perform exclusionary
practices against not only Mainlanders but also non-Chinese ethnic minorities such
as Nepalese, Filipinos, and Indonesians. Barry Sautman characterizes Hong Kong
people’s exclusionary practices as “Hong Kong semi-ethnocracy.”30
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Given Hong Kong people’s exclusionary everyday practices, I find it
difficult to imagine a Hong Kong society that can turn away from discrimination
and toward a functioning inclusive community: one where people embrace critical
dialogues and “accept the ‘other’ without expecting them to conform,” in
Stevenson’s words.31 A Hong Kong whose culture fails to embrace critical
dialogues with people of different cultures, especially those of the marginalized, is
a Hong Kong where the idea and the practice of human rights and of cultural
democracy will find unfertile soil. I argue, further, that without such an open
environment, Hong Kong society will find it difficult, if not impossible, to
transgress its cultural boundaries and broaden its cosmopolitan sensitivity.

Conclusion
At the beginning of this concluding chapter, I confessed that, during the initial
stage of my PhD study, I resisted examining Disney in a critical way. I was
narrowly characterizing cultural studies as a field of inquiry whose exclusive
focus is on people’s agency in regulating their own cultural consumption.
Through this narrow characterization, I placed myself over a metaphorical safety
net because cultural practices usually do entail a certain degree of agency.
However, at that time, I missed the point that an active cultural practice is not a
necessarily socially progressive and subversive practice.
At the consumption level, as I have argued in chapter Five, parents’
consumption acts and parents’ use of Disney offerings can be seen as acceptance,
an uptake, or resistance, depending on what aspects of power researchers address.
If we view these acts in terms of “agency,” all these acts display a certain degree
of consumer agency. In other words, “agency” as a concept is not subversive by
411

nature. Furthermore, even though my parent respondents resisted Disney’s
promotion of consumerist behavior, screen violence, and mischievous acts, the
resistance was not political resistance. Disney is famous as family entertainment,
and parents’ uses of Disney or parents’ resistance to Disney derives usually from
this established idea—the idea of Disney’s fame as a manufacturer of fun. The
parents resist certain Disney products because these offerings, in the parents’
view, create a bad learning environment for their children’s personality
development. The parents’ resistance has little relation to such larger and political
questions as Disney’s global media domination, Disney’s private governance over
public land, and the potential harmful effects of Disney Realism. Certainly, the
parents’ resistance is real and helps us understand that Disney’s media
domination in children’s entertainment does not necessarily lead to cultural
homogenization. However, it is quite futile to argue that this media-consumption
resistance can evolve into political resistance, which would, in turn, challenge
Disney’s dominant position as a media outlet—rather than challenge, here and
there, simply a few of the outlet’s offerings. In other words, consumer agency and
consumer resistance do not necessarily lead to political resistance.
I have noticed that this chasm between consumer resistance and political
resistance surfaces in other HKDL-related settings. My HKDL worker
respondents’ local resistance against management did not evolve into political
resistance. I have observed many HKDL visitors flout and disrupt Disney’s
orderly park rules, but I have neither observed nor interviewed nor, for that matter,
read about even marginal numbers of Hong Kong visitors who transformed their
on-site resistance into political resistance. And although it is true that many local
media practitioners set out to change the meaning of “Disney” from “Hong Kong
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dream” to “Hong Kong shame” and to “Americanism,” it is also true—and quite
telling—that these media practitioners never united to extend their critique from
HKDL’s operations to the political context that made HKDL possible. In short,
all these acts and assertions of resistance seem to have little relationship to the
development of human rights, democracy, and pluralistic culture, which Hong
Kong people lack under the present regime.
Here, I am not suggesting that Hong Kong people possess consumptionrelated agency, work-related agency, or speech-related agency but that they
simultaneously lack political agency. Rather, I argue that the concept of the
relationship between agency and resistance—a concept that cultural studies
scholars such as John Fiske32 highlight—in fact fails to address people’s
resistance to resistant activities. As consumers, my respondents resisted
performing or supporting any politicized consumption activity; none of my
HKDL-worker respondents stated that they had ever thought of joining the HKDL
labor union; and the anti-Disney group of which I am a member received precious
little popular support, as demonstrated by the group’s small membership. In fact,
the long, winding course of my research has convinced me that many of my
respondents resist adopting a citizen-based political identity and that the concept
of the relationship between agency and resistance cannot, by itself, help us to
address, in comprehensive or rigorous ways, my respondents’ overt refusal to
politicize their everyday acts, transforming or extending these into political acts.
Here, therefore, I reject the paradigm of resistance, which can easily
evolve into a paradigm of “populist” resistance. To conduct and frame my
research, I have preferred to use Massey’s concept of a multiplicity of spaces and
Paula Saukko’s dialogic-research strategy.33 As I stated in the introductory
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section, my own initial resistance to studying Disney’s real power in Hong Kong
may have been due to my fear that this type of study would require me to deny
my popular-culture pleasures and thus my identity. Both Massey’s concept of a
multiplicity of spaces and Saukko’s emphasis on polyvocality, however, have
helped me live with my internal tension: I sometimes enjoy Disney offerings but I
also detest Disney’s non-transparent and sometimes inhumane corporate practices.
The concept of a multiplicity of spaces points to not only diverse local actors who
occupy, interpret, and respond diversely among diverse spatial social relations,
but also the possibility that each actor may occupy more than one space. Thus,
just as Disney can be entertainment, a global corporation, and a local employer,
so too can an individual person occupy several diverse spaces in relation to
Disney. Therefore, it is possible that I love Winnie the Pooh and detest Disney’s
policies at the same time. In fact, it is possible for me both to love Pooh and to
question Pooh. My critical study of Disney, in the end, results not in self-denial
but in self-affirmation: I understand more about how I, by using different
perspectives, differently perceive and differently respond to different issues in
relation to Disney. This is not an ambivalent attitude but a multiplicity of attitudes
grounded on a multiplicity of spaces.
As a cultural studies student, I have learned from my study of HKDL that
engaged cultural research means personal involvement in a particular site (real,
symbolic, and imaginary). The goal should be, through communication, to get
different voices heard, recognized, and accepted in a culture of openness;
engaged cultural research means neither that views should submit to
homogenization within an overly consensual framework nor that the researcher
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should impose his or her own political or theoretical agenda onto people’s
behavior. This is the openness of cultural studies that enables researchers to act.
The Hong Kong people’s contradictory views about HKDL’s development
(development leads to environmental damage, but park improvements should stem
from park development) show that Hong Kong people commonly negotiate among
different discourses. The contestation of various discourses poses a challenging
question for cultural studies scholars who examine the role that culture plays in
shaping particular social events and in intersecting power with culture in a variety
of social contexts. If cultural studies is not simply about the study of culture but
about the politics of cultures, then we should study “how power works where
people live their lives,” in Meaghan Morris’ words.34 In several chapters, I
attempted to situate concrete concerns in the materiality of peoples’ lives,
limitations, and aspirations, especially as these people responded to economic
arrangements, emotional structures, and cultural discourses35 within the broad,
complex webs of power relations forming the domestic, national, and international
spheres.
If we only keep on criticizing certain government policies or certain
corporate acts in a particular way without understanding people’s diverse opinions,
as in Disney-focused criticism that polarizes without accounting for the majority of
Hong Kong people’s ambivalence toward HKDL, then our characterization of
“reality” does an injustice to these different views and to itself. In short, by
dismissing views as irrelevant or as misled, our struggle may also tarnish our ideal
for an open and pluralistic society.
My study on the establishment, the operation, and the consumption
activities of Hong Kong Disneyland constitutes only a starting point from which
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researchers (1) can integrate cultural perspectives into any number of allegedly
revitalizing projects such as HKDL, (2) can understand people’s different views
and uses of Disney’s Hong Kong offerings in relation to the local-global
framework of Hong Kong’s political handover, and (3) can examine the HKDL
project’s cultural and political effects on Hong Kong people’s citizenship rights
and on Hong Kong people’s encounters with diverse cultures.
My study is far from exhaustive in that many of my respondents—be they
reporters, media producers, Disney and HKDL consumers, or HKDL workers—
had attained a tertiary education: strong contrasts may characterize the opinions
held by people of different classes. In my examination of HKDL as a work place,
I did not collect information from managers or from senior-ranking officers. In
this regard, I do not—and indeed cannot—assert that my study offers a
comprehensive understanding of HKDL management policy. Also, the lack of
information supplied from HKDL public relations officers and from higherranking HKDL staff means that my study lacks sufficient pluralism, although this
“lack” is simultaneously a structural feature of Disney’s operations in Hong Kong.
One of my study’s strengths is another setback: my focus on respondents’
diverse cultural understandings both of Hong Kong as a city and of some Hong
Kong people’s behavior. My research opens little space in which respondents
could creatively imagine what Hong Kong society and Hong Kong people should
be like or become in the future. In the case of Disneyland, I seldom conducted
research on people’s diverse visions of what an ideal park should be. Yet as I
have been working on the final draft of this thesis, workers have been dredging
mud and sand every day at the Phase II reclamation site of Penny’s Bay: sixty
new hectares of land will be in existence by 2009.36 If the Hong Kong
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government is going to build another park on this land, then the governmentDisney joint-venture company (the Hong Kong International Theme Park
Company, HKITP) has the right to buy the Phase II site at any time during the
twenty years following HKDL’s 2005 opening.37 The government also expects
that upon completion of Phases I and II, Penny’s Bay will have two private theme
parks, five resort hotels, and 74,400 square meters of rentable retail, dining, and
entertainment complexes.38
Is the above-mentioned development our ideal development of Penny’s
Bay? Do we still want to spend millions from the public coffers to build a private
park for some vague economic promise whose proclaimed future effects are
speculative at best? Can we foresee no project better than a private park that has
no obligation to address community needs and concerns? Do we still want to
struggle with Disney’s non-transparent management practice, which hides from
us—the common shareholders—the park’s profits and the park’s losses? Do we
want to build another park over whose master-planning neither the people nor the
biggest shareholder—the government—exercises respectable power? To answer
these questions, we should not rely chiefly on opinion surveys, which cannot
promote critical pluralistic culture or participatory democracy; Hong Kong
Disneyland cannot be called the people’s park, not because of its foreign or
American characteristics but because of the publicly funded park’s reinforcement
of the HKSAR government’s undemocratic governance and because of the
publicly funded park’s private operation, which excludes public participation. In
the midst of urban redevelopment and suburban development, scholars should
conduct further research to work out different plans for building up a place-
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based39 inclusive park that respects citizens’ rights, voices, and differences.
People’s participation, after all, is the basis of cultural citizenship and democracy.
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Hong Kong Disneyland
Penny’s Bay, Lantau Island, HK
Wing Yee Choi
Kwan Fong Cultural Research & Development Programme (KFCRD)
Room 320, B. Y. Lam Building
Lingnan University
8 Castle Peak Rd
Tuen Mun NT
2 October 2006

Dear Ms Chu:
Subject: Invitation for an Interview
I am a Junior Research Associate at Lingnan University. My research is about the
development of Hong Kong Disneyland and its localization process.
There is a consensus that Disneyland theme park has been unique in popular culture
phenomenon. The Disney Magic has been wide-reaching for over 50 years and it
continues to attract audience not only in America but also worldwide. Disney’s
transnational success has made it a global model for service and management culture.
Terms such as “Disneyfied” and “Disney version” are invented to describe Disney’s
enormous influence.
My research is concerned with cultural globalization – how transnational companies
localize their offerings by adapting to local tastes and how local consumers appropriate
transnational offerings for their own use. In my thesis I investigate how local families
interpret Disney characters and movies, using Disney merchandise in their daily lives to
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realize a particular type of good life. Further, I try to examine how Hong Kong
Disneyland adapts to local tastes by modifying its park design; for example, by consulting
feng shui, establishing Fantasy Gardens for photo-taking, and providing a wide variety of
Asian cuisine inside the park.
It is bound to be challenging to plant a US cultural and corporate institution in
Chinese territory, especially when it is a theme park project involving Hong Kong $23
billion. As a new organization in Hong Kong, Hong Kong Disneyland anticipated and
experienced cultural challenges from locals, visitors and the media, yet the park continually
makes itself attractive and culturally sensitive. Therefore, to present a balanced view of
these issues in my dissertation, I would like to interview Hong Kong Disneyland about
how the park has adapted to local play culture, work culture and media culture. Since my
research is exclusively about how global culture localizes, an interview with the company
would be indispensable and invaluable to my understanding of the complicated decisions
that global companies face.
My research is the first serious, academic project on the localization of Disney culture
in Hong Kong. I sincerely wish and hope that the company might grant me an interview
chance.
My correspondence address, phone number, fax number and email address are as
follows:
Address:

Kwan Fong Cultural Research & Development Programme
(KFCRD), Room 320, B. Y. Lam Building, 8 Castle Peak Road, Fu
Tei, Tun Mun, Hong Kong.

Phone number:

91XX 44XX

Fax number:

25XX 51XX

Email address:

choiwy@ln.edu.hk

Best regards,

Wing Yee Choi
Junior Research Associate
KFCRD, LU

424

Appendix 2

June 10, 2005
Major Ian Swan,
Educational Services Secretary,
Educational Services Department,
The Salvation Army Hong Kong and Macau Command.

Dear Major Swan,
I am an instructor working in the City University of Hong Kong and a PhD
candidate doing research at the Lingnan University of Hong Kong. I sincerely
hope that you can grant me a visit of your school, to observe students’ behavior
when they play, and to talk to them about their favorite leisure activities.
My research is about the about the intricate relation between globalization process
and local appropriations. My focus is on the setup of Disneyland Hong Kong and
the cultural effects of the global circulation of Disney merchandize in our local
lives, especially in the domestic sphere. There is always a strong association
between Disney, childhood, and family. Part of my research is about how Disney
and its transmedia products insert into our lives and how parents make use of
Disney toys and edutainment merchandize to build up intimate relationship with
their children and to develop children’s personality.
Since peer groups have great influence on children’s favorites and personality
development, I would very much like to go to a kindergarten school to observe and
experience how children play with each other in a school setting, to talk to them to
see how their favorites (toys, characters, TV programs) have been influenced by
their peers, and how they interpret their favorite Disney movies and characters.
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I have already done several case studies and the findings have been presented in an
international conference “Crossroads 2004 in Cultural Studies” held in the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, titled “Disney, Hong Kong families,
and the formation of children’s subjectivities.” My research focus on the local
appropriation of the global offerings receives major academic attention in the UK
and USA, but has been relatively neglected in Hong Kong until recently. My
research is indeed the first of its kind locally. The substance of the study would be
tremendously enhanced if you can grant me a chance to visit your school and to talk
to your students.
My correspondence address and phone number are as follows:
Address:

Phone no.:

Department of Cultural Studies,
Lingnan University,
Tuen Mun, Hong Kong.
91XX 44XX

Attached please find a copy of the Crossroads 2004 conference abstract for your
reference. If you have any questions on the research, please feel free to contact
me.

Yours sincerely,

Kimburley Choi
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